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Could a work of revelation justify itself today as  viable theological project?  The 
question is imperative especially when sceptics have questioned the validity of 
revelation as a doctrinal discipline.  Colin Gunton traces the modern difficulty with 
revelation to the influence of Hegel in giving rise to immediacy, and suggests that 
attention should be given to mediation.  It is in this light we argue that the 
distinctiveness of Thomas F. Torrance’s theology of revelation and mediation is able 
to contribute significantly to the debate and bring a fresh breeze to the theological 
landscape laden with a sense of revelation-weariness.  
 
Principally we are making two claims.  First, divine self-disclosure in Torrance’s 
theological scheme instead of immediacy is the mediation of God in Jesus Christ.  It 
is through the Mediator who bridges between God andhumanity that the self-
revelation of God is finally and fully mediated, and the normative pattern of the union 
and communion of divine and human action of revelation and mediation is set.  We 
would argue that dualism is, to Torrance, the threat to Christ’s revelation and 
mediation, and the way of surmounting is to return to the scientific realism of 
understanding God appropriately in accordance with the compulsive nature of his 
self-disclosure.    
 
Our discussion of Torrance’s pneumatology and multiple mediations involves the 
second claim.  Notwithstanding the intent to uphold the primacy of scriptural 
mediation, we argue that Torrance, in responding to dualistic peril, has made the 
unusual move to advocate the effacement of scripture in revelation.  Such move is 
unjustifiable as it has adverse repercussion not only f r the mediation of scripture, but 
other media of revelation as well.  The move has subtly gravitated revelation from 
mediation to immediacy and subverted Torrance’s theological framework.  What is 
required of Torrance to overcome the dualistic tension, as we claim in the discussion 
of the church, Word and sacraments, and contingent cr ation as media of revelation, 
is to remain in line with the normative pattern of revelation and mediation which he 
has built upon the foundation of the Mediator.  Essentially revelation in Torrance’s 
scheme is the mediation of God’s self-disclosure in Christ, and the continuous 
unfolding of that revelation by the conjoint work of the divine and the human through 
multiple mediations in human history.  Finally, we ould engage Paul Tillich and 
Colin Gunton in providing Torrance with alternatives that affirm the validity of 
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Could a work of revelation justify itself today as  viable theological project after 
question about the validity of revelation as a doctrinal discipline is raised by F. G. 
Downing in, as the title conspicuously suggests, Has Christianity a Revelation?1  
Downing is not alone in casting the doubt.  Ronald Thiemann pinpoints that scholars, 
among others, such as James Barr, David Kelsey and Gordon Kaufman have 
reverberated the query, in one way or another.2  The sceptical voices may be 
construed as representative response to the failure of the discussion of revelation, 
which dominates theology mainly from the 1920s to the 1960s, in providing clear 
understanding with regard to the nature and possibility of the discipline.  This is the 
period that, according to Thiemann, has given rise to a sense of ‘revelation-
weariness’ over the discussion in the theological landscape.3   
The problem of clarity, however, is not merely a modern symptom.  The 
difficulty can be traced back to the era of Reformation when major differences about 
how Christianity is to be perceived as a revealed religion emerge between Catholic 
and Protestant.  The matter is complex for the differences, as Colin Gunton claims, do 
not restrict to beliefs about the nature of scripture and tradition, they concern as well 
‘a far less easily formulable question about the nature of revelation according to 
Christianity, and its relation to its sources.’4  The problem compounds during the 
Enlightenment when revelation is displaced by reason, when reason becomes the yard 
to measure the historical basis of Christianity and query the epistemological 
foundation of faith.  On this note, Hegel, in perceiving reason as the dynamic self-
revelation of God, regards Christianity as the revealed religion and thus engenders the 
programme of appropriating revelation as a form of immediacy that eventually paths 
the way for future developments.  The immense contribution of Hegel, nevertheless, 
is as well one of the main causes of modern difficulty with revelation.  According to 
Gunton, ‘Since Hegel’s time, theology has been dominated by quests for different 
forms of immediacy, and that, I believe, is one root f our modern discomfort with 
                                               
1 F. Gerald Downing, Has Christianity a Revelation? (London: SCM 1964). 
2 Ronald F. Thiemann, Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 1985), 2-3.  See James Barr, Old and New in Interpretation (London: SCM, 
1966), 65-102; James Barr, The Bible in the Modern World (London: SCM, 1973); David H. Kelsey, 
The Use of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975); Gordon Kaufman, A  Essay 
on Theological Method (Missoula: Scholars, 1979). 
3 Ibid., 1. 
4 Colin Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 2. 
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question of a revealed religion.  The [biblical] notion of a revealed religion… has 
been replaced by different forms of immediacy.’5   
 If Gunton’s account is acceptable, the nineteenth-century quest of biblical 
criticism could be read as a form of immediacy as the movement seeks to attain the 
direct knowing of God independent of tradition.  The post-modern pursuit of biblical 
narrative is another example, as the accentuation that the constitution of the reader is 
shaped by the retelling of the story is achieved at the expense of the relation between 
word and reality.  The period between the two, the p ase Thiemann regards as 
leading the discipline into the blind alley,6 cannot be spared of the influence either.  
In alluding to John Baillie who claims in contrast to the past that modern theology 
has come to understand revelation as God revealing himself, Gunton believes it is 
another form of immediacy.7  Rudolf Bultmann is clearly the theologian of existential 
immediacy to Gunton.  The question is would Karl Barth be regarded as another?  
Gunton, in making a controversial criticism, says, ‘Barth’s insistence that God is 
revealed through God, he [Alan Spence] argues, detracts from the incarnational and 
pneumatological mediation of revelation.’  ‘Even if we concede to Barth the rejoinder 
he could make that revelation is mediated by the humanity of Christ, we can continue 
to hold against him that the humanity is in some way given short measure, so that the 
mediatedness of revelation, given with the right hand, is in effect taken away by the 
left.’8  Arguably there is ground for Gunton’s claim.  However, if the conclusion is 
suggestive of the model of God-reveals-Godself as another form of immediacy, we 
may diverge slightly from Gunton as here, we claim, is where the distinctiveness of 
Thomas F. Torrance could manifestly be found. 
It would be superfluous to add anything to the accolade of Alister McGrath 
that regards Torrance ‘as the most significant British academic theologian of the 
twentieth century’.9  Torrance’s contribution indeed has been remarkable; especially, 
among others, his massive oeuvre of theological works ranging from the important 
field of science to theology.10  As the student of Barth and someone who self-
                                               
5 Ibid., 3-4. 
6 Thiemann, 1. 
7 Gunton, 7.  Cf., John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1956), 55-56. 
8 Ibid., 5.  Cf., Alan Spence, ‘Christ's Humanity and Ours,’ in Persons, Divine and Human: King's 
College Essays in Theological Anthropology, ed. Christoph Schwöbel and Colin Gunton (Edinburgh: T 
& T Clark, 1992), 89. 
9 Alister E. McGrath, Thomas F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 
xi. 
10 Torrance has authored, edited or translated more than 360 pieces of work by the time of his 
retirement, and another 250 more after that.  See McGrath, xi.   
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professes to have built upon the theological foundation of his teacher,11 Torrance is 
not the ordinary ‘Barthian’ of regurgitation.12  As Gunton rightly recognises God-
reveals-Godself as the hallmark of Barth’s theology f revelation, so it is of Torrance 
but without the difficulties as indicated, or, at least, working to rectify them.  That is 
to say, and we would suggest, Torrance’s divine self-disclosure is to be read as the 
endeavour to articulate a theology of revelation and mediation centred on the 
incarnate Son Jesus Christ as the sole Mediator who reveals and mediates the Father 
to humanity by the Spirit; the human person of Christ is underpinned as the 
cornerstone of the normative pattern of revelation and mediation, and the work of the 
Spirit is given a far greater role beyond the subjectivity of the knower.  The emphasis 
of mediation is not inadvertent but worked out with the intent to develop a theology 
of revelation and multiple mediations that views scripture, church, Word and 
sacraments, and contingent creation as the media of divine revelation.  The anchorage 
of Torrance’s argument is to be found primarily in the normativeness of the union and 
communion of divine and human action that is derivative of the hypostatic union of 
Christ.  That is to say, the mediation of revelation is achieved by the conjoint effort of 
the divine and the human.  On this note, theological s ience as the human action of 
scientific inquiry locates its indispensable and rightful place in Torrance’s total 
interconnected scheme.  Here is the distinctiveness of Torrance: God-reveals-Godself 
is the collapse of revelation and mediation in the M diator.  The inseparability of 
revelation and mediation in Jesus Christ is the jewel of Torrance’s theology that is 
able to find the place of some illumination particularly when the discussion of 
revelation is currently having a bewildering time.   
Yet, surprisingly, in the light that revelation is not an unfamiliar theme to the 
readers of Torrance, this aspect of his thought seem  to attract less attention than it 
deserves.  One main reason could possibly be that Torrance, in his whole academic 
career, has contributed substantially in various disciplines of scholarly discussion 
ranging vastly from patristic to modern theology, and from theology to science.  As 
                                               
11 TCFK, vii.  Torrance says that his theological works ‘have arisen out of a sustained engagement 
with the tension between Christian theology, as it has been renewed directly or indirectly through the 
great work of Barth, and the general frame of thougt that has dominated Europe culture for several 
hundred years.’ 
12 Whether Torrance should be called a Barthian is an issue of debate.  For example, Richard Gelwick 
claims that as a mature theologian he has moved beyond Barth.  McGrath, Weightman and Langford 
however believe that Torrance’s work is the further r finement of the methodology of Barth’s 
theology.  See Richard Gelwick, Review: ‘Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of 
Knowledge,’ Journal of the American Academy of Religion 54 (1986): 198; McGrath, 133-40; Colin 
Weightman, Theology in a Polanyian Universe: The Theology of Thomas Torrance (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1994), 132; Thomas A. Langford, ‘T. F. Torrance's Theological Science: A Reaction,’ Scottish 
Journal of Theology 25 (1972): 155. 
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his diverse works are influential and have aroused ignificant responses not only in 
the United Kingdom but more so in the United States and areas in Southeast Asia, 
studies of them have often been led to different focuses.  A quick overview of some 
academic works on Torrance in recent decades would ill minate the diversity and 
perhaps ably explain the ‘neglect’.  One of the earli st doctoral theses is 
accomplished by Gray who attempts to explore Torrance’s understanding of theology 
as a discipline of science.13  Sansom adopts similar approach in his work and focuses 
more on the methodological aspect of Torrance’s discourse.14  Trook looks into 
Torrance’s arguments of the correlation between science and theology, and seeks to 
examine the interrelatedness that connects the disciplines.15  The importance of 
Torrance’s Christology is taken up by Yeung in Being and Knowing.16  The work 
analyses the implications of the doctrine of Christ in human knowing of the triune 
God and science.  Richardson has done a thorough stdy on Torrance’s appropriation 
of science, particularly the realism of Einsteinian science, in explicating the ultimate 
trinitarian reality.17  Torrance’s use of Einstein in theology is once more examined by 
Wong.18  Spjuth approaches Torrance with the framework of the doctrine of creation.  
He has done exemplary work in comparing Torrance with Eberhard Jüngel and 
brought to light the significant influence of Barth on both of them.19  Weightman’s 
thesis aims at the contribution of Polanyi on Torrance’s theological science.20  
Martin, in comparing Torrance with Polanyi, explores the incarnational basis of 
Christian education.21  Simmons in his research has addressed Torrance’s 
christological exploration of science through semantic studies.22  Luoma’s detailed 
                                               
13 Bryan J. A. Gray, ‘Thesis: Theology as Science: An Examination of the Theological Methodology 
of Thomas F. Torrance’ (Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1975). 
14 Dennis Lee Sansom, ‘Thesis: Scientific Theology: An Examination of the Methodology of Thomas 
Forsyth Torrance’ (Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1981). 
15 Douglas Alan Trook, ‘Thesis: The Unified Christocentric Field: Toward a Time-Eternal Relativity 
Model for Theological Hermeneutics in the onto-Relational Theology of Thomas F. Torrance’ (The 
University of Drew, 1986). 
16 H. K. Yeung, Being and Knowing: An Examination of T.F. Torrance's Christological Science. 
(Hong Kong: Alliance Bible Seminary, 1996). 
17 Kurt A. Richardson, ‘Thesis: Trinitarian Reality: The Interrelation of Uncreated and Created Being 
in the Thought of Thomas F. Torrance’ (University of Basel, 1993). 
18 W. H. Wong, ‘Thesis: An Appraisal of the Interpretation of Einsteinian Physics in T.F. Torrance's 
Scientific Theology’ (The University of Aberdeen, 1994). 
19 Roland Spjuth, Creation, Contingency and Divine Presence in the Thologies of Thomas F. 
Torrance and Eberhard Jüngel (Lund: Lund University Press, 1995). 
20 Colin Weightman, Theology in a Polanyian Universe: The Theology of Thomas Torrance (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1994). 
21 Robert Keith Martin, ‘Thesis: The Incarnate Ground of Christian Education: The Integration of 
Epistemology and Ontology in the Thought of Michael Polanyi and Thomas F. Torrance’ (Princeton 
Theological Seminary, 1995). 
22 Stephen Arthur Simmons, ‘Thesis: The Semantics of God and Nature in the Writings of Thomas F. 
Torrance’ (The University of Chicago, 1995). 
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work bestows homoousion the central focus of Torrance’s understanding of the
relation between theology and science.23 
The above projects in one way or another concentrate on the interrelation 
between science and theology in Torrance’s corpus.  There are, however, other works 
which pay more attention to matters of dogma and theology.  For example, Kang 
gives a thorough discussion on Torrance’s profound erstanding of the significance 
of the vicarious humanity of Christ.24  Stamps analyses the relation between the 
Eucharist and incarnation, and presents an interesting aspect of Torrance’s 
sacramental theology within the framework of Calvin.25  Brondos works on the 
reconciliatory nature of Christ and the significance of atonement in Torrance’s 
scheme.26  Lucas, in comparing Torrance with Balthasar, analyses the doctrine of 
personhood.27  The theme of personhood is again looked into by Bevan in the context 
of post-modern era.28  Torrance’s discourse of the nature and work of the Spirit in 
relation to the triune Godhead is examined by Shin.29  Redding examines the relation 
between the priestly ministry of Christ and prayer in Torrance’ theological 
framework and sets it within the eucharistic tradition of the Church of Scotland.30  
The theme of union with Christ is taken up, although rather differently, by Rankin 
and Kye.  Rankin develops his work by mainly focusing on Torrance’s Auburn and 
New College lecture notes.31  Kye gives a much complete and well-structured 
account of Torrance’s thought on the topic that could serve as a fine secondary 
literature.32 
                                               
23 Tapio Luoma, Incarnation and Physics: Natural Science in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance 
(New York: Oxford, 2002). 
24 P. S. Kang, ‘Thesis: The Concept of the Vicarious Humanity of Christ in the Theology of Thomas 
Forsyth Torrance’ (The University of Aberdeen, 1983). 
25 Robert Julian Stamps, ‘The Sacrament of the Word Made Flesh: The Eucharistic Theology of 
Thomas F. Torrance’ (St John's College, 1986). 
26 D. A. Brondos, ‘Thesis: Jesus Christ the Living Reconciliation: A Transformational Model of 
Atonement’ (King's College, 1996). 
27 R.H. Lucas, ‘Thesis: The Whole Christ for the Whole Person: A Comparative and Critical Study of 
the Doctrine of Personhood in Hans Urs Von Balthasar nd the Doctrine of Sanctification in T. F. 
Torrance in Light of Their Trinitarian Theology’ (The University of Aberdeen, 1997). 
28 A. M. Bevan, ‘Thesis: The Person of Christ and the Nature of Human Participation in the Theology 
of T.F. Torrance: A Post-Modern Realist Approach to Personhood’ (The University of London, 2002). 
29 M-C. Shin, ‘Thesis: A Dialogical Trinitarian Pneumatology: A Critical Appraisal of Contemporary 
Pneumatological Discourse in the Light of Torrance's Trinitarian Theology’ (The University of 
Aberdeen, 1997). 
30 G. E. Redding, ‘Thesis: The Significance of the Priesthood of Christ for a Theology of Prayer in the 
Reformed Tradition, with Reference to T.F and J.B. Torrance, and the Eucharistic Tradition of the 
Church of Scotland’ (King's College, 1999). 
31 William Duncan Rankin, ‘Thesis: Carnal Union with Christ in the Theology of T.F. Torrance’ (The 
University of Edinburgh, 1997). 
32 Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2003). 
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A few works that are related to the subject of our concern have to be 
mentioned.  Guthridge has worked on Torrance’s Christology with the frame of 
revelation and reconciliation.  Although revelation is discussed, the main concern of 
Guthridge, and rightly so, is Torrance’s insight of Christology.  In addition, as the 
work is done in 1967, it is therefore deprived of Trrance’s later important works.33  
McPake’s research on the reception of Barth in Scotland does make reference to 
Torrance’s concept of God’s self-revelation.34  Morrison gives a meticulous and 
substantive account of Torrance’s knowledge of God by underscoring the importance 
of epistemological realism.35  McPake and Morrison although deal with Torrance’s 
revelation, due to their main focuses, they, like Guthridge, are unable to give it the 
centre-stage; the theme of revelation and mediation, and the critical relation between 
them in Torrance’s profound thought fail to shine.  Perhaps, among all, Kruger’s 
project comes closest to the subject in question.  I  Participation in the Self-
Knowledge of God: The Nature and Means of Our Knowledge of God in the Theology 
of T. F. Torrance, Kruger explores Torrance’s understanding of our knowledge of 
God in Christ by the Spirit.  Kruger aims to argue that in Torrance’s scheme our 
knowledge of God lies primarily in our participation in God’s self-knowing.  Such 
knowledge is chiefly communicated through the earthly means of scripture, 
sacraments and church.  However, as the title suggets, the main focus on 
participation in the self-knowledge of God excludes r velation and critical issues of 
immediacy and mediation from the main menu.  Due to the ‘neglect’, Torrance’s 
theological science and discussion of scientific inqu ry as human participation in the 
knowledge of God are given less than little attention, and the quintessential discourse 
of the contingent creation as the crucial medium in mediating our knowing of God is 
left without mentioning.  In addition, Torrance’s subtle yet sophisticated rhetoric of 
the dynamic of the union and communion of divine and human action of revelation 
and mediation remains very much to be unearthed.  Having said that it is in no way to 
discredit Kruger’s effort, as his work remains unquestionably as one of the most 
useful reference materials.  But the work, like the above projects mentioned, involves 
to certain extent the discussion of revelation and yet subordinates it to the main thrust 
                                               
33 Joannes Guthridge S.J., ‘Thesis: The Christology of T. F. Torrance: Revelation and Reconciliation 
in Christ’ (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1967). 
34 J. L. McPake, ‘Thesis: H. R. Mackintosh, T. F. Torrance and the Reception of the Theology of Karl 
Barth in Scotland---with Particular Reference to the Concept of the Self-Revelation of God’ (The 
University of Edinburgh, 1994). 
35 John D. Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth 
Torrance (New York: Peter Lang, 1997). 
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of the thesis, fails to engage the problems that Gunton has acutely pinpointed.  Thus, 
with the notion that a work is yet to be fully committed to Torrance’s revelation and 
mediation, we believe a project of such nature could j stify its valid place in the on 
going research of Torrance that is increasingly gaining greater momentum.  It is with 
this intent that the present project is undertaken, and rudimentary steps are made to 
embark on a journey of academic expedition. 
Principally we endeavour to make two claims.  First, divine self-disclosure in 
Torrance’s theological scheme instead of immediacy is the mediation of the incarnate 
Son of God Jesus Christ.  It is through the Mediator who bridges between God and 
humanity that the self-revelation of God is finally and fully mediated, and the 
normative pattern of the union and communion of divine and human action of 
revelation and mediation---of which God in Christ by the dynamic work of the Spirit 
is revealed continuously in human history through multiple mediations---is set.  Thus, 
in the first three chapters that constitute part one f the thesis, our chief focus is to 
analyse Torrance’s thought on Jesus Christ as God’s revelation and mediation.  
Chapter one would examine Torrance’s understanding of the nature and fulfilment of 
Christ as the two-way movement of God’s revelation and mediation.  Through the 
mediation of Israel and ultimately has its foundation n the hypostatic union of Christ, 
we would argue that Torrance’s thought on the normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation as the conjoint action of the divine and the human in union and 
communion is unfolded.  We turn to what Torrance perceives to be the threat to 
God’s revelation and mediation in chapter two, the detriment of dualism.  We attempt 
to show that Arian dualism and Newtonian dualism according to Torrance relegate 
divine self-disclosure by separating God from the cr ated world irreconcilably.  As 
the main problem of dualism lies in approaching divine revelation and mediation 
from the standpoint of humanity separating erroneously the knowing from the being 
of God, we suggest Torrance’s postulation of theological science that takes 
cognisance of the realism of Einsteinian-Polanyian science is to be read as the repair 
of the damage.  Thus, chapter three would focus on T rrance’s understanding of 
scientific inquiry as the appropriate human action because it is carried out 
responsively in accordance with the nature of Christ’s revelation and mediation.   
Theological science as the apposite human action of the normative pattern of 
revelation and mediation leads the discussion into the second part of the thesis that 
pivots on Torrance’s arguments of the work of the Spirit and multiple mediations.  
Chapter four aims at the pneumatology of Torrance.  It would examine firstly the 
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essentiality of the communion of the Spirit as the divine action of bringing humanity 
to God in Christ, and secondly the importance of the epistemic dynamic of the Spirit 
in enabling the mediation of divine revelation by the correlation of our rational 
knowing with God’s objective being through media of created existence. 
Our discussion of Torrance’s multiple mediations in chapter five and six 
involves the second claim of the thesis.  We would, in the analysis of Torrance’s 
understanding of the normative status of scripture in chapter five, claim that 
notwithstanding the intent to uphold the mediatory nature, his unexpected advocacy 
of the effacement of scripture (after it has served its function of mediation) has 
adverse repercussion not only for the mediatedness of scripture, it has also 
unknowingly gravitated revelation from mediation toimmediacy.  We would 
critically examine the nature and cause of the advocacy, and ascertain the severe 
ramifications the shift to immediacy entails.  We would argue that the move of 
effacing scripture is both unjustifiable and unnecessary because it is not only at odds 
with his explication of the importance of multiple mediations, it also cuts against the 
grain of the normative pattern of the union and communion of divine and human 
action of revelation and mediation.  It fundamentally subverts Torrance’s theology of 
revelation and mediation.  What is required of Torrance in this regard, as our 
examinations of his discourse of the church, Word an sacraments, and contingent 
creation as the ordained media of divine self-disclosure in chapter six would argue, is 
to remain in line with the normative pattern of revelation and mediation which he has 
built upon the foundation of the Mediator.  The upshot of our argument essentially is 
that revelation in Torrance’s theological scheme is pr ncipally the mediation of God’s 
self-disclosure achieved in Jesus Christ, and the continuous unfolding of that which 
Christ has achieved in human history by the dynamic work of the Spirit and the 
scientific participation of humanity through media of created existence of which God 
has ordained.   
Finally, apart from recapitulating the main arguments, we would, in the 
conclusion of the thesis through a brief dialogue with Tillich and Gunton, provide 
Torrance with alternatives that affirm the mediatedn ss of scripture.  Tillich and 
Gunton are selected because of their contrasting theological position in relation to 
Torrance, and also they belong to the same historical era.  Tillich’s insight of the 
revelatory role of religious symbol and Gunton’s view of propositional revelation 
would be able to give Torrance some impetus to reconsider the unnecessary move.  
Their arguments would be, at least, food for thought. 
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To end we would state that the purpose of this work is to examine Torrance’s 
theology of revelation and mediation.  The thesis would proceed by appropriating the 
method of systematic analysis.  With the intent to unfold the vision of Torrance, to 
engage him within his arguments that are embedded in his enormous corpus so to 
appreciate the beauty of architectonic interconnectedness and to sieve through the 
problematics, little attention would be paid to thecontext and historical development 
of his thought.  The fact is, as McGrath and Kye point ut, Torrance is remarkably 
coherent and consistent in his theological articulation throughout his research life.36  
 
 
                                               





The Mediation of Christ 
 
 
Chapter one, as part one of the thesis, aims at Torrance’s thought on Jesus Christ as 
the revelation and mediation of God.  The task of the chapter is twofold.  First, it 
attempts to examine Torrance’s claim that Jesus Christ is the sole Mediator of God, 
and it is in and through him that one locates the fulfilment of divine revelation and 
mediation.  We will begin our analysis first by discu sing the mediation of Israel.  We 
intend to argue that as Israel to Torrance is the womb of the incarnation it is through 
her that the normative pattern of divine revelation and mediation is grounded, as it 
awaits its fulfilment in the coming of the Son of God.  We will proceed to discuss 
Torrance’s understanding of the nature of the Word made flesh. We attempt to 
demonstrate that the concept of hypostatic union becom s for Torrance the 
undergirding principle to articulate Christ as the epitome of the union and 
communion of divine and human action, and in him the two-way movement of the 
normative pattern of revelation and mediation finds its fulfilment.  Second, in our 
analysis of the mediation of Israel we would argue that Torrance indeed possesses a 
rich understanding of multiple mediations.  The argument is meant to be an 
anticipation of a fuller study especially when we come to chapter five and six of the 
thesis.  It nevertheless serves to prepare the stage and demonstrate the theological 
thrust of Torrance with regard to the importance of multiple mediations and the 
indispensability of the media of divine revelation. 
 
 
The Mediation of Israel 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine Torrance’s thought on the nature of Israel’s 
mediation.  We would argue that by appropriating the analogy of ‘tool’, Torrance 
develops implicitly the concept of multiple mediations and underpins the importance 
of the unity of the form and being of the media in d vine mediation.  Through the 
analysis of the two-way movement of revelation constituted within the covenantal 
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relation between God and Israel, we attempt to establi h the essentiality of the union 
and communion of divine and human action in revelation and mediation.  Finally, as 
the embodiment of divine revelation, we would argue that the media assume an 
indispensable place in Torrance’s theology of revelation and mediation that cannot be 
discarded, relegated or taken lightly. 
Frederick the Great of Germany once asked his private doctor this question. 
‘Zimmermann, can you give me a single proof of the existence of God?’  Dr. 
Zimmermann replied, ‘Your Majesty, the Jews!’1  The reply to Torrance is not 
merely about the proof of God’s existence.  More importantly it is about the great 
mystery of God especially in relation to his wonderful providence in the world.  The 
persistent existence of the Jews testifies to the intent and act of God in the world.  It 
is God’s deliberate work to set ‘the Jews before us even to-day in order to teach us 
something that we cannot learn in any other way.’2  To Torrance the selection of 
Israel by God underlines the singular purpose of mediating God’s self-revelation in 
the world in order that the salvation of humanity is made possible through the later 
coming of the incarnate Son of God, Jesus Christ.  Torrance says, ‘In his desire to 
reveal himself and make himself knowable to mankind, he selected one small race out 
of the whole mass of humanity, and subjected it to ntensive interaction and dialogue 
with him in such a way that he might mould and shape this people in the service of 
his self-revelation’,3 and ‘out of the womb of Israel, Jesus---the Jew from Nazareth.’4  
If God may be known through the Jews, the question inevitably is ‘How is it 
possible…?’5  It is a question about the nature of mediation; about the characteristic 
of Israel being the medium of God’s self-disclosure in human history.  To answer the 
question, Torrance uses ‘tool’ as an analogy.  He asks, ‘What are the tools we need in 
order to grasp the content of divine revelation?’6  Torrance continues, 
 
                                               
1 Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Salvation is of the Jews,’ Evangelical Quarterly 22 (1950): 164.  Torrance 
cites the illustration from Barth’s Dogmatics in Outline, 72ff.  Torrance regards the existence of the 
Jews as an astonishing miracle.  He says that by all the laws of geography, history and ethnography, 
Israel ought to have been swallowed up in the ocean of humanity and to have disappeared along with 
the Amalekites, the Moabites, and all the other peoples of the ancient days. 
2 Ibid. 
3 MC, 7. 
4 ‘Salvation is of the Jews’, 167.  Author’s italic.  The concept of Israel as the womb of the incarnatio  
is significant in Torrance’s understanding of the role Israel plays in mediating God’s self-revelation.  
He says, ‘God had adapted Israel to His purpose in such a way as to form within it a womb for the 
incarnation of the Word and a matrix of appropriate forms of human thought and speech for the 
reception of the incarnational revelation.’  See GR, 149; RET, 87.  
5 Ibid. 
6 MC, 5. 
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What I have in mind here are not physical or electronic tools but conceptual tools.  
Really to get to know something we need to find the appropriate way in which to 
grasp it and shape what we grasp in mind---that is to ay, what we need are adequate 
modes of thought and speech.  The need for conceptual tools of this kind is 
particularly pressing when we have to do with something radically new which we 
cannot understand by assimilating it into the framework of what we already know, 
and for which old patterns of thought and speech are not only inadequate but can 
prove quite false.  Quite new disclosures of nature require new modes of thought and 
speech to match them.  That is why again and again as scientific inquiry opens up 
new ground and quite unanticipated discoveries are made, it has to forge new mental 
instruments and invent new symbolic languages, and why if they are really matched 
to the hitherto unknown aspects of nature they open out the possibility of still further 
discovery.7 
  
 And,  
 
I believe that this applies no less to our knowledge of God.  If we are to know him 
and speak about him in a way that is appropriate to him, we need to have fitting 
modes of thought and speech, adequate conceptual forms and structures….  Let us 
consider God’s historical relations with the people of Israel in just this light.8 
 
The tools Torrance refers to are the matrix of ideas, concepts, categories, 
linguistic patterns, forms, structures and the whole f other human facilities that 
could be appropriated to articulate the ‘radically new’ encounter with God.9  To 
Torrance the uniqueness of Israel is that the matter of forging the appropriate tools 
does not fall solely on her although her participation is crucial and constitutive in the 
process.  It lies fully and finally in God who moulds out of Israel an appropriate 
matrix of articulation and expression that would serve the cause.  Using Jeremiah’s 
analogy to underline the necessary moulding process, Torrance says that it is like the 
‘potter at work with his clay, which is so apt here.  He takes a lump of clay, throws it 
down upon the potter’s wheel, and proceeds to rotate i  under the steady pressure of 
his figures until it is moulded into the kind of vess l suitable for his purpose.  But 
when the clay proves to be lumpy and recalcitrant he breaks it down and remoulds it 
in accordance with his design, and he does that again nd again until he has formed 
and fashioned a vessel to his liking which will serve his purpose well.’10  Torrance 
attempts to bring forth two points from the analogy.  He wants to underline the fact 
                                               
7 Ibid., 6.   
8 Ibid., 6-7.   
9 Ibid., 27-28.  The basic idea of the analogy of the ‘ ool’ as Kruger observes is to create a medium in 
human thought and understanding through which God could communicate himself to the human race.  
See C.B. Kruger, ‘Thesis: Participation in the Self-Knowledge of God: The Nature and Means of Our 
Knowledge of God in the Theology of T.F. Torrance’ (The University of Aberdeen, 1990), 47. 
10 Ibid., 7. 
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that human thought by its sinful nature is ‘unusable’ for the purpose of mediating 
divine revelation.  And the moulding process is painfully unavoidable if it is to 
become an appropriate medium of God’s revelation.  He says that through the 
historical struggles with God, ‘Israel teaches us, then, that divine revelation cuts 
against the grain of our naturalistic existence andcalls into question the naturalistic 
pattern of human thought.’11  However, the painstaking process of transformation is 
not in itself the end to Torrance.  What is important is at the end of the moulding 
there could emerge divinely ordained structures of th ught and speech through which 
God could mediate his self-revelation in human history.  Torrance says, ‘Among 
these permanent structures let me refer to the Word and Name of God, to revelation, 
mercy, truth, holiness, to messiah, saviour, to prophet, priest and king, father, son, 
servant, to covenant, sacrifice, forgiveness, reconciliation, redemption, atonement, 
and those basic patterns of worship which we find set out in the ancient liturgy or in 
the Psalms.’12  Torrance underlines that these structures of articulation and expression 
take formative form in the course of the history of Israel.  They ‘constitute the 
essential furniture of our knowledge of God even in and through Jesus.’13  Without 
them the significance of the incarnation of the Word ‘could not have been grasped---
Jesus himself would have remained a bewildering enima.’14  Torrance says,  
 
It was just because Jesus, born from above as he was, as nevertheless produced 
through the womb of Israel, mediated to us through the matrix of those conceptual 
and linguistic patterns, that he could be recognised as Son of God and Saviour and 
his crucifixion could be interpreted as atoning sacrifice for sin.  It was because God 
mediated his revelation to mankind in that patient, informing way through the history 
of Israel and within the interpretative framework of its relation with God in salvation 
and worship, that people were able in that context to know God in Jesus and enter 
into communion with him, and to proclaim him to theworld.15 
 
The importance of the mediatory patterns of articulation and expression, or 
the appropriate tools, which God has forged in Israel, cannot be undermined.  
Torrance asserts that they play a crucial role in our understanding of God’s self-
revelation in Jesus.  In order to substantiate his argument, Torrance draws our 
attention to some modern theology that fails to recognise the important mediatorial 
role these authoritative patterns play.  Torrance remarks, ‘We have tried to 
                                               
11 Ibid., 12. 
12 Ibid., 18. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 18-19. 
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understand Jesus within the patterns of our own various cultures so that in the West 
and the East we have steadily gentilised our image of Jesus.  We have tended to 
abstract Jesus from his setting in the context of Israel and its vicarious mission in 
regard to divine revelation….  That is to say, we detach patterns of thought from their 
embodiment in Israel as they presented in the Old Testament Scriptures, or even the 
New Testament, and then schematise them to our own culture….  It is not difficult, as 
Albert Schweitzer found, to show that, when we seek to interpret Jesus like that 
within the conditioning of our European culture, wein vitably lose him.’16  The point 
of Torrance is basic but important.  He is sounding a caution that in our attempt to 
make Jesus relevant to modern ways of thought, we are in fact obscuring him because 
the ‘tools’ that we are using are not of God’s choie.17  The truism to Torrance is 
there are no other ways except the media which God has ordained---the authoritative 
conceptual and linguistic structures forged in the istory of Israel---if our 
understanding of God’s self-revelation is to be authen ic. 
The importance of appropriating the right tools of c nceptual articulation and 
linguistic structure is manifest in Torrance’s thought.  If the ‘tools’ could be said to 
be the form, the being to Torrance is as important a matter in mediating divine 
revelation.  The crux is that the whole enterprise of revelation and mediation is not 
merely a business of cognition; it also involves, affects and transforms the whole life 
and being of Israel.  Torrance says that it ‘penetrat d human existence in the 
particular life and history of one people elected as the instrument for the actualisation 
of God’s revelation in humanity and separated as a holy nation in whose midst God 
dwelt in an intimated way through the presence of His Word.’18  In this regard, we 
would suggest, the form and being in Torrance’s mind are intrinsically related to one 
another, and they constitute the totality of mediation.  In order to have a better grasp 
of Torrance’s thought, the issue has to be looked at within the framework of 
covenantal relation between God and Israel.  As the current section concerns 
                                               
16 Ibid., 19. 
17 In fact Torrance says that we are plastering the face of Jesus with a mask of different gentile 
features.  The setback is we are preventing ourselve  from seeing and understanding him as who he 
really is as a Jew.  And by doing that we are also preventing the Jews from recognising Christ as the 
Messiah whom they are still expecting.  In addition, Torrance claims that the Jews could help us in our 
understanding of Jesus as he is actually presented i  the Jewish Scriptures.  He says, ‘We desperately 
need Jewish eyes to help to see what we cannot see because of our gentile lenses, that is, the cultural-
conditioned habits of thought and interpretation which we bring to Jesus and which make us read into 
him the kind of observational images which have played such a dominant role in our literary culture 
and, until recent decades, in our scientific culture as well.’  See MC, 19-20. 
18 RET, 86-87. 
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primarily the mediation of Israel, the limited compass forbids an exhaustive account 
of Torrance’s concept of covenant, except to briefly touch on the essential elements 
that are related to the discussion. 
Torrance accentuates that the covenant established between God and Israel 
testifies to the grace of God.19  Although the tedious process of forging the 
appropriate tools is an act of union and communion between divine initiation and 
Israel’s responsive participation, it is carried out within the sphere of covenantal 
relation that indubitably points to the grace of God.  The covenant is ‘the intimate 
structure of family relations’ of which God may ‘increasingly imprint himself upon 
the generations of Israel in such a way that it could become the instrument of his 
great purpose of revelation’.20  However, the selection and shaping of Israel within 
the covenantal relation is not the end in itself.  The intent of God is far from being 
restricted to the people of Israel.  To Torrance the covenantal relation between God 
and Israel is ‘the one covenant of grace which embraced the whole of creation and 
constituted its inner bond and ground, and therefore carried in it the promise of a final 
universalisation of God’s revelation in which His Word would bring light and 
salvation to all the peoples of mankind and indeed a new earth.’21  That is to say, 
within the covenantal framework, ‘[God] took Israel into his hands in this unique way 
in order to provide the actual means, a whole set of spiritual tools, appropriate forms 
of understanding, worship and expression, through which apprehension of God could 
be made accessible to human beings and knowledge of God could take root in the soil 
of humanity.’22  Thus, when becoming aware of the covenantal responsibility, 
Torrance claims that Israel constitutes into a worshipping community and opens 
herself towards God.  Torrance underlines that the same Word who is the Creator of 
all things is at work in Israel to create a corporate reciprocity and to use the responses 
it provokes as instruments for the deeper penetration into Israel’s existence and 
                                               
19 Torrance says that the keeping of the covenant does n t depend on the worth of Israel, but is 
‘conditioned by the pure out flowing love of God in the continuous act of grace, of grace for grace.’  
CAC1, 289. 
20 MC, 7. 
21 GR, 147.  Torrance says that the covenant embraces not only humanity but the whole of creation as 
well.  It is through the covenant that ‘the whole universe of creaturely existence, visible and invisible, 
is brought into a relation with God in which it is appointed to reflect His glory and be the sphere of His 
Revelation.’  Thus, there is a correspondence between the Creator and creation.  See SF, l-lv. 
22 MC, 7.  For fuller account of Israel as the covenantal partner of God in mediating revelation, see 
Thomas F. Torrance, ‘The Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel in World History,’ in The Witness of 
the Jews to God, ed. David W. Torrance (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1982), 88-90. 
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being.23  The reciprocity between God and Israel within thecovenantal relation 
constitutes a two-way movement.  Torrance elucidates,  
 
A two-way movement is involved: an adaptation of divine revelation to the human 
mind and an adaptation of articulate forms of human understanding and language to 
divine revelation.  That is surely how we are to regard God’s long historical dialogue 
with Israel: the penetration of the Word of God into the depths of Israel’s being and 
soul in such a way that it took human shape and yet in such a way that the human 
response it called forth was so locked into the Word of God that it was used as the 
vehicle of further address on the part of that Word t  Israel.’24 
 
In the movement of the adaptation of divine revelation to human mind, ‘the 
Word of God invaded the social matrix of Israel’s life, culture, religion and history, 
and clothed itself with Israel’s language, it had to struggle with the communal 
meaning already embedded in it in order to assimilate it to God’s revelation of 
Himself.’25  The struggle arises out of the adaptation of the Word to Israel is 
unavoidable because in order for ‘new understanding to take root within Israel, it had 
to take shape with Israel’s language, and therefore it had to remould the inner 
structure of the society within which that language had its home and had to determine 
the whole history of Israel in its physical existenc .’26  As the Word adapts to Israel, 
Torrance says that Israel is faced with God in an unprecedented and intimate way that 
‘the innate resistance of the human soul and mind resulting from the alienation of 
man from God inevitably became intensified’.27  That is the main reason why ‘Within 
the moral and liturgical institutions of the covenant, the revelation of God as holy and 
righteous, as truth and love, was brought to bear upon the whole way of Israel’s life 
and thought, when it was found to cut against the grain of natural existence, even 
against the grain of its religious desires and forms of worship’.  But, Torrance asserts, 
‘that is what objective divine revelation had to do in opening up the way through all 
in-built bias against it for its realisation and actualisation within Israel, and in turning 
the soul and mind of this people inside out so thatit was no longer self-centred but 
                                               
23 ‘The Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel in World History’, 88-89. 
24 MC, 7-8.  Also see RET, 85-86. 
25 GR, 147.  Torrance says that the adaptation of the Word of God to the life of Israel could be seen as 
the movement of the pre-history of the incarnation.  It is the movement that ‘God prepared a way, 
manifested His truth, and assumed man into a life-relation with Himself.’  Torrance underlines that 
that is the triple activity of grace which God carries through in Israel and it anticipates as well the
coming of Christ to fulfil the triple activity.  Torrance says, ‘He began to open up through Israel a n w 
and a living way for the redemption of mankind, that w s to find its fulfilment in Jesus Christ, the way, 
the Truth, and the Life.’  See CAC1, 288. 
26 Ibid., 147. 
27 MC, 10. 
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God-centred.’28  Succinctly put, the key argument of Torrance is that unless the being 
of Israel is changed, her innate weakness will eclipse the revelation of God and fail 
her from the role as the medium of revelation.  
In a way it could be said that the covenantal relation between God and Israel 
is a kind of love-hate relation.  The movement of God towards Israel does not just 
bear upon the life and culture of Israel in some tangential fashion. As the Word 
adapts to Israel, Israel is able to engage within herself a critical self-revision of her 
nature and being.  The reciprocity between God and Israel within the covenantal 
relation facilitates and brings forth from Israel both the appropriate forms of 
articulation and a renewed being so that Israel coud completely become an ordained 
medium of God’s self-revelation.  The participative response of Israel in her critical 
self-revision constitutes the movement of the ‘adaptation of articulate forms of 
human understanding and language to divine revelation.’  On this note, Torrance says 
that ‘New forms of worships, thought, and expression had to be created as the context 
within which the Word of God could be heard and understanding of it could be 
established.’  However, Torrance underlines that in order for this orientation towards 
God to be habituated in the being of Israel, the Word f God needs to keep on 
pressing for ‘articulation within the corporate medium of covenant reciprocity’.  And 
that continuous divine pressing eventually takes ‘verbal and even written form 
through the shared understanding and shared response that developed in this 
people.’29  The written form of articulation of which Torrance refers to is the Old 
Testament scripture.  To Torrance scriptural texts are crucially important in this 
regard not only because by themselves they testify to the selection and transformation 
of Israel, but also ‘in and through them men continued to hear God addressing them 
directly and backing up His Word by the living power and majesty of His divine 
Person.’30  Thus, Torrance says,  
 
This means that we must think of Israel itself as the Prophet sent by God… all the 
prophets are to be understood within the one body which had been brought into 
special relationship with God within which it was moulded and structured as the 
earthen vessel to receive and communicate the Word of God to mankind.  It was 
within Israel constituted in that way that God sent the prophets and out of Israel 
                                               
28 Ibid., 10.  Also see CAC1, 290-91. 
29 GR, 148.  Torrance underlines that the pressing of God on Israel that takes the form of historical 




constituted in that way that the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament were composed 
and handed down.31   
 
To Torrance the long struggle of Israel with the living God as recorded in 
scripture is the preparation of the final and ultimate mediation of divine revelation to 
humanity.  Israel is the womb of God in the sense that out of her one anticipates the 
coming of the one who is the epitome of the perfect union and communion of divine 
and human action; ‘when the personal self-communication of God could be met by 
true and faithful reception from man.’32  Torrance concludes, 
 
And at last in the fullness of time the Word of God became man in Jesus, born of the 
Virgin Mary, within the embrace of Israel’s faith and worship and expectation, 
himself God and man, in whom the covenanted relationship between God and Israel 
and through Israel with all humanity was gathered up, transformed and fulfilled once 
for all.  In him the revealing of God and the understanding of man fully coincided, 
the whole Word of God and the perfect human response of man were indivisibly 
united in one Person, the Mediator.33 
 
We have thus far analysed Torrance’s thought on the reciprocal relation 
between God and Israel in bringing about the mediation of divine self-disclosure in 
human history.  We argue that by using the tool as an analogy, Torrance develops his 
thought on the subject in question.  It is not difficult to ascertain that the tool to which 
Torrance constantly refers as he develops his argument is not limited only to the form 
of concepts and articulations.  It includes as well the being of Israel as a nation.  If we 
approach Torrance’s discourse of shaping the appropriate tools in this light, a rich but 
subtle account of multiple mediations emerges indubitably by itself.  And the 
fulfilment of multiple mediations to Torrance would not be possible without the 
participation of both the divine and human agencies.  In the case of Israel, it takes 
both the divine initiation and Israel’s responsive participation through the course of 
dialogical interaction in history to make possible both the appropriate media of 
mediation and the unfolding of divine revelation.  As Torrance says, ‘And we have 
found that in grace and wisdom God adopted a way of making himself known to this 
people in which the movement of his revelation fulfilled itself not only from the side 
                                               
31 MC, 14. 
32 Ibid., 9. 
33 Ibid.  Although Torrance says that it is Jesus Christ and not Israel who constitutes the reality and 
substance of God’s self-revelation, he asserts that it is ‘Jesus Christ in Israel and not apart from Israel, 
so that Israel the servant of the Lord is nevertheless included by God for ever within his elected wayof 
mediating knowledge of himself to the world.  Since Israel as a whole is given a permanent place in 
God’s revelation of himself, the Old Testament mediation of revelation must be appreciated and 
understood from the perspective of its fulfilment i Christ.’  MC, 23. 
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of God toward man but from the side of man toward God, and so he brought into 
being ways of human understanding and human obedience to his revelation which 
were assumed into union with it and constituted the human expression in concept and 
word of that revelation in its communication to man.’34  Notwithstanding the relation 
between the divine and human action is not necessarily symmetrical, human 
participation, however insignificant it is as compared to divine grace, constitutes an 
indispensable place in the union and communion that could not be undermined or 
relegated in anyway.  Essentially when Torrance says that ‘divine revelation was 
progressively mediated to mankind in and through Israel’ it means that the revelation 
of God is embodied in Israel.  The notion of the embodiment of revelation could be 
apprehended in two ways.  First, as mentioned, it is the embodiment of the Word in 
Israel.  Second, it is the embodiment of the Word in the matrix of conceptual 
articulation and expression; ‘there arose in the course of that mediation through the 
embodiment of revelation in Israel appropriate structures of understanding and 
articulating the Word of God which were of more than transient value, for under 
divine inspiration they were assimilated to the human form of the Word of God, 
essential to its communication and apprehension’.35  It is noteworthy that in the 
course of establishing his argument, Torrance asserts the importance of scripture not 
only in mediating but also in embodying the revelation of God; ‘in and through them 
[scriptural texts] men continued to hear God addressing them’.36  On this note, we 
would judge that the medium of revelation in Torrance’s theological scheme assumes 
an important role that cannot be taken lightly.  Tosuggest otherwise would inevitably 
put stress on or even subvert his theology of revelation and multiple mediations.   
There is however a lacuna in Torrance’s discourse that we would like to 
underline.  Torrance says that God’s revelation to Israel takes the form of an ever-
deepening spiral process.37  It is unfortunate that Torrance does not develop the 
concept further in his argument in relation to the nature of revelation and mediation.  
Given the importance of the continuous reciprocity between God and Israel in the 
course of history, a theme Torrance rightly capitalises, the concept of spiral 
movement is not a peripheral matter.  A lack of exposition only results in making the 
                                               
34 Ibid., 22.  
35 Ibid. 
36 GR, 148. 
37 MC, 8. 
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arguments of Torrance at times seem imprecise and insubstantial.38  Nevertheless, 
taking the main thrust of Torrance’s argument into consideration, we may suggest 
that his quick mentioning of the spiral movement of revelation reverberates to certain 
extent the significance of ‘the hermeneutical spiral’ of R. L. Hart,39 or the importance 
of ‘learning about learning’ of Rowan Williams.40  In the case of Torrance, we may 
say that attention is given to the historical events of revelation and the interpretation 
of them in the context of Israel’s interaction with God as recorded in the Old 
Testament scripture.  In other words, the spiral movement of revelation entails the 
essentiality of continuous human action in reckoning, interpreting, learning, 
articulating and embodying revelation in such a way that it is mediated in accordance 
with the compulsive nature of the revealing God.  Alternatively put, the spiral 
movement mirrors the continuous process of forging the appropriate tools of 
mediation.  And, to Torrance, such a spiral process r quires rational and scientific 
inquiry on the part of human agency to unfold divine revelation.41  The crux is 
revelation to Torrance is far from being an immediate or irrational mystical 
encounter.  His definition of the term clearly underscores the intelligibility of it.  He 
says,  
 
By revelation is meant, then, not some vague, inarticulate awareness of God 
projected out of the human consciousness, but an intelligible, articulate revealing of 
God by God whom we are enabled to apprehend through the creative power of his 
Word addressed to us, yet a revealing of God by Godwhich is actualised within the 
conditions of our creaturely existence and therefore within the medium of our human 
thought and speech.42   
 
An important question not unrelated to our discussion has to be addressed 
before moving to the next section.  We need to ask Torrance that since Christ has 
now come and the ultimate revelation and mediation of God has now been fulfilled in 
Christ, would Israel then be effaced from the surface of the earth since she has served 
                                               
38 In alluding to Donald Winslow’s comment that says ‘Torrance’s speciality is the whole’, Kruger 
underlines that while it mainly bears upon Torrance’s comprehension of the ‘vast panorama of the 
history of Christian thought’, it is also applicable to Torrance’s discussion of Israel as the womb of 
incarnation.  Kruger, 23. 
39 R. L. Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 
83-105.  Hart argues that revelation as fundament refers primarily to the triadic constitutive process of 
which the substantive bearing of revelation founds human being in historical time in the hermeneutic 
spiral.  The triadic constitutive process of fundament refers to ‘the already founded, to founding afresh, 
and to the yet to be founded.’  See 85. 
40 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 131-46. 
41 For fuller account of the importance of rational and scientific activity in unfolding the knowledge of 
divine revelation, see TS, 337-52. 
42 RET, 85. 
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her very function as the womb of the incarnate Son?  I  ‘Salvation is of the Jews’ 
Torrance gives us a number of reasons as to why the Jews continue to exist even until 
today.43  Three things are mentioned in relation to the Jews as the witness of God.  
First, the Jews continue to bear witness to the judgement and mercy of God.  Second, 
the Jews bear the witness of how we are to know God and how to understand Jesus.  
Third, the Jews bear witness to the contempt and antago ism of the human heart to 
God.  Another reason Torrance gives is that they ar God’s ‘finger-post’ pointing to 
the future; ‘What is going to happen?  Will God notd  anything?’  Watch the Jews!44  
In someway the account of Torrance resonates the conversation between Frederick 
the Great of Germany and his private doctor Zimmermann that we mention at the 
outset.  However our purpose of asking the question at this juncture is neither about 
the proof of God’s existence nor his wonderful providence in the world, although 
both are unquestionably important.  What we intend to bring forth is the crucial point 
that the media of God’s self-revelation do not efface themselves after they have 
served their function of mediation.  Israel continues to exist long after she has 
accomplished her task as the womb of the incarnatio.  We believe Torrance would 
concur with our remark as his account well evidences th  point. 
 
 
Incarnation: Fully God and Fully Man 
 
Torrance says that his theological works ‘have arisen out of a sustained engagement 
with the tension between Christian theology, as it has been renewed directly or 
indirectly through the great work of Barth, and thegeneral frame of thought that has 
dominated Europe culture for several hundred years.’ 45  As we depart from the 
discussion of the mediation of Israel and turn our attention to Torrance’s thought on 
the nature of the person of the Mediator, the influence of Barth becomes apparent 
undergirding his discourse of Christ as the sole obj ctive reality of God’s revelation 
and mediation.  Even though allusions to Barth are hardly made in Torrance’s 
arguments, the influence of Barth cannot escape one’s notice.  Thus, with that in 
mind, we would commence the section by examining Torrance’s understanding of the 
                                               
43 ‘Salvation is of the Jews’, 167-73.  With regard to the significance of Israel to Christian community, 
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44 Ibid., 171.  Author’s italic. 
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 22
hypostatic union of Christ before going on to the divinity and humanity of Christ in 
the final section. 
What are we then to think of the person of the Mediator?  This is the question 
Torrance asks with regard to Christ as the fulfilment of God’s revelation and 
mediation.  According to Torrance the answer lies in the being of Christ.  In line with 
the confession of the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), Torrance underlines that in 
Christ there are two distinct natures hypostatically united in one person without 
separation and confusion.46  ‘The union between the divine and human natures in 
Christ is what we call hypostatic,’ Torrance explicates, ‘for they are united in the one 
hypostasis or person of the Son; it is therefore a “personal u ion” in the sense that the 
two natures are united in One Person, and have their hypostasis or substance in that 
One Person alone.’47  Thus, the ‘divine and human natures remain distinct but united 
in the One Person of the Son.’48  Torrance says,  
 
We are not to think of Jesus Christ, Athanasius used to argue, as God in man, for that 
could be said of a prophet or a saint, and stops short of what the Incarnation of Son of 
God really was.  Rather must we think of Jesus Christ as God coming to us as man.  
Nor must he be interpreted just as the appearance of God in human form or in the 
mode of a human life, for that also would fall far short of what the incarnation really 
was.  The incarnation means that in Jesus Christ we hav  to do with One who is 
wholly God and yet with one who is wholly man, but very God of very God though 
he is, the Son of God comes to us as man.49   
 
The conceptual tools Torrance uses to explicate the doctrine of hypostatic 
union are anhypostasia and enhypostasia.  He underlines, ‘By anhypostasia classical 
Christology asserted that in the assumptio carnis the human nature of Christ had no 
independent per se subsistence apart from the event of i carnation, apart from the 
                                               
46 CAC1, 110.  Also see MC, 56, 65. 
47 Ibid., 109.  According to Torrance, there are three aspects what the fundamental truth of hypostatic 
union means for our understanding of the ministry and work of Jesus Christ.  First, since in Jesus 
Christ God himself has come into our human being and u ited our human nature to his own, atoning 
reconciliation then takes place within the personal Being of the Mediator.  Second, since in Christ God 
and man are united as one person, Torrance says that the mediation of reconciliation that takes place in 
Christ has the efficacy of restoring humanity back to God as Christ shares the inner relations of God’s 
own life and love.  Third, as Christ is in oneness with the Father, the reconciliatory activity of Christ as 
man in our human existence finds its ontological ground in the union and communion of God as 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  Thus, Torrance says that ‘in Jesus Christ, the Mediator, in whom atoning 
union and hypostatic union served each other.  Yet it is not atonement that constitutes the goal and end 
of that integrated movement of reconciliation but union with God in and through Jesus Christ in whom 
our human nature is not only saved, healed and renewed but lifted up to participate in the very light, 
life and love of the Holy Trinity.’  See MC, 63-66. 
48 Ibid., 109. 
49 MC, 56.  
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hypostatic union.’50  The crux is that Jesus Christ is not an independent human 
existence apart from the incarnation.  However, by enhypostasia, Torrance says that 
‘it asserts that in the assumptio carnis the human nature of Christ was given a real 
and concrete subsistence within the hypostatic union---it was enhypostatic in the 
Word.’51  Torrance underscores that anhypostasia and enhypostasia are inseparable in 
our thinking and understanding of the person Jesus Christ.  The conceptual tools 
enable Torrance to answer questions with regard to the nature of the person of the 
Mediator as the eternal Son assuming human nature into oneness with himself in the 
event of incarnation; to articulate the fact that in that assumption he is not only real 
man but also a man.  Since the hypostatic union of Christ is the linchpin of 
Torrance’s normative pattern of revelation and mediation, we would analyse first the 
divinity and then the humanity of Christ. 
 
The Divinity of Christ 
 
Torrance’s argument of the divinity of Christ revolves around the oneness in being of 
the Son and the Father.  The essentiality of the oneness between the Son and the 
Father in Torrance’s thought is clearly evidenced when he says,  
 
The supreme point which I wish to stress… is the fact that the Father/Son or 
Son/Father relationship falls within the very Being of God.  That is to say, the 
Sonship embodied in Jesus Christ belongs to the inner relations of God’s own eternal 
Being, so that when Jesus Christ reveals God the Father to us through himself the 
only begotten Son, he gives us access to knowledge of God in some measure as he is 
in himself.52   
 
The notion that the Son shares the same being with the Father is important to 
Torrance because it underscores the point that the validity of Christ’s revelation and 
mediation lies in the being of God.  Torrance continues,  
 
[Jesus] is the Son of God within God, so that what he is and does as Son of the Father 
falls within the eternal Being of the Godhead.  That is the doctrine of the Mediator, 
the doctrine of the incarnate Son of the Father whois f one and the same being with 
the Father.53   
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Because the Son of God is within the eternal being of the Godhead, Torrance 
argues that Jesus Christ is to be acknowledged as God in the same sense as the Father 
is acknowledged as God.  As the Son and the Father re indivisible, the oneness 
between them provides the mandate for Torrance to claim that in the revelation and 
mediation of Christ our ‘knowledge of God the Father and the knowledge of Jesus 
Christ the incarnate Son of the Father arise in us together, not one without the 
other.’54  To put it differently, our knowledge of the Father and the Son is one 
indivisible movement of knowing because it is grounded in and governed by the 
mutual relation in being in which the Father and the Son share.  To Torrance the 
mutual relation in being is intrinsically affiliated to the mutual relation in knowing 
between the Father and the Son.  On this note, Torrance asserts that ‘Our knowledge 
of the Father and the Son, of the Father in the Son and of the Son in the Father, is 
mediated to us in and through Jesus Christ in such a way that in a profound sense we 
are given to share in the knowledge which God has of himself within himself as 
Father and Son or Son and Father, which is part of what is meant by our knowing 
God through the Spirit of God who is in him and whom he sends to us through the 
Son.’55  Since God has revealed and mediated himself to us in himself as the Son of 
God, Jesus Christ is the normative centre whereby all knowledge of God’s revelation 
is controlled.56   
One important concept Torrance appropriates to a gre t extent to explicate the 
oneness of the Son and the Father is homoousion.  Torrance calls it the king-pin of 
the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed as it assumes an enormous role in articulating 
the truth of the Son as having the same being with the Father.  Torrance underlines, 
‘The primary and all-embracing significance of the omoousion was its categorical 
assertion that Jesus is God, and that as God he speaks equally with the Father in the 
one being of the Godhead.’57  He continues,  
 
                                               
54 Ibid., 55. 
55 Ibid. 
56 As Christ is the normative centre of our knowledge of God, Torrance says that ‘it is theologically 
quite improper to contrast a Christology from above and a Christology from below, for our knowledge 
of God the Father and our knowledge of God the Son perfectly coincide in our knowledge of the one 
undivided reality of God’s self-revelation in the Person, the Mediator.’  When referring to the 
Christology from below or above, Torrance is aiming at the approach of formulating the doctrine of 
Christ by beginning either from the side of the humanity or divinity of Christ.  To him, either approach 
will not be able to attain a complete understanding of Christ.  For detailed discussion see MC, 55-56. 
57 TF, 133. 
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homoousion---the affirmation of oneness in being between the Son---and indeed the 
incarnate Son---and the Father.  Without that ontic unity there is no Mediator 
between God and man and the identity of Jesus Christ a  nothing to do with any 
self-giving or self-revealing on the part of the eternal God, in which event the whole 
structure not only of the Creed but of the Gospel itself would disintegrate and 
collapse.  How much seemed to hang on that one fateful expression, ‘of one 
substance with The Father.’58 
 
It is noteworthy that notwithstanding Torrance’s extensive use of the term, it 
is not the term itself that is significant but the reality of which it points to.  The term 
although by definition means consubstantiality to Trrance, it is the reality of the 
undivided unity in the being of God of which the term indicates that is vital.  
Torrance says that since the Son is homoousion with the Father and is unbrokenly 
inherent in him, the ‘I am’ of the incarnate Son is one with and is inseparable from 
the ‘I am’ of God the Father.  In Jesus Christ ‘we have a Logos that is not of man’s 
devising but One who goes back into the eternal Being of God for he proceeded from 
the eternal Being of God’.59  The movement of going back to God’s being is the 
movement of Logos-Godward, or Son-Fatherward, as Torrance understands it in the 
language of the Gospel of John.  Torrance calls it the ana-logical reference that means 
a movement of thoughts and concepts going or referring back to God.60  Like the 
biblical statements, Torrance claims that omoousion has its ontological qualification 
not because of its own philosophical significance, or due to its unique place in the 
history of the church, but because it is rightly relat d to its object, to the Logos who is 
consubstantial with the Being of God.61  The importance of Jesus Christ as the centre 
of our understanding and articulation of God’s self-r velation is again underpinned; 
‘Everything hinges on the reality of God’s elf-communication to us in Jesus 
Christ’.62  To Torrance the claim of Christ’s divinity in relation to the oneness in 
being between the Father and the Son is built upon ‘G d in his relation to himself’ 
and not upon some a priori human presupposition. 
Unquestionably the term in itself is not a biblical term and Torrance is not 
unaware of the challenges he faces in putting so much stock in homoousion.  He says, 
‘There is admittedly a danger in such expressions, for apart from the dubiousness of 
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their history or their ambiguity, to make a single term carry such weight risks 
misunderstanding.’ In alluding to Hilary, Torrance ontinues, ‘The infinite and 
boundless God cannot be made comprehensible by a few words of human speech.’63  
Thus, in congruence with Hilary, Torrance underlines that when a brief expression 
like homoousion or consubstantialis is used, it must be interpreted with scrupulous 
care.64  In the light that the non-biblical term of homoousion is used by the Nicene 
Fathers to safeguard the integrity of the Gospel against ‘the heretical rabble of the 
day’, Torrance says, ‘Far from imposing an alien meaning upon the evangelical 
witness, theological language of this kind is adapted under the impact of divine 
revelation to convey the message of the Gospel, so that in spite of the inadequacy of 
human language in itself it is made to indicate divine realities beyond its natural 
capacity and is to be understood in their light.’65  In other words, in a fashion similar 
to the shaping of the appropriate tool of articulation as we have discussed earlier, the 
non-biblical term to Torrance has been adapted and harnessed to communicate the 
realism of the all-important relation between the Father and the Son as revealed in 
scripture.  Torrance asserts, ‘That is how we are to r gard the term homoousion in the 
Creed, which has been reforged or reminted through the believing and doxological 
commitment of the Church to God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ’, and thus ‘What 
the homoousion did was to give expression to the ontological structure upon which 
the meaning of various biblical texts rested and through which they were 
integrated.’66  In this way, Torrance says that homoousion becomes a technical term 
that means ‘of one and the same being and nature’.  Torrance underlines that it is 
Athanasius who champions the use of h moousion in referring to the truth that the 
Son is identical in being and of one nature with the Father.  Torrance says,  
 
It is the self-same God who is revealed to us as the Son and the Father---the incarnate 
Son is the very same being as God the Father.  No statemen about this could be 
stronger than that of Anathasius when he argued that ‘the whole being of the Son is 
proper to the being of the Father’, and that ‘the being of the Son is the fullness of the 
Father’s Godhead.’  The Son and the Father are so es entially and completely one 
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and the same God that---a phrase Athanasius reiterat d---the Son is everything that 
the Father is, except ‘Father’.  This being the case, any detraction from the Son 
cannot but be a detraction from the Father, for to deny the divine nature of the Son is 
to deny that God is eternally and intrinsically Father, and to deny the divine reality of 
the Word is to say that in himself God is essentially wordless and wisdomless.67 
 
 Apart from referring to the oneness of the Father and the Son, there is another 
important nuance in the use of homoousion.  Torrance says that if the Son is eternally 
begotten of the Father within the being of the Godhead, then homoousion, while 
referring to the oneness in being between the Father and the Son, expresses at the 
same time the distinction between them that obtains w thin that oneness.  In alluding 
to Basil, Torrance says, ‘For nothing can be homoousion with itself, but one thing 
homoousion with another’, thus, ‘while the Father and the Son are the same being 
they are eternally distinct for the Father is unchageably the Father and not the Son 
and the Son is unchangeably the Son and not the Father.’68  It is manifest from the 
appropriation of Athanasius, Hilary and Basil, that Torrance attempts to underscore 
the point that homoousion indeed serves as an effective interpretative frame through 
which general understanding of God’s self-revelation is given more exact guideline.   
Without doubt homoousion to Torrance is the appropriate tool of articulation 
the Nicene Fathers used when they were confronted with the dualistic threat of 
Arianism in the fourth century.  The use of homoousion continues to have significant 
bearing on our theological reflection today because ‘it is a faithful distillation of the 
fundamental sense of the Holy Scripture.’69  In addition, as much as the term 
homoousion provides us with an interpretive frame to express the oneness in being 
between the Son and the Father, Torrance claims that it also serves as a hinge 
between our creedal confession of the triune God and God’s revealing acts in the 
world.  Torrance delineates, ‘It is through the omoousion, or rather through the 
reality it stands for, that we are able to understand that what God is toward us in the 
condescension of his love and grace in Jesus Christ he is in his very own Being, and 
that the specific modes of God’s self-communication t  us in the incarnation of his 
Word in space and time as Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not transient aspects of his 
Reality but are personal modes of being that belong t  God as he eternally is in his 
own relations and ultimate Reality.’70  To put it succinctly, it is through omoousion 
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that our understanding of God in accordance with his self-revelation moves from the 
economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity in realisation that they are one and the 
same.  In this regard, our theological articulation of the oneness in being between the 
Son and the Father as revealed through the words an deeds of Christ finds its 
justification in the ontological reality of God’s eternal being.  Torrance is adamant 
that if the consubstantial relation between the Sonand the Father is sundered, the 
teaching of economic and ontological Trinity will fall apart.  In the words of 
Torrance, if the Son is not of the same being with the Father, ‘Christian faith would 
be thrown into internal contradiction and confusion.’71 
We have thus far shown that in his justification of the divinity of Christ, 
Torrance primarily pivots his argument on the oneness of the Son and the Father.  
The appropriate conceptual tool to articulate the on ness in being is homoousion.  
However, the crux of Torrance’s argument lies not i the term but the reality of God’s 
being which homoousion points to.  To Torrance any threat to subvert the divinity of 
Christ would undermine the ontological reality and validity of Christ’s revelation and 
mediation; it will also have detrimental impact on ur understanding of the triune 
God and Christian faith.  If the justification of Christ’s divinity is crucial in this 
regard, the importance to safeguard the other pole of the hypostatic union cannot be 
overemphasised.  Thus, we may turn to the humanity of Christ in Torrance’s 
framework. 
 
The Humanity of Christ 
 
In his discussion of the humanity of Christ, Torrance appropriates the conceptual 
tools of anhypostasia and enhypostasia to explicate the full human nature of the 
person of Christ.  Notwithstanding the reality that Christ has come and become man, 
Torrance argues that the humanity of Christ cannot be understood properly apart from 
the hypostatic union of God and man.  To Torrance the human person of Christ is not 
a separate person from the Word of God, but God and man in one person of Jesus 
Christ.  What the Word of God has achieved as fully man from birth to death in the 
incarnation cannot be severed from the hypostatic union; as anhypostasia and 
enhypostasia are inseparable if understanding of the human person of Christ is to be 
proper.  The import is clearly underscored in the following unpublished lecture note.  
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Torrance remarks that the hypostatic union is ‘one long act’ stretching from 
Bethlehem to the resurrection.72  He says, 
 
The crucial factor here is the meaning of ‘the human n ture’ of Christ.  There is no 
doubt at all that by ‘human nature’ the fathers wanted to stress the actuality of 
Christ’s union with us in our true humanity; that Christ was a man in all points like 
us, yet without sin.  And that is right as far as it goes, for Christ was a man like 
ourselves, coming into and living in our mode of existence, and sharing in it to the 
full within a span of temporal life on earth between birth and death, and in the unity 
of a rational soul, and a body.  But the Chalcedonian statement does not say that it 
was corrupt human nature taken from our fallen creation, where human nature is 
determined and perverted by sin, and where it is under the accusation and judgment 
of Holy God.  But all that is essential, for the unassumed is unhealed, and it is with 
and within the humanity He assumed from us that the Incarnate Son is one with the 
Father.  Therefore the hypostatic union cannot be separated from the act of 
assumption of our fallen human nature, from the living sanctification of our 
humanity, through condemnation of sin in the flesh, and through rendering from 
within it, perfect obedience to God.  In short: if we think of Christ as assuming 
neutral and perfect humanity, then the doctrine of the hypostatic union may well be 
stated statically, but if it is our fallen humanity which He assumed, in order to heal 
and sanctify it, not only through the act of assumption, but through a life of 
obedience and a death in sacrifice, then we cannot state the doctrine of the hypostatic 
union statically, but must state it dynamically, in terms of the whole course of 
Christ’s life and obedience, from His birth to His resurrection.73 
 
This citation encapsulates the essence of Torrance’s understanding of the 
human person of Jesus Christ.  From the statement w may suggest that Torrance 
underpins three important points as the distinctiveness of Christ’s humanity.  First, 
the humanity that Christ assumes is a fallen one, as the unassumed is unhealed.  
Second, the humanity of Christ is dynamically related o the divinity of Christ.  Third, 
the humanity of Christ is marked by Christ’s perfect obedience to the Father.  The 
distinctiveness becomes noticeable when Torrance defen s the human person of Jesus 
Christ from the perspective of the resurrection.  That is to say, Torrance regards the 
resurrection instead of the virgin birth as the proper starting point of our theological 
reflection in relation to the human person of Christ.  Torrance says, ‘It is in the 
resurrection that we have the unveiling of the myster  of the incarnation’.74  To take 
cognisance of Torrance’s remark, we would attend to his argument within the context 
of resurrection. 
 To Torrance the teaching of the New Testament makes it clear that we cannot 
isolate Christ’s resurrection from the whole redeeming purpose of God.  The event of 
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resurrection must be considered in the light of who Jesus Christ is ‘in his own Person, 
in his own intrinsic logos, and indeed in the light of his divine and human ntures.’  
This double consideration constitutes the double duality of the humanity of Christ; 
the duality of hypostatic union and the duality of Christ’s holiness and the human 
corruption.  The double duality is the inevitable reality of the incarnation ‘because he 
who lives and acts in this situation is divine and human in one Person, that all he does 
in our fallen existence has a dark side and a lightside, a side of humiliation and a side 
of exaltation’.75 Torrance explicates that the humiliation and exaltation of Christ are 
not simply two events of which one follows after another, but both occur to a great 
extent at the same time through the incarnate life of Christ.  The coming of the Word 
of God into our mortal human existence is itself the exaltation of human lowly 
existence into union and communion with God.  However, the exaltation of humanity 
is the obverse of the humiliation of the Son of God.  Torrance says that it is in this 
light that ‘we must think of the mutual involution of mortality and immortality, death 
and life, the crucifixion and the resurrection of Christ.’  Therefore,  ‘Seen in this way 
the resurrection is not to be understood merely as something that follows upon the 
crucifixion but as the other side of it’.76  In alluding to Hilary, Torrance underlines 
that it is only in the light of the resurrection tha  the whole mystery of faith becomes 
visible.  The mystery of faith that Torrance underpins is closely associated with the 
very nature of the humanity of Christ.  To Torrance th  humanity of Christ is nothing 
less than ‘living the life which Jesus Christ lived in our midst, the life of complete 
obedience to the Father and of perfect communion with him, the life of absolute 
holiness in the midst of our sin and corruption, and by living it through the whole 
course of our human existence from birth to death, he achieved within our creaturely 
being the very union between God and man that constitutes the heart of atonement, 
effecting man’s salvation and restoration to communion with God the Father.’77  
Simply put, the humanity of Christ is about the passive and active obedience of Christ 
to the Father from the virgin birth to the resurrection in order to mediate the 
revelation and reconciliation of God to the fallen world. 
 The passive obedience of Christ to the Father in the context of resurrection is 
about the act of raising Christ from his death by the Father.  The emphasis is placed 
upon the fact that in death the fully human person of Jesus Christ submits himself 
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unconditionally and completely to our fallen condition of utter weakness and 
powerlessness.  ‘It was real and complete death,’ Torrance says, ‘our death into 
which he entered, and where he was so powerless that he had to be raised up by God 
himself.’78  Torrance claims that ‘Passive resurrection is the counterpart to that abject 
passion, and corresponds to the “anhypostatic” aspect of the Incarnation and the 
dramatic aspect of redemption in which we are saved by the sheer act of Almighty 
God.’  And since ‘this passive obedience of Jesus wa  essentially a voluntary act and 
deliberately vicarious act in accepting the Father’s will,’ Torrance underlines that ‘it 
was also a positive and indeed a creative act, and as such is the counterpart to the 
“enhypostatic” aspect of the Incarnation and the pri stly aspect of redemption in 
which we are saved through the human mediation of the incarnation Son.’79  Torrance 
regards the passive and active obedience of Christ as the perfect human obedience to 
God in fulfilling the movement of revelation and mediation.  It is in Christ’s passive 
and active submission from birth to resurrection that he reveals to the estranged world 
the God of creation and mediates reconciliation betwe n them.  On this note, 
resurrection is the creative and positive outcome of Christ’s atonement.80  It is the 
final affirmation of humanity and the assuming of humanity by grace into union and 
communion with the eternal life and love of God.  The resurrection of Christ to 
Torrance is not merely a historical event in the lif  of Christ, it corresponds 
intimately as well to the being of Christ as fully man and fully God; as Torrance aptly 
says, ‘what Jesus Christ is in his resurrection, he is himself.’81   Torrance regards the 
whole human life of Christ from his birth to his resurrection as the manifestation of 
the ultimate creative act of God among humanity in human history.  Although as a 
complete human being Christ can be approached and comprehended in his humanity, 
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Torrance underpins that ‘as soon as we confront him in the power of his resurrection 
our understanding of his humanity must be set within e fact of the whole Christ, as 
God manifest in the flesh, the Creator in our midst as human creature, come to effect 
the recreation of human nature from within its existence in space and time.’82  Thus, 
we may comment conclusively that to Torrance the humanity of Christ is not merely 
about the human person of Christ living among us and with us, it is also about who 
Christ is in himself in relation to the Father as the ultimate revelation and mediation 
of God.   
 We have analysed, particularly from the standpoint f resurrection, Torrance’s 
thought on the humanity of Christ.  Our analysis shows that the conceptual tools of 
anhypostasia and enhypostasia are crucial to Torrance as they undergird his argument 
to a great extent.  In Torrance’s view the proper understanding of the human person 
of Christ cannot be achieved apart from the hypostatic union.  As critical as the 
divinity of Christ, the theological task of safeguarding the humanity of Christ cannot 
be compromised before the hypostatic union suffers any misapprehension.  The 
truism to Torrance is that any attempt to disturb the cornerstone will indubitably 
impinge on our perception of divine revelation and mediation.  The crux is there is no 
mediator apart from the one who is fully God and fully man. 
 
 
The Christological Foundation of Revelation and Mediation 
 
If to ask who is the Jesus of Nazareth would eventually lead us to the truth that he is 
the Son of God, the one who bridges the gap between God and humanity because in 
him is found both fully God and fully man in one person, the next question about how 
as the Mediator he is able to fulfil the role of revelation and mediation is one that 
cannot be ignored.  As we continue the discussion it is therefore our aim to analyse 
Torrance’s answer to this consequential question.  We would focus on Torrance’s 
account of Christ as the fulfilment of the two-way movement of divine adaptation to 
humanity and human adaptation to divinity. 
The fulfilment of the revelation and mediation of God according to Torrance 
is to be found in the person of Jesus Christ.  He, th  incarnate Son of God, the ‘true 
God and true Man’ who arrives out of the womb of Israel, is the ‘only one Mediator 
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between God and man’ and ‘the objective reality of G d’s revelation’.83  Torrance 
underlines that by his coming ‘the Word of God has become man in the midst of 
man’s estrangement from God, committing himself to human understanding and 
creating communion between man and God.’84  To Torrance the sphere of 
communion created in Christ although it is built upon the foundation of the 
covenantal relation between God and Israel,85 it is through the union in Christ that 
one would find the divine initiation and human participation of revelation and 
mediation meet in perfection.  Torrance says, 
 
[T]he incarnation is to be understood as the mighty act of God in which His Word 
has become event in our flesh in such a way that the event corresponds perfectly with 
His Word.  Jesus Christ is the Truth of God actualised in our midst, the incarnate 
faithfulness of God, but He is also man keeping faith nd truth with God in a perfect 
correspondence between His life and activity in the flesh and the Word of God.  In 
Him there is utter consistency between God the Word revealing Himself to man and 
man hearing, believing, obeying, and speaking His Word.  Not only is He the 
incarnation of the divine faithfulness but the embodiment and actualisation of man’s 
faithfulness in answer to God’s; but as such He offrs to God, and is toward God in 
His own person and life, our human responses of faith nd obedience to God.  If it 
was in His humanity in entire solidarity with us tha  Jesus Christ stood in our place, 
and gave to God and to man, then this includes the fact that He believed for us, 
offering to God in His vicarious faithfulness, the p rfect response of human faith 
which we could not offer.86   
 
 It is in Jesus Christ that the self-revelation of God and the perfect 
understanding of God’s self-revelation are fully and i divisibly united.  In Torrance’s 
words, ‘Jesus Christ is at once the complete revelation of God to man and the 
correspondence on man’s part to that revelation requi d by it for the fulfilment of its 
own revealing movement.’87  ‘Jesus Christ stood forth,’ Torrance says, ‘not only as 
the controlling centre of the mediation of divine revelation in and through Israel, but 
as himself the personal self-revelation of God to man, the eternal Word of God made 
flesh once for all within the objective and subjective structures of human existence.’88  
Thus, Torrance underscores that in Christ the self-revelation of God achieves its end 
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of bridging between God and humanity via fulfilling the two-way movement of 
divine adaptation to humanity and human adaptation o God.  On this note, the 
incarnation of Jesus Christ is of essential importance in setting the normative pattern 
of revelation and mediation because in the incarnatio  we have ‘the actual Way 
which the divine Word has taken and takes in our human communion with it and our 
human knowing of it.’89  The humanity of Christ provides us with ‘e actual medium 
in and through which God acts upon our thinking andspeaking, giving them an inner 
obedience to his Word through our participation on the holy communion of Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit.’90  The importance of the union and communion of divine and 
human action of revelation and mediation in Torrance’s theological framework is 
clearly evidenced here.  Divine initiation and human participation form the bipolarity 
of revelation and mediation in the incarnation.  Any elevation of one at the expense of 
the other will disrupt the steady bipolar relation and undermine Torrance’s argument.  
If the involvement of both the divine and human action is critical in this regard, we 
need to examine how in Torrance’s discourse the incarnation of the Word realises 
divine revelation and mediation.  In other words, we are asking about Torrance’s 
justification of the claim that the incarnation is indeed the fulfilment of the two-way 
movement of divine and human adaptation.  Fundamentally it is a question about the 
nature of revelation and mediation of the incarnate Son of God.  We would begin first 
with Torrance’s discourse of the God-manward movement that underpins the 
adaptation of divine revelation to the human mind, and subsequently the man-
Godward movement that focuses on the adaptation of human obedient understanding 
to divine revelation. 
 
The God-manward Movement 
 
Torrance says that the articulation of the Word of G d is not about the human talk 
about God.  It is, however, God’s own Word about himself as he has lived the life of 
humanity and spoken about it to humanity in the word f humanity.  Without the 
personal God who comes and reveals himself to us as the Word, we can neither speak 
nor talk about God.  Torrance says, ‘We do not begin, then, with God alone or with 
man alone, nor even with God speaking on the one had and man hearing on the 
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other hand, but with God and man as they are posited together in a movement of 
creative self-communication by the Word of God.’91  It is on this basis of 
togetherness and openness between God and humanity that Torrance argues for the 
reality of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ.  There is in the incarnate Son a 
profound reciprocity between the revealing of the Word in human form without 
subverting its divinity, and the reception of the Word without undermining its 
humanity.  Torrance claims the nature of such recipo ity is that the responding 
movement of humanity towards God is itself constitutive of the revealing movement 
of the Word towards humanity.  ‘Thus,’ he says, ‘the Word of God communicated to 
man includes within itself meeting between man and God as well as meeting between 
God and man, for in assuming the form of human speech the Word of God spoken to 
man becomes at the same time word of man in answer to God.’92  Torrance asserts 
that our understanding of God in this regard does not derive from any analysis of the 
social and religious life of Israel or the early church.  It comes directly from the 
activity of the Word that has penetrated into our hman estrangement and established 
a ‘two-way connexion’ between God and humanity.  As Torrance aptly says, it is 
through ‘the Interpreter and Mediator between man and God’ that the Word has 
‘spoken to man from the highest and heard by him in the depths, and spoken to God 
out of the depths and heard by Him in the highest.’93  If the Word of God is to be 
spoken and heard, the unavoidable question Torrance needs to address is the 
effectiveness of human communication in articulating he Word of God to humanity. 
In order for any effective communication to take place within human 
conversation, Torrance says that one cannot do without the use of created rationality.  
Created rationality according to Torrance is the gift God has bestowed upon the 
contingent reality through the act of creation.  Torrance underlines that the contingent 
rationality of creation is different from, but dependent on, God’s transcendent 
rationality that essentially gives it the inner law.  The adaptation of God to humanity 
is the movement of God ‘into this created rationality (or logos) that the Word (or 
Logos) of God enters, assimilating it to Himself in the incarnation, in order to become 
Word to man through the medium of human word’.94  But, Torrance avers, when 
Jesus Christ comes into this contingent world the challenge he faces is not only about 
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the appropriation of the created rationality to articulate the Word of God.  The main 
problem lies in the inconsistency of human speech and act in communication.  The 
point Torrance attempts to make is that while in God the Word, Person and Act are 
one and undivided, they all fall apart in humanity.  Torrance says, 
 
With us word is different from act.  We speak, but have to exert additional power in 
order to fulfil what we say in deeds.  We act, but o r acts are not personal in 
themselves.  Our speech and our actions do not coincide in the unity and power of 
our person.  Act and person, word and person, word and act are all separate---they 
are not unrelated, but their relationship is conditioned by physical existence and is 
refracted and strung out in time.  
 
However, with God the situation is just the reverse.  H  continues, 
 
[God] encounters us as One whose Word and whose Act belong to the self-
subsistence of His Person.  What He speaks takes place of itself, for it is filled with 
the power of His Person, the power by which He is what He is and by which He lives 
His own personal Life in absolute self-sufficiency and freedom.  His power to act is 
not other than the power of His Person or the power of His Word.  He is in Person 
identical with His Word, and His Word is itself His Act.95 
 
 Torrance claims that when the Word of God condescends to the situation of 
humanity in order to mediate the revelation of God, he encounters a division of word, 
person and act.  Yet the brokenness of human conditi  and its inability to utter an 
appropriate word by itself about God could not deter the movement of God to 
humanity.  Torrance says, 
 
He comes as genuine man, physically conditioned in space and time, in whom 
willing, speaking and doing are different, who thinks and forms judgments, whose 
acts follow upon his decisions, whose words are in addition to his person and whose 
works are in addition to his words, but who in none f these things is self-sufficient, 
for as man he lives and thinks and speaks and acts only in inseparable relation to his 
fellow-men and in dependence upon the physical creation.96 
  
 For the purpose of mediating God’s revelation, the Word comes and becomes 
a physical event in space and time to share in full the limitations of the fallen 
creation.  However, by appropriating the finite human form within the frailty of 
earthy life, the Word does not cease to be God but in doing so is able to speak God to 
us.  ‘The unity in God,’ Torrance says, ‘between Person, Word and Act has been 
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made to overlap and gather within its embrace the diff rences between person, word 
and act in the creature, so that they are allowed to mediate God’s Word to man in 
time through a oneness between Christ’s human utteranc  about God and God’s self-
utterance to man.’97  In other words, ‘in revelation we have the divine assumption of 
our human word into union with God’s own Word, effecting it as the human 
expression of the divine Word, and giving it, as such, real and full place as human 
word in obedience to the divine.’98  The brokenness of human communication is 
surmounted through the ‘union between uncreated and created rationality and 
between uncreated and created word’ so that human articul tion is able to serve the 
Word in mediating God’s revelation.99  The human word is fully established as the 
‘appropriate tool’ through the regenerating and humanising work of the incarnate 
Word.   Human expressions in the form of word, person and act then become the 
divinely ordained ‘earthen vessels’ used by God to speak about God.  On this note, 
the movement of God’s adaptation to humanity is fulfilled in the incarnation of the 
Word.  And it is at this point that one locates as well the movement of humanity 
towards God; the adaptation of human understanding to divine revelation. 
 
The Man-Godward Movement 
 
One thing unmistakably clear about the incarnation o Torrance is that there is an 
essential bi-polarity in God’s revelation to humanity.  He says that ‘God is God and 
not man, and yet in the incarnation God has become man… as truly divine and truly 
human, to become the final Word of God to man and the one Mediator between God 
and man.’100  That is to say, ‘the incarnation shows us that God reveals himself (God) 
in terms of what is not-God (man), that revelation is given to us only in terms of what 
it is not, in the humanity of those whom it is given, so that from first to last we have 
to reckon with an essential bi-polarity.’101  The implication of this bipolarity of 
revelation is that we cannot get behind the ‘what he is not to the what he is in himself, 
any more than we can get behind the back of Jesus to the eternal Son of God’.  
Torrance therefore claims that ‘Revelation is not only act from the side of God but 
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also from the side of man’.  He asserts that the act from the side of humanity towards 
God takes place fully and solely ‘in the form of the Humanity of Christ which is of 
the very substance of revelation.’102  Torrance is adamant that humanity alone has no 
understanding of God’s revelation.  We cannot come to God and talk about him apart 
from the Word made flesh.  To Torrance the event of incarnation evidences the fact 
that we know nothing of the Word of God except that which is revealed to us by the 
Word in the incarnate Christ.  Torrance says, 
 
Revelation involves, then, the freedom of God to be pr sent to man and to open up 
man for God and to realise from the side of man his understanding of revelation and 
his obedient respond to it, to effect in man real meeting with God in revelation and to 
give him capacity for revelation.103 
 
 Torrance underlines that this capacity for revelation is not to be judged by 
humanity.  The realisation of it depends fully on God who by the activity of the Spirit 
enables humanity to receive it.  It is the Spirit who ‘effects from the side of man and 
issuing out of man’s life a really human understanding of revelation and a really 
human obedience to it.’104  It is noteworthy that in Torrance’s thought the el ment of 
human obedience is intimately related to the movement of humanity towards God in 
revelation.  Revelation to Torrance is not merely an act of God in humanity, but the 
act of perfect human obedience achieved by the Word of God in and from humanity.  
Because the act of perfect obedience is unattainable by fallen humanity, it has to be 
achieved by God.  Torrance says, ‘Incarnation was wholly act of God but it was no 
less true human life truly lived in our actual humanity.’  ‘Jesus Christ is not only 
Word of God to man, but Believer’; in ‘his obedient life he yielded the perfect 
response of man to the divine revelation which is that revelation in human form.’105  
The act of perfect obedience of the incarnate Word is integral and essential in the 
man-Godward movement because it achieves for humanity what humanity could not 
do if being left alone.  Torrance pointedly says, ‘We are not concerned simply with a 
divine revelation which demands from us all a human response, but with a divine 
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revelation which already includes a true and appropriate and fully human response as 
part of its achievement for us and to us and in us.’ 106   
 One important aspect of Torrance’s thought with rega d to the movement of 
humanity towards God is about the mediation of reconciliation.  Torrance says that 
divine revelation and reconciliation are inseparable, ‘as revelation does not achieve 
its end as revelation apart from reconciliation, for only through reconciliation can 
revelation complete its own movement within man, bringing out of our humanity the 
obedient reception of revelation which is an essential part of its very substance.’107  
Revelation thus necessarily ‘involves a communion through the reconciliation of the 
estranged parties, a reconciliation of the will and mind of man with the will and mind 
of God.’108  In this regard, we may comment that the reconciliation of will and mind 
as mentioned here in someway reverberates our earlier d scussion of the 
embracement of human brokenness by the unity of God’s Person, Word and Act.  
They both pivot on the redemption and restoration of humanity in Christ.  Torrance 
aptly says,  
 
By being completely and unreservedly God’s Word incar ate in the fullness of grace 
and truth He was able from within our estranged and impaired existence to deliver 
man from subjection to futility and negation, recreate his relation to God, realise 
perfect humanity on the earth, and to offer in and through Himself man’s true 
response in person, word and act to God the Creator.109   
 
The key concept here is the reconciliation of humanity to God through the 
revelation of the incarnate Word involves a transformation of human existence and 
being in such a way that there gives rise to a trueand appropriate response of 
obedience from the side of humanity to God.  The outc me is the birth of a new 
humanity, or a new human existence, in Christ.  In this new creation the adaptation of 
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human understanding to divine revelation is realised through ‘his distinctive response 
toward God in the fullness of his creaturely freedom and integrity.’110  The 
actualisation of the true response of humanity to God is part of the fulfilment of 
divine revelation, since the movement of humanity towards God is constitutive of the 
bipolar relation of revelation.  Thus, through the participation of divine revelation, the 
renewed humanity is able to mediate and articulate the revelation of God.  However, 
having said that, we need to underscore that, to Torrance, the mediatory action of the 
renewed humanity is one wholly and solely dependent upon the vicarious act of 
Christ through the work of the Spirit.  That is the purpose of the coming of the Word 
in flesh, to set the normative pattern of the union and communion of divine and 
human action of revelation and mediation.  No one comes to the Father except 
through the Son, and no one comes to the Son except by the Spirit.  Thus Torrance 
says conclusively,  
 
Such was the life and mission of Jesus Christ the Word made flesh who mediated 
between God and man, reconciling them in and through Himself, and so established a 
correlation and correspondence between God’s self-giving and man’s receiving 
within which alone God’s revelation could be actualised in man and a true faithful 
response could be yielded by man to God.111 
 
We have thus far analysed Torrance’s thought on the importance of Jesus 
Christ as God’s revelation and mediation.  We argue that Christ to Torrance is the 
sole Mediator between God and humanity, and it is only in and through him that one 
could locate the complete reality of God’s giving and man’s receiving of revelation.  
In relation to our first section on Israel as the womb of the incarnation, certain 
correlation may be drawn between the mediation of Israel and the mediation of 
Christ.  In alluding to Torrance’s analogy, we may s  that Christ is the ‘ultimate and 
perfect tool’ that God has forged out of Israel.  The two-way movement of Israel’s 
covenantal relation with God is culminated in Christ’s fulfilment of the God-
manward movement and man-Godward movement of revelation nd mediation.  It is 
clear from our discussion that the activity of the Word of God to Torrance does not 
begin only in the moment of incarnation.  The normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation that is initiated by the Word of God in Israel finds its ultimate completion 
in Jesus Christ, the one from Nazareth who is both fully God and fully man in one 




person.  On this note, it is evident that the argument of Torrance necessarily hinges 
on the hypostatic union of Christ.  Any attempt to disturb the cornerstone, that inner 
constitutive divine and human action, would inevitably cause the understanding of 
Christ as the sole Mediator between God and humanity d all that it entails to 
disintegrate and collapse.   
One more issue awaits our attention before we end the section.  It concerns 
the human person of Jesus as the medium of God’s revelation and mediation.  We 
would like to ask Torrance that since Jesus in his s ort span of life on earth has 
fulfilled the purpose and accomplished the task of mediating God’s revelation, would 
Jesus as the medium of revelation then be effaced from the economy of God?  This 
question is not unlike the one we post earlier in relation to Israel as the medium of 
God’s revelation.  The answer of Torrance here is as unequivocal.  He says, 
 
It is thus in the form of sheer humanity in all itslowliness, weakness and darkness 
that God’s Word has reached us and made provision for free and adequate response 
on our part, but in such a way that far from being a dispensable medium to be 
discarded as soon as the target is reached, the humanity of the Word, God’s 
condescension to be one with us in our humanity, remains the proof that in His own 
eternal Being He is not closed to us, and the manifestation of His freedom to unveil 
Himself to man and share with him His own divine Life.112  
 
From the citation it is manifest that Torrance is consistent in his understanding 
of the validity of the media of divine revelation.  Like Israel, the human person Jesus 
is not a dispensable medium.  Thus, it may be said that any move by Torrance to 
discard or efface the medium soon after it has served its mediatorial function will go 
against the grain of his argument.  The media of divine revelation indeed play a 





This chapter has underpinned our claim that God’s self-disclosure in Torrance’s 
theology takes the form of mediation instead of immediacy.  Our analysis suggests 
that as the Mediator, Jesus Christ to Torrance is the culmination and fulfilment of 
God’s revelation and mediation.  The election of Israel as the mediation of God is an 
integral part of Christ’s revelation and mediation, the revelatory movement of the 
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pre-history of the incarnation.113   The former is the womb of the latter, and the latter 
is the recapitulation of the former.   
Torrance’s discourse of the two-way movement of Christ brings to light the 
significance of the union and communion of divine and human action in revelation 
and mediation.  The crux is revelation in Torrance’s scheme is far from being any 
type of divine monologue.  Revelation to Torrance involves God and humanity, the 
subject and the object, the giver and the receiver, th  speaker and the hearer.  It is a 
form of ‘relational-revelation’, if we may coin a term for it.  It explains, as we our 
argument shows, Torrance’s endeavour to approach the issue from the covenantal 
relation between God and Israel.  In the case of the incarnate Son, within the 
Mediator of the new covenant who bridges perfectly between God and humanity, 
there are the perfect subject-object relation, the perfect giver-receiver relation, and 
the perfect speaker-hearer relation.   
Our discussion also suggests that Torrance indeed possesses a rich 
understanding of multiple mediations.  His expositin of the painstaking covenantal 
relation between God and Israel in forging the ‘right tools’ evidences the point 
without which God’s self-revelation in human history would be impaired.  
Approaching Christ in this light, the incarnate Word of God is to Torrance the actual 
medium, or the ‘perfect tool’, because in him we have the complete unity of Person, 
Word and Act in revelation and mediation. 
An aspect of Torrance’s thought that has also contributed to the richness 
regards the embodiment of revelation in the media.  We highlight that Torrance uses 
the Old Testament texts as example to support his argument.  This leads us to the 
question about the term of participation.  The question of which we have put to 
Torrance twice is whether the medium would efface its lf soon after it has served its 
function.  The answer of Torrance, as our discussion  clearly indicate, is 
unambiguous.  If Torrance is consistent in claiming that the medium of Israel and the 
medium of the human person of Jesus would not efface themselves after they have 
served their mediatory function, there is no cause to make the medium of scripture 
the exception; here involves the second claim of the thesis that would be addressed in 
full in chapter five and six.  Thus, we may conclude our argument by stating that 
God-reveals-Godself is essentially about mediation and not immediacy in Torrance’s 
theological scheme.  As Christ is the sole Mediator of God, it is in and through him 
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that the human and earthly media by the work of the Spirit continue to mediate divine 








Dualism: The Eclipse of Divine Revelation 
 
 
In the preceding chapter we discuss Torrance’s christological formulation of 
revelation and mediation.  Our discussion shows that in Torrance’s theological 
scheme Christ is the sole Mediator of God and it isn and through him that divine 
self-disclosure is fully revealed and mediated.  Because Jesus is who he is in himself 
as the Son of God, he completes the revelatory and me iatory works that God has 
initiated painstakingly with Israel in the course of human history.  Being fully man 
and fully God in one person, Christ fulfils and establishes the normative pattern of the 
union and communion of divine and human action of revelation and mediation.  
Torrance is adamant that the christological foundation of revelation and mediation 
has to be guarded unreservedly against any distortion, as our apprehension of divine 
self-disclosure and the integrity of the Gospel stand or fall by it.  Approaching 
Torrance in this light one could appreciate the reason of his relentless criticism of 
dualism.  On this note, it is the purpose of this chapter to argue that Torrance’s 
conviction to safeguard the revelation and mediation of Christ is best evidenced in his 
persistent attacks on dualism.  
However, what is dualism?  Or, to be precise, what is dualism to Torrance?  
This question in the first instance may appear to some as superfluous.  Is not it 
conspicuous?  Dualism is so much an important theme that Torrance has addressed 
immensely throughout his corpus; the compass is vast as he covers almost the whole 
spectrum of Western thought spanning from ancient Pla onic dualism to modern 
Newtonian dualism.  There is some justification to the comment that one of the main 
aims of Torrance’s theological reconstruction is to bring to light and correct the 
ramifications of dualism that are so much embedded in current Western theology.1  
Notwithstanding dualism commands such a centre-stage in Torrance’s theological 
enterprise, to one’s surprise little effort has been put in to define the term.  The 
meaning of dualism and its implications within the context of Torrance’s theological 
works particularly in relation to divine revelation and mediation remain to be 
explored.  To attend to these issues is inseparable to achieving the purpose of the 
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chapter.  Thus, to set the stage, we would first briefly touch on from the standpoint of 
Torrance the historical thrust of dualism and his sort definition of the term.  We then 
attempt to delimit Torrance’s understanding of dualism and its implications within 
the theological context of his criticism of Arian dualism and Newtonian dualism. We 
hope, in the course of discussion, to argue in one way or another that the intent of 
Torrance’s criticism is to safeguard the integrity of God’s revelation and mediation in 
Jesus Christ.   
 
 
Historical Thrust and Meaning of Dualism 
 
The purpose of this section is twofold.  First, it is to set the stage by sketching, in a 
brief fashion, the historical terrain of dualism from the perspective of Torrance.  Our 
aim is to show that what Torrance has gathered under the rubric of dualism is indeed 
vast and complex.  Second, we attempt to demonstrate th  Torrance’s definition of 
dualism is inadequate in supporting his theological endeavour, and the appropriate 
way to go is to delimit the term within the context of his theological discourse. 
The main concern of Torrance about dualism is that regardless of the form it 
takes, it has the undesirable outcome of distorting the revelation and mediation of 
God in Jesus Christ.  This concern is conspicuous in Torrance’s criticism of some 
modern theology for distorting the revelation of God by gravitating the understanding 
of it from the centrality of God to humanity.  Torrance calls this shift of apprehension 
the ‘eclipse of God’, a concept he borrows from Martin Buber who uses it to 
underline the failure of ‘new theology’ in distinguishing God from human 
subjectivity.2  Torrance says, ‘An eclipse of the sun, Buber reminds us, is something 
that occurs between the sun and our eyes, not in the sun itself.  So it is with the 
eclipse of God that is now taking place, for something has stepped between our 
existence and God to shut off the light of heaven, but that something is in fact 
ourselves, our own bloated selfhood.’3  The identification of ‘ourselves’ as the 
primary cause of eclipsing God is indicative of the wrong starting point of 
                                               
2 GR, 29.   
3 Ibid.  Author’s italic.  In congruence with Buber, Torrance claims that the theological impairment of 
‘new theology’ with regard to the knowledge of God is about the ‘boasted selfhood’ being in the way 
between human existence and God.  The ‘new theology’ that Torrance generally refers to is the 
theology of John Robinson, Harry Williams, Paul Van Buren and Werner Pelz.  To certain degree, that 
includes the ‘God is dead’ theology of Thomas Altizer and William Hamilton as well. 
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apprehension if divine revelation is to be properly understood.  To Torrance if our 
understanding of God’s self-disclosure does not repos  upon and is not controlled by 
the reality of God in Jesus Christ, but something that is thought out or devised out of 
our a priori conceptualisation, distortion is inevitable.  Torrance remarks that this 
form of modern dualism takes its definitive shape especially through the thought of 
Descartes, Newton and Kant.4  To Torrance the separation of the mental and material 
realms has led Descartes to the epistemological dualism of separating the subject 
from the object, locating truth in the pure reason of the knowing subjectivity.  In 
Torrance’s view, Newton’s dualism that separates th absolute and relative time and 
space has given rise to the receptacle notion of God rendering the revelation of the 
incarnate Word impossible.  Kant’s imposition of subjective conceptual order to 
objective reality, according to Torrance, has created a hiatus between the phenomenal 
and noumenal world.  By limiting the qualification of scientific knowledge to 
observable phenomena, Kant dichotomises faith from science and deprives faith of its 
objective and ontological reference.  To Torrance the dualisms of Descartes, Newton 
and Kant have adverse impact on successive thinkers such as Schleiermarcher, 
Ritschl and later, Bultmann.5  However, Torrance underscores that the problem of 
dualism in fact goes back through the centuries to the foundations of classical 
Western culture in Greece.  Torrance says, ‘I refer here to the irreducible dualisms in 
the philosophy and cosmology of Plato and Aristotle, which threw into sharp contrast 
rectilinear motion in terrestrial mechanics and circular motion in celestial mechanics, 
which were related to the dualisms between the empirical and the theoretical, the 
physical and the spiritual, the temporal and the eternal, the mortal and the divine.’6   
As indicated, the terrain Torrance covers is an enormous one that spans 
almost the whole history of Western thought.  According to Torrance three main 
periods of change could be highlighted to demarcate the major cosmological 
                                               
4 GGT, 21. 
5 With regard to Bultmann, Torrance considers him among the modern theologians the one who is 
deeply caught in dualism.  Torrance says that the dualistic mindset of Bultmann has kept God outside 
of this world of objective reality and rendered therevelation and mediation of Christ in human history 
impossible.  The story of Incarnation and Resurrection, and other miraculous stories as recorded in 
scripture are being demythologised and deprived of their ontological relevance ‘on the ground that 
they would rupture the continuum of historical happenings through the alleged inference of 
supernatural, transcendent power.’  Torrance says, ‘The effect of all this was to make Bultmann offer 
an existential reinterpretation of the Christian message, in which it would be made safe from the 
critical investigation of science---or, otherwise expressed, in which the advances of scientific 
understanding of the universe would be quite irrelevant for Christian existence and faith.’  See GGT, 
18-19.   
6 Ibid., 21. 
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mutations.  The first change takes place between th second and fourth centuries 
when the primitive cosmology of the Greeks mutates into the Ptolemaic cosmology; 
to Torrance it is the period when the dominant dualisms of Plato and Aristotle 
congeal into the comprehensive dualism of Ptolemaic cosmology.  Torrance says, 
‘[A] new astronomical system was elaborated in conjunction with a theory of radical 
disjunction between the heavenly and the earthly realms.  A vast shift in outlook took 
place to which there corresponded an equally great shif in meaning and in the 
reference of statements.  In such a period of profound mutation the really basic 
epistemological questions come to the surface and decisions have to be taken.’7  
Indeed critical decisions have to be made especially within the church with regard to 
the dualisms of Gnosticism and Arianism.  The second mutation takes place from the 
fourteenth century and reaches its zenith in the sev nt enth century.  The period is 
marked by the change from Ptolemaic cosmology to Newtonian cosmology.  
Torrance says that it is the time when ‘the new era ushered in with Galileo continued 
to be characterised by an inveterate dualism that ws given its philosophical 
expression by Descartes and Locke and its scientific expression by Isaac Newton---
who built into his great system of the world the massive dualism between absolute 
mathematical time and space and relative apparent time and space that was to become 
paradigmatic for all modern science and cosmology up to Einstein.’8  This leads us to 
the third change that, according to Torrance, occurs in the twentieth century, when 
Newtonian cosmology gradually makes way to Einsteinian cosmology.  Torrance 
regards this as the ‘great mutation’ because the impact of relativity and quantum 
physics has caused a change from the old dualistic perspective of the world to the 
new understanding of the rational unity of the universe.9  However, it is within this 
context of profound transition that Torrance criticises modern theology in general for 
failing to appreciate its significance.10  The main problem to Torrance lies precisely 
in the fact that the entrenched dualistic mindset i still having a strong grip over its 
subjects, as shown in the phenomenon of ‘the eclipse of God’.  Nevertheless, 
Torrance is not without hope.  He believes that the modern return to realism in 
scientific advancement will be the beacon of light to theology.  In other words, he 
believes that theology will go back to the realist approach of grounding our 
                                               
7 GR, 29-30. 
8 GGT, 23. 
9 GR, 29-31.  See GGT, 21-27. 
10 GGT, 17. 
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understanding of divine revelation in God as he has revealed to us in Jesus Christ.  
Torrance says, ‘This is the soil in which the “new theology” has sprung up, but it 
must be regarded as a symptom of change and confusi that will pass, for we shall 
find our faith more adequately grounded and our apprehension of God in Christ more 
clear and rational than before.’11  
The panoramic historical sketch suggests that dualism is a complex term to 
Torrance.  It may be said that the term is a conceptual tool for Torrance to articulate 
certain bipolar division ranging widely from theology to philosophy and to 
cosmology.  Torrance’s general use of it is not without difficulty.12  The main 
problem lies in the fact that Torrance has often failed to account accurately the 
nuance of the term in the light of its complexity and diversity, especially when it is 
used in association with the works of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant or Newton.  
However, to be fair to Torrance, it has to be pointed out that the term is one that 
cannot be defined easily.  R. M. McInerny remarks that ‘although it is possible to 
reduce the uses of the term dualism to a finite number of meanings, the term remains 
vague and of wide carrying application.’13  The difficulty is apparent particularly 
when it is associated with compound concepts such as Pl tonism, Aristotelianism, 
Cartesianism, or Kantianism.  Thus, it is not surprising to know at times one may say 
that ‘it is easier to find different usages of the term while still finding the concept 
itself hard to explain.’14  In Belief in Science and in Christian Life, under the section 
‘Notes on Terms and Concepts’, Torrance briefly defines dualism.  He says, 
 
dualism---the division of reality into two incompatible spheres of being.  This may be 
cosmological, in the dualism between a sensible and an intelligible realm, neither of 
which can be reduced to the other.  It may also be epistemological, in which the 
empirical and theoretical aspects of reality are separated from one another, thereby 
giving rise to the extremes of empiricism and rationalism.  It may also be 
anthropological, in a dualism between the mind and the body, in which a physical 
and mental substance are conceived as either interacting with one another or as 
                                               
11 GR, 31. 
12 Luoma comments that Torrance’s definition of dualism is too general and imprecise.  He says that 
Torrance seems to presume that his reader is well aare of what he is talking about concerning the 
meaning of the term.  Luoma is not alone in this rega d.  Muller pinpoints the same problem by saying 
that Torrance’s ambiguous use of dualism has led to misleading outcomes.  In alluding to Muller’s 
criticism of Torrance, Luoma remarks that Torrance’s problem has caused Muller to claim that 
Torrance is actually a dualist because he draws distinction between God and the creation.  See Tapio 
Luoma, Incarnation and Physics: Natural Science in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 86, 192.  And Richard A. Muller, ‘The Barth Legacy: New Athanasius 
or Origen Redivivus?  A Response to T. F. Torrance,’ Thomist, no. 54 (1990): 673-704. 
13 R. M. McInerny, ‘Dualism’ in New Catholic Encyclopaedia vol. 4 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 
1073-75.  Cited in Luoma, 82. 
14 Luoma, 82. 
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running a parallel course without affecting one another.  In the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition man is regarded as an integrated whole, who is soul of his body and body of 
his soul.15 
 
Few points could be noted.  The explanation of dualism as ‘the division of 
reality’ indicates that the reality to Torrance is inherently one even thought it is being 
perceived as ‘two incompatible spheres of being.’16  With regard to the ‘two 
incompatible spheres of being’, Torrance does not elaborate adequately the nature of 
incompatibility.  From the definition, however, we may say that in relation to 
cosmological dualism, the relation between the two spheres is that of irreducibility.  
In relation to epistemological dualism, it is one of disassociation.  And, to 
anthropological dualism, it is either interaction or parallelism.  Our preceding sketch 
shows that out of the three dualisms identified, cosm logical and epistemological 
dualisms are the central ones Torrance consistently deals with in his theological 
discourse.   
One observation regards the nature of formulating the definition deserves 
some attention.  Tapio Luoma indicates that the definition is taken from a book ‘with 
a greater interest in theological implications for science and vice versa than in 
theology itself.’17  In other words, the definition may serve well as ‘  secondary 
definition with a special interest in modifying theological intentions to a more 
readable form for scientifically orientated readers.’18  It is insufficient to represent 
fully Torrance’s understanding of dualism from a theological standpoint.  In this 
regard, what is needed is a theological understanding of the term.  While some 
dictionaries are helpful in offering definitions such as ‘Any view that is constituted 
by two basic or fundamental principles such as spirit and matter or good and evil’,19 
or ‘The philosophical system which presupposes two original and independent 
principles in the universe, one good and the other evil’,20 they are too general for our 
cause.  The appropriate way to go, as we suggest, is to approach the term from within 
Torrance’s theological discourse that has given rise to it.  By doing that we hope 
                                               
15 BSCL, 136. 
16 Luoma comments that the ‘two incompatible spheres of being’ means that the separation is not an 
inherent feature of reality itself but a consequence of a mental attitude in which the reality is seen 
through a framework of two spheres.  See Luoma, 86. 
17 Luoma, 87. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Donald K. McKim, Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms (London: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1996), 83. 
20 Alan Cairns, Dictionary of Theological Terms (Greenville: Ambassador Emerald International, 
2002), 140. 
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Torrance’s understanding of dualism and its implications may become clear, and his 
conviction to safeguard the revelation and mediation of God in Jesus Christ through 
his persistent criticism would be apparent as well.  As indicated, dualism is a big 
topic in Torrance’s works.  We would, among all his di cussions, focus mainly on his 
criticisms of Arian dualism and Newtonian dualism.  Arian dualism is crucial to our 
discussion because through criticising it, Torrance addresses the problem of God’s 
revelation in Christ.  Newtonian dualism is selected because to Torrance it shares 





In this section we attempt to delimit the meaning ad implications of dualism by 
analysing Torrance’s criticism of Arianism.  Through the analysis we would argue 
explicitly and implicitly that the intent of Torrance’s criticism is to safeguard the 
revelation and mediation of God in Jesus Christ.  It should be noted from the outset 
that Torrance avoids making a clear distinction betwe n the teachings of Arius and 
his supporters.  To Torrance they are both taken indiscriminately as one representing 
Arianism and the problems of Arian dualism.  Whether one would agree with 
Torrance’s generalisation is an issue outside the limited compass of the current 
section.  Nevertheless, it does serve the purpose of allowing Torrance to focus on the 
issues that matter to him most. 
In an important statement Torrance says, ‘Athanasius’ full doctrine of the Son 
is developed over against the radical dualism betwen the cosmos noetos and the 
cosmos aisthetos, and between God and the creation, that lay at the heart of Arian 
theology.’21  Torrance claims that the basis of Arius’ teachings essentially originated 
from a particular disjunctive view of dividing the cosmos into the intelligible world 
and the sensible world, and thus separating God from the creation.  That is to say, to 
Torrance, the root of Arianism does not come from the Judaeo-Christian mode of 
unitary thinking that Athanasius would regard to have scripture as its foundation, but 
from the Hellenistic framework that builds primarily upon Platonic dualism.22  
                                               
21 TRci, 224. 
22 According to Torrance the main challenge the early church faces is the cultural clash against the 
Graeco-Roman civilisation that is fundamentally dualistic in religion, philosophy and science.  The 
dominant philosophical teachings of Plato and Aristotle according to Torrance govern the mindset that 
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Torrance’s juxtaposition of Athanasius and Arian in the statement is indicative of 
what he perceives as the irreconcilable conflict betwe n the two modes of thinking.  
Torrance maintains that Arian dualism has provided the theological backdrop for 
Athanasius and the Nicene Fathers to develop the ort odox doctrine of the Son.  The 
conflict between the two is clearly shown in the sustained struggle of the church with 
Arianism that eventually leads to the formation of the Creed of the Council of Nicaea 
in 325.  A struggle that would not only bring to light the theological debates about the 
nature of Christ and his relation with the Father, it also enables Torrance to recognise 
the entrenched dualism as the main hindrance to a proper theological understanding 
of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ.  As indicated by Torrance, the theology of 
Arius is essentially dualistic because it is built philosophically upon the foundation of 
Platonic dualism that postulates the radical division between the cosmos noetos and 
the cosmos aisthetos.  The separation between God and the creation is the inevitable 
outcome of perceiving the single cosmos into two irreconcilable spheres.  If this is the 
heart of Arian dualism, we could say that it has both epistemological and 
cosmological implications in terms of how we understand God and his revelation in 
Christ.  And in both cases they have the same undesirable results to Torrance.   
                                                                                                                            
leads to the separation of the empirical from the toretical, the temporal from the eternal, and the 
material from the spiritual.  The challenge becomes acute when certain quarter of Judaism that is 
influenced by the Hellenistic culture begins to postulate a transcendentalist notion of God which leads 
to the accentuation of the gulf between God and the creation.  For example, the influential teaching of 
Philo of Alexandria that advocates the need of an intermediate realm of ideas to correlate the vast 
distinction between the Creator and the creatures has directly and indirectly underscored the dualistic 
mindset of the time.  The transcendentalist notion advocates that God is so utterly otherworldly that e 
is virtually ineffable and unknowable in his own being.  It rules out the possibility of knowing God as
he is in himself.  In other words, God could not be known other than his external relation to the 
creation. To Torrance, epistemologically, knowledge of God on this ground contradicts the self-
revelation of God in Jesus Christ because it is based on a detached and abstract way through a contrast 
between the Creator and the creatures.  According to Torrance the ‘yawning chasm’ that is the 
outcome of the disparate separation of God from the world is also evident in the mythological system 
of Gnosticism.  The Gnostic sects, generally considere  to be heretic by the Church Fathers, such as 
Irenaeus, hold the view of dualistic realm which Torrance regards to be ‘a suprasensual, utterly 
transcendental realm of eternal and divine realities and a very earthly, material realm of transient and
murky existence.’  The chasm is so wide that the Gnostics believe any interaction between the 
desperate realms is only made possible by the mediation of mythological hierarchies of sub-divine 
agents.  The influence of Gnostic mythology is seen within the church.  What is at stake to Torrance is 
the mythologisation of the act of God in biblical history among the semi-Christian Gnostics indeed 
renders the impossibility of a real physical incarnation and resurrection of Christ.  The mythologisation 
and its ‘high-flown philosophical’ interpretation of scripture which Torrance reckons as negative 
products of radical dualism threaten the understanding and the knowledge of God’s revelation.  In this 
regard, Platonic dualism in Torrance’s view is the main problem faced by the early church both 
externally and internally.  See TF, 47-48, 66 and GGT, 38.  For fuller reading of Gnosticism, see G. 
Vesey and P. Foulkes, Dictionary of Philosophy (Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), 127; 
Denis Minns, Irenaeus, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), 15; Terrance L. Tiessen, ‘Gnosticism as 
Heresy: The Response of Irenaeus,’ Hellenization Revisited, ed. by Wendy E. Hellenman (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1990), 340; Pheme Perkins, The Gnostic Dialogue: The Early Church 
and the Crisis of Gnosticism (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 167. 
 52
We would first focus on the epistemological implication of Arian dualism.  
Torrance underlines that the radical separation of the intelligible and sensible world 
as advocated by Arians has the consequence of making true knowledge of divine 
revelation in Christ inconceivable in two ways.  First, if Arians were right to claim 
that God is inherently separated from the creation, it would mean that God has no 
personal relation with the world.  If God is voided of any possible interaction with the 
world, then, according to Torrance, divine self-disclo ure would be unthinkable and 
‘theology in the strict and proper sense is impossible.’23  Torrance maintains that the 
outcome of dualism could only be mythology.  He says, ‘Mythology is possible only 
on the axiomatic assumption of a radical dichotomy or chorismos between God and 
the world, for then our attempts to think of God are only epinoetic acts grounded in 
our own this worldly self-knowledge and projected into God across the great gulf 
between us.’24  To Torrance the projection of human thought and imagination into 
God is theologically unscientific because it lacks verification and correction from the 
revelation of God.25  The situation however would be very different if the gulf 
between God and the creation is removed. Torrance says, ‘dianoetic way of thinking 
is possible, in which our thoughts, while remaining fully human, nevertheless reposes 
upon the reality of God himself and are determined by his hypostatic self-
                                               
23 TRci, 240.  To Torrance the economy of God in the world is the basis of our theological knowledge.  
He says, ‘Theology must moves from discerning the orderly structure of the saving oikonomia to the 
inner relations of God in himself.’  The importance of the correspondence between theologia and 
oikonomia cannot be undermined.  Essentially to Torrance what du lism has done is to impair the very 
theological structure and render theologia impossible.  On this note, LaCugna is in agreement with 
Torrance.  LaCugna comments that Arius’ views are most vulnerable in his interpretation of the 
relationship between the oikonomia in Christ and theologia.  She says, ‘Arius affirmed that even 
though God cannot suffer, still God suffers in the person of the Logos, though it is a lesser God who 
suffers.  In this respect Arius disjoined theologia from oikonomia.’  However, LaCugna continues, 
‘The pro-Nicenes argued in the opposite fashion….  In this respect they operated out of a correlation 
between oikonomia and theologia.   At the same time, they could not countenance the idea of God 
suffering, and since for them Christ was not a lesser God but true God, the Logos could not be said to 
suffer.  In this respect the pro-Nicene solution to the Arian problem also created a gap between 
oikonomia and theologia.’  LaCugna argues that it is the schism between oikonomia and theologia that 
eventually leads to the downfall of the doctrine of Trinity.  LaCugna’s emphasis of the correspondence 
between oikonomia and theologia is in congruence with Torrance’s assertion.  See TRci, 250.  Also 
Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper San 
Francisco, 1993), 35. 
24 Ibid. 
25 It has been the main aim of Torrance’s theological s ience to safeguard the integrity of the revelation 
of the Gospel.  Torrance says that his intention is ‘to clarify the processes of scientific activity in
theology, to throw human thinking of God back upon Him as its direct and proper Object and thus to 
serve the self-scrutiny of theology as a pure science.’  Kruger aptly remarks that Torrance ‘is 
concerned with the purity of Christian theology.’  See TS, xvii. Also C.B. Kruger, ‘Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation: Participation in the Self-Knowledge of God: The Nature and Means of Our 
Knowledge of God in the Theology of T.F. Torrance’ (The University of Aberdeen, 1990), 12. 
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communication to us in this world.’26  Second, by insisting on the dualism between 
God and the world, Arians are rejecting the possibility of the incarnation of God.  
Because God to Arians is transcendental and ineffabl , God could not be 
condescended in Jesus Christ.  If God could not be incarnated in Jesus Christ, the 
truth of God’s revelation and mediation in Jesus Christ is rendered null.  That is why 
according to Torrance the radical dualism between th  cosmos noetos and the cosmos 
aisthetos inevitably points to the contentious issues of the nature of Christ and his 
relation with the Father as the Son.  The matter is both christological and 
epistemological.  Torrance underlines that Athanasius, n order to reprimand the 
dualism of Arians and to defend the orthodoxy of the c urch, insists on the deity of 
the Son and his oneness with the Father.27  Torrance says, ‘Jesus Christ himself, the 
Word made flesh, is here not only the Life and the Truth but also the one Way to the 
Father: “through Jesus Christ we have access to the Father in one Spirit.”  That is 
why the relation between the Incarnate Son and the Father constitutes the 
epistemological heart of Athanasius’ theology’.28  In responding to the dualistic 
separation of God and the world, and the postulation of the transcendental and 
ineffable nature of God, Torrance defends the validity of Christ’s revelation and 
mediation by underpinning the importance of the conjoint participation of the divine 
and the human in revelation.  He says, ‘[W]e through the same Spirit may participate 
in the relation of the Son to the Father and of the Father to the Son… even though he 
infinitely transcends our conceiving and speaking of him.’29   
To Torrance the cosmological implication of Arian dualism takes its 
manifestation in Arians’ understanding of the being of Christ and the nature of his 
mediation.  Torrance underlines that the separation of God from the creation has the 
setback of drawing a line of division between the unknowable Being of God the 
Father and the knowable Logos or the Son.  He says, ‘And so they [Arians] held in 
their doctrine of creation, that God first created he Logos or the Son as the principle 
by which he created the rest of the universe; in other words, they interpreted Christ in 
terms of cosmological principle’.30  That is to say, according to Arians’ cosmology as 
Torrance reads it, God is so other-worldly that he ne ds first to create the Logos as 
his agent, the highest of God’s creature, and then rough him to bring about the 
                                               
26 TRci, 240. 
27 TF, 121-22. 
28 TRci, 240.  Author’s italic. 
29 Ibid., 241. 
30 Ibid., 224-25. 
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creation of all things.31  ‘The Logos,’ Torrance says, ‘was thus regarded as occupying 
the status and role of a created intermediary between God and the world’.32  Torrance 
remarks that the cosmological argument of Arians in this regard is not without logical 
basis.  If Arians were right to claim that God is utterly unknowable and 
undifferentiated, such nature of God would necessarily make the idea of the incarnate 
Christ as God inconceivable.  However, if Christ were divine, it would logically mean 
that apart from the Father there is another divine being existing along with him, and 
that to Arians would mean that God’s being is divisible and even plural.  The thought 
that God’s being is divisible is one Torrance says the Arians would unquestionably 
reject.  Thus, if a being really exists beside the Father, it is only acceptable to Arians 
if the Father brings it into existence out of nothing.33  That is why Arians are able to 
say that ‘There was a time when the Son was not.’34  And they claim that the 
incarnate Son of God has to be created out of nothig t rough the will of the Father 
even though he is adopted as the Son.  Since the Son is created through an act of 
God’s will, Arians conclude on the basis of logic that he cannot share the same being 
of God and his deity is therefore denied.35   
To Torrance the argument of Arians is essentially philosophical.  He 
underlines that because Arians interpret Christ in terms of cosmological principle, the 
Platonic dualism that is embedded in their cosmology leads them to undermine 
Christ’s deity by cutting the essential bond between the Son and the Father.36  It is 
noteworthy that in their rejection of Christ’s deity the Arians are not without biblical 
proof.  They appeal to biblical verses that particularly indicate the poverty and 
weakness of Christ and his need to offer obedience and prayer to the Father to 
substantiate their arguments of Christ’s createdness.37  While Arianism rejects the 
deity of Christ, Torrance says that it underpins the Logos as ‘a creature, but not as 
                                               
31 Ibid., 115, 85. 
32 TF, 136-37.  By relegating the Son to a mere creature, Torrance claims that Arian dualism deeply 
distorts the orthodox teaching of the mediation of Christ that is defended relentlessly by the Nicene 
Fathers.  See TF, 118-20. 
33 Ibid., 118. 
34 TRci, 62. 
35 Ibid., 48. 
36 TF, 1121-125. 
37 The popular text used by Arians is taken from Prove b 8:22 which says, ‘The Lord created me a 
beginning of his ways for his work’.  Concerning the weakness, poverty and obedience of Christ, the 
common verses cited are Philippians 2:9 f. and Hebrews 3:1 f.  Although Arians use the biblical verses 
to argue for the creaturely nature of Christ, Torrance says that Athanasius, in countering Arians, has 
interpreted the texts within the general scope of scripture and in the light of ‘the Apostle mind’.  
Athanasius claims that the human nature of Christ ha  to be interpreted in terms of the condescension 
of the Logos to be one of us for our sake.  Thus, Christ’s taking up of the human flesh is done in such a 
manner that he may act in our place and on our behalf before God.  See TF, 62; TRci, 151. 
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one of the creatures; a work, but not as one of the works, an offspring, but not as one 
of the offsprings’.38  The endeavour to elevate the Logos above all creatur s has 
unintentionally made the Logos neither fully divine or fully creaturely, and the 
outcome to Torrance could only be a distorted hypostatic union of Christ.39  Without 
question, the interpretation of Arians is entirely rejected by Athanasius.40  And the 
rejection is significant to Torrance because Arians’ cosmological interpretation of 
Christ indeed has a twofold undesirable repercussion.  First, as indicated earlier, it 
makes the revelation of God in Christ impossible.  If Christ is the created Logos of 
whom all things are subsequently made, he does not inhere eternally in the Being of 
God.  Like all creatures the Logos is alien and is different from the being and 
propriety of the Father.  Thus, his knowledge of the Father could only remain external 
because the ‘Son or Word cannot have or mediate any authentic knowledge of God, 
for he can know and understand only what is “in proportion to his own measure” as a 
creature.’41  In the final analysis, he constitutes only a detached and a changeable 
image of God.42  This leads us to the second point that if Arians’ concept of Christ 
remains unchallenged, it would impair, in Torrance’s opinion, the doctrine of 
soteriology.  Torrance aptly says, ‘[T]he atoning sacrifice of Christ would then be 
understood only in terms of some kind of superficial socio-moral or judicial 
transaction between God and mankind which does not penetrate into the ontological 
depths of human being or bear savingly upon the distorted and corrupt condition of 
man’s actual human existence’.43  If we recall Torrance’s stress of the closeness 
between revelation and reconciliation in our preceding chapter, any distortion of 
Christ’s revelation to him would indubitably lead to the impairment of our 
understanding of Christ’s salvation.  
We have thus far analysed Torrance’s understanding of dualism in the 
theological context of Arianism.  As discussed, dualism to Torrance, as represented 
by Arianism, is about the separation of cosmos noetos and cosmos aisthetos that 
inevitably leads to the logical conclusion of separating the Creator from the creation.  
By separating God irreconcilably from the world, Arian dualism deprives God of 
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having any interaction and relation with the world and thus renders the incarnation of 
the Son impossible.  On this note, the hypostatic un on of Christ and his homoousion 
with the Father are impinged.  When God’s action could not take place in the 
creation, the normative pattern of the union and communion of divine and human 
action of revelation and mediation is damaged; as there is an absence of divine 
participation.  When what is left is only human action, or the action of the created 
Logos, Torrance asserts that the definitive outcome could only be the projection of 
human thought and imagination into God; it could only be mythology and not the 
hypostatic self-revelation of Christ.  To put it succinctly, Arian dualism to Torrance is 
the nullification of the revelation and mediation of Christ.  It is for this reason that 
among the discernible heresies Torrance regards Arianism to be the archenemy of the 
church, ‘forcing’ the church subsequently to crystalli e its faith in the form of creed.44  
The reprimand of Arian dualism by Athanasius and the Nicene Fathers is seen by 
Torrance as the critical theological defence of the c urch.  If we approach Torrance’s 
criticism of dualism in the same light, we may comment that his intent to address the 
issue today is to defend the essentiality of Christ’s revelation and mediation from 
being eclipsed by what he perceives as ‘some modern th ology’.  Fundamentally the 
problems of dualism that confront us today are not completely new to Torrance.  
Torrance says, ‘Today too we have the same sort of confusion…  The real issues are 
basically the same as in the third and fourth centuries, while we have the same kind 
of popular theology that in Gnosticism and Arianism gripped the imagination of the 
popular mind but menaced the foundations of the Christian Church’.45   
One issue demands our attention.  Torrance’s definition of dualism, as 
mentioned in the preceding section, is general and philosophical, and is inadequate in 
supporting his theological usage.  It is therefore ur aim to elicit some result from the 
current discussion to complement his definition theologically.  Three main points 
may be drawn from our analysis.  First, it concerns the irreconcilable relation 
between the poles in dualism.  The dualism of Arians clearly underpins that the 
cosmos noetos and cosmos aisthetos are two poles of existence.  The relation between 
the two poles is one of opposition, or even contradiction.  The irreconcilable relation 
between God and the creation is indicative of the opposing bipolar relation in 
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dualism.  It is noteworthy that the hypostatic union f Christ that involves the 
bipolarity of God and man is not considered as dualism by Torrance.  The crux is that 
the nature of relation between the two poles of God an  man in Christ is not seen as 
opposing or contradicting, but union.  The problem of Arian, Ebionite or Docetic 
version of Christ lies precisely in its dualistic pro ensity to see the two poles as 
irreconcilable.  Thus, we may suggest that the key problem of dualism to Torrance is 
not about the existence of bipolar poles, but the irr concilable, opposing and 
contradicting relation between the two poles.  Second, dualism is not merely a 
technical term appropriated for the description of the phenomenon of opposing poles; 
it is also about an internalised mindset that shapes a person’s perception of reality.  
The Arian controversy shows that the issue is much more than a debate over a 
definition or conception.  It involves one’s entrenched pattern of thinking and mode 
of conceiving reality.46  Third, dualism posts a threat to realism.  From our discussion 
it is apparent that dualism in Torrance’s mind represents certain form of destruction 
or distortion.  The reality of one cosmos is distortedly perceived as two opposing 
poles of cosmos noetos and cosmos aisthetos.  The relation between God and the 
world is misstated by the irreconcilable separation.  The knowledge of God, 
revelation, mediation and salvation in Jesus Christ are all destructed by dualistic 
interpretation.  Thus, from the analysis, we may define dualism in Torrance’s 
theological context as an internalised mode of perceiving reality into two opposing 
poles of the Creator and the creation, negating any real relation between them and 
rendering God’s revelation and mediation in Christ null. 
A question has to be raised as we approach the end of the section.  We need to 
ask how accurate is Torrance’s reading of Arius and his supporters.  We have 
mentioned from the outset that by taking their works indiscriminately as one, 
Torrance is giving his critics the occasion of criti ism.  And the inducement to 
comment critically is there especially when reading Torrance’s account, one could 
not but to feel that on certain occasions his interpr tations appear simplistic.  The fact 
is Torrance has developed his line of argument against Arianism fully and uncritically 
from the discourse of Athanasius without taking any historical context, textual 
difficulty or current patristic scholarship into consideration.  John Webster comments 
that Torrance’s premises may or may not be correct, but the ‘arguments against those 
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premises are sufficiently strong to warrant very serious attention: recent work on the 
theology of Arius, for instance, suggests both thate issues are more complex than 
Torrance allows and that early Christianity may have much less theologically firm’.47  
Torrance, however, is not without defence.  He clearly spells out his methodology in 
The Trinitarian Faith.  Torrance says, ‘I have tried to let the patristic theologians 
concerned, almost entirely from the Greek East, speak for themselves, without the 
intrusion of material derived from later sources.  I have deliberately refrained from 
discussing the interpretation of modern authors, while such references to their works 
as I have made are mostly of an incidental kind.’48   
Notwithstanding Torrance’s clarification, one may question the workability of 
his methodology.  The issue is not merely about the ‘patristic theologians concerned’ 
are able to speak for themselves ‘without the intrusion of material derived from later 
sources’.  It is as well whether modern readers ‘without the intrusion of material 
derived from later sources’ could adequately apprehend the message given the 
incompleteness, complexity and particularity of theworks of the patristic authors and 
their contexts.  Even if we could claim to know the‘plain sense’ of the texts without 
being too occupied with historical issues as advocated by John Barton,49 one may still 
need to ask if Torrance’s exposition of the materials by itself should be or should not 
be considered as an  ‘intrusion of material derived from later sources’?  The question 
is particularly relevant in the light that some criti s, such as John Morrison, have 
commented that to some extent the Greek Fathers are me  reflections of Torrance’s 
own larger theological program.50  In addition, Torrance has some questions to 
answer in relation to his use of Athanasius against Arius.  On this note, the caution of 
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Rowan Williams desires our attention.  He says, ‘[T]he writings of Athanasius, have 
to be handled with caution---not total scepticism, indeed, but with the recognition 
that, divorced from their own original literary context, they are, in the works in which 
they are now found, very far from presenting to us the systematic thought of Arius as 
he himself saw it.’51  Not unrelated to the present discussion, we need to ask as well 
the legitimacy of Torrance in associating Arius with Platonism in the discourse.  This 
is a worthy question in the light that Torrance seems to project the impression that 
Arius’ argumentation, particularly on the mediatorial ole of the Son, is built upon the 
ground of Platonic philosophy.  On this issue, Rowan Williams provides us with an 
alternative view.  He says, ‘Arius’ cosmos is not that of “Middle Platonism”; ascent 
to the first principle by graded sequence of images, knowledge of God through the 
created works which show his wisdom and through the primary eikōn, the Son, are 
not at the heart of Arius’ understanding…  he is not a philosopher, and it would be a 
mistake to accuse him of distorting theology to serve the ends of philosophical 
tidiness.’52   
An observation picked up by Luoma about Torrance’s selective use of 
materials has to be highlighted.  Luoma comments that while Torrance associates 
Platonism and dualism, he suggests at the same time that Athanasius has no such 
Platonic influence.  Luoma says, ‘This interpretation s, however, quite limited and 
not at all as simple as Torrance would have us believe.  It has been convincingly 
shown that Platonic thought had a remarkable influece upon Athanasius and the 
other Greek Fathers to such an extent that the sharp distinction Torrance draws 
between Platonic dualism and the thought of the Nicene Fathers can hardly be 
justified.’53   
The above are valid remarks and questions that Torrance indeed cannot avoid.  
However, we should not neglect the fact that while Torrance could be more complete 
in substantiating his arguments, his ultimate concern is to safeguard what he regards 
as the most fundamental in theological construction; namely, the revelation and 
mediation of God in Jesus Christ.  The Arian controve sy as stated by Athanasius 
provides Torrance with a window to identify dualism as the formidable threat that has 
to be harnessed resolutely.  Torrance’s association of the ‘eclipse of God’ with some 
modern theology, his criticisms of Descartes, Newton and Kant, and Aristotle and 
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Plato, as shown in our historical sketch, are indicative of the understanding.  By 
working with a general definition, it enables Torrance to gather easily under the 
rubric of dualism any threat to Christ’s revelation a d mediation that is operating 
along the bipolar division.  In someway that accounts for Torrance’s difficulty, as our 
argument shows. 
We have in this section defined dualism theologically nd ascertained its 
detrimental implications within the context of Torrance’s criticism of Arianism.  Our 
discussion suggests that the main motive of Torrance to attack Arianism lies in the 
defence of the realism of God’s revelation and mediation in Christ.  Torrance’s 
endeavour, however, is not without problem.  As we turn to his criticism of 
Newtonian dualism, it would be clear that the intent of safeguarding Christ’s 
revelation and mediation continues to shape Torrance’s argument and his reading of 





The aim of the present section is to examine Torrance’s criticism of Newtonian 
dualism.  We attempt to argue, after delimiting dualism within the theological context 
of Torrance in the preceding section, that the motive of safeguarding God’s revelation 
and mediation in Christ is constitutive of his reading and judging of the work of 
Newton as dualistic.  
The relation between Newton and Descartes according to Torrance is one of 
‘hate and love’.  In spite of Newton’s apparent dislike of Descartes, he is 
unquestionably indebted to him.  J. Herivel says, ‘The arguments here advanced, if 
sound, point to a very important influence of Descartes on Newton in dynamics, 
direct in the case of the principle of inertia, circular motion, and collisions, indirect in 
the case of Newton’s concept of force.’54  Notwithstanding the influence, Newton 
rejects Descartes’ rationalistic abstraction of mathematics and his method of deriving 
positions by pure intellection.  Newton takes up a more realist conception of 
mathematics that is closely coordinated with experience.  Torrance observes that 
Newton’s reaction against Descartes has led him into a stronger notion of causality, 
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and a more rigidly mechanical conception of the universe.55  Besides mechanics, the 
metaphysics of Descartes has also left an indelible impact on Newton.  Torrance 
comments, ‘[Newton] took over more or less uncritically the Cartesian development 
of Galileo’s phenomenalism as something that belonged, almost axiomatically, to the 
new science which he championed and of which he becam  the supreme exponent.’56  
Although Newton underpins the relatedness of scientific concept with sense 
experience, he essentially builds the Cartesian dualism of the independent mind and 
matter deeply into his scientific system.  This is the root of Newton’s dualism to 
Torrance. 
To be in line with his rejection of Cartesian’s ‘pure mathematics’, Newton 
conceives nature as a mechanism operating according to atural laws.57  His main 
focus is to give a mathematical account of the intell gibility and rationality of the 
universe.  Newton rejects questions of hypothetical nature.  Questions that cannot be 
mathematically deduced from phenomena have no place in his scheme.58  For 
example, with regard to the question about the origin of gravity, Newton makes this 
axiomatic statement, ‘I frame no hypotheses’.59  Torrance could appreciate Newton’s 
claims that the scientific principles of mechanical uses in the universe could not be 
extrapolated to account for the origin of the universe; as a different kind of 
explanation is required for the ‘cause’ of its existence.60  If hypotheses and 
speculations are disallowed in Newton’s scientific system, the inevitable question is 
what ‘different kind of explanation’ could we have for the cause of the ultimate and 
inherent intelligibility of the universe?  It is here we judge that Torrance has 
manoeuvred his way deftly to relate science and theology within the scheme of 
Newton’s discourse.  According to Torrance, Newton perceives the universe as a 
mechanical system complete and consistent in itselfonly if it is related to the counsel 
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of a voluntary and intelligent Agent beyond it.61  Neither chance nor necessity could 
suffice an intelligent answer for its operation and existence. In the final analysis, 
Newton says that we are thrown back to the ultimate will of God, the Creator who 
creates and sustains the stability and regularity of the universe.  This indeed is an 
important point because it implies that the universe is an open system towards God 
and dependent on God in spite of its deterministic and mechanical character.  On this 
note, we may comment that Torrance has no difficulty in concurring with Newton as 
he himself recognises as well the importance of creation contingence; a crucial 
thought of Torrance in his understanding of the relation between science and theology 
that will be explored in greater length in chapter six.   
There is, however, in Torrance view, a problem in Newton’s idea of 
associating God with the universe.  Although according to Newton the limitation of 
mechanical causes could reveal nothing about God, he believes that ‘it may yield 
exact and coherent knowledge of things only in terms of an absolute reference-system 
constituted in the inertial conditioning of all things by God.’62  This brings us to what 
Torrance believes to be the crux of Newton’s discourse; namely, the dualistic 
distinction between the absolute and relative time and space, and the identification of 
the absolute time and space with God as the inertial system of reference for the 
phenomenal reality.  Torrance maintains that time and space in Newton’s notion are 
on the one hand absolute, undifferentiated, unchanging and bear no relation to 
anything external, on the other hand they could be experienced through the 
coordination of sense and motion.  However, the latter (relative time and space) 
should not be confounded with the former (absolute time and space) because it is 
essentially the inference of our sense experience.  Torrance claims that the 
undergirding principle that is at work here is derivative of the Cartesian dualism in 
separating the real nature of the universe from our relative observation of it.  In the 
final analysis, the independent role that is given to absolute time and space inevitably 
implies an irreducible gap between the way we explain the mechanical world and the 
mechanical world itself is to be explained.63  This is the precise reason to Torrance 
why God is needed in Newton’s scientific framework to be ‘the kind of explanation’ 
for the cause and origin of the contingent creation.   
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In alluding to General Scholium, Torrance underlines that Newton has 
grounded the independent ontological status of the absolute time and space in the 
eternal and infinite God who, ‘by existing always and everywhere, constitutes 
duration and space.’64  That is to say, in Torrance’s reading, ‘Newton seems to have 
identified absolute time with the eternal duration of God and absolute space with the 
infinite presence of God.’65  The outcome of such identification is the receptacle 
notion of understanding God as the ‘container’ containing all events and objects in 
objective reality.  Torrance claims that in this way Newton is able to account for the 
rationality and intelligibility of the mechanical world as ‘the movement of thought 
from God to the world’.66  But to relate the mechanical world to God as the absolute 
referential point as indicated is not without difficulty.  Torrance asserts that the 
immediate theological challenge is the possibility of a synthesis between the Creator 
and the creation, the ‘grand mythological synthesis’.67  The outcome of such 
synthesis is detrimental as it leads to either the debasement of divine transcendence or 
the elevation and deification of the material world beyond its creatureliness.  The 
question is could this truly be the view of Newton?   
In responding to the question, Torrance’s argument at his point makes a 
striking turn.  He says, ‘Certainly Newton himself would have denied this, for he 
clearly intended to guard himself against such a chrge.  He explicitly wrote in the 
General Scholium that God is not identical with eterni y and infinity, i.e., with 
infinite time and space.’68  Torrance’s discourse on this note appears ambiguous, 
especially in the light that he is drawing from the same source to substantiate two 
opposing points.  However, to be fair to Torrance, it should be said that even in 
Newton’s own words the phrases are not without problems.  Luoma comments that 
Newton certainly writes ‘[God is] eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; 
that is his duration reaches from eternity to eternity; his presence from infinity to 
infinity.’ 69  ‘But,’ Luoma says, ‘Newton determinedly rejects any idea that the 
adjective eternal or infinite could be used as subject predicates referring to God in 
phrases like “God is eternity” or “God is infinity”---he is just eternal and infinite.’70  
If Luoma is right in his analysis, one could either say that Newton has or has not 
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identified the absolute time and space with God.  It all depends on how God’s eternal 
duration and presence are being interpreted in the context of Newton’s writings.  
Taking Torrance’s work in its proper setting of criti ising Newtonian dualism, we are 
not inaccurate to judge that he inclines to subscrie the view that Newton does 
identify God with absolute time and space, and hold a receptacle view of God’s 
duration and presence.  Our judgment is also based on the following analysis. 
One thing, however, is unequivocally clear.  Torrance definitively claims that 
Newton has identified the absolute time and space with the mind of God.  He says, 
‘[T]his fixed frame of reference---absolute, mathematical time and space---Newton 
identified with the mind of God, which contains and imposes objective order upon the 
universe.  God contains the universe, however, without being affected by it 
impassibly and immutably---that is what Newton meant by the term absolute in this 
connection.’71  By establishing such a link, Torrance perceives in Newton’s concept 
an implication that reaches not just the realm of science but also theology.  It is 
important for us to recall that the root of Newton’s concept, as Torrance indicates, 
lies in his acceptance of Cartesian dualism that advocates the separation of the mind 
of the observer and the objective structure of nature.72  Thus, to make a statement that 
the mind of God is identified with the absolute time and space, Torrance is 
pinpointing the dualistic division between the absolute and relative time and space 
has now been transposed into the dualistic separation between God and the world.  In 
this regard, God’s relation with the world becomes tangential.  There is an absence of 
dynamic interaction between God and the world because the dualism of Newton has 
mutually excluded one from another, and made the God of scripture esoterically 
incomprehensible.  God in Newton’s scheme has becom impersonal and ineffable.  
Torrance says,  
 
But if God inertially contains and regulates the universe without being affected by it, 
there is no interaction between God and the universe in the biblical or patristic sense-
--that is why Newton found himself having to reject the incarnation, and even to 
support Arius against Athanasius.73   
 
And,  
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If God Himself is the infinite Container of all things He can no more become 
incarnate than a box can become one of the several objects that it contains.  Thus, 
Newton found himself in sharp conflict with Nicene theology and its famous 
homoousion, and even set himself to defend Arius against Athanasius.74   
 
From the arguments it is self-evidenced that Torrance regards the dualism of 
Newton as problematic and objectionable as the dualism of Arian.  The identification 
of God with the absolute time and space that indubitably leads to the receptacle 
notion of God has the serious setback of separating God from the world.  It renders 
incarnation and homoousion impossible.  To Torrance that would only mean one 
thing---the nullification of God’s revelation and mediation in Christ.  By associating 
Newton with Arius, the move of Torrance is indicative of why Newton is to be taken 
seriously as the proponent of dualism; namely, he perceives in him a mirror of Arius.  
The crux is Torrance believes he has detected similar dualistic patterns between Arius 
and Newton.  To Torrance the Platonic dualism of Arius has given rise to a highly 
transcendental view of God that separates God impassibly from the interaction of the 
world.  Similarly, the Cartesian dualism of Newton brings forth the identification of 
God with the absolute time and space, and creates an unbridgeable schism between 
God and the phenomenal world.  Arius believes incaration is impossible because the 
ineffable God cannot become an object of creation.  Likewise, the notion of God as 
the Container will rule out the possibility of incarn tion; as Torrance says, the 
Container cannot become an object of its contents.  Thus, it should not come to us as 
a surprise that Torrance indeed regards the dualism of Newton as the ‘revival of the 
old Hellenistic dualism’75 that should be handed with utmost severity, just as Arius 
was critically challenged by Athanasius in his days. 
Our analysis thus far touches on the reasons for Newton to use God as the 
explanation for the rationality and intelligibility of the universe.  One aspect of 
Torrance’s reading has to be highlighted here.  Torrance says notwithstanding the 
notion that God is the absolute inertial system to which the deterministic and 
mechanical world refers to, God is also needed in Newton’s scheme on scientific 
terms to manage certain ‘irregularities’ in the universe that ‘require constant divine 
intervention in order to preserve harmony and stabili y within the solar and stellar 
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system.’76  In other words, there are deficiencies in the chain of mechanical causes 
that require God to play the regulative role in order to guarantee consistent harmony 
and perpetual on going of the universe.  Torrance claims that Newton’s appropriation 
of God in this regard entails significant implications.  First, it implies a rejection on 
Newton’s part of a complete deterministic and mechanical world.  Second, God is 
seen as an active Agent whose ‘divine causes are mad  to operate in interconnection 
with and on the same level as mechanical causes.’77   On this note, the transcendence 
of God as identified with the absolute time and space is compromised.  Torrance 
comments that that could not be the desire of Newton as it contradicts the arguments 
of the separation of God from the world, as indicated earlier.  Torrance thus 
concludes that Newton ‘appears to have confused, or mistakenly run together, the all-
important comprehending and containing role of God in relation to the creation of the 
universe and its continuance as an entire system, and the role of God in regulating the 
chain of mechanical causes and coping with the emergencies resulting from 
irregularities within the universe.’78   
Is there really some confusion between the two roles f God by Newton?  Is 
Torrance’s assessment justifiable?  Luoma comments that this problem troubles 
Torrance a fair deal because he has based his arguments on the presumption of 
Newton’s deterministic views and restricted understanding of the contingency of the 
universe.  The remark of Torrance about Newton’s confusion is, according to Luoma, 
a ‘satisfying explanation’ for Torrance to justify his interpretation.79  We however 
believe the key lies in the accuracy of Torrance’s r ading of Newton.  We have, in the 
earlier discussion, mentioned the association of God’s duration and presence with the 
absolute time and space.  Now the question concerns the mind of God and the 
absolute time and space.  In order to know the answer, e need to go back to the 
meaning of Newton’s ensorium Dei to which Torrance has translated as the mind of 
God.  The translation is not unambiguous because the significance of Newton’s 
sensorium in this context is a matter of debate.  In relation t  Newton’s controversy 
with Leibniz, it has been argued that the term should be understood as an analogy and 
not literally, as it refers to God’s ability to be intimately aware of the world and 
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events in it.80  In addition, according to Edward Craig’s analysis in The Mind of God 
and the Works of Man, he says that the sensorium according to Newton is ‘where the 
brain meets the mind, where the physiological processes give rise to a representation 
of the world in consciousness,’81 not quite the ‘actual’ mind of God as Torrance 
would have us believed.  Notwithstanding the issue of translation, what is important 
is that Newton himself has given the impression that he is after all not too keen of the 
association, and the sensorium of God has only been mentioned once by Newton in 
the wider context of his works, as Luoma indicates.82  This is a significant 
observation.  If Luoma is right on this note, it would mean that there is no ‘confusion’ 
on the part of Newton because, in the first place, th re is no strict identification 
between ‘the mind of God’ and the absolute time and space in his framework.  Thus, 
there is no contradiction here for Newton to give God the regulative role to mend 
irregularities in the phenomenal world.   
If that is the case, the vital question now is why ould Torrance in his reading 
of Newton put so much stock in the identification of the mind of God with the 
absolute time and space?  A possible answer, as sugge ted by Luoma, is that 
Torrance’s interpretation of Newton’s works is superficial as he has not only made 
the direct identification on behalf of Newton, he has also read more into the thought 
of Newton than is justified.83   While there is certainly some truth in the explanation, 
we suspect there is more to it than meets the eye.  We would argue that when 
Torrance approaches Newton with his frame of dualism and detects in someway that 
Newton did associate the mind of God (and God’s duration and presence, as shown in 
our earlier discussion) with the absolute time and space, he believes he has found the 
root of Newton’s dualism.  By firmly pounding on the association, Torrance could 
gain mileage and establish a case out of it.  The main reason for Torrance to pin on 
the association is that dualism is too much a formidable threat to God’s revelation and 
mediation in Christ.  To Torrance the account of Newton runs the risk of separating 
                                               
80 Luoma underlines that Torrance is inaccurate in saying that Newton has linked sensorium of God to 
the absolute time and space.  The fact is, according to Luoma, only space is involved.  It is clearly 
evidenced in the Opticks, the work that gives rise to the discussion, when N wton says, ‘And these 
things being rightly dispatched, does it not appear from Phaenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, 
living, intelligent, omnipresent, who in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory, sees the things 
themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them wholly by their 
immediate present to himself.’  See Luoma, 96. 
81 Craig, Edward. The Mind of God and the Works of Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 31.  Cited 
in Luoma, 96. 
82 Luoma, 96 
83 Ibid., 97. 
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God from the world by creating an irreconcilable schi m between the two; it deprives 
God of having any real interaction with the world and thus makes the incarnation of 
God in Christ questionable; it distorts homoousion and hypostatic union.  When 
divine action could not take place in the world, the normative pattern of the union and 
communion of divine and human action of revelation and mediation is impaired.  
Christ’s revelation, mediation and salvation are annulled, as implicated in Arian 
dualism.  The stake is simply too high for Torrance to ignore, even though the 
association in this regard is tenuous. 
We have in this section centred on Torrance’s criticism of Newton.  Our 
discussion suggests that the main cause of his disapproval lies in perceiving the 
dualistic threat that is embedded in the works of Newton; which, to Torrance, would 
inevitably lead to the subversion of God’s revelation and mediation in Christ.  
Torrance’s intent is manifest when he relates Newtonian dualism with Arian dualism, 
and to regard the former as the revival of the old Hellenistic dualism.  Thus, it may 
not be inaccurate to conclude that Torrance’s intent o safeguard the realism of 
Christ’s revelation and mediation in the contingent creation has motivated him to read 





This chapter focuses primarily on Torrance’s perception of dualism as the detriment 
to the proper understanding of God’s revelation and mediation in Christ.  By 
sketching the historical terrain of dualism via thelenses of Torrance, we show that 
what Torrance has gathered under the rubric is vast and complex.  Notwithstanding 
Torrance’s immense effort to engage the issue, little has been put in to define the term 
theologically.  Our first endeavour therefore is to delimit dualism theologically in 
accordance with Torrance’s understanding so that it may complement his 
philosophically inclined definition.  We then identify the ramifications of dualism in 
Torrance’s criticism of Arians and Newton.  We argue that the main problem of 
dualism to Torrance lies basically in its a priori approach in separating God 
irreconcilably from the world, and depriving God of having any actual relation with 
it.  By rendering the incarnation of God impossible, dualism distorts the hypostatic 
union of Christ and his homoousion with the Father.  It impairs the normative pattern 
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of revelation and mediation by denying Christ of his divinity.  On this note, 
Torrance’s criticism of Arian dualism and Newtonian dualism, as our argument 
shows, is carried out principally in the interest of safeguarding God’s revelation and 
mediation in Christ.  The task of defence is of paramount importance to Torrance 
particularly in the light of what he perceives to be the problematic eclipsing of God in 
some modern theology.  Unquestionably Torrance regards the problem as the 
inappropriateness of human action in understanding ivine self-disclosure.  However, 
it would be an oversight for one to take Torrance’s criticism as a debasement of 
human participation, for human action is as important as divine action in this regard.  
The crux is human action has to be carried out in accordance with divine action, as 
Torrance would argue.  How could human action achieve ts proper and rightful role 
in Torrance’s theology of revelation and mediation is the primary question we 
endeavour to answer in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
The Epistemological Realism of Theological Science 
 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine Torrance’s appropriation of 
scientific realism as the repair of dualism in apprehending divine self-disclosure in 
Jesus Christ.  We attempt to show that by advocating the importance of the scientific 
nature of theology, Torrance underscores the appropriateness of scientific inquiry as 
the human action of the normative pattern of revelation and mediation in mediating 
the knowledge of God in Christ.  Thus, to set the backdrop of his arguments, we 
would begin with Torrance’s understanding of the realism of the Einsteinian-
Polanyian science.  Torrance’s postulation of theology as a valid discipline of science 
and the essentiality of scientific inquiry as the human action of theological science 
will be analysed.  As Torrance’s approach could be described as critical realism,1 we 
would discuss the relation of objectivity and subjectivity in the process of inquiry.  
Finally, question about the reasonableness of Torrance’s scientific approach would be 
touched on in the conclusion. 
 
 
The Realism of Einsteinian-Polanyian Science: A Perspective of Torrance 
 
Torrance claims that we are now living in a great tr nsition in the history of Western 
thought.  To him a deep paradigmatic change in the development of science is taking 
place as the realist perspective of objective reality is replacing the dualistic approach 
of perceiving the world cosmologically and epistemologically.  In this unitary 
understanding of objectivity of which theorem and experience are integrated to set the 
basis of the attainment of knowledge, it opens up, as Torrance says, ‘a dynamic, 
open-structured universe, in which the human spirit is being liberated from its 
                                               
1 McGrath comments that the position adopted by Torrance is best described as critical realism, a term 
defined in accordance with the description of N. T. Wright.  See Alister E. McGrath, Thomas F. 
Torrance: An Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 217-18.  Also see Sue Patterson, 
Realist Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1999), 12-32; P. M. 
Achtemeier, ‘The Truth of Tradition: Critical Realism in the Thought of Alasdair Macintyre and T. F. 
Torrance,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 47, no. 3 (1994): 355-74; John D. Morrison, ‘Heidegg r, 
Correspondence Truth and the Realist Theology of Thomas Forsyth Torrance,’ The Evangelical 
Quarterly 69 (1997): 139-55.   
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captivity in closed deterministic systems of cause and effect’.2  Such profound 
transition in modern scientific advancement is one Torrance claims that theologians 
in general cannot ignore.3  According to Torrance the shift from Newtonian to 
Einsteinian-Polanyian science is characterised by the conviction of the self-disclosure 
of objective reality and a realisation of the need for scientific inquiry to be apposite to 
the nature of the contingent rationality of the created world.  On this note, Torrance 
recognises that the scientific return to realism could serve as a reminder to theology, 
calling it back from the entrenched dualism to an appropriate human action of realist 
thinking of God’s revelation and mediation in Christ.  Before we continue, it has to 
be made known from the outset that the present section is meant neither to be a 
comprehensive study of the relation between science and theology in Torrance’s 
framework nor in itself an exhaustive analysis of the science of Einstein and Polanyi; 
as either attempt warrants a magnitude that is beyond our current compass and aim.  
The purpose of the section, however, as the heading sug ests, is to touch on the 
essential characteristics of Einsteinian-Polanyian science from the standpoint of 
Torrance so to set the backdrop of his theological s ience as the legitimate scientific 
activity of human action of the normative pattern of revelation and mediation, a 
proper corrective to dualistic distortion of God’s self-disclosure in Christ.  Thus, we 
will primarily touch on the self-disclosure of objective reality of Einstein and the 
personal knowledge of Polanyi. 
 
Albert Einstein and the Self-Disclosure of Objective Reality 
 
To Torrance one of the greatest contributions of Einstein lies in his success in finally 
going beyond Newtonian science by postulating the realism of scientific 
                                               
2 RST, ix . 
3 GGT, 17.  For that matter, Torrance argues that the dev lopment of natural science has long been 
associated with Christian tradition.  There is ‘a deeper interaction between theology and science than is 
often realised’, and ‘Christian theology has had both beneficial and harmful effects upon the rise and
progress of empirical and theoretical science.’  Torrance relates the rise of empirical science to the 
contribution of Greek patristic theology of which te radicalised ideas of contingence and contingent 
order lay the foundation of the unitary understanding of the universe.  However, according to 
Torrance, the unmoved Mover of the pervasive mediaeval doctrine of God has injected the dualistic 
mode of thinking and caused the derailment of science from its integrated foundation.  The Arian 
concept of the impassibility and ineffability of God becomes to Newton an explanation of the inertial 
relation between God and the universe.  When God is understood as only the referential point to the 
phenomenal world, it inevitably gives rise to a deterministic and mechanistic notion of the universe.  
The Newtonian dualism rules the scientific world until the late nineteenth century when true scientific 
thinking, according to Torrance, begins to take steps to restore cosmological and epistemological 
realism.  See TCFK, 218-19. 
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epistemology, and thus opening up the way for theology to return from the 
entrenched dualism to a realist approach of understanding God’s revelation and 
mediation in Christ.  Torrance is unequivocal that the achievement of Einstein is not 
possible without the significant influence of a great Christian scientist, Clark 
Maxwell.  Torrance regards Maxwell’s works as the major breakthrough in the era of 
Post-Newtonian mechanics as they steer the developmnt of science progressively 
back to realism.4  To Torrance Maxwell’s emphasis on the integration of form and 
being of scientific inquiry reorients the conception f knowledge in a new way 
departing from that of dualism.  Torrance claims that Maxwell’s formulation of field 
theory has left an indelible impact on the following generation of scientists by 
opening up a new frontier of relational understanding towards the objective reality.  
Because Maxwell has prepared the ground for a realist form of scientific thinking, 
Torrance says that Einstein is able to stand on his shoulders and continue to advance 
scientific realism.  It is in Einstein’s works that Torrance regards the transition from 
mechanical thinking to relational or ‘field’ thinking started by Maxwell reaches its 
culmination.  The realist characteristic of Einsteinian science according to Torrance is 
best demonstrated in the theory of relativity.  Building upon the field theory, 
Torrance says that it operates with the integration of empirical and theoretic 
components of science, and lays bare the dynamic structures and self-disclosing 
nature of the objective reality.  The development is of particular significance in the 
light of the increasing failure of mechanistic scien  to account satisfactorily new 
discovery made possible by the advancement of science.5  To Torrance it essentially 
brings forth the erroneous basis of dualism and affirms the validity of realism in 
approaching the objective reality.  On this note, w may briefly discuss Torrance’s 
accounts of Einstein’s mathematical formulation, theory and principia in order to 
substantiate the suggestion that it is from scientif c realism that Torrance finds the 
useful apparatus for theology. 
                                               
4 CTSC, 50-51.  Also see Torrance’s introduction to the book by Maxwell, A Dynamical Theory of the 
Eelectromagnetic Field (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1982), ix.  
5 TCFK, 272.  This ‘enormous stride’ of moving forward in Einsteinian science according to Torrance 
involves ‘a step back to Newton.’  That is to say, in Torrance’s view, although Einstein appropriates 
the deduction of classical science, his cognitive instrument is free in the sense that it has no prior 
logical control from fixed premises.  He allows the objective comprehensibility in the nature of things 
that is independent of our observation to ‘speak intuitively’ to us.  Thus, with regard to the notion f 
time and space in the theory of relativity, Einstein is able to reject Newton’s postulation of the absolute 
time and space and to define them in terms of their relation to the human observer’s physical frame of 
reference.  To Torrance, Einstein is deeply convinced of the independence of the objective reality.  See
TCFK, 273 and CFM, xx. 
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By rejecting traditional dualism that separates ‘the logic formal’ from ‘the 
objective or intuitive content’ of mathematics, Torrance says that Einstein, in 
following the heels of Maxwell, has turned his thought from abstract to embodied 
mathematics.  Torrance comments, ‘This was the all-important switch from Euclidean 
to four-dimensional geometry and the physical but dynamic space-time concepts it 
entailed, which meant working with ontological grounded objectivities and 
intelligibilities that can never be completely reduced to conceptual explications or 
mathematical formalisations.’6  However, instead of debasing the validity of 
mathematical components in physics, Torrance underli es Einstein’s claims that they 
have a more basic and heuristic role to play in scientif c discovery when they are in 
intuitive contact with the objective reality.  By underpinning the importance of 
integrating form and being, Torrance asserts that Einstein has overcome the old 
dualism of Kantian phenomenalism by fusing together  logical-formal aspect and 
the intuitive content of mathematics.  Thus, Torrance claims that Einstein has 
changed radically our perception of reality from the enclosed dualistic-mechanistic 
model to an open realist-disclosure model.  The outcome is the consequential 
awareness that the constancy of objective reality, as represented by mathematical 
invariance in physics, is essentially contingent and self-disclosing, and cannot be 
imposed upon or reduced to anything simply by a priori principle.  Torrance regards 
the epistemic change as an important step in leading the way of a needed repair of 
what dualism has done not only in science but also in theology, especially in relation 
to our understanding of the revelation and mediation of God in Christ.  
The new approach towards the understanding of theory and principia in 
Einsteinian science is one theology cannot overlook especially with regard to its 
apprehension of revelatory knowledge as the conjoint action of the divine and the 
human, and its construction and revision as dogma.  Torrance remarks that in the 
context of the new scientific development, theory is no longer considered as the 
working hypothesis which involves ‘convenient arrangement of our observational 
concepts for certain pragmatic or technological ends’ that has no metaphysical 
relation to the inherent order of the natural world.7  Theory, in its proper sense, is ‘a 
speculative penetration into the structure of things’ and to ‘allow it to disclose itself 
to us.’8  Similarly, principia are not fixed but fluid axioms.  They are cognitive 
                                               
6 CTSC, 57. 
7 TCKF, 273. 
8 Ibid. 
 74
instruments used to penetrate into the objective comprehensibility of the universe.  
Torrance says, ‘We are not concerned here, then, with axioms in the old sense of 
fixed premises or principles in which we argue from certain accepted position to 
necessary conclusions….  What we have here are openflexible structures used 
postulationally, and therefore with fluid revision the further they penetrate into and 
lay bare the “inner logic” of the field under investigation.’9  With the discovery of the 
inner logic or the inherent order of the intelligible nature, Torrance says that ‘we 
realise that we “invented” or came upon them because they came at us from the side 
of the universe itself, compelling us to formulate them as “laws” through the 
astonishing correlation between our human thinking a d empirical reality.’10   
The significant redefinition of theory and principia could be said to have a 
twofold impact to Torrance.  First, it reveals the w akness of Newtonian and Kantian 
epistemological dualism by showing that the main problem of a priori approach in 
making scientific statement is nothing more than empty conceptual schemata that 
build upon the dichotomy of knowledge and the objectiv  reality.11  With the 
                                               
9 Ibid., 274. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Torrance regards Einstein’s works as the antidote to he deterministic dualism of Newtonian science 
and Kantian epistemology.  To Torrance absolute tim and space in Newtonian physics are considered 
as the inertial system to which the phenomenal event and experience take reference to in order to make 
logical sense the casual structure of the world.  Torrance claims that Newton has derived the concept 
out of the need to establish a fixed point for determining position, since no object is at rest in the
universe and all coordinate systems are to be thought of as movable systems in time and space.  On 
this note, Torrance underlines that Einstein is quick to point out this ‘fictitious character’ of Newton’s 
postulation because it arises not by empirical observation but by ‘free inventions of the intellect’.  
Thus, Torrance remarks that Newtonian science has been operating with fundamental axioms that are 
‘placed at the beginning of the theory as formal premises’.    In Torrance’s view, the problem of Kant 
to certain degree is not unlike that of Newton.  Torrance says that Kant, when responding to Hume’s 
analysis, has ‘transferred’ absolute time and space from the mind of God to the mind of the knower in 
order to maintain their absolute character and to argue that they are not affected by sense experience.  
Through his theory of ‘synthetic a priori’, Torrance says that Kant, instead of reading law of nature o t 
of nature, ultimately imposes conceptual order upon nature through the processes and structures of 
active reason.  Like Newton, the outcome of Kant’s epistemological approach is a closed system with 
its premises being detached from the process of inquiry.  To Torrance this inevitably leads to 
axiomatic abstraction and imposition of theoretical presupposition upon the object of investigation.  
However, with the advent of relativity theory, Torrance underlines that the deterministic dualism has to 
make way for the rediscovery of the contingent freedom and objective reality.  Scientific premises 
according to Einstein could not be preconceived in advance; they need to be the integral parts of 
scientific inquiry, postulation and verification if they are to be relevant.  They can only be a posteriori 
and are accepted ‘on the ground of that they give int lligible and unifying form to the inferential 
relations in which they are incorporated.’  The keypoint of Torrance is about the reciprocal dynamic 
between the scientific-axiomatic formulation and the inherent rationality of things that is beyond our
comprehension.  And it is at this point Torrance finds the relevance of Einstein’s theory of relativity in 
providing the integrative solution that the Newtonian mechanistic postulation or Kantian 
epistemological presupposition has failed to do.  Thus, to Torrance, the achievement of Einstein lies in 
initiating a new way of axiomatic thinking in physic , eliciting the inner logic of contingent order, and 
laying bare the premises embedded in the intrinsic connections of objective reality.  See TCFK, 23, 
272-73; GR, 99-100; GGT, 25-26. 
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meaning of theory and principia redefined, Torrance argues that relativity theory has
made possible the advancement of scientific knowledge through the remarkable 
epistemic correlation between the inherent thought pat erns of the human mind with 
the intelligible order of nature embodied in objective reality.  As Torrance aptly says, 
‘for if nature is not in itself that which we claim to know of it in its relations toward 
us, then we do not really know nature but are merely operating with convenient 
symbols or useful arrangements of observational data.’12  Second, since the 
development of theological knowledge is not completely unlike that of science, the 
redefinition that underscores the correlation betwen the self-disclosing nature of 
objective reality and the appropriateness of scientific inquiry has implication in our 
understanding of God’s self-revelation in Christ as involving necessarily the union 
and communion of divine and human action, if it is to be genuine.  In addition, 
because revelatory knowledge of God attained by this act of union and communion 
between the divine and human is essentially fluid an not static, the forming of it as 
dogma by the church thus logically calls for constat revision and correction under 
the on going compulsive influence of the revealing God in Christ by the Spirit.  This 
is the vital argument that undergirds Torrance’s criticism of the aberrance of dualism 
especially in the context of defending not only thesovereignty of God, but also the 
appropriateness of human participation as scientific inquiry in the revelation and 
mediation of divine self-disclosure in Christ.  Thus, it may be said that the Einsteinian 
revolution has provided Torrance with what he would regard as the ‘appropriate tool’ 
to argue for the imperative return of theology from its epistemic course of dualism to 
realism in understanding divine revelation and mediation. 
We may end our discussion with a short demonstration of the effectiveness of 
the ‘tool’.  When commenting on Einstein’s stress of grounding scientific knowledge 
on the self-disclosing nature of objective intelligib lity, Torrance says, ‘This all 
important point, theologically speaking, may be called the homoousion of physics, the 
basic insight that our knowledge of the universe is not cut short at appearance or what 
we can deduce from them, but is a grasping of reality in its ontological depth, and that 
we are unable to pierce through appearances and apprehend the structures of reality 
unless we operate with the ontological integration of form and being, or of structure 
and matter, which is, after all, what E = MC² entails.’13  Just as the concept of 
                                               
12 GGT, 162. 
13 Ibid. 
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homoousion comes about through the Nicene Fathers’ theological realisation of the 
inherent truth of God’s self-revelation and mediation in Christ, the concept of the 
‘homoousion of physics’ emerges through Einstein’s scientific discovery of the 
revelatory nature of objective reality.  Both, as Torrance argues, pivot on the 
undeniable fact that the true nature of things essentially is what they are inherently in 
themselves.  ‘Nature does not deceive us or play tricks with us,’ Torrance says, ‘it is 
everywhere trustworthy and reliable.  Thus the homoousion of physics represents an 
epistemological revolution of very far-reaching significance for natural [and 
theological] science.’14   
                                               
14 Ibid.  Notwithstanding the groundbreaking achievement of his scientific works, Torrance says that 
Einstein is not blind to the fact that science has its limitation.  At least, according to Einstein, science is 
unable, as a process of inquiry itself, to establish independently the basic belief of the objective 
rationality of reality.  Thus, Einstein is convinced that without profound faith that derives from religion 
and revelation, science would be inconceivable.  In co gruence with Einstein, Torrance would argue 
that the essential breakthrough of modern science aris s out of that fundamental conviction of belief 
and faith.  Torrance says that both Einstein and Maxwell hold the view that the fundamental beliefs are
intuitive and religious in character.  The intuitive character of belief is associated with the ‘pre-
established harmony’ between human thought and the independent empirical reality.  It makes possible 
the human mind to discover and understand the intrinsic structure of natural order; as Einstein claims 
that it is only through intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience, that we are abl to 
derive the basic laws that govern the nature.  It is important to note that, like Maxwell, Einstein does 
not consider these fundamental beliefs ‘primitive guesses’.  They are however rational insights 
impressed upon the human mind by the compelling and disclosing nature of the contingent reality. 
This leads Einstein to comprehend the religious character of such belief.  Einstein says, ‘To the sphere 
of religion belongs the faith that the regulations valid for the world of existence are rational, that is 
comprehensible to reason.  I cannot conceive of a genuine scientist without that profound faith.  The 
situation may be expressed as an image: science without religion is lame, religion without science is 
blind.’  What about the reciprocal dependence of religion on science?  Torrance underlines that 
religion is dependent on natural science to purge it of ‘the dross of its anthropomorphism’; particularly, 
the abstract form of anthropomorphism found in the projection of idealised concepts into God by the 
liberal theology.  It would be mistaken in this regard for one to think that Torrance is rejecting 
anthropomorphism totally.  In fact anthropomorphism has a role to play in Torrance’s theological 
reconstruction if it is appropriated on the basis that it derives from a profound reciprocal relation with 
a personal God who interacts with the world through his Word.  Torrance is able to underpin the 
relation between anthropomorphism and Christian doctrines because God to him is essentially 
relational and personal.  However, could the same be said of Einstein’s God?  What is this ‘God’ that 
Einstein refers to on certain occasions as ‘the Old ne’?  Arguably the most famous saying of Einstein 
concerning his understanding of God’s nature is that ‘God does not play dice’.  The statement is made 
in the context of expressing his disagreement with the idea of ‘indeterminacy’, or ‘uncertainty’, that is 
associated with a form of contemporary quantum theory.  If ‘God does not play dice’ is about 
Einstein’s profound belief in the regularity of nature, ‘God does not wear his heart on his sleeve’ 
stands for the conviction that the deep secret and beauty of contingent nature cannot be deduced 
simply from phenomenal appearances.  When referring to ‘God is deep but not devious’, Torrance says 
it expresses the complexity and subtlety, ultimate simplicity and reliability of the universe.  The 
question is what can we make out of these? How are these sayings to be interpreted?  If one is 
suspicious of an element of pantheism, he may find supports as Einstein indeed has equated ‘the 
rationality or intelligibility of the world’ with ‘a superior mind that reveals itself in the world of 
experience’ to express his concept of God.  In addition, by associating himself with Spinoza’s notion 
of God, Einstein seems to subscribe the idea that God is the ‘impersonal infinite Being immanent in 
the universe’.  In this regard, it is not surprising to know that Karl Popper in fact regards Einstein’s 
thought as ‘theistic’.  Notwithstanding his theological position, the important point to Torrance is that 
Einstein, standing on the shoulders of Maxwell, has eld firmly to the end the importance of 
fundamental belief and faith in scientific inquiry.  See CTSC, 7-8, 58-60; GGT, 112, 119, 127. 
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Michael Polanyi and the Personal Knowledge 
 
Michael Polanyi explains in Personal Knowledge that when he sub-titled the book 
‘Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy’, he had in mind now is the ‘critical moment’ for 
us to challenge the validity and superiority of rationalism.  Citing from St. Augustine, 
he argues that all knowledge is a gift of grace and ‘we must strive under the guidance 
of antecedent belief: nisi credideritis, non intelligitis.’15  To emulate Augustine’s 
success in bringing the history of Greek philosophy to a close by inaugurating, for the 
first time, a post-critical philosophy, Polanyi underpins that fundamental belief, as the 
source of all knowledge, is critical and essential in scientific endeavour.  Such 
acknowledgement is, according to Polanyi, a realisation that ‘we can voice our 
ultimate convictions only from within our convictions.’16  The problem of rationalism 
and the need to return to the fundamental belief in sc ence as Polanyi underscores 
point to that which Buber regards as the eclipse of G d in theology to Torrance.  
Unquestionably, belief, or faith, arises out of personal conviction.17 However, unlike 
                                               
15 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1969), 266.  Hereafter abbreviated as PK. Polanyi cites from St. Augustine, De libero 
arbitrio, Book I, par. 4: ‘The steps are laid down by the prophet who says, “Unless ye believe, ye shall 
not understand”.’ 
16 Ibid., 267. 
17 Torrance underlines that although belief or faith rises out of personal conviction, it is not merely an 
individualistic activity.  The quest for knowledge is not a solitary occupation.  It involves ‘inter-
personal relations with one another’.  It is when pople are open to sharing the intimate experience of 
reality that a communal conviction can be reached.  It is in the context of a believing community that 
certain common beliefs can be shaped and upheld.  Polanyi asserts that since ‘no body knows more 
than a tiny fragment of science to judge its validity and value at the first hand… he has to rely on 
views accepted at second hand on the authority of community of people accredited as scientists.’  This 
implies that in every scientific community, there exists a form of organised authority and tradition.  
They function as touchstones to facilitate both thevalue and growth of knowledge.  Polanyi and 
Torrance recognise the role of authority and tradition in setting boundary for scientific field.  They are 
there to assess and verify the outcome of research.  However, with the intent to enlarge and deepen its 
content, Torrance claims that authority and tradition cannot have the final verdict because they (like 
the outcome of research) are subject to the actual disc osure of reality and are consistently being 
relativised by the truth.  As Torrance says, ‘This does not imply that we must operate uncritically 
within the knowledge or wisdom accumulated in our cltural tradition, just because we are unable to 
extricate ourselves from involvement in it.  On thecontrary, it is because our thought is so powerfully 
influenced by culture that we must bring its latent assumptions out into the open and put them to the 
test.’  Polanyi makes the same point as well.  However, in adding an ‘essential qualification’ to the 
principle of authority, Polanyi goes beyond Torrance in claiming that ‘Every acceptance of authority is 
qualified by some measure of reaction to it or even against it.  Submission to the consensus is always 
accompanied to some extent by the imposition of one’s vi ws on the consensus to which we submit.’  
While both agree on the importance of application and modification of authority and tradition, the 
implication of Polanyi’s view is that he acknowledgs the possibility of fundamental changes within 
science.  Polanyi believes that a reasonable conception of science ‘must include conflicting views 
within science and admit of changes in the fundamental beliefs and values of scientists.’  While 
Torrance clearly identifies the common ground betwen science and theology, he would certainly be 
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the belief and conviction of dualism that essentially work with a priori principle, 
Torrance stresses that the postulation of Polanyi involves basic acts of 
acknowledgement in responding to the revealing intelligibility that is inherent in the 
nature of things and thus cannot be reduced to mere subjectivity.18  Regarded in this 
way, Torrance claims that fundamental belief and contingent rationality are 
intrinsically bound together, and the correlation between them forms the basis for 
Polanyi to focus on the importance of belief as the source of rational knowledge.19  
Thus, Torrance says that Polanyi, together with Maxwell and Einstein, have rejected 
the positivist emphasis on abstract and detached forms of thought, and attacked 
dualistic separation of mind and matter.20   
A crucial area Torrance believes Polanyi has moved significantly beyond 
Maxwell and Einstein regards the argument that there can be no knowledge of 
material realities apart from the personal activity of the knower.21  The argument is of 
particular importance to Torrance not only because it brings to light the place of 
personal judgement in scientific epistemology, it also affirms Torrance’s claim of the 
indispensable role of human participation as scientific inquiry in theology.  Having 
said that, it is unequivocal to Torrance that the acknowledgement of personal 
participation does not sweep the import to free scintif c knowledge from personal 
biases and subjective prejudices as argued by the positivists under the carpet.  Citing 
the argument of Polanyi, Torrance asserts that the positivists have overlooked the 
vital fact that it is only ‘person’ who is capable of self-criticism and of distinguishing 
what he knows from his subjective states.22  Essentially, as Polanyi says, ‘the 
discernment of a coherence, the appraisal of order, th  assessment of a probability, 
the choice between two theories, the ability to see and to guess rightly the informal 
                                                                                                                            
hesitant in applying this to the fundamental beliefs of the Christian faith.  See RST, 111-112; RET, 17; 
CTSC, 13, 68; PK, 163, 167, 208; Colin Weightman, Theology in a Polanyian Universe: The Theology 
of Thomas Torrance (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 227-28. 
18 CTSC, 68.  As Maxwell and Einstein have underlined that it is the ontological anchoring of belief in 
transcendent reality that prevents it from being subjective or arbitrary, Torrance points out that truth to 
Polanyi is essentially about the external pole of belief.  Thus, belief is about the obedience of the mind 
to the truth in the recognition of its universal claims and normative authority. 
19 Ibid., 62.  According to Torrance no one has given more explicit discussion to the priority of belief 
in rational knowledge than Polanyi. 
20 Polanyi is concerned to free science from the dominance of positivism.  In particular, according to 
Torrance, Polanyi has in mind the conventionalist and positivist notions of science advanced by Ernst 
Mach.  See TCFK, 110-111. 
21 CTSC, 62.  Weightman underlines that in his stress on the need for natural scientists to keep free 
from selfish desire, Einstein apparently associates th  personal with a negative self-centredness.  This 




decisions that enter into the process of verification, and so on, are all personal acts in 
which the scientist is constantly engaged throughout his inquiries.’23  By 
underpinning the necessity of personal participation, Torrance claims that Polanyi 
does not reject objectivity but objectivism in personal knowledge.  His emphasis on 
personal elements does not entail any subjectivism, but a refusal to it.  Indisputably 
certain degree of detachment is needed in order to maintain necessary impartiality.  
Yet a total detachment is impossible as personal participation is an integral part of the 
knowledge process.  The discourse of Polanyi has immense significance to Torrance.  
It provides Torrance with the needed support in arguing that personal belief and 
conviction in theology are legitimately objective and scientific.  It endorses 
Torrance’s claim that personal participation in theology is essentially the human 
action of scientific inquiry in responding appositely to the divine action of self-
disclosure in Christ.   
To continue to set the stage, we would mainly focus on three aspects of 
Torrance’s use of Polanyi in theology that are related to our discussion.  First, it is the 
principle of ‘indwelling’ of which Torrance regards to have an epistemological 
overlap between science and theology.  Polanyi explains that ‘indwelling’ is about the 
use of a framework for unfolding human understanding i  accordance with the 
indications and standards imposed by the framework.24  It is an interactive process 
whereby we as the subject interiorise the object we seek to know and make ourselves 
dwell in it in order to develop new facilities.25  Torrance paraphrases it as ‘the activity 
in which we let our minds dwell within some context of experience, using the 
framework which it supplies to help us gain access to deeper and fuller meaning.’26  
To both Torrance and Polanyi this is the way primary concepts that are intuitively 
                                               
23 TCFK, 135.  Polanyi concedes by saying that there is always a ‘residue of personal judgment 
involved in deciding whether to accept any particular piece of evidence, be it as proof of a true 
regularity, or, on the contrary, as a refutation of an apparent regularity.  This is how I saw and accepted 
the fact that, strictly speaking, all empirical science is inexact.  And as I came to realise that all 
integration is, like perception, based largely on tacit elements, of which we have only a vague 
knowledge, I applied this also to science, and decided that science was grounded on an act of personal 
judgement, and called this knowledge, therefore, a personal knowledge.’   In congruence with Polanyi, 
Torrance delineates, ‘In the nature of the case, however, this is not a logical or impersonal movement 
of thought carried out merely through formal operations according to definite rules, but one that can be 
undertaken only by a rational agent in the exercise of critical appraisal and judgment as well as 
intuitive discernment and apprehension.  Formal rules and impersonal instruments do, of course, play a 
considerable and indeed an utterly essential role in scientific activity, but they have to be directed and 
controlled by the scientist, as from an active personal centre of intentionality, if they are to fulfil their 
purpose.’ See TCFK, 123, 134. 
24 Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. Marjorie Grene (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1969), 134.  Hereafter abbreviated as KB. 
25 Ibid., 148. 
26 TCFK, 93. 
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connected with the object take shape in our minds and transform our thoughts.  It 
enables Torrance to argue scientifically that the compulsiveness of God’s self-
disclosure takes place in shaping human inquiry as it participates in ascertaining the 
knowledge of God in accordance with the intent of divine revelation and mediation in 
Christ.  The principle is of particular importance as Torrance claims that ‘Polanyi 
should use here the language found in the Fourth Gospel, where Jesus speaks of the 
mutual indwelling between himself and his disciples, their dwelling in his Word and 
his dwelling in them through the Spirit, enabling them to enter into more intimate 
knowledge of his mind as the revelation of the Father, and so be led forward into the 
truth.’27  However, Torrance’s use of Polanyi in this regard is not without criticism.  
Colin Weightman comments that Torrance is keen to underscore the objective 
character but undervalue the subjective aspect of indwelling as understood by 
Polanyi.28  The inescapable bodily-rootedness of personal indwelling is not 
mentioned as well in Torrance’s explication.29  Instead Torrance focuses on the 
indwelling of the object and not on the equally signif cant indwelling of the knower 
and his culture.  Weightman’s observation is not inaccurate.  Nevertheless, the matter 
in question may not be that Torrance has ‘ignored’ this crucial aspect of Polanyi’s 
thought.  Torrance, in his discussion of the personal and social coefficient of 
knowledge, clearly demonstrates that he has in mind as well the importance of the 
subjective aspect of indwelling, both bodily and culturally.30  However, in his 
appropriation, Torrance is sometime caught up with the concern to safeguard the 
absolute objectivity or the sovereignty of God in Christ’s revelation and mediation 
and thus, unlike Polanyi in natural science, unwilling to maintain the equilibrium; but 
to put more weight on the objective reality.  In other words, Torrance’s appropriation 
of Polanyi is selective and critical; as McGrath says, ‘Torrance himself regards his 
use of Polanyi as a means of developing and strength ing his own fundamental 
theological ideas, and is empathic that those ideas are not grounded in Polanyi’s 
writings.’31  The upholding of God in Christ’s revelation and mediation to Torrance is 
the critical task beyond any negotiation in theology, as any compromise in that 
                                               
27 Ibid. 
28 Weightman, 220-22. 
29 Ibid.  According to Polanyi, knowing fuses our subidiary awareness of the particulars belonging to 
our subject matter with our subsidiary awareness of our own bodily and cultural being.  Thus, he 
emphasises that all thought is incarnate or embodied.  This aspect, however, has not been the focus of 
Torrance’s discussion.   
30 For detailed discussion, see Torrance’s article of ‘The Social Coefficient of Knowledge’ in RST, 98-
130. 
31 McGrath, 229. 
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department would run the risk of falling into the pitfall of dualism, particularly the 
Arian dualism and Newtonian dualism.  On this note, w  would argue that Torrance’s 
theological consideration has circumscribed him from appropriating Polanyi lock, 
stock and barrel.   
 The second aspect of Polanyi’s discourse that is significant to Torrance 
concerns the tacit character of personal knowledge.  Torrance remarks that this is the 
distinctiveness of Polanyi in providing an important answer with regard to the 
relation between human thought and experience.32  Polanyi claims that ‘we know 
more than we can tell, for in addition to our “focal awareness” and the explicit 
knowledge to which it gives rise, we always operate with a “subsidiary awareness” 
and an implicit knowledge on which we rely in all our explicit operations.’33  Polanyi 
underlines that this tacit dimension is evident in he scientific discovery through ‘an 
unaccountable intuitive apprehension of a structure in reality’, and in the 
development of knowledge through ‘a process of integration in which largely 
unspecifiable clues are organised in response to the in imation of a true coherent in 
nature.’34  In appropriating Polanyi’s thought, Torrance claims that all explicit 
knowledge, be it scientific or theological, arises out of the tacit dimension.  On this 
note, Torrance has no difficulty in incorporating taci  dimension to his discussion of 
ultimate beliefs, such as the belief of order, rationality, simplicity, and contingency.35  
However, one area of Torrance’s appropriation has to be addressed.  It regards his 
claim that the tacit dimension provides the continuous epistemological field that 
integrates the sciences and arts, and overcomes the dualisms that have led to the 
fragmentation of human culture.36  Although Torrance’s intent is clearly to argue for
a solution to the entrenched dualism, he would have to face two issues in relation to 
his use of Polanyi here.  First, Polanyi although affirms the presence of tacit 
dimension in knowledge, he does not state that the respective tacit dimensions are 
continuous from one field to another.  No doubt all explicit knowledge is rooted in 
tacit dimension in a subsidiary-focal manner for Polanyi, this however does not imply 
                                               
32 TCFK, 112.  In Torrance’s view, Polanyi has moved beyond Einstein in thinking out further the 
coordination between idea and phenomenal reality.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.  
35 For example, with regard to applying tacit dimensio  to the discussion of simplicity, Torrance says 
that it will neither yield specific information in itself nor a particular view of reality, but provide a 
framework through which the reality can be glimpsed.  For this reason, simplicity could be seen as a 
form of cognitive means required in Torrance’s social coefficient of knowledge.  For detailed 
discussion see TCFK, 191-214. 
36 BSCL, 145. 
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by default a principle of continuity.  Moreover, Polanyi does not affirm continuity 
between science and religion.37  This leads to the second point that Torrance, in his 
discussion of the social coefficient of knowledge, does make a distinction between 
social coefficients of theological and non-theological knowledge.  He says, ‘There is 
an inescapable need for a social coefficient of knowledge in order to establish and 
maintain semantic relations with reality…But of course our special concern here is 
with the social coefficient of theological knowledge, and with the way in which our 
basic theological concepts arise in the dynamic andempirical correlation of our 
human life to the self-revealing interaction of God with us in the world.’38  By 
making the distinction that has an unintended consequence of implying a 
discontinuity in the tacit substructures of religion and natural science, Torrance 
indeed cannot escape from receiving criticism that he has contradicted himself in his 
use of the principle of tacit dimensions.39    
 The third aspect of Polanyi’s thought that is of service to Torrance regards the 
acknowledgment that without the independent existence of a transcendent rationality, 
scientific knowledge cannot be pursued.  Polanyi says that he is often caught up in the 
pursuit of a reality that is only partially disclosed, and yet he is convinced that it has 
an independence and power for manifesting itself in unthought-of ways in the 
future.40  Torrance claims that this is the contingent nature of objectivity that science 
and theology share, as both are open to what is beyond to which they have no control.  
Because of the overwhelming nature of the transcendent rationality, Torrance 
underscores that any scientific formalisation of the universe must retain not just an 
open structure character, it must also to be ready for consistent revision in the light of 
a continuous interaction with contingent reality sothat ‘human reason becomes 
enlightened from beyond the limits of created rationality’.41  On this note, the 
acknowledgement of Polanyi reinforces Torrance’s use of Einstein’s redefinition of 
theory and principia in substantiating the argument of the fluid-axiomatic nature of 
theological statement and dogma.  Notwithstanding the significance of human 
participation as involving personal decision in scientific inquiry, the conviction of 
Polanyi corroborates Torrance’s claim that the overwh lming presence of 
                                               
37 Weightman, 214. 
38 RST, 102. 
39 Weightman, 214. 
40 GR, 96.  Torrance although is unequivocal that ‘the independent existence of a transcendent 
rationality’ cannot be confounded with God, it does point to the ultimate reality that provides the basis 
for social coefficient of knowledge.  BSCL, 145; RST, 102, 103-04, and Weightman, 214. 
41 Ibid., 97.  See PK, 384. 
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preternatural element, which demands a sense of transcendent awe in us, a point we 
will return to later, indeed is to be found in every discipline of science.  Torrance, 
however, clarifies that ‘this transcendental element in the sciences of nature is not of 
course to be identified with God, for it comes at us out of the immanent rationality of 
nature, but it does cry aloud for God if only because the immanent rationality in 
nature does not provide us with any explanation of itself’42 (see chapter six).  To 
Polanyi the concept of transcendent reality is not merely an object of academic 
pursuit in science.  It is also the fundamental guiding belief of science.43  The creative 
life of a scientific community rests upon the belief in the possibility to discover the 
still hidden truth.  And, according to Polanyi, it is also a belief in ‘spiritual reality’ 
and the ‘reality of emergent meaning and truth’.44  As noted from the outset, 
Polanyi’s conviction of the ultimate belief is neither irrational nor subjective fancies 
to Torrance.  It is in fact a genuine commitment of he mind to the objective reality in 
distinction to the regulative principles of Kant.45  It is as well a matter of faith46.  
Although Torrance is justifiable to underpin the objective ground of belief and faith, 
he is rather quiet about Polanyi’s understanding that ruth and transcendental ideas 
are human ideas as well, since both arise only within an articulate framework 
provided by society.47  Furthermore, there is a dynamic between object and subject in 
this accessibility of truth and Polanyi has given both even attentions.  However, in 
Torrance’s discussion, as noted earlier, his attention on the object outweighs the 
subject because of his theological consideration.  Thus, Langford comments that 
‘Torrance certainly wants to keep the subject and object in dynamic tension.  But he 
moves in an entirely different way from Polanyi when he stresses the initiative and 
                                               
42 Ibid. 
43 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 76.  
Hereafter abbreviated as SFS.   
44 Ibid., 17. 
45 TCFK, 196-97. 
46 When commenting that no one has written more trencha tly about the need for faith than Polanyi, 
Torrance says, ‘Any account of science which does not explicitly describe it as something we believe 
in is essentially incomplete and a false pretence.  It amounts to a claim that science is essentially 
different from and superior to all human beliefs that are not scientific statements---and this is 
untrue…for the great scientists realise that behind a  permeating all scientific activity, reaching from 
end to end of their inquiries, there is an elemental, intuitive, unshakable faith in the significant nature 
of things in the universe, faith in the intelligibil ty of the universe, faith in its pervasive and unitary 
character, faith in its regularity and stability and constancy and simplicity; but faith also in the 
possibility of grasping the real world with our conepts, together with the faith that the intelligibility of 
the real world holds good when it transcends our conceptions and formulations, faith in the truth over 
which we have no control, but in the service of which our human rationality stands or falls.’  See 
TCFK, 195-96. 
47 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 60-70.  See 
Weightman, 223. 
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controlling character of the object in question.  Polanyi’s position rests upon the 
complete interrelatedness of the two.’48  Nevertheless, the difference on this matter 
could not undermine the importance of Polanyi to Torrance, especially in relation to 
how he understands and uses Polanyian science for the logy.   
To set the stage we have in this section touched on the main features of 
Einsteinian-Polanyian science from the standpoint of Torrance and their implications 
in his theological endeavour.  Our discussion shows that Torrance, in recognising the 
importance of the self-disclosure of objective reality and the necessity for human 
participation to be genuinely scientific and personal i  the attainment of knowledge, 
affirms the realist epistemology of the integration of form and being, and underscores 
the intrinsic reciprocity between the object and the subject in the process of scientific 
inquiry.  Torrance sees the dynamic interaction betwe n the scientific inquiry of the 
subjective knower and the compulsive self-disclosing nature of the objective reality 
in Einsteinian-Polanyian science as analogous to that of the normative pattern of 
revelation and mediation in theology which maintains the importance of the dynamic 
union and communion of divine and human action in the knowing of God in Christ.  
On this note, the inherent similarity between science and theology has provided the 
ground for Torrance to appropriate science for the service of theology.  The 
advancement of modern science, as our argument shows, has enabled Torrance to 
regard it as the beacon of light in directing theology from the entrenchment of 
dualism to a realism of knowing God in accordance with the revelation and mediation 
of Christ.  It essentially provides the needed endorsement for Torrance to make the 
legitimate claim that the human action of the normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation of theology is essentially scientific and personal, and is carried out 
appropriately in accordance with the nature of divine self-disclosure.   As Torrance 
says, ‘Theological and natural science each has its proper objective to pursue but their 
work inevitably overlaps, for both operate through the same rational structures of 
space and time… each is what it its as a movement of human inquiry because of the 
profound co-ordination between human knowing and space-time structures of the 
creation.’49  On this note, the importance of Einstein and Polanyi to Torrance in his 
theological reconstruction cannot be underestimated. 
 
                                               
48 Thomas A. Langford, ‘T. F. Torrance's Theological Science, a Reaction,’ Scottish Journal of 
Theology 25 (1972): 196. 
49 Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Newton, Einstein and Scientific Theology,’ Religious Studies 8 (1972): 233. 
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Theology as Scientific Discipline 
 
In the preceding section we have touched on the essential characteristics of 
Einsteinian-Polanyian science that Torrance reckons t  be of significance to theology.  
Our aim of this section is to bring the discussion a step further by analysing 
Torrance’s perception of the scientific nature of theology; namely, his understanding 
of theological science. 
In the preface of his magnum opus, Theological Science, Torrance refers to A. 
E. Taylor and says, ‘If knowledge is to be more than personal opinion, he argued, 
there must be control of our personal intellectual constructions by something which is 
not constructed but received.  In our human knowledge of God this is humbly to 
acknowledge that what is genuinely given has unquestionable right to control our 
thinking and acting, just because it is so utterly given to us and not made by us… 
[Thus] Professor Taylor held that we might entertain hope for the future of theology 
as “a genuine, assured, and yet progressive science of God.”’50  According to 
Torrance the teaching of Taylor aptly encapsulates th  essence of theological science.  
Fundamentally theological science is a philosophy of the science of God.  The core 
engagement here is the independent reality of God and the authority of the givenness 
of God’s self-revelation.  As God is the object of ur theological knowledge, 
scientific theology is our cognitive response to God in obedience to the demands of 
his objective reality and self-revelation.  In other words, it is an attempt ‘to allow 
God’s own eloquent self-evident to sound through to us in His Logos so that we may 
know and understand Him out of His own rationality and under the determination of 
His divine being.’51  On this note, we begin properly with God’s self-disclosure in 
Christ and seek to clarify this knowing by rigorous scientific inquiry.  Regarded in 
this way, theological science is the science of God, or, the science of God’s revelation 
and mediation in Christ. 
Theological science demands us in this process of clari i ation to be open to 
God so that we may respond faithfully and truly to his self-disclosure.  ‘It is through 
this disciplined obedience of our mind to God as He giv  Himself to be known by us 
that we advance in knowledge of Him,’ Torrance continues, ‘in the course of this 
                                               
50 TS, viii.  See A. E. Taylor, The Faith of a Moralist (London: Macmillan, 1930), 235-241. 
51 Ibid., ix. 
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inquiry that we raise the question of the possibility of the knowledge of God’.52  
Torrance claims that this process is critical in the light that our understanding of 
God’s self-disclosure often suffers from ‘double vision’.53  The problem mainly lies 
in our erring attempts to bring to its apprehension preconceived ideas that are not 
appropriate or wrongly extrapolated from another fild of experience.54  Torrance 
says, ‘It is always the nature of things that must prescribe for us the specific mode of 
rationality that we must adopt toward them, and prescribe also the form of 
verification apposite to them, and therefore it is a major part of all scientific activity 
to reach clear convictions as to the distinctive nature of what we are seeking to know 
in order that we may develop and operate with the distinctive categories demanded of 
us.’55  Hence, Torrance says that theological statements and concepts are 
characteristically analogous to the Einsteinian theory of relativity as they refer to the 
ultimate invariance of objective reality and are constantly relativised by it.  Torrance 
elucidates, 
 
Its task [theological science] is to bring to view the new and distinctive kinds of 
connection that obtain in the relation of God to man within space-time structures of 
the creation, and to generate, under the objective of scientific pressure of the divine 
self-revelation, appropriate modes and systems of thought, as open and as simple as 
possible, through which those distinctive connections can come to expression in our 
human representations of them, and yet to do that in such a way that the constancies 
of the divine economy, invariant for any and every believer, stand out in their 
distinction from and are yet served by, the variant formulations and interpretational 
systems which we develop in the progress of our inquiry.  Thus, theological concepts 
and statements have a feature similar to that implied in relativity theory, for they 
refer to what is greater than we can ever conceive, and are themselves relativised 
precisely by the revelation of that transcendent reality which they serve.56 
 
This is the cardinal principle.  It undergirds theological science if it is to 
overcome the ‘double vision’ and to faithfully mediate the self-revelation of God not 
by any preconceived idea, but in accordance with its intrinsic nature and order.57  The 
                                               
52 Ibid., 9. 
53 Ibid., x.  Torrance explicates that although God des not cease to disclose his reality, humanity on 
their own are unable to trace the thought of God back to God without suffering from distorted vision.  
He says, ‘All a man may be able to do then in his sense of the presence of God is to give it oblique, or 
symbolic, meaning only to discover that he has to thrust himself into its content, or he may try to 
straighten out the connections of his thoughts and make them point beyond him, only to find that they 
break off and point into emptiness and nothing, even though he remains haunted, as it were, by the 
ultimate rationality of God around him.’ 
54 Ibid., xi. 
55 Ibid., xii.  See GGT , 7-9. 
56 TCFK, 276. 
57 TS, x-xii.  However, one point remains rather puzzling when Torrance claims that the attainment of 
knowledge involves a ‘give and take’ between the subject and the object, and that ‘all knowledge is by 
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Gifford lectures delivered by Taylor in 1927 may have helped Torrance to recognise 
the importance of scientific thought in theology.  However, it is in his later encounter 
of Barth’s Church Dogmatics that convinces him that it is ‘here one could really get 
at a scientific theology.’58  Barth has provided a reformed theological structure for 
Torrance to relate theology to science in a profound way.59  The emphasis of Barth 
that theology is the scientific self-test of church language determined by the object 
which is God revealed in Jesus Christ makes an indelible impression on Torrance.  In 
order for us to have a better grasp of Torrance’s thought, we need to touch on the 
foundation of which he builds upon and the reasons that cause him later to move 
beyond Barth in order for theology to truly engage with science in the understanding 
of God’s revelation and mediation in Christ. 
We have mentioned that Torrance rightly shares with Barth the view that 
theological science is the evaluation of the language of God grounded in his self-
revelation in Jesus Christ.  ‘The question of truth,’ Barth says, ‘is the question as to 
the agreement of the Church’s distinctive talk about God with the being of the 
Church.’60  The test of the agreement, which is the character of scientific exercise, 
ranks theology as theological science independently along with other sciences.  Barth 
says that theology does not by default possess ‘special keys to special doors,’ it has 
not at its disposal an extraordinary knowledge thatis beyond the attainment of other 
sciences.61  In fact it has been criticised by many such as historian, educationist, 
philosopher and so on, within the framework of other sciences.62  And the outcome is 
an increase in self-alienation of the church and a degeneration of the language about 
God.63    Barth is adamant that the task to criticise and revise theological language 
                                                                                                                            
the way of being a compromise between thought and being’.  He says that our knowing is like ‘a sort 
of lens through which we allow nature in its intrinsic patterns to reveal itself to our apprehension’, a d 
through ‘the process of refining the lens or theory, our basic images and concepts undergo radical 
change’.  In other words, the correction of ‘double-vision’ falls on the part of the beholder to do the 
necessary adjustment as he focuses on the object.  Should the vision remain unclear, then, in 
Torrance’s word, ‘If something is inherently rational, and not merely accidental or surd-like, then it is 
our fault and not that of the thing itself if we fail to understand it.’  Torrance reiterates, ‘Although God 
does not cease to disclose His power and deity to them [inquirers] the truth becomes stifled, for at the
very roots of their knowledge, as St. Paul said, they twist it into untruth.’  If our reading of Torrance is 
right, he does not seem to suggest that with regard to the attainment of knowledge, God is going to 
compromise or to ‘give and take’ when we are off focus. 
58 John I. Hesselink, ‘A Pilgrimage in the School of Christ---An Interview with T. F. Torrance,’ 
Reformed Review 38 (1984): 53.  See Mary Doyle Morgan, ‘A New Vision of Wholeness,’ 
Presbyterian Survey  (1980): 22. 
59 TCFK, vii. 
60 CD, I/1, 4. 
61 Ibid., 5. 
62 Ibid., 5-6. 
63 Ibid., 6. 
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cannot be done apart from the standpoint of the principle peculiar to the church.  
Theology is scientific as it sets itself to this tak determined solely by the yardstick of 
‘the being of the Church, of Jesus Christ as its bais, goal and content.’64  Although 
Barth ranks theology along with other sciences, he is adamant that such juxtaposition 
should not, in the slightest possible way, accommodate theology to the concepts of 
other sciences.  He has made it clear that by bearing the title ‘science’, theology does 
not ‘allow itself to be disturbed or hampered in its own task by regard for what is 
described as science elsewhere.’65  In fact he argues that in order for theology to 
perform scientifically, it must completely subordinate and sacrifice every single 
consideration of what ‘science’ means elsewhere.66  Barth’s firmness on the issue, 
which Torrance fully subscribes, could not be made more explicit in the rather heated 
discussion after the delivery of a paper by his friend, Heinrich Scholz.67  The incident 
deserves our attention for two reasons.  First, it accentuates Barth’s perception that 
Torrance ardently supports.  Second, although Torrance was unquestionably on the 
side of Barth, the influence of Scholz is detectable in his later development.68   
The issue of contention essentially is about the nature of the scientific status 
of theology.  To Scholz the decisive factor to scientific (wissenschaftlich) 
qualification is fundamentally not about the subject but the method ‘which it applied, 
which required to take the form of an axiomatic and de uctive approach, based upon 
clearly formulated propositions.’69  Out of the six conditions of Scholz’s proposition, 
the first three are the essential ones that have considerable bearing on theology as a 
scientific discipline.  First, all propositions constructed by the subject in question 
have to be free from contradiction.  Second, the unity of all propositions has to be 
observed.  Third, all propositions formulated must be capable of test and 
examination.70  Barth’s rejection is expected.  Apart from the first condition that ‘is 
acceptable by theologian only upon the very limited interpretation’, Barth says, ‘Not 
an iota can be yielded here without betraying theology, for any concession here 
                                               
64 Ibid., Barth underpins three criteria for theological science.  Like other sciences, theology is firstly a 
human effort enquiring into a specific object of knowledge.  Secondly, it follows a definite, self-
consistent path of knowledge.  Finally, like other sciences, it has the duty to be accountable for its own 
justification. 
65 Ibid., 8. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Barth has recorded the discussion in CD, I/1, 8-9. 
68 The incident is narrated by Torrance in the preface of STR.  The impression of Scholz on Torrance is 
evident.  
69 McGrath, 141. 
70 Heinrich Scholz, ‘Wie Ist Eine Evangelische Theologie Als Wissenschaft Moglich?,’ Zwischen den 
Zeiten  (1931): 8-53. 
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involves surrendering the theme of theology.’71  Barth argues that if theology is to be 
in its own right a subject of science, it cannot simultaneously succumb itself to ‘the 
obligation of submission to standards valid for other sciences.’72  Barth delineates 
that if theology were to be placed in a systematic relationship with other sciences, it 
would have to regard its own existence, like other sciences, as fundamentally 
necessary within an ordered cosmos.  That, he asserts, is unacceptable as theology is 
not a member of the ordered cosmos but a ‘stop-gap’ in an unordered one.  With that 
argument, he claims that it is not possible to have  concept of science common to 
theology and other sciences.73  To certain extent Barth’s argument is the opposite of 
Scholz.  The criterion is not the method but the subject.  The ‘scientific starting point’ 
in theology has to be the resurrection of Christ and not epistemology.74  To Barth 
even the good intent of formulating a better definitio  of science has to be rejected by 
theology.  His keynote, which is shared by Torrance, could be identified here, 
 
The only way which theology has of proving its scientific character is to devote itself 
to the task of knowledge as determined by its actual theme and thus to show what it 
means by true science.  No science has any manorial rights to the title, nor does any 
theory of science have absolute power either to grant or withheld the title…  
Theology has no reason not to call itself a science.75 
 
In order to do justice to Scholz, we must say that he indeed does not impose 
the conditions to theology.76  Scholz however undoubtedly believes that theology 
should justify more of the assertions it has made.  Pannenberg, when commenting on 
the controversy, expresses that ‘Barth’s argument for he scientific status of theology 
on grounds of appropriateness to its object is sometimes used to justify far-reaching 
assertions with no mention of Scholz’s disagreement with him and the problems it 
has raised.’77  Notwithstanding the difference, Scholz’s arguments make an 
impression on Torrance.78  We could detect, in addition to the influence of Einstein, 
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73 Ibid. 
74 STR, x. 
75 CD, I/1, 10. 
76 Weightman, 133-34. 
77 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science (London: Longman and Todd, 1976), 
270.  Pannenberg accepts Scholz’s proposition.  He beli ves if theology is to be called a discipline of 
science, it has to meet the conditions as Scholz underli ed.  See Weightman, 134-35 and McGrath 
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78 STR, ix-x.  The influence can be seen in Torrance’s eagerness to discuss with Barth the philosophy 
and logic of science taught by Scholz in their lastmeeting in Basel, 1968. It could also be detected in 
Torrance’s review of Mathesis Universalis, a collection of Scholz’s essays published in 1961. 
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Scholz’s propensity for axiomatisation in Torrance’s mature works where he argues 
for the correlation between theology and science.  Torrance writes,  
 
The claim is put forward that theology is a pure of a realist kind operating on its own 
proper ground and governed by its own proper object, and comparison are drawn 
between theological science and natural science in these respects. Thus understood 
theology is a positive and progressive inquiry into the knowledge of God proceeding 
under the determination of his self-revelation….  It is a human enterprise working 
with revisable formulations in a manner not unlike that of an axiomatic science 
operating with fluid axioms.79 
 
One may comment that Torrance appears to have taken‘on board the precise 
position which Barth rejected in his encounter with Scholz.’80  However, it is not the 
case as the fluid axioms that Torrance refers to are open to change and modification 
in relation to the object in question.81  Torrance says, ‘The kind of scientific theology 
that arises in this way may be called fluid dogmatics… because it is objectively 
oriented in the living God, operates with fluid axioms, i.e., axioms that are 
progressively modified in the light of the realities that are disclosed to us in God’.82  
In other words, scientific theology could be axiomatised into concepts without 
compromise as long as they are open and subject to further renewal in the light of the 
deepening knowledge of God’s revelation and mediation in Christ.  Torrance is 
prepared to take the argument a step further by claiming that ‘even when it attains the 
status of a physical law, is rather like a refined l ns through which we discern ontic 
structures in the universe’.83  With that assertion, it may be said that Torrance, as he 
matures in his thinking, has gradually moved beyond Barth in his understanding of 
scientific theology.  While Barth claims that theology ‘has nothing to learn’ from 
other sciences,84 Torrance has shown otherwise without sacrificing the quintessence 
of the objectivity of God in his self-disclosure.   
Arguably the theological tension between Barth and Torrance lies in Barth’s 
attitude towards natural science.  Torrance clearly identifies it as he says, ‘Rigorous 
as that concept of dogmatics as a science might be, as it was in Barth’s own Church 
Dogmatics, it appeared to be little more than a formal science and fell somewhat 
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short of what I had been seeking.’85  In Torrance’s view, scientific theology needs to 
‘advance through and beyond Barth’ on two accounts.  First, notwithstanding Barth’s 
significant contribution in substantiating theological dogmatic in its own right as a 
critical science, he has not tried or succeeded in formulating an appropriate cognitive 
instrument to bring forth theologically what Torrance regards as the ‘profound 
harmonies and symmetries of the divine grace in which is enshrined the inner logic of 
God’s creative and redemptive operations in the universe.’86  If scientific theology is 
to be faithful to its object, Torrance claims that it must move beyond what it is and 
come up with an apparatus that is analogously corresponding to the four-dimensional 
geometry of Einstein.  Second, theology as a scientific discipline cannot be a form of 
monism, especially in the light that modern scientific advancement has called for a 
cross-fertilisation and synthesis of disciplines.  Torrance says, ‘[T]he future will be 
altogether different---that we can already see: it will be a synthesis of new structures, 
hierarchically ordered in multiple levels, and infinitely open to the transcendence of 
the living God.’87  The importance of reciprocity between theology and science leads 
us to the point that ‘a closer relation must be established between natural theology 
and revealed theology’, if theological science is to account seriously the relation 
between the incarnation and creation in God’s wholistic plan of salvation.88  It, 
however, could not be done in the old traditional form of natural theology, as Barth 
rightly criticised (see chapter six).89  Thus, in full recognition of the need to ‘advance 
through and beyond Barth’, Torrance could not regard Barth’s notion that theology 
has nothing to learn from science as an acceptable one.  
In fact the relation between theological science and natural science takes a 
turn for the better when Torrance focuses on basic problems both face. Torrance 
claims that the constant challenge awaiting theology and science is threefold: ‘how to 
refer our thoughts and statements genuinely beyond urselves, how to reach 
knowledge of reality in which we do not intrude ourselves distortingly into the 
picture, and yet how to retain the full and integral pl ce of the human subject in it 
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87 Ibid. 
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itself methodologically unscientific. 
 92
all.’  90  In this quest both theological science and natural science are to be allies as 
each faces ‘the same insidious enemy, namely, man himself assuming the role of the 
Creator’.91  Torrance is confident that the prospect for a mutual learning between 
theology and science is encouraging.92  Without doubt, Scholz is not the only person 
who has served as a stimulus to Torrance in his puruit of the correlation between 
science and theology, a subject that is close to his heart from young.93  The early 
influence of Daniel Lamont94 and later that of Einstein and Polanyi cannot be 
overlooked in Torrance’s development.  Thus, it is not surprising at times to hear the 
claim that Torrance should not be called a Barthian, given the fact that as a mature 
theologian he has moved through and beyond Barth.95  However, McGrath, 
Weightman and Langford’s assessment about Torrance representing the further 
working-out of the methodology of Barth’s theology is likely to be an accurate one.96  
Essentially Torrance anchors his cardinal principle of theological science to Barth’s 
assertion of the objectivity of God in the revelation and mediation of Jesus Christ. 
We have thus far analysed the scientific nature of T rrance’s theological 
science.  Our analysis shows that although Torrance embraces a different approach, 
he is much indebted to Barth at least on two scores that eventually become the 
hallmark of his theology; namely, the conviction that theology in its own right is a 
discipline of science, and it is in its entirety a science of God’s revelation and 
mediation in Christ Jesus.  On this note, Torrance’s ingenuity, as we judge, lies in his 
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theological creativity to espouse and appropriate the epistemic tools of Einsteinian-
Polanyian science in theology without sacrificing the quintessence of the objectivity 
of divine self-disclosure in Christ.  By postulating theology as a scientific discipline, 
Torrance is affirming the importance of scientific nquiry as the human action of the 
normative pattern of revelation and mediation. 
 
 
Scientific Inquiry of Divine Self-disclosure in Christ 
 
With Torrance’s emphasis of the scientific status of theology in mind, the aim of this 
section is to examine, as remedy for dualism, the appropriateness of human action as 
the inquiry of God’s revelation and mediation in Christ.  We attempt to focus 
primarily on the factors that determine the inquiry as properly scientific.  Thus, we 
would examine the transcendent awe, the predicament of human existence, and the 
proficiency of language of the scientific inquiry of Torrance’s theological science. 
The attainment of knowledge begins with the rudimentary steps of inquiry.  
This feature is shared by all quests of knowledge including both theological and 
natural science.  In this regard, inquiry, particularly scientific inquiry, to Torrance, 
has the task of formulating questions that are apposite to the nature of the 
investigating object in order to derive knowledge that is in accordance with its self-
disclosure.97  When open to the objective reality, Torrance underlines that scientific 
inquiry takes ‘the form of questioning in which we allow what we already know or 
hold to be knowledge to be called in question by the object.’98  The pivotal point 
gravitates from the subject to the object as we allow ourselves to be ordered around 
the object of inquiry.  This change of focus, as mentioned, is the key characteristic of 
scientific inquiry in Einsteinian-Polanyian science.  If theological science is to be 
considered scientific as natural science, Torrance asserts that it has to develop ‘a 
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scientific inquiry in which we learn how not to project ourselves into the centre of the 
picture but rather how to allow the rationality of God to throw its masterful light upon 
the whole area of human experience and knowledge.’99  In responding to Polanyi who 
claims that in every change of scientific value there corresponds a change of maxims 
of procedure in scientific method,100 Torrance advocates that this epistemological 
inversion is crucial for theology as a scientific discipline.101  It has implication in the 
way questions are being asked.  Advancement of scientific knowledge is made 
possible if we dare to ask new questions.  New questions often require a change in 
language of expression and representation.  They require corresponding changes in 
the framework of concepts and the structure of logic.102  However, should we fail to 
design the questions properly, Torrance is certain that they would have a backward 
effect on us as a form of criticism.  The object in question is not responsible for our 
failure of observation and cognition.  Thus, Torrance underpins the importance for 
scientific inquiry to be ‘ruthless and unrelenting, probing into the deepest depths of 
our knowing in order to uncover and cut away all that inders us from behaving in 
terms of the nature, and in order to allow ourselves to be “told” by the object what we 
cannot tell ourselves about it, and so genuinely to learn what is beyond what we 
already know or think we know.’103  Such rigor is inevitable if human action is to be 
appropriate to the demand of divine revelation.  Torrance says,  
 
[T]heological science is a form of human inquiry in which we can only seek to grasp 
as far as we can what is communicated to us through rderly constructions of our 
forming, and in which we have to distinguish the substance of the truth from our 
scientific formulations of it, so that all dogmas must be regarded as relative to and 
relativised by what we seek to cognise through them…  It would be a grave error to 
identify them as such with the transcendent form and being of the divine Truth, but it 
would also be a grave error to treat them as symbolic expressions of our encounter 
with reality with no ultimate fundamentum in re.104 
 
                                               
99 GR, vii. 
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Three key determinative factors could be identified here.  In order for the 
human action of the theological science to be properly scientific, we need to ask 
whether there is a sense of transcendent awe in the inquiry?  Is the predicament of 
human existence the basis of the inquiry?  And finally, could ordinary language 
communicate and mediate divine revelation in this process? 
 
The Transcendent Awe 
 
Torrance asserts that the interpretive method adopte  in theological science and the 
theological statements it formulates are not unlike that of empirical science.  
Although Torrance admits that statements in theology are ‘heard statements’ in the 
sense that they derive from the self-revelation of the living God, theological inquiry 
remains very much as human scientific action participating in that divine disclosure.  
Like natural science, theological science needs to distinguish the substance of the 
truth from our scientific formulations of it.  Models or analogues are only ectypal, 
and not archetypal.  They are always subject to criticism and revision at every 
moment of revelation so that the ultimate objectivity continues to retain its authority 
and majesty over them.105  Torrance’s concern of the confusion is not without cause.  
He is conscious of the power of autonomous reason in the process of inquiry.  
Although reason can serve us, it can also hinder us.  In alluding to lessons learned 
from Kant, Torrance says that if we fail to understand the proper place of human 
reason and let it assumes the masterful role, it will ins st on shaping what it seeks to 
know, and so becomes its own the greatest obstacle.106   Reason is constantly at work 
in formulating analogues and constructing models in the process of inquiring in order 
to elicit answers from the reality.  Unless reason ubmits itself to the authority of the 
ultimate objectivity in its theoretic construction, the danger of confusion and the 
temptation to replace truth with the abstract formulation of it is still lurking. 
To Torrance the confusion is indicative as well of our failure in recognising 
that there is a line to which human inquiry, however scientific it is, cannot cross 
without making error or inconsistency.  Weizsäcker says that ‘we do not know what 
lies beyond that limit, or else it would not be the limit of our knowledge.  Still, we 
assume that something does lie beyond it.  And this alone is already an assumption 
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about something that we do not know.’107  Weizsäcker recognises that human inquiry 
has a limitation, and we have to accept the unknown sphere that is beyond us as 
something outside the boundary of science.108  Hence, when facing the unknown, one 
needs to learn to scientifically maintain a respectful silence.109  Broglie, in Physics 
and Microphysics, asks, ‘Undoubtedly it is a triumph for the human mind to have 
again able to unravel laws… but can it be asserted that this success is bound to be 
maintained indefinitely?’ 110  Broglie underscores that even in nuclear physics there is 
a limit as to how much we can comprehend.  Inevitably the range of scientific inquiry 
has to be limited within what is determinable on a phenomenological basis and leave 
out the aspects of reality that are not assessable.111  Torrance is in full agreement with 
Weizsäcker and Broglie.  Being a theologian, Torrance’s articulation is, expectedly, 
theological.  He says that this is ‘the distinction between earth and heaven or between 
the visible and expressible and the invisible and ineffable’.112  On this note, it seems 
that Torrance is drawing a direct comparison between natural science and theological 
science.  However, it is not the case notwithstanding a reasonable parallel between 
them.  Torrance clearly identifies the basic difference.  He says,  
 
There can be no direct comparison between the spheres of the knowable and the 
unknowable in the natural science and the two realms with which theology operates, 
but there is a distinct parallel between the relation of the determinable and the 
indeterminable in exact science and the relation of earth to heaven in theology.  By 
the latter is intended the relation between the realm of objectivity and intelligible 
intuition and the realm where theological knowledge is given objective but not 
specifiable reality but where it can only suspend ju gement and maintain a respectful 
silence before the depth and majesty of the objectivity.  This is the eschatological 
frontier which a scientific theology that is faithful to the nature of its given Object is 
bound to acknowledge in refusing to trespass beyond the limits imposed upon it by 
the self-revelation of God in His Word as well as by His transcendent Glory and 
Holiness.113 
 
The acknowledgement of our incapability to trespass without making error or 
inconsistency is not an acceptance of ignorance.  To Torrance it is the scientific 
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recognition of the ‘forced acceptance of a limit’.114  While the unknown faced by 
natural science is in fact unknowable, the unknown faced by theological science is the 
eschatological frontier that cannot be trespassed beyond what God has ordained in his 
revelation and mediation in Christ.  Be it natural science or theological science, 
human inquiry, if it is properly scientific, has toaccept its finitude and maintain a 
sense of respectful silence and transcendent awe before the majestic depth of the 
ultimate.  Hence, the scientific inquiry of theological science ought to submit itself to 
God’s self-disclosure in Christ especially when, as Torrance aptly underscores, ‘we 
can only seek to grasp as far as we can what is communicated to us’.115 
 
The Predicament of Human Existence 
 
Could doubt be cast upon the unknown as one beholds it in respectful silence?  
Although Torrance is quick to dismiss the validity of doubt in scientific inquiry,116 he 
cannot avoid the question as it leads to the predicament of human existence.  Doubt, 
together with anxiety and uncertainty and the whole range of human experiences, 
constitute the materials of questioning.  When an inquiry is made in the predicament 
of human existence, where does it lead?  Tillich says, ‘The existential question, 
namely, man himself in the conflicts of his existential situation, is not the source for 
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the revelatory answer formulated by theology.  One cannot derive the divine self-
manifestation from an analysis of the human predicament.’117  When in predicament, 
the inquirer is the question and not the answer.  He has to ask and inquire.  And he 
cannot stop asking since his very being is the question of his existence.  Thus, as 
Tillich says, ‘The question, asked by man, is man himself.’118 
This is one moment Torrance is in congruence with Tllich.  Torrance says, 
‘[I]t is true that in every inquiry question and answer are correlated and that a 
measure of independence as well as mutual dependence is involved, as Tillich has 
pointed out.  It is also true that in the last resot “the question, asked by man, is man 
himself”’.119  Torrance’s remark is central for it indicates that e is not unaware of the 
intrinsic relation between question and answer in the course of inquiry.  However, 
how does this relation work in theological science?  How does it work in relation to 
Tillich’s existential approach, especially when Torrance is in agreement with him in 
this regard?  Since Torrance shares Tillich’s model f correlation, let us use it to help 
ascertain the answer.  
According to Tillich the first condition of the model of correction is the 
independence of question and answer.120  Based on Torrance’s agreement with 
Tillich, he will not have any objection to this condition.  The second and more 
difficult one is the mutual dependence of question and answer.  In this regard, Tillich 
says that two reciprocal factors are at work.  First, it is the ‘directedness’ of the 
question by the answer, and second, the ‘influence’ of the existential question on the 
theological answers.121  Let us begin with the first factor.  Tillich elucidates,  
 
While the material of the existential question is the very expression of the human 
predicament, the form of the question is determined by the total system and by the 
answers given in it.  The question implied in human finitude is directed toward the 
answer: eternal.  The question implied in human estrangement is directed toward the 
answer: forgiveness.  This directedness of the questions does not take away their 
seriousness, but it gives them a form determined by the theological system as a 
whole.122   
 
In other words, the question put forth by the inquirer although is independent 
of the answer, is ‘directed’ by the answer in the way that it is being asked.  Tillich’s 
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notion that ‘question is determined by the answer’ is in fact in line with the principle 
of theological science, since scientific question ought to be formulated in accordance 
with the self-revealing nature of the ultimate object.  The deterministic effect of the 
answer, as Tillich says, does not demean the integrty and seriousness of the question.  
The subjective entity of the inquirer is maintained.  The process is not mechanical as 
the inquirer retains his freedom of choice in making personal decision.  Torrance 
assents to the argument.  Essentially when confronted with the answer, Torrance, in 
alluding to Polanyi, underscores that ‘the discernme t of a coherence, the appraisal of 
order, the assessment of a probability, the choice between two theories, the ability to 
see and to guess rightly the informal decisions that enter into the process of 
verification, and so on, are all personal, mental acts in which the scientist [inquirer] is 
constantly engaged throughout his inquiries.’123  Not unrelated to this, Torrance 
underlines,  
 
All true knowledge involves a two-fold operation, a positive relation of attachment in 
which we submit ourselves to an object, and a relation of detachment in which we 
discriminate between the object and our awareness of it.  As Tillich has expressed it, 
‘cognitive distance is the presupposition of cognitive union.124 
 
Torrance seemingly shares Tillich’s proposition.  However, if we take a closer 
look, there is a difference in degree in terms of how they understand the effect of the 
answer on the question.  Tillich although is unequivocal in the tenet of ‘directedness’, 
his deterministic emphasis remains very much on the s ructure of the question.  In the 
last resort, to Tillich, it remains wrong to derive question implied in human existence 
from the revelatory answer.125  It is wrong because the revelatory answer is 
meaningless if no question about it is being asked.  According to Tillich one cannot 
receive an answer to a question that he has not asked because any such answer would 
be foolish for him.126  Torrance agrees.  But, he is not prepared to stop where Tillich 
does.  He wants to go further.  To Torrance it is precisely because when a person in 
his existential predicament is unable to ask the right question, he renders the answer 
meaningless.  In this regard, the genuine question ought to be thrust upon him from 
the side of the object so that he is able to ask the right question and to understand the 
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meaning of the revelatory answer.127  Torrance is not rejecting the fact that we 
determine and shape the questions according to our existential predicament.  He 
however stresses that unless our questions are being questioned down to the roots of 
our existence before the object, we are not getting a ywhere.128  Thus, Tillich’s 
dictum---the question, asked by man, is man himself---is agreed by Torrance only if it 
describes the initial steps of inquiry.  After that, it ought to be the questioner is 
essentially a questioned man.  It is only when he faces the supreme and ultimate 
question, he is able to inquire.  Torrance underscores,  
 
He can ask them [questions] responsibly only as he list ns and lets himself be 
questioned by the Truth down to the very roots of his being until he is set free from 
himself, from his own preconceptions and self-deception, from self-willed and 
arbitrary thinking, from pride of reason and desire to control the questioning God.  It 
is in theological questioning of this kind that we really learn the meaning of scientific 
questioning as questioning controlled by the nature of the given objective reality and 
so learn that the truth or falsity of our questions is determined by whether they arise 
ultimately from the side of the object or not.129 
 
We may comment that while Tillich is allowing one to wonder in the world of 
existential experience in order to find the possible path leading to the answer, 
Torrance is trying to get the wonderer out by telling him directly the only way.  The 
factor that determines the approach in fact lies in the substance of question.  For 
Tillich, the substance is the whole of human existential experience; ranging from 
language, literature, art, philosophy, science, myth, liturgy and other human 
activities.  For Torrance, it is God’s revelation ad mediation in Jesus Christ.  
Inevitably the selection of substance determines th epistemological starting point.  
Succinctly put, one pivots on humanity, the other on God.  Thus, as our discussion 
shows, it should not surprise us that in spite of the common ground, they are rather 
different in terms of how they comprehend the relation between the existential 
question and the theological answer in the course of inquiry.130   
Another important observation about the substance of question is that it also 
determines the form of the question.  In Tillich’s scheme, his wide range of 
                                               
127 TS, 120. 
128 Ibid.  Torrance asserts, ‘It is only through the unremitting questioning of our questions and of 
ourselves the questioners, that true questions are put into our mouths to be directed to the object for its 
disclosure to us. Formally it is we who put the question, but the material constituent of our question is 
radically altered through the impress of the object upon our questioning.’ 
129 Ibid., 125-26.  In theological science, this is what Torrance called the interrogative form of inquiry.  
See TRst, 123. 
130 Although the word ‘existential’ is not quite the vocabulary of Torrance. 
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existential materials allows the question to take shape in various expressions.  
Torrance certainly does not have the same liberty.  In fact, his emphasis on the 
substance will filter away all forms of question deem irrelevant except the one that is 
in conformity to the nature of God’s self-disclosure.  How Torrance and Tillich 
understand the correlation between ‘substance’ and ‘form’ is an important point of 
consideration.  We have discussed its effect on the first factor, the issue of 
‘directedness’.  We would now turn to the second factor, the influence of the 
existential question on the theological answer. 
Tillich asserts that ‘the form of theological answer is not independent of the 
form of the existential question.’131  He says that in order for the answer to effectively 
engage the question, the answer has to be given in relation to the question.132  A 
contradiction, however, seems to surface between th independent and dependent 
nature of the answer.  How could the answer retain i s independence if it has to 
depend on the question?  In this regard, the solution lies in the correlation between 
the substance and form of the answer.  As the substance is independent to the form, 
Tillich is able to claim that the influence of the question will change only the form 
and not the substance.  Tillich says, 
 
If theology gives the answer, ‘the Christ,’ to the question implied in human 
estrangement, it does so differently, depending on whether the reference is to the 
existential conflict of Jewish legalism, to the existential despair of Greek scepticism, 
or to the threat of nihilism as expressed in twentieth-century literature, art, and 
psychology.  Nevertheless, the question does not create the answer.  The answer, ‘the 
Christ,’ cannot be created by man, but man can receive it and express it according to 
the way he has asked for it.133 
 
To Torrance the relation between substance and form of the answer works just 
the opposite way; it is one of the inseparability.  Tillich’s notion that ‘the form of 
theological answer is not independent of the form of the existential question’ is 
simply unacceptable, or even nonsensical, to Torrance. Torrance would claim that if 
theology gives the answer ‘the Christ’, it does so exclusively with reference to the 
objectivity of God revealed in Christ Jesus.134  If there is any influence, it would only 
be from the answer, both substance and form.  Thus, it is apparent that no common 
                                               
131 Tillich, 17.  Author’s Italic 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 TS, ix. 
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ground could exist between Tillich and Torrance with regard to the influence of the 
existential question on the theological answer.   
We may conclude our analysis by saying that althoug Torrance is agreeable 
to the slogan, ‘the question, asked by man, is man himself’, his understanding of the 
correlation between question and answer in human inquiry is rather different from 
that of Tillich.  We would judge that the distinction of Torrance lies primarily in his 
scientific understanding of the subject in question.  As discussed, notwithstanding the 
accentuation of the subordination of the human action of inquiry to the divine action 
of compulsive self-disclosure, the relevance of the predicament of human existence is 
not ignored or undermined by Torrance.  Thus, as we argue, human action as 
scientific inquiry indeed plays an indispensable role in Torrance’s normative pattern 
of revelation and mediation. 
 
The Proficiency of Language 
 
If theological science is a form of human inquiry that seeks ‘to grasp as far as we can 
what is communicated to us’,135 the question whether theological language could 
measure up to the expectation of communicating and me iating accurately God’s 
self-disclosure in Christ cannot be overlooked.  The point of contention is whether 
theological language, as Ronald Hepburn advocates, is continuous with ordinary 
language.136  Differing from Hepburn, Torrance draws on the arguments of 
Heisenberg to underscore that ordinary language could not serve theological and 
scientific purpose.137  Due to its ambiguity and inaccuracy, Heisenberg says that 
ordinary language could not explain scientific concept with complete precision.138  
The use of mathematical scheme as the supplement to natural language is needed in 
science to correlate scientific concept to phenomena.  I  addition, since the arrival of 
quantum physics, the need to define a language that logical patterns are in complete 
and accurate conformity with the mathematical scheme of scientific theory has 
become critical.139  Torrance argues that same development occurs in theology as 
                                               
135 Ibid., 287-88 
136 Ronald W. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox: Critical Studies in Twentieth-Century Theology 
(London: Watts, 1958), 84. 
137 TS., 292.  Torrance is inaccurate in his citation.  The article ‘Language and Reality in Modern 
Physics’ is not in pages 167 to 186 but in 145 to 160. 
138 Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1959), 145-49, 157-60.  
139 Ibid. 
 103
well.  He uses the doctrine of Christology to substantiate his argument.  Torrance 
says, 
 
In our encounter with Christ we meet new realities hat cannot be explained in terms 
of our previous knowledge and reach new conceptions f rced upon us by those new 
realities which require new language in which to express them. 
 
Torrance continues,  
 
In this process scientific theology develops a system of theological conceptions that 
reaches indefinitely beyond the system in which the observer has a part and which he 
construes within the limits of his ordinary notions of space and time, but the more 
this takes place the more impossible it is to correlate unambiguously the severely 
theological language that is created with the ordinary language of our every day 
experience.140   
 
Two factors could be observed from the citations.  They are, first, the need to 
develop new concepts to correlate the new realities, and second, the use of language 
to communicate the new concepts.  The communication of new realities is possible if 
these two factors are working together side by side.   Although Torrance does not 
give us an example of the new reality in the above citation, we could suggest, for 
example, the uniqueness of Jesus as God and man.  The question is how could we 
reach a new conception to correlate this new reality?  The answer from Torrance 
would be the concept of homoousion.141  What language is being used to express the 
concept?  The answer is Greek language.  Another example of new reality we face in 
our encounter with Jesus is that he is the Lord.  The new concept is Jesus is not 
merely a prophet, a rabbi, or a lord, but he is the Lord.  Presently, the language of 
description is English.  In science, a statement of Heisenberg may illustrate the point.  
He says, ‘However, if one wishes to speak about the a omic particles themselves one 
must either use the mathematical scheme as the only supplement to natural language 
or one must combine it with a language that makes us  of a modified logic’.142  In this 
statement, the factors are at work as well.  The scientific discovery of atomic particles 
poses a challenge for science to devise language to d scribe it.  And the language of 
                                               
140 TS, 293.  My italic.  Since the old system cannot construe the new realities, Torrance underlines that 
the discussion of the historical Jesus becomes crucial.  He says that unless we anchor to historical 
Jesus, theological knowledge would be without the indispensable relevance or applicability to our 
existence.  Devoid of interaction, language about God would render impossible.  Torrance thus argues 
that notwithstanding the rigor of historico-critical investigation, theological science cannot disregad 
its historical root in the historical Jesus if it is to be faithful to its object.  
141 CDG, 80. 
142 Heisenberg, 160. 
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description is either ‘the mathematical scheme as the only supplement to natural 
language or one must combine it with a language that makes use of a modified logic.’   
What is our point?  The point is we believe that Torrance has overlooked a 
basic difference here.  While both science and theology are on the same journey to 
search for new concepts to communicate the new realities, the languages of 
description used by them are in fact very different.  Notwithstanding that it is an 
expansion of ordinary language, the language of science has developed into a 
specialised technical language.143  The language of theology, although is 
theologically technical, remains very much as the form of ordinary language.  
Alasdair MacIntyre reminds us that while some theologians may have their 
idiosyncrasy to believe that religious language is a pecialised language, it ‘must not 
conceal us that such language is nothing more or less than Hebrew or English….  As 
Sir Edwyn Hoskyns put it, the language of the Holy Spirit is New Testament 
Greek.’144  The fact is many theological expressions and utterances derive their sense 
of use from other religious and non-religious contexts.  Expressions such as ‘to love’, 
‘to forgive’ or ‘to be thankful’ are found not only in theological language but also in 
the fabric of our everyday language.  When theology appropriates common language 
for theological expression, it hardly confers new or different meaning on such 
expression.  For example, the new reality of our relation with God in Jesus Christ is 
that God is our Father.  The meaning of ‘Father’ is unquestionably enriched in 
theological language.  Such expansion however does n t alter radically its original 
meaning in common language.  The word homoousion, as mentioned, is another good 
example.145  Indeed it is along similar trains of thought that Hepburn argues, 
‘Theological language is, once more, continuous with ordinary language.’146   
Without doubt Torrance, in appreciating the development of language in 
science, desires to draw a line between ordinary langu ge and theological language.  
The thought that ordinary language is incapable of correlating the new realities with 
precise accuracy thus forces theological science to create a ‘new language’ is 
certainly in his mind.  Torrance subsequently underlines, though unexpectedly, that 
the new realities in Jesus Christ are different from those of science as what we are 
dealing here in theology essentially is ‘a relationship that is translogical and cannot 
                                               
143 For detailed account of the development of scientific language, see Heisenberg, 46-50. 
144 Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Is religious language so idiosyncratic that we can hope for no philosophical 
account of it?’, Metaphysical Beliefs, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM, 1957), 176. 
145 CDG, 80. 
146 Hepburn, 84.  Author’s italic. 
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be logicalised’, and ‘a relation between language and realities that cannot be resolved 
into language alone.’147  In order to comprehend divine self-disclosure, Torrance 
underpins the essentiality of the work of the Holy Spirit in human action of scientific 
inquiry.  But, he immediately concedes that, 
 
invocation of the Holy Spirit does not allow us to make light of human experience or 
dispense with its natural language since it is after all only with human knowledge 
and human speech that we can be concerned…  Unless the most refined theological 
conception intersect with our ordinary knowledge at decisive points and our 
theological terms bear some relation to ordinary language, if only as the tools by 
which they are constructed, it is impossible for us as men on earth and in history to 
have any understanding of God or to say anything about Him.148 
 
The inconsistency is self-evidenced.  Hepburn’s argument of theological 
language as a continuation of ordinary language inded holds water.  As we end this 
discussion, the reminder of Heisenberg deserves our attention.  He says, ‘We know 
that any understanding must be based finally upon the natural language because it is 
only there we can be certain to touch reality, and hence we must be sceptical about 
any scepticism with regard to this natural language nd its essential concepts.  
Therefore, we may use these concepts as they have been used at all time.’149  
Torrance’s eventual stress of the validity is indicative of the crucial role ordinary 
language plays in the process of scientific inquiry of theological science.  
We have in this section analysed the appropriateness of scientific inquiry.  
Our analysis suggests that for human inquiry of theological science to be scientific, 
the key points of not trespassing beyond what has been given, not disregarding the 
predicament of human existence, and not undermining the effectiveness of ordinary 
language have to be upheld.  Thus, as we end, it may be said that for theological 
inquiry to be properly scientific is consequential to Torrance because it is only by 
being that it could then become the ‘appropriate tool’ not only to surmount the 




Objectivity and Subjectivity in Revelation 
 
                                               
147 TS, 294. 
148 Ibid.  My italic. 
149 Heisenberg, 172.  See TS, 294. 
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In our previous discussion, particularly on the correlation between question and 
answer, the import of subjectivity and objectivity in the process of inquiry is 
implicated.  As the relation between objectivity and subjectivity corresponds to that 
of the divine and the human of the normative pattern of revelation and mediation, it is 
thus the aim of the current section to focus on the dynamic before we close the 
chapter.  We would analyse Torrance’s thought on the self-revealing nature of 
objectivity, the reciprocity of subjectivity, and the subject-object relation in the 
process of the scientific inquiry of theological science.  
 
The Revealing Nature of Objectivity 
 
Torrance says that in all scientific studies we refr our thought externally to the object 
of our observation.150  We no longer look at realities from a distance and to describe 
them as they are from a detached manner.  The attainment of knowledge has to do 
with our active and passive participation in the way e understand realities.151  Since 
we are part of the process of knowing, ‘the rigorous formalisations of our knowledge 
are not to be treated like transcripts of reality but precisely as scientific instruments 
and demonstrative indications referring us away from urselves to the thing we seek 
to know, so that by their nature they are engaged in the relentless service of 
objectivity.’152  As we are open to the disclosure, the compulsive nature of reality will 
force itself upon us through our knowing.  It will challenge and revise our knowledge 
and bring us a step closer to what is beyond, as Torrance says, ‘The relativity of our 
knowledge to external reality and its objectivity are but the obverse of each other.’153  
On this note, our commitment to regular and critical revision is inevitable if our 
knowing is to be in accordance with the nature of things and not our self-imposed 
presuppositions.  Torrance underlines that this painst king process of reworking our 
scientific conception is paramount in modern science as the reality that confronts us 
is a much profounder objectivity that is non-deterministic and is beyond our 
comprehension.154  Thus, Torrance asserts, ‘For any natural science, then, to claim 
finality for the reference of its theories would be tantamount to rejecting 
                                               
150 TS, 259.  Torrance underlines that there are differences in objectivity among various sciences as 
each special science has its own particular object of investigation.  In addition, within one special 
science there are also various levels of objectivity. 
151 Ibid., 295-96. 




objectivity.’155  To Torrance the task faced by theological science is indeed similar to 
that of natural science.  However, Torrance pinpoints a radical difference as he says,  
 
In theology our thought does terminate upon what is final and ultimate, the Lord God 
Himself, who is implacably resistant and objective to our formulations in that He 
cannot be confined to them.  It is because we come t  know God in His transcendent 
Majesty and Truth, and know Him to be greater than we can ever conceive or 
express, that we acknowledge the limitation and relativity of all our forms of thought 
and speech about Him.  Thus, theological knowledge is profoundly relative because 
it is relative to the Absolute, and profoundly objective because it has for its primary 
Object God who can be known only through Himself and not by reference beyond 
Him.156 
 
According to Torrance, the objectivity of theological science has both the 
transcendent and immanent characteristics.  Torrance calls them the ultimate 
objectivity and contingent objectivity.157  The objectivity is ultimate because God is 
transcendent in his encountering with us.  It is contingent because he makes himself 
known to us through the structured objectivities of the world, but at the same time 
distinguishing himself from them.  ‘This is the baffling element in theological 
knowledge,’ Torrance underlines, ‘the bi-polarity or bi-focality of its truth-reference, 
but it arises from the unique nature of the Object and the way He has taken in making 
Himself the object of our knowledge.  It would be a failure in scientific exactitude to 
ignore this or assimilate theological science to any of the other sciences as if it were 
of no essential significance.’158  This is the uniqueness of theological science that 
deserves our attention.  In all other sciences the subjects and the objects are both in 
the realm of creaturely reality.   They exist together in the same dimension within the 
same structure of space and time.159  But in theological science both the object and 
                                               
155 Ibid., 297. 
156 Ibid.  The distinction is remarkable.  In natural science no finality of reference can be made becaus 
the quest of truth is a journey of making countless references of fact from one to another. Since the 
objectivity has yet to come to its finality, natural science has to operate with a relative conception of 
truth.  However, knowledge is relative in theological science because it is relativised first by the 
Absolute through its compulsive imposition, and second from its self-critical method of inquiry.  Thus, 
to theological science, Torrance asserts that the finality of God is its source of relativity and the 
ultimate of God is its basis of objectivity.  While both natural science and theological science share t e 
rigour of methodological progress, the former deals with creaturely realities and beings, the latter has
God as its primary object that is the creative source of all beings. 
157 Ibid., 298. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid., Torrance says that scientists are the spokesmen of nature disclosing its wonder and beauty, 
and bringing its nature into intelligible articulation.  To be the prophets of nature, Torrance underlines 
that we have to presuppose some sort of agreement between our minds and external realities in the 
light that our thought and language can be the media through which the objectivities of realties are 
brought into rational disclosure.  As humanity and nature belong to the same level of rationality, we 
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the subject are of different realms.  Hence, Torrance is adamant that God can only be 
known ‘in His utter difference from us’ and ‘know Him where He encounters us 
within the sphere of our contingent existence’.160  In other words, our knowledge of 
God hinges very much on the fact that God in his ‘ultimate objectivity’ has 
condescended himself in our creaturely existence as the ‘contingent objectivity’.  God 
to Torrance cannot be known through scientific verification or demonstration.161  
Torrance aptly underlines, 
 
This is the way of Grace, for we know God only through His sovereign and 
unconditionally self-giving.  Natural objects, as we have seen, have to be the objects 
of our cognition when we know them, but it is only out of pure Grace that God gives 
Himself to be the object of our knowing and thinking.162 
 
Two observations could be made with regard to God’s unconditional self-
giving as the objectivity of Grace.  First, Torrance defends the belief that such non-
deterministic nature of theological objectivity is not ‘weak objectivity’ as some of his 
contemporaries have criticised.163  Second, through distinguishing the objectivity of 
theology and science, Torrance clearly underscores the unique objectivity of God as 
revealed and mediated in Jesus Christ.  God to Torrance essentially is ‘the Lordly 
Object over whom we have no power but whom we may know only through humble 
                                                                                                                            
are able to bring to open the structure and order of creaturely objectivities when we reduce human 
relations with nature to scientific knowledge. 
160 Ibid., 299.  Torrance underlines that we have to clarify ‘our knowledge of Him both in terms of the 
creaturely objectivity which His self-revelation to us has assumed in our world of space and time and 
in terms of the transcendent objectivity of His own eternal Being.’   
161 Ibid., 299-300.  Torrance delineates, ‘The experimntal investigation through man-made controls, 
and the corresponding demonstration offered by making things work as we stipulate, are scientifically 
inappropriate to the living God, for it would not be the Lord God but an idol that could come under our 
power like that, and it would not be theology but magic that could conjure up and manipulate “the 
divine” like that.’  Torrance cites Polanyi to substantiate his argument that God’s acts cannot be 
verified by scientific verification.  Polanyi points out that if the resurrection of the dead could be 
experimentally verified, this would strictly disprove its miraculous nature, for ‘to the extent that any
event can be established in terms of natural science, it belongs to the natural order of things.  However 
monstrous and surprising it may be, once it has been fully established as an observable fact, the event 
ceases to be regarded as supernatural….  It is illogical to attempt the proof of the supernatural by 
natural tests, for these can only establish the natural aspects of an event and can never represent it as 
supernatural.’  See Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 284. 
162 Ibid.   
163 Ibid., 296.  Torrance underlines that such criticism implies the equivalent of objective knowledge 
with a deterministic description of things.  He assert  that those theologians who advocate the 
equivalent of objectivity with descriptive objectivism tend to confine God to their own subjectivity.  
He cites Barth’s criticism of Bultmann as an example to illustrate that theologians who are charged by 
such remark would often claim ‘objectivity’ for God to indicate that God is a reality apart from human 
subjective experience.  Such ‘objectivity’ is the equivalent of God’s transcendent unknowability.  
Torrance questions the argument.  He asks how could God be known if this is the case.  He says that 
such ‘objectivity’ is only an empty movement of thought. 
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service and love.’164  These observations underpin the importance that while God 
graciously gives himself to us as the object of our knowledge, the ‘Gift is not 
detached from the Giver’ and he retains his transcendence in our knowing of him165   
 
The Reciprocity of Subjectivity 
 
Our discussion thus far shows that the inquirer is bound to his object of inquiry.  As 
much as the inquirer in his enquiry should subject himself unconditionally to the 
object in order to have a true knowledge of things, the unwavering fact is he remains 
entirely as a free, active, spontaneous, self-determin  and personal agent in his 
epistemic relation with the object.166  As Polanyi says, ‘There is always a residue of 
personal judgment involved in deciding whether to accept any particular piece of 
evidence…  I applied this also to science, and decided that science was grounded on 
an act of personal judgement, and called this knowledge, therefore, a personal 
knowledge.’ 167  Torrance calls it ‘personal-coefficient’.168  However, by saying that, 
Torrance does not imply that impartiality is unimportant in scientific inquiry.  In fact, 
to be impartial and objective in scientific inquiry do not eliminate the personal-
coefficient.  Torrance says, 
 
This is what we mean by ‘disinterested’ and sometims ‘impersonal’ approach, but 
far from involving disinterest in the object it calls for such an attachment to the 
object that we become detached from all alien presupositions and thus genuinely 
objective, and far from involving the elimination of personal judgement it calls for 
such a profound commitment to the rationality of the object that we are able to 
distinguish it from our own subjective states and conditions.169 
 
   To Torrance scientific inquiry is a function of the human mind in which 
spontaneity, imagination and judgement play a significant role.  We cannot cut our 
positive involvement out of the process of knowing nor can we allow our negative 
presupposition to taint it.  This is the unique feature of subjectivity.  Torrance claims 
                                               
164 Ibid., 300. 
165 Ibid. 
166 The role of ‘person’ as the active agent is an important teaching of Calvin.  Torrance comments that 
it has the effect of restoring theological knowledg to the field of direct intuitive knowledge of God in 
his Word and Spirit, and of giving it an essentially dialogical character instead of the merely dialectical 
character it has derived from reflecting upon the abstr ctive ideas. 
167 Cited by Torrance in TCFK, 123. 
168 TS, 303.  Without personal participation, Torrance says that the inquirer would only be a 
‘mechanical brain’ or a ‘prisoner of mechanical operations’ abstracting and formulating propositions i 
a detached manner. 
169 Ibid. 
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that such uniqueness is further underpinned in theological science by the fact that the 
objectivity indeed demands and creates a reciprocal rel tion with the subjectivity in 
the scientific inquiry of knowing God.170  Our knowledge of God’s self-disclosure in 
Christ from the outset involves a relation of union a d communion, and not a 
disjunction between the subject and the object.  Yet, it is not a union and communion 
in which God is entangled in our subjectivity.171  Torrance asserts, 
 
Face to face with the divine Object the human subject is not allowed to draw back 
into monologue or distinguished reflection, for he himself becomes the object of the 
active attention and self-giving of the divine Object; rather is he drawn into 
responsive activity, for he is opened up to the Object in his innermost being and 
made capable of apprehending Him, not merely in terms of his own acts of 
consciousness but in terms of the Object Himself as he meets and experiences Him in 
His undiminished and irreducible nature as the divine Subject, the Lord God.172 
 
 The argument of Torrance is significance.  There is indeed a reversal of 
relation between the subject and the object in the rev lation and mediation of God in 
Christ.  It is in this trans-subjective relation to God that the human subject is taken 
out of himself and finally made capable of objectivity; thus, becoming the true 
subject.  Torrance is not unaware of the pitfall of objectivism.  He argues, ‘It is 
essential to its objectivity since this is the form of rationality that the human reason 
must adopt if it is to be faithful to the nature of the divine Subject-Object---a merely 
objectivist approach could not be properly objective for it could not do justice to the 
divine Reality: it could only abstract from it.’173  Torrance is not alone in this regard.  
Buber, in expressing similar note, says, ‘Anthropomorphism always reflects our need 
to preserve the concrete quality evidenced in the encounter; yet even this need is not 
its true root: it is in the encounter itself that we are confronted with something 
compellingly anthropomorphic, something commanding reciprocity, a primary 
Thou’.174  But it is at this point when the human subjectivity is assuming its full 
reciprocal role that he is constantly being tempted.  The temptation is to take 
masterfully a creative role and to subdue divine objectivity into subjective models of 
dialectical abstraction and thus unjustifiably alter he objective knowledge.  The 
ramification in this regard is twofold.  First, our objective knowledge has been 
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172 Ibid., 308. 
173 Ibid., 308-09. 
174 Martin Buber, The Eclipse of God (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 14.  Cited in TS, 309. 
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subjectively subjectivised.  Second, the replacement of objective divine encounter 
with subjective self-encounter.  In other words, our a tonomous reason triumphs over 
divine revelation.  In congruence with Buber about this false subjectivity, Torrance 
avers, ‘There cannot be any doubt that this confinement of God to human subjectivity 
is the constant danger of modern Protestantism, and it can only result in what Buber 
has significantly called the “the eclipse of God” in which we allow ourselves to get 
between God and ourselves.  It is our own bloated subjectivity that shuts off the 
divine light from the world.’175  We would judge that the concept of 
anthropomorphism to Torrance is an explication of the transcendent objectivity.  God 
in his complete otherness gives himself to us by adapting himself to our humanity and 
at the same time lifts up our humanity into union and communion with him.  The 
objectivity of God anthropomorphised in the incarnation of Jesus Christ summoning 
us to know him in accordance with the way he has objectified himself.  On this note, 
the objectification of God in humanity disallows usto read our humanity back into 
God or to confound the objectivity of God with our human subjectivity.   
 
The Subject-Object Relation 
 
We have noted that God to Torrance is both the ultimate objectivity and contingent 
objectivity.  How could the transcendent God retain his objectivity in the contingent 
reality becomes an acute question.  In this regard, the answer of Torrance clearly 
evidences the influence of Barth.  Notwithstanding God to Barth as the ‘Subject of 
revelation is the Subject that remains indissolubly Subject’, he concedes that in 
certain respects ‘God is also the Object, if not the object.’176  The notion that God 
could paradoxically be both the subject and the object serves as the key to the door 
for Torrance.  James Brown’s interpretation of Barth may help us see the influence 
and connection.  Brown says, ‘God is Object to His own self-knowledge in the life of 
the eternal Trinity, Object of faith-knowledge to man in revelation, a disclosure 
which in turn presents God as Subject, the living Lord who calls for man’s obedience, 
the active Subject in organising man’s knowledge of Himself, both as to its form and 
its manner, its possibilities and its substance.  Indeed, Subject and Object are very 
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176 CD, I/1, 438.  Cited in James Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology (London: SCM, 
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ready in Barth to collapse into each other’.177  Evidently the Subject and the Object 
do collapse into each other in Torrance’s framework.  In fact, Torrance is more than 
ready to declare definitively that the subject of God is indeed the object, the 
objectivity of God in his transcendence and contingence.  The entanglement between 
the revealer and the inquirer in the subject-object r lation is resolved.  Torrance is 
able to declare that when facing the divine object, the human subject will not enmesh 
the objectivity of God within his subjectivity because he then becomes the object of 
God as God retains his objectivity. 
 There is, however, a question.  Where is the point of encounter between the 
objectivity of God and the subjectivity of human counterpart in this reciprocal 
relation?  Or, where is the contact so that true subjectivity and true objectivity could 
evoke and support each other in the process of knowing?  The question may appear 
superfluous in the first instance.  Nevertheless, if we take a closer look, we could say 
that notwithstanding pieces of jigsaw seem to fall in place, one remains to be found.  
The missing piece could be what Torrance is trying to et at, but has not fully brought 
into open.  Let us recapitulate the main points that Torrance has highlighted.  First, 
the way of knowing God is one of divine grace.   Second, it involves obedience and 
trust.  Third, despite the potential pitfall, reason has a place in our knowing of God.  
The question is what could be the missing piece in r lation to the above points in the 
subject-object relation between the inquirer and the revealer in the revelation and 
mediation of Christ?   
 Let us go back to the Gospel to find the answer.  In the Gospel story the 
saving acts of God are announced as the salvific message to call upon us a personal 
response.  There is an original kerygma in the calling and that we are presented with 
an object to which our subjectivity adjusts itself in accordance with its nature.178  We 
do not make or discover the object.  Neither do we project our generalisation of 
experience nor our own subjective world-view upon it.  The object is the 
inconceivable paradox, if we use the expression of Kierkegaard.  It is 
characteristically transcendent, as Barth claims.  Apart from the self-revelation of 
God in Jesus Christ, the contingent objectivity of G d, Torrance would agree that no 
object for faith is possible, as any object created subjectively by us would contradict 
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the authenticity of the Christian faith and the principle of theological science.179  On 
this note, faith as the proper response remains very much an act of human subjectivity 
for it involves personal decision, or personal judgement, as Polanyi underscores.  
Thus, ‘Faith is not wrought ex opere operato’, ‘It cannot be true, as element in a 
naturally existing tradition: it is made true, realised as true, as it is appropriated as 
truth in a form of living.’180  In other words, Christianity is not a philosophy but the 
truth and the way of life in Jesus Christ.  We have to make the subjective decision of 
faith in order for us to live and to know the life of truth that is in accordance with 
God in Christ, the objectivity of faith.  To Torrance God is the indefeasible subject 
who has condescended to become the object of our knowing so that we may surrender 
ourselves in the obedience of faith.  Our faithful ability of surrendering, or obedience, 
in itself is the grace of God.  Thus, the human subjectivity is now given with new 
scope and strength by the grace of God.   
Could faith then be the missing piece in Torrance’s picture of the subject-
object relation?  One possible reason constituting the inconspicuousness is that the 
exposition of faith in Torrance’s theological scienc  has often been marked as 
rationalistic.  Torrance himself is unequivocal in asserting that our understanding of 
God is ‘essentially a rational event.’181  In more than one occasion he has stressed the 
importance of reason in our faith-knowledge of God.  For example, he says, ‘Faith is 
the orientation of the reason toward God’s self-revelation, the rational response of 
man to the Word of God’,182 and ‘Faith is the relation of our minds to the Object’.183  
Torrance’s uncompromising approach has often led his critics to remark that his 
rationalistic faith is construed at the expense of other faith qualities.  On this note, the 
critique of Thomas Langford is the representative.  Langford comments, ‘Torrance 
has an extremely rationalistic or intellectualistic understanding of faith.  The 
dominant character of faith, as depicted, is its raion lity and not its qualities of trust 
or obedience.  This is a serious matter and one which must be set forth clearly for its 
consequences dominate the presentation.’184  Langford’s critical remark is not 
without ground.  However, Morrison’s response towards the criticism of Langford 
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183 Ibid., 132. 
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deserves some attention.  Morrison says, ‘It must be said too that while Torrance has 
probably overemphasised the cognitive aspect of faith as the proper mode of knowing 
God, yet Torrance does not forgo the critical aspects of trust and obedience.’185  We 
would suggest that Torrance in someway has unknowingly caused it to be a misfit.  
His emphatic reminders of the pitfall of autonomous reason and the importance of 
grace and obedience have unconsciously ‘marginalised’ th  role of his rationalistic 
faith in the object-subject relation.  Perhaps, Torrance is subtly caught in a dilemma.  
While he stands by the importance of the rationality of faith, it vanishes from sight 
when his discourse turns to more of a personal relation of trust and obedience 
between the object and the subject.  Such disappearance is unnecessary for two 
reasons.  First, faith, as mentioned, has an important role in the subject-object 
relation.  Second, notwithstanding the propensity for rationality, Torrance indeed 
does not forgo other qualities of faith.  In fact, the problem may not even occur 
should Torrance make explicit other faith qualities.  Faith, as underscored as well in 
our discussion of the Einsteinian-Polanyian science, indeed constitutes a vital aspect 
of human action of scientific inquiry in Torrance’s scheme of revelation and 
mediation. 
We have in this section analysed Torrance’s thought on the nature of 
objectivity and subjectivity, and the reciprocal relation between them in the process 
of scientific inquiry of theological science.  Our discussion demonstrates that 
Torrance indeed possesses a sophisticated account of justifying the subordination of 
human action to divine self-disclosure in the process of scientific inquiry.  Although 
Torrance manages to uphold both the subjectivity and the objectivity, the crucial 
factor of faith in the dynamic reciprocal relation requires some accentuation.  
Nevertheless, we may conclude by commenting that Torrance has succeeded in 
building a coherent account without compromising either the human or the divine of 
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This chapter pivots on Torrance’s use of scientific realism as the corrective to 
dualism in our understanding of God’s self-disclosure in Jesus Christ.  Our discussion 
shows that the Einsteinian-Polanyian science has provided Torrance with the impetus, 
as he develops his understanding in and through Barth, to argue for the significance 
of theological science and the appropriateness of human action as the scientific 
inquiry of God.  Notwithstanding the necessity for the knowing subject to subordinate 
to the revealing object in the reciprocal relation if inquiring is to be properly 
scientific, such subordination to Torrance does not demean but brings to fulfilment 
the subjectivity of the human knower.  Thus, we would j dge that Torrance’s subject-
object reciprocity indeed coheres with his normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation. 
Before we end the chapter, the pending question is whether Torrance’s 
scientific approach towards theology is a reasonable one.  Torrance’s endeavour is 
well received by Robert Palma as he has contributed enormously to ‘the prospect of a 
continuing fruitful interaction’ between science and theology.  The success of 
Torrance, according to Palma, lies in the rejection of the old adversary model as he 
helps us to apprehend ‘the dialogue between theology and natural science in terms of 
complementarity, fortification, and clarification.’186  As Jim Neidhart, in his 
commentary of Torrance’s works, says, ‘a dynamic coinherence between theology 
and science would preserve the integrity of both disciplines while healing the breach 
that has opened up between them.’187  Indisputably theology to Torrance is a 
scientific discipline, the science of God’s self-disclosure in Christ.  ‘He is to be 
commended for establishing the scientific nature of theological construction with 
such force and erudition,’ Thomas Langford says, as E. L. Mascall and Alan 
Willingale concur.188 
Some, nevertheless, question the relation between sci ce and theology in 
Torrance’s framework.  For example, David Galilee, in alluding to a statement of 
Austin Farrer, says, ‘And so if we ask whether belief in God is “scientific”, we were 
bound to answer Yes and No.  Yes, for it can be the following out of thoughts started 
by science; No, for it cannot be a piece of science itself…  And since God is not a 
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part of the world, still less an aspect of it, nothing that is said about God, however 
truly, can be a statement belonging to any science’.189  Andrew Louth acknowledges 
that Torrance is not making an attempt ‘to assimilate theology to the exact sciences’, 
but rather ‘to derive some illumination for the theological task from the way in which 
modern science (and in particular modern physics) has ad to grapple with the 
problem of epistemology’.190  However, Louth observes that while Torrance rightly 
recognises the main difference between theology and science on the ground of 
theology’s object as God’s giving of himself to humanity through grace, he has gone 
‘too far too quickly’ and overlooked that it has ‘to do with men and women, with 
persons’ as well.  Since theology rightly and approriately distinguishes itself from 
other forms of scientific knowledge because it has to do with the grace of God in 
Christ, should not that distinction ‘thus lead Torrance himself to class theology 
among the humanities’?191  The main divergence between Barth and Torrance in 
relation to the subject in question, as Louth sees it, lies in while Barth is not keen to 
develop analogies between theology and science, Torrance regards that as at least one 
of his central tasks of theological reconstruction.192  In alluding to Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s sustained attack on the Enlightenment’s fundamental claim that science is 
the way and the only way to the truth, Louth questions the validity of conceding all 
concern with truth to the sciences.  Louth says, ‘Gadamer sees sciences as one way of 
apprehending truth, not the way, and he thus situates science within a total approach 
to truth, rather than seeking to tailor the ways of apprehending the truth to the 
methods of the sciences.’193  Whether Torrance is agreeable to the comments is 
potentially a lengthy discussion that we shall not venture out into without deviating 
too far from the main concern of the chapter.  Nevertheless, the remarks are food for 
thought particularly in the light of Torrance’s declaration that it is out of God’s grace 
and our obedience, the union and communion of divine a d human action, that God’s 
own eloquent self-disclosure may ‘sound through to us in His Logos so that we may 
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know and understand Him out of His own rationality and under the determination of 
His divine being.’194 
 
 
                                               





The Communion of the Holy Spirit 
 
 
In the first three chapters that constitute part one f the thesis, we establish the claim 
that God’s self-disclosure in Torrance’s theology, instead of taking the form of 
immediacy, is the revelation and mediation of the incarnate Son Jesus Christ.  We 
discuss the nature of Christ’s revelation and mediation in chapter one.  Our discussion 
shows that Christ, being fully God and fully man in o e person, culminates and fulfils 
the two-way movement, sets the union and communion of divine and human action as 
the normative pattern of revelation and mediation.  We turn to dualism in chapter 
two, the treacherous threat to Christ’s revelation and mediation in Torrance’s opinion.  
Our analysis shows that Arian dualism and Newtonian dualism relegate God’s self-
disclosure in Christ by separating the Creator form the creation irreconcilably.  To 
Torrance the chief problem of dualism lies in the erroneous approach of interpreting 
Christ’s revelation and mediation; it gravitates the focal point from the centrality of 
God to humanity.  On this note, Torrance advocates realism as the appropriate 
remedy as it pivots on responding in accordance with the nature of the self-disclosure 
of the objective reality.  By building upon the theological foundation of Barth and 
taking cue from the advancement of Einsteinian-Polanyian science, a realist 
epistemology of theological science is postulated.  Thus, in chapter three, we examine 
Torrance’s understanding of scientific inquiry as the appropriate human action of 
knowing God in Christ.  As Torrance has provided the answer to the human action, 
the question now is what would constitute the divine action of the normative pattern 
of revelation and mediation, particularly after theascension of Christ?  It is with the 
intent to examine Torrance’s response to this question that we enter into chapter four, 
the beginning of the part two of the thesis.   
The main purpose of the part two of the thesis is two-fold.  First, we attempt, 
in chapter four, to analyse Torrance’s understanding of the work of the Spirit as the 
divine action of the normative pattern of revelation and mediation.  Second, in 
chapter five and six, Torrance’s thought on multiple mediations with regard to 
scripture, church, preaching, sacraments, and contingent creation would be studied.  
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As the chapters involve our second claim of the thesis, Torrance’s advocacy of the 
effacement of scripture would be critically examined in chapter five, and the import 
of the normative pattern of revelation and mediation undergirding Torrance’s 
framework of multiple mediations would be analysed in chapter six.  When the thesis 
draws near to the end, we would in the final conclusion engage Tillich and Gunton in 
providing Torrance with alternate views on scriptural mediation.  Thus, with the aim 
to address Torrance’s thought on the Spirit of God as the essential divine action of the 
normative pattern of revelation and mediation, we would now turn to chapter four and 
focus firstly on the nature of the communion of the Spirit, and secondly on the 
epistemic dynamic of the Spirit in enabling our knowing of God and validating 
earthly media as proper forms of divine mediation. 
 
 
The Communion of the Spirit of God 
  
To Torrance it is only by the communion of the Spirit that humanity could come 
before God in Christ.  On this note, the distinctive work of the Spirit in facilitating the 
communal process becomes unquestionably crucial.  Thus, the primary purpose of 
this section is to analyse Torrance’s thought on the nature of the communion of the 
Spirit.  The guiding question is whether Torrance’s xplication of the work of the 
Spirit is consistent with his overarching principle of the sole mediatorship of Christ.  
We would engage Kruger and Gunton in our discussion to illuminate and affirm 
Torrance’s understanding. 
Torrance, in delineating the nature of the ministry of the Sprit, says, ‘Since it 
is only through himself that God reveals himself, God himself is the personal content 
of his revelation to us embodied in Jesus Christ hi incarnate Son.  Since it is only 
through himself that communion with God is accessible to us, God himself is the 
personal reality of that communion granted to us in the Holy Spirit.’1  This statement 
encapsulates Torrance’s understanding that although the self-revelation of God is 
mediated to us in Christ, it is actualised in us through the communion of the Spirit.  It 
is in and through the communion of the Spirit that divine revelation is personally and 
experientially brought to bear upon us so that we are able to be brought forward to 
hear and apprehend the Word of God.  Our communion w th God in Christ is made 
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possible via a relation established between the divine and the human in the Spirit.  As 
Torrance says, ‘God creates that relation by the presence of his Spirit within us as a 
relation of himself to himself.’2  On this note, Torrance’s view reverberates that of 
Barth which says, ‘The Spirit of God is God in his freedom to be present to the 
creature, and so to create this relation and thereby to e the life of the creature.  And 
God’s Spirit, the Holy Spirit, especially in revelation, is God himself in that he can 
not only come to man but also in man, and thus to complete his revelation in him.’3  
In congruence with Barth, Torrance claims that thisis ‘how we are led to think of the 
Holy Spirit as we indwell the New Testament Scriptures and listen to the incarnate 
Word of God speaking to us in Christ, and through the holy presence of God in his 
Spirit finds Christ himself coming to dwell in us in such a way that we are enabled to 
receive and apprehend God’s revelation of himself.’4  As the Spirit discloses to us the 
revelation of the Father through the Son and brings us into communion with the 
Father in the Son, the Spirit to Torrance, as Gary Deddo pointedly underlines, ‘is 
rightly identified as the Spirit of the Jesus Christ the Son of God and the Spirit of God 
the Father.’  In Torrance’s scheme, Deddo says, ‘The Spirit can only be personally 
recognised and identified in relation to Jesus Christ because the Spirit is the Spirit of 
Jesus and Jesus is the place where God the Father and God the Son have provided 
access to the knowledge of themselves.’5  We may call the association of the Spirit 
with Jesus Christ the Son of God, particularly in relation to the unfolding of divine 
revelation and mediation, as the ‘epistemological dependence’ of the Spirit.   
Torrance although is unequivocal in underscoring the epistemic work of the 
Spirit in unfolding divine self-disclosure, he is adamant that the controlling centre of 
our knowing of God lies solely in Christ instead of the Spirit.  In alluding to 
Athanasius’ emphasis of the Son as the only Logos and Eidos of Godhead, Torrance 
pinpoints that ‘it is in and through the incarnate Form of God in Jesus Christ that His 
Face and Image are revealed and that our human knowledge of Him is shaped and 
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formed through the conformity of our minds to Jesus Christ.’6  In other words, only 
when we permit our scientific inquiry to respond appositely to what is revealed in 
Jesus, as Torrance says, ‘we allow the basic forms of theological truth to come to 
view… as in the Spirit the being and nature of God is brought to bear upon us so that 
we think under the compulsion.’7  By pivoting on the controlled knowing of God in 
Christ, Torrance claims that the work of the Spirit is there primarily to unveil that 
which is hidden.  Thus the Spirit to Torrance is alo the Spirit of Truth as it is only 
through the Spirit that Christ is revealed as the Son of the Father.8  Torrance is 
adamant that as the Spirit leads all to Christ, he bears witness to Christ and not to 
himself.  The Spirit, Torrance says, ‘does not show us Himself, but shows us the Face 
of the Father in the Face of the Son, and shows us the heart of the Son in the heart of 
the Father.’9  The Spirit does not focus on himself because it is his mission from the 
Father to declare the Son and pay attention to the Son.  The function of the Spirit is to 
‘direct us through himself to the one Word and Face of God in Jesus Christ in 
accordance with whom all our knowledge of God is formed in our minds, knowledge 
of the Spirit as well as of the Father and of the Son.’10  ‘By His very mode of being as 
Spirit He hides Himself from us so that we do not know Him directly in His own 
hypostasis, and in His mode of activity as transparent Light He effaces Himself that 
the one Trinity God may shine through Him to us.’ 11  Torrance says that the ‘hiding’ 
of the Spirit is the diaphanous self-effacing nature of the Spirit; by ‘hiding behind’ 
the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father, th Spirit brings the radiance of God’s 
glory to bear upon us.12  Notwithstanding the homoousion of the Spirit and the Son, 
Torrance is explicit that the Spirit, unlike the Son, is not of one substance with us ‘for 
He incarnates the Son and did not incarnate Himself’, and thus he is able to direct us 
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through himself to the one Logos and Eidos of Godhead in Jesus Christ.13  By 
pivoting on Christ as the controlled knowing of divine self-disclosure, and the 
epistemic function of the Spirit in pointing all to Christ instead of himself in the 
unfolding of the knowledge of God, Torrance undersco es that, 
 
[The Spirit] brings the Being and Reality of God out f his hiddenness to bear upon 





[The Spirit] is the creative Agent of God’s revelation to us and the creative Agent in 
our reception and understanding of that revelation…  He is the living Action and 
Presence of God in it all, who so relates the divine Word to the human and earthly 
forms which it assumed in Jesus Christ that in Him we are enabled to meet God face 
to face, shining in His own uncreated Light and speaking to us personally in His own 
eternal Word.14 
 
The ‘epistemological dependence’ of the Spirit is aconstitutive argument that 
cannot be overlooked in Torrance’s scheme of establi hing Christ as the sole 
Mediator of God.  As the Spirit in his communion with humanity points to, and in 
that sense reveals, the Son who reveals the Father in the Son, divine self-disclosure 
unfolded through multiple mediations of human and earthly media in the course of 
human history does not finally have the Spirit as its ultimate focus but Christ the 
incarnate Son of God.  The ‘hiddenness’ of the Spirit in relation to the Son in divine 
revelation and mediation as Torrance argues may invite criticism that his 
pneumatology is one, like Barth, that allows the Son to eclipse the Spirit; as Eugene 
Rogers Junior says, ‘Barth allows the Son to eclipse the Spirit when he allows his fear 
of Schleiermacher to overshadow his admiration for Athanasius.’15  It is a subject of 
debate if Torrance suffers the same problem.  The fact is while the centrality of Christ 
is fundamentally upheld in divine self-disclosure, Torrance attempts to maintain 
simultaneously the sovereignty of the Spirit in his‘ iddenness’ by accentuating that 
‘yet in Himself He [the Spirit] brings us to participate in the communion of the Father 
and the Son’, as ‘He is the Spirit that goes forth from God and returns to God, who 
brings God to bear directly upon and lifts us up to experience the undiluted acts of 
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God Almighty.’16  Although Torrance says that we do not know the Spirit directly in 
his own personal reality, he avers that the Godness of the Spirit is indisputable 
‘because it is in His Light that we see Light and by His creative operation that we 
know the unknowable and eternal God, we know Him as no less Lord God than the 
Father and the Son’.17  Torrance underscores,  
 
Yet He is never other than God… is free to condescend to mortal men on earth and, 
unlimited by their creaturely incapacity for Him, to present Himself to them in His 
own transcendent Being and Reality, and so to emancip te them from imprisonment 
in themselves and their weakness and to raise them up to partake of His creative and 
eternal life.  Thus with the coming of the Spirit to us the Being of God Almighty, the 
Maker of heaven and earth, breaks through the distance between the creature and the 
Creator, shines through all the intermedia of our creaturely existence and knowledge, 
disclosing Himself to us personally….  Therefore, for us to be in the Spirit means to 
come up against God in the most absolute and ultimate sense, in His sheer Godness, 
to meet and experience Him in His immutable Reality who, by being the Lord God 
and by giving Himself to us as our God, lays absolute and exclusive claim upon our 
worship and love and obedience.18 
 
From the discourse it is conspicuous that Torrance refuses to let the Spirit be 
eclipsed by the Son, even thought the importance of the ‘hiddenness’ of the Spirit in 
directing all to Christ is always at the forefront of his thought.  However, if one takes 
a closer study of the arguments, it soon becomes clar that while Torrance 
endeavours to argue for the Godness and sovereignty of the Spirit by underpinning 
the revelatory movements both of his coming to humanity in communion and of his 
lifting humanity up before God in the knowing of God, some vagueness emerges in 
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relation to the sole mediatorship of Christ.  Given Torrance’s stress of the deity and 
work of the Spirit, the ambiguity lies in whether apart from Christ, the Spirit through 
his communion with humanity is also the revelation and mediation of God.  Kruger 
picks up similar problem when he remarks that there ar  ‘places in Torrance’s 
writings where there is a very definite ambiguity in his discussion of the coming of 
the Spirit at Pentecost especially as regards our sharing in the Son’s communion with 
and knowing of the Father.’19  The uncertainty to Kruger lies in the Spirit at times 
could be seen as the content of the sharing, since the Spirit in Torrance’s account is 
also the very communion of the Father and the Son in the reciprocal relation of the 
immanent Trinity.  Thus, our partaking of the Spirit s also our partaking of the 
communion and mutual knowing of the Trinity, and to share in God’s self-knowing.  
On this note, Kruger says, ‘Here Pentecost is Christ ministering the things of God to 
us.  This is in line with the Biblical covenantal framework.  The great blessing of God 
upon His people in the New Covenant mediated by Christ is the outpouring of the 
Spirit upon all flesh.’20  There is, however, another approach in Torrance’s thought of 
which the coming of the Spirit is understood more christologically.  Kruger pinpoints, 
‘With respect to our knowing God, Pentecost, in Torrance’s thought here is 
interpreted more in line with the fact that it is in Jesus Christ alone that human 
knowing of God and human sharing in God’s own self-knowledge exist and that this 
cannot be separated from Christ Himself.’21   
Kruger, in substantiating the observation, cites statements of Torrance to 
demonstrate the ambiguity.  According to him, Torrance, in Trinitarian Faith, says 
that ‘Jesus Christ thus constitutes the bridge betwe n God and man, between the 
invisible and the visible, the incomprehensible and the comprehensible, the 
immeasurable and the measurable.  It is, then, in Jesus Christ, through “union and 
communion” with him in love, and through sharing in the love of God incarnate in 
him, that we are enabled to know God in such a way th t our knowledge of God is 
firm and sure, for it is anchored in the ultimate reality of God’s own eternal being.’  
Kruger underlines that Torrance, after underpinning the importance of Christ, goes on 
to say, ‘That would not be possible without the aid of the Spirit of God.’  Judging the 
logical development of the argument, Kruger remarks that one would expect Torrance 
                                               
19 C. B. Kruger, ‘Thesis: Participation in the Self-Knowledge of God: The Nature and Means of Our 
Knowledge of God in the Theology of T.F. Torrance’ (The University of Aberdeen, 1990), 204. 
20 Ibid.  Author’s italic. 
21 Ibid., 204-05. 
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to go on from here to speak specifically and directly of the ‘union and communion’ 
with Christ through the Spirit.  However, instead of that, Torrance refers to the fact 
that it is ‘in and through the Lord Jesus Christ God has accustomed his Holy Spirit to 
dwell in human nature and at the same time has adapte  human nature to receive the 
Holy Spirit, which enables us through the gift of the Holy Spirit to share in the 
relation of mutual knowing between the Father and the Son and thus on God’s 
knowledge of himself.’  On this note, it seems that t e sharing and knowing of God to 
Torrance lies quintessentially in our partaking of the Spirit who dwells in us as God’s 
gift.22  Citing a longer statement to prove the point, Kruger says that the ambiguity 
continues although a clear christological orientation is emerging.  Torrance says,  
 
Strictly speaking, as Irenaeus pointed out, only God can know himself so that it is 
only through God that God may be known….  Hence if we are really to know God it 
can be only through sharing in some incredible way in the knowledge which God has 
of himself.  That is to say, we can know God only if he brings us into communion 
with him in the inner relations of his own being as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  This 
sharing in the knowledge that God has of himself was made possible through the 
incarnation of God’s Son and his mediation of the Spirit of the Father and the Son.  
In the incarnation God communicated himself to us in Jesus Christ his beloved Son, 
not something about himself, but his very Self, and thereby made himself known to 
us according to his own divine nature as Father.  And at Pentecost God poured out 
upon us his own Spirit who as the Spirit of the Father and the Son is the immediate 
presence of God to us in his own very being as God.  In Jesus Christ God has 
embodied in our human existence the mutual knowledge which the Father and the 
Son have of one another and in the Holy Spirit he giv s us communion in the mutual 
relation of the Father and the Son… express it the o r way around, through Jesus 
Christ we are given access to the Father in one Spirit.23   
 
Kruger remarks that although here to Torrance ‘the coming of the Spirit 
“gives us communion in the mutual relation of the Father and the Son”’, ‘it is not yet 
that clear as to whether the Spirit is Himself that communion or whether it is a 
partaking on our part in the Son’s communion with the Father through the Son’.24  
Alternatively put, the key of Kruger’s criticism lies in whether, in Torrance’s 
account, the communion of the Spirit is the mediation of the revelation of God in 
Christ to us, or the way to Christ through whom we may partake the revelation of 
God.  The question is which is the correct one.  Kruge  says that if we take ‘the 
overarching thrust of Torrance’s thought and its centring upon the person of Christ 
then this would suggest that the main or all-encompassing perspective within which 
                                               
22 Ibid., 205.  Cited from TF, 32. 
23 TF, 54-55.  Author’s italic.  Cited in Kruger, 205-06.  
24 Kruger, 206. 
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Pentecost should be viewed as Christological.’25  In alluding to Torrance’s account of 
the ‘hiddenness’ of the Spirit, Kruger underlines that the Spirit’s work is 
fundamentally christological.  Kruger says, ‘Now, this emphasis upon the self-
effacing and Christological nature of the Spirit’s coming and work in hiding Himself 
and shining His Light upon Jesus must be interpreted more “closely” and 
“personally” in term of “union and communion with Christ”.  It is not just that the 
Spirit throws His Light upon a “distant” Christ but actually “connects” us with Christ 
Himself.’26  In addition, when referring to the doctrine of the Spirit in The School of 
Faith, Kruger claims that to Torrance the ‘proper work’ of the Spirit in the 
communion is ‘uttering Christ, revealing Him, creating communion with Him…  The 
Spirit has an essentially Christocentric relation.’27  Taking this christological 
framework into consideration, Kruger believes the latter interpretation, that of 
perceiving the communion of the Spirit as the way to Christ through whom we may 
partake the revelation of God, is the correct one.28   
Kruger’s conclusion corroborates our argument that Jesus Christ essentially is 
the sole Mediator of God in Torrance’s theological scheme.  Notwithstanding the 
ambiguity, the overarching christological thrust of Torrance’s pneumatology 
indicates that the communion of the Spirit is to lead all to God’s self-disclosure in 
Christ, the controlling centre of our knowing of God.  To some extent we may say 
that the vagueness is due to a lack of clarity in Torrance’s attempt to delimit the 
function of the Spirit in relation to the Son.   The intent of Torrance to give the person 
of the Spirit a distinctive role so to avoid the eclipse of the Spirit in God’s revelation 
and mediation in Christ is evident.  With the endeavour of Torrance in mind, we may 
turn to Gunton for some guidance and affirmation.  
In alluding to George Caird’s remark that the Fourth Gospel is distinctive 
because it is written from the perspective of the cur h under the guidance of the 
Spirit, Gunton makes a ‘slightly exaggerated contrast’ between the Synoptic Gospel 
and the Fourth Gospel by saying that in the former w  have an understanding of 
revelation from the point of view of its first recipients, and in the latter one from the 
later church.29  The uniqueness of the Fourth Gospel is paramount t  Gunton because 
                                               
25 Ibid., 206-07. 
26 Ibid., 209. 
27 SF, xcviii.  Cited in Kruger, 210. 
28 Kruger, 210. 
29 Colin Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 114-16.  Although a 
few crucial expressions of revelation could be identifi d in the Synoptic Gospel, Gunton claims that 
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it is ‘trinitarian in a thoroughgoing but also distinctive way.’30  Gunton says that the 
way to understand it is to compare the weighting of the actions of the persons of the 
Trinity with Barth’s similar account.  Notwithstandi g Barth’s conspicuous trinitarian 
and christological account, Gunton remarks that some features are questionable.  For 
example, Gunton asks whether Barth is right to describe Jesus Christ as revelation 
and the Father as revealer.  Although in some aspect this is a feature of the Synoptic 
account, Gunton asks could the other way round be also possible.  Gunton says, ‘We 
have already met the problem of Barth’s tendency to underplay the significance of the 
humanity of Christ.  It is accompanied by an equivocal failure to give due place and 
function to the Holy Spirit.’31  Gunton says that to Barth the Spirit is the ‘subjective 
side in the event of revelation.’32  It is Barth’s equivalent of the Reformation concept 
                                                                                                                            
the Gospel of John focuses singularly on the revelation of glory; encompassing the whole life of Jesus 
Christ from incarnation to ascension.  Among the episodic events of Jesus, the Synoptics pay special 
attention to the baptism of Jesus.  Gunton says although in the Eastern Orthodox tradition this event is 
seen as a revelation of the Trinity, he underpins that he centrality of revelation is Jesus Christ.  This is 
in line with the expression of Mark that says that upon Jesus the Spirit descends and the voice of the 
Father says ‘Thou art my son….’ (Mk. 1:11).  Beside the baptismal event, Gunton alludes to the 
confession of Peter at Caesarea Philippi and the subseq ent narrative of transfiguration as the 
revelation of the Son by the Father.  Although the content of revelation in this regard concerns Jesus’ 
destiny and the meaning to be the Son of God, Gunton says, ‘All three evangelists interpret Peter’s 
confession through the transfiguration when God affirms, in a way analogous to the baptism, both the 
confession and Jesus’ interpretation of it.’  Notwithstanding the revelation of Christ is clearly made 
known, as Mk. 9:7 indicates, Gunton observers that t e recipients are incapable of a full grasp.  And, 
since the story is told from the point of view of those whom it happened, it continues into the Fourth 
Gospel.  The third major episode of the Synoptics concerns the story of resurrection.  Gunton 
underscores that there is a two-fold dynamic in the ev nt.  On the one hand, the resurrection is, as 
Pannenberg says, the divine declaration of the significa ce of Christ.  It is an eschatological event a d 
thus it anticipates the final revelation.  But, on the other hand, resurrection, as the story indicates, is not 
revelation that in someway overturns the darkness of the cross.  Rather, it establishes that as revelation.  
To sum up the Synoptics, Gunton says, ‘The revelation is of the suffering sonship of Jesus, that it is
through his death above all that he is revealed to be the one that he is, the vehicle not primarily of 
revelation but of salvation, atonement in his blood: the restoration and realisation of the predestined 
human relationship to the father.  By anticipation n baptism and transfiguration, in fullness at the 
cross, he is revealed as the one sent and anointed to bear the sin of the world and so to set his people 
free for God.’ The Fourth Gospel is not unlike that of he Synoptics with regard to the focus of divine 
salvific economy.  However, Gunton is confident that the definitive treatment of revelation in the New 
Testament can be found there. 
30 Ibid., 119.  Gunton says that although the Fourth Gospel, like the Synoptics, has employed the genre 
of narrative, it is of different kind as revelation is treated relationally rather than narratively.  Gunton 
says, ‘We should be alerted already to the distinct contribution that John has to make by his use of the 
idea of indwelling.  The knowledge of which he speaks is first of all the knowledge by acquaintance 
that is a function of the interrelatedness of persons.’  Thus, it should not come as a surprise to us that 
the knowledge of which John derives from revelation is one that is framed within the relations between 
God and the world.  We may briefly summarise Gunton’s exposition in three points.  First, revelation 
is about creation; Christ is the mediator of creation.  Second, it concerns incarnation.  The mediator of 
creation becomes incarnate in Jesus Christ (Jn.1:14); ‘Revelation is thus at a datable time and place, 
tied offensively and unphilosophically, to a historical person.’  Third, Jesus Christ is the centre.  The
one who reveals God, is also the mediator of salvation; ‘It is the epiphany of the one who is the 
mediator of God’s salvation.’ 
31 Ibid. 
32 CD, I/1, 449.  Cited in Gunton, 119. 
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of the internal word; God confirms internally for the believer the external word of the 
Bible.  Gunton argues that although Barth’s revelation may represent a version of 
reformation teaching, he could not avoid the weakness of limiting the work of the 
Spirit to the believer’s relation in Christ, a problem that is so typical of the 
pneumatology of the Western tradition.33  On this note, Torrance, in expressing 
similar view, regards the construction of a full doctrine of the Spirit as an urgent task 
of modern theology that even Barth has yet to work ut thoroughly in his 
Dogmatics.34  Gunton and Torrance are not alone in this regard.  Eugene Rogers notes 
that ‘many critics have argued, persuasively, that despite books, sections, 
monographs and the Trinitarian revival, Karl Barth has managed to substantially 
ignore the Holy Spirit, or to reduce it to a function of Jesus Christ---“the power of 
Jesus Christ”’.35  The way out according to Gunton, which is also the endeavour of 
Torrance as shown in the attempt to overcome the eclips  of the Spirit, is first to give 
the Spirit more a distinctive role, and second to develop a more adequate conception 
of mediation.  Gunton elucidates, 
 
Revelation is… an eschatological concept: it is that which is awaited at the end time, 
when we shall know as we are known.  If there is any revelation in the midst of time, 
it will be because the Spirit, the agent of eschatological completeness and the one 
who prefects the creation, enables an anticipation  take place: so mediates 
revelation that we may say that the mysteries of God are made known in our time.36 
 
To Gunton the emphasis of the Spirit is the characte istic of the Fourth Gospel 
because it is written from the perspective of those who live after the giving of the 
Spirit.  John’s churchly situation enables him to comprehend that which is lacked in 
the disciples’ understanding even though they are confronted with clear revelation as 
described in the Synoptic narratives.  The reason of distinction, of which Gunton 
reiterates the point of John, is that the ‘Spirit was not yet given, but now the Paraclete 
is with them (Jn. 7:39, cf. 12:16).’37  To John the Spirit is the one whom the Father 
sends through the Son to bring believers to all truth (Jn.16:13).  As the truth is Jesus 
Christ, Gunton underscores, as Torrance, that the Spirit is the agent of revelation 
                                               
33 Gunton, 119-20. 
34 Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Karl Barth,’ Expository Times (1955): 209.  Torrance says, ‘If I were asked to 
give my main criticism of the teaching of Karl Barth I think I would say that we need to have from him 
much more than he has yet given us, a thoroughly worked out doctrine of the Holy Spirit’. 
35 Rogers, 173. 
36 Gunton, 120. 
37 Ibid.  Gunton believes this is the reason why John is able to show us the glory of the Christ not only 
at crucial moments of revelation, but in the whole of his life.   
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leading all to the truth, to Jesus.  And by pointing away from himself to Christ, it does 
not deny the truism that the Spirit is also revealed, ‘but revealed as one from whom 
rather to whom we look.’  ‘The Spirit is revealed,’ Gunton say , ‘as the mediator of 
relation to God through Christ and consequently as the mediator of revelation.’38  
This is the heart of Gunton’s argument to which Torrance would agree without 
difficulty.  The mediatory office of ‘the Spirit is to point to, and in that sense, reveal 
the Son; that of the Son to reveal the Father.’39  Going back to Barth, the question is 
whether the trinitarian structure of revelation might be better to state as the Son 
reveals the Father in and through the Spirit.  By asking questions, Gunton underlines 
that we are not implying that such elements are absent.  But, ‘there is a tendency 
working against them suggesting that the Son revels him elf, with the result that the 
nature of the relation between Son and Father is obscured, and the work of the Spirit 
too closely located in the believer’s subjective appropriation of revelation.’40  The 
crux to Gunton is without the mediatory and revealing work of the Spirit, no one will 
know the Son as the way to the Father; since one is ot the same as the other in the 
Trinity, and each has unique function and action, thus, differences of mediation 
naturally follow. 
It is not difficult to note the congruity between Torrance and Gunton on the 
importance of the mediation and revelation of the Spirit.  The strength of Gunton’s 
account lies in while stressing the distinctive work f the Spirit it does not confuse 
but corroborate the sole mediatorship of Christ.  Gunton’s exposition of the Gospel 
would also be a complement to Torrance in his endeavour to avoid the eclipse of the 
Spirit.  Although the ways of articulation and substantiation are uniquely different 
between the two, Gunton and Torrance, as our examinations show, agree 
unanimously on the distinctiveness of the Spirit and the Son in mediating God’s self-
disclosure in human history.  Essentially the communion of the Spirit to Torrance and 
Gunton is to lead all to the Son, as the Son reveals the Father.  Before we move to the 
next section, a question not irrelevant to our analysis awaits attention.  If Gunton is 
right about Barth’s weakness of limiting the activity of the Spirit to the believer’s 
subjective appropriation of revelation, we may ask whether Torrance, 
notwithstanding his endeavour, is free from the same problem.  This is an important 
                                               
38 Ibid., 121.  Author’s italic. 
39 Ibid., 122. 
40 Ibid. 
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question.  Nevertheless, it will not be addressed until the next chapter when we look 
into Torrance’s thought on scripture. 
 
 
The Epistemic Dynamic of the Spirit 
 
In the foregoing section we primarily discuss Torrance’s understanding of the 
communion of the Spirit in enabling believers to meet God in Christ.  Our focus of 
this section, however, is to turn to the nature of the epistemic work of the Spirit in 
unfolding divine self-disclosure through media of creaturely existence.  We would 
analyse Torrance’s thought on the activity of the Spirit in facilitating our scientific 
knowing of God, validating multiple media and correlating them with the being of 
God in divine mediation. 
Torrance questions whether it is meaningful to speak of the epistemology of 
the Spirit, given that our knowing of God’s revelation and mediation in Christ cannot 
be actualised apart from the Spirit.  If there is a pl ce for the question, Torrance 
believes it is to be carried out in relation to theFather and the Son, since the Spirit by 
himself, as the foregoing discussion shows, has no independent epistemological 
ground.  If our concern of the work of the Spirit includes aspects of our knowing of 
God where epistemological forms break off, and where we are confronted with the 
acts of God that are very much beyond our comprehension and description, Torrance 
says that instead of indulging in the discussion of the epistemology of the Spirit, the 
speaking of the epistemological relevance of the Spirit would be more accurate and 
meaningful.  Torrance elucidates,  
 
In epistemology we are concerned with the formal aspects of knowledge, the forms 
of the how and the forms of the what as they arise in our understanding under the 
impact of the object, whereas in the Spirit we are concerned rather with the non-
formal, with the given reality or object of our knowledge as it outruns all forms of 
our understanding, and with the abrupt acts of God through which our understanding 
of Him arises but which cannot be reduced to forms of our understanding….  As 
knowledge of God actually arises, however, we know that we cannot attribute it to 
ourselves… though it is our knowledge of Him, it is explicable only from the side of 
God as freely given participation in His self-knowledge.  The epistemological 
relevance of the Holy Spirit lies in the dynamic and transformal aspects of this 
knowledge.41   
 
                                               
41 GR, 165-66.  Author’s italic. 
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Torrance believes the discussion of the epistemology f the Spirit is 
inappropriate because it presupposes human action al e could ascertain the 
knowledge of God by coming before the Spirit methodol gically and scientifically, 
and therefore runs the risk of losing the free, dynamic and non-formal aspects of the 
Spirit and the knowledge of God.  Torrance’s refusal is consequential as, we judge, it 
entails a deeper dimension of addressing what he beli ves to be the crisis of 
domesticating the Spirit of God particularly in Roman Catholicism and Protestant 
Pietism.  Torrance says, ‘This is the persistent error of the Romanism and 
Protestantism; the one confounds the Spirit with the spirit of the Church… and the 
other confounds the Spirit of God with the human spirit.’  The ramification of the 
confusion indubitably is the dissolve of our knowledg  of the Spirit ‘in the 
subjectivities of the consciousness of the Church or the individual, and the products 
of this consciousness, in its collective or individual, are put forward as operations of 
the Holy Spirit.’42  Torrance is adamant that the only way out of the predicament is to 
submit oneself before the living God and to ‘distinguish the Holy Spirit from our 
spirits, and to know him in all his transcendent freedom and power as Creator 
Spiritus.’43  Torrance underlines, ‘Because the Spirit is the active and living presence 
of this One and Only God, He resists all our attempts to be independent of Him or to 
get alongside of Him or to manipulate Him for our own ends.  Hence in all our 
knowing of God the Spirit… convicts us of falsifying the truth and of confounding 
Him with our own subjective states, and in which He distinguishes Himself from our 
spirits’.44  On this note, Torrance pinpoints the meaning of the indwelling of the Spirit 
as, 
 
The presence of the Holy Spirit means, therefore, while God reveals Himself to us 
within the subject-object structures of our existence in space and time He encounters 
us always as the Lord in the implacable objectivity of His divine Being, objecting to 
our objectifying modes of thought and imparting Himself to us in accordance with 
the mode of His own self-revealing through the Word.45   
 
From the argument it is manifest that the discussion of the epistemological 
relevance of the Spirit is more appropriate than that of epistemology, as the Spirit 
essentially is dynamic, non-formal and even personal i  unfolding God’s self-
                                               
42 TRst, 242. 
43 Ibid., 228. 
44 GR, 173. 
45 Ibid. 
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disclosure in Christ; as Torrance aptly says, ‘the Spirit is at work as personalising 
Spirit.’46  However, given the vitality of the Spirit that, according to Torrance, is 
beyond human domestication or dominion, would it then dominate or even swallow 
up the human subjectivity through the acts of ‘objecting’ and ‘imparting’ within the 
reciprocal subject-object relation?  To ascertain the answer, we may take cognisance 
of Torrance’s employment of a term used by the Greek Fathers.  Torrance says, 
‘Theosis describes man’s involvement in such a mighty act of G d upon him that he 
is raised up to find the true centre of his existence ot in himself but in Holy God, 
where he lives and moves and has his being in the uncreated but creative energy of 
the Holy Spirit.’47  Although it is only in the Spirit that our knowing of God is 
authentic knowing, Torrance is unequivocal that it ‘does not mean that by receiving 
the Spirit we lose our own proper being’.48  Notwithstanding the dynamic 
compulsiveness, the personalising work of the Spirit in the subject-object relation is 
to bring to fulfilment the subjectivity of the human knower than to relegate or demean 
his dignity and self-determination as proper human person (see chapter three).  
Torrance elucidates, ‘Far from crushing our creaturely nature or damaging our 
personal existence, the indwelling presence of God through Jesus Christ and in Holy 
Spirit has the effect of healing and restoring and deepening human personal being… 
for it is through Christ and in the Spirit that we are granted personalising communion 
with the ever-living God in the perfection of his triune being.’49 
If Torrance’s account of the Spirit and the nature of our knowing of God in 
the Spirit are acceptable, the challenge faces us ihow are we going to relate the free, 
dynamic, and non-formal aspects of the Spirit with the scientific mode of human 
inquiry?  Is there a contradiction in Torrance’s argumentation?  Should we throw 
scientific inquiry out of the window?  Would our knowing of God’s self-disclosure in 
Christ by the Spirit then become immediate, supra rational and ecstatic?  ‘Surely not,’ 
Torrance avers, ‘for it is the miraculous nature of the Spirit’s activity that while He 
creates in us the ability to know God beyond all creaturely and human capacities this 
                                               
46 Ibid., 188.  Author’s italic. 
47 TRst, 243.  According to Torrance the whole experience of falling under the overwhelming presence 
of God and coming under the control of the Spirit in our knowing of him is akin to what the Greek 
Fathers call theosis.  Torrance says that the term is usually translated wrongly as deification; but it has 
nothing to do with divinisation of humanity any more than the incarnation has to do with the 
humanisation of God.  By theosis Torrance says that ‘the Greek fathers wish to express the fact that in 
the new coming of the Spirit we are up against God in the most absolute sense, God in his ultimate 
holiness or Godness.’ 
48 TRci, 238. 
49 TF, 230-31. 
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does not involve any suppression of our rational and critical powers.’50  In fact, far 
from suppressing or crushing ‘the frail forms of contingent rationality’, Torrance 
claims that ‘the presence of the Holy Spirit empowers, integrates and establishes 
them while overcoming the alienating deficiencies and contradictions which we have 
introduced into them’.51  Torrance elucidates the epistemic dynamic of the Spirit,  
 
Here we have to do with sober, self-critical activity, with careful, controlled 
judgements, with rational knowledge in its own right.  We are concerned with modes 
of knowledge which have to be questioned and tested as to their real ground in actual 
knowledge, and which have to be examined and corrected to see that they are rightly 
and appropriately related to the realities to which they claim to refer.  This is, in fact, 
the area of the Spirit’s relevance to our human knowledge, where modes of knowing 
are related to being and forms of thought and speech r fer to realities beyond 
themselves.52   
 
Thus, instead of taking leave of our sense and ration lity in the inquiry of 
God, the Spirit of God, as Torrance claims, in factworks through them in a dynamic 
and non-formal way so that we are able to grasp that which ‘outruns all forms of our 
understanding’.  The crux is the correlating of ourrational knowing and the dynamic 
being of God that is outside the contingent rational ty depends precisely on the non-
formal and personalising divine action of the Spirit.53  It is here we argue that the 
                                               
50 GR, 168. 
51 CDG, 220. 
52 GR, 168. 
53 The epistemological relevance of the Spirit has provided an important basis to unravel the difficult 
relation between knowing and being.  However, the qu stion is how does the epistemological process 
take place in the structure of reality?  In this regard, Torrance makes reference to Einstein and Polanyi 
and addresses the relation within the stratified structure of knowledge.  The point of Torrance is that 
there is ‘a correspondence between the structure of comprehension and the structure of the 
comprehensive entity which is the object.’  He applies the principle of marginal control of Polanyi in 
the stratified structure of knowledge and asserts that in every level of stratified structure, the inquiry is 
referred and coordinated by the one above so that knowing becomes comprehensible and meaningful.  
Torrance calls this movement ‘the principle of coherent integration from above’.  The hierarchical 
coordination of sciences inevitably implies a movement of knowledge from a lower to a higher 
paradigm.  To Torrance theology naturally constitutes the highest level since its primary concern is the 
Creator God.  Torrance claims that similarities exist between the scientific structure and the 
theological structure.  As no dogmatic system contains its own truth-reference, it requires to cross into 
a higher level in order to be ontologically significant as well as theologically consistent.  Although in 
theology the movement is parallel but not identical to the stratified structure of the nature science, it 
can be apprehended in three levels from the experience of the Gospel to the articulation of the truth of 
the Gospel.  The first level is ‘the ground level of religious experience and worship’, and its focus is ‘a 
personal encounter with Jesus Christ within the structure of our historical existence in space and time.’  
The second level is theological and its main concern is to appropriate ‘intellectual instruments’ in 
order to ‘apprehend more fully the economic and ontol gical and trinitarian structure of God’s 
revealing and saving acts in Jesus Christ’.  In this level the doctrine of homoousion is the hinge as it 
makes rational sense the being of God who reveals freely himself in Jesus Christ.  Torrance says that 
homoousion is the ‘ontological and epistemological linchpin of Christian theology’, it enables us to 
deepen our grasp of the triune God in such a way tht ‘our thought has to move from the secondary 
level in which we have to do with the economic Trinity to the tertiary of higher theological level where 
 134
epistemic dynamic of the Spirit is of significance in constituting the divine action of 
the normative pattern of revelation and mediation.  Torrance calls it ‘the area of 
epistemological diastasis’, or the place and work of the Spirit.54  ‘This then is the 
specific domain of the Spirit in theological knowledge,’ Torrance says, ‘for by His 
power and enlightenment we think and speak directly of God in and through the 
forms of our rational experience and articulation and we do that under the direction 
and control of the inner rationality of the divine B ing, the eternal Logos and Eidos of 
Godhead.’55  Only by the epistemic dynamic of the Spirit that such trans-formal 
experience is made possible, so that as human we are able to know by our scientific 
inquiry the truth of God’s self-disclosure in Christ.   
As we continue to analyse Torrance’s thought on the activity of the Spirit, we 
would take heed of his declaration that the most fundamental ‘area of epistemological 
diastasis’ is the relation of our cognitive and semantic acts to the being of God.  As 
noted, our attainment of God’s knowledge to Torrance lies in the correlating of our 
rational knowing with the being of God by the Spirit.  Difficulty however emerges as 
how could our thinking and speaking relate to God’s being since, as Torrance says, ‘It 
is impossible to reduce to thought how thought is related to being, else all we are left 
with is mere thought; it is likewise impossible to state in statements how statements 
are related to being without substituting mere statements for the relation to being’.56  
                                                                                                                            
we have to do with the ontological Trinity’.  In the third level, the higher theological level, through the 
appropriation of the homoousion of the Son and the Spirit, human thoughts are lifted rom the level of 
economic Trinity to the level of the ontological Trinity.  It is there that the knowledge of God is 
culminated in his eternal intelligible personal relations.  Torrance claims that in this process a new
concept, the perichoresis, is needed, along with omoousion, to make rational sense of the hypostatic 
union in God.  Torrance calls perichoresis the onto-relational concept of the divine Persons.  It speaks 
of the intra-trinitarian relations in God; and out of it is developed the doctrine of the Trinity the n w 
concept of person according to which the relations between persons belong to what persons are.  
Torrance concludes by saying that ‘it is in the recognition of the homoousial oneness between the 
economic Trinity and the transcendental Trinity, together with the doctrine of the perichoretic relations 
within the eternal Communion of the Father, the Sonand the Holy Spirit, that a thorough refinement of 
all our theological beliefs and truths takes place.’  Incidentally in the process of unraveling the 
problem Torrance has answered a question Gunton raises.  It concerns the basis of the movement from 
economy to theology.  Gunton asks by what right does thought move from history to eternity or from 
action in time to being in eternity.  Torrance’s answer, as indicated, lies precisely in the principle of 
coherent integration from above.  Thus, Gunton pinpoi ts that in Torrance’s epistemological 
framework the rationale behind the necessity to move from economy to theology is more rational than 
mechanical.  See TCFK, 85; CTSC, 36-37; CDG, 84-88, 91-95, 102-07; TRst, 17-19, 83, 93-94; TS, 
233; GR, 186; P.S. Kang, ‘Thesis: The Concept of the Vicarious Humanity of Christ in the Theology 
of Thomas Forsyth Torrance’ (The University of Aberd en, 1983), 357-58; Weightman 232; Colin 
Gunton, ‘Person and Being: T. F. Torrance’s Doctrine of God,’ The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: 
Theologians in Dialogue with T.F. Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2001), 122-23. 
54 GR, 169, 171. 
55 Ibid., 170. 
56 GR, 175. 
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Although we are unable to account with scientific ac uracy and verification how it 
ultimately happens, Torrance is unequivocal that a rel tion does indeed take place at 
this point in which, like all authentic knowledge, the being ‘shows through’ from 
beyond our forms of thought and speech.  Torrance says that ‘we are at the one point 
where the necessity for epistemological diastasis between the reality we know and 
our knowing of it becomes supremely compelling’,57 and without the Spirit ‘we 
would not break through to the divine Being, or rather the divine Being would not 
break through to us in His reality as Being and thus in His distinction from our 
thought and speech of Him.’58  However, tension exists at this point.  
Notwithstanding the Spirit through his indwelling brings about the imprint of God’s 
being upon us in our experience, thinking and speaking so that we are able to relate 
appositely to divine compulsiveness, the Spirit, in doing so, reinforces as well the 
impossibility of how our thoughts and statements are to relate to God without 
breaking off.  To resolve the problem, Torrance says, 
 
Through the Spirit empirical relation to the divine B ing takes place and within it we 
are given intuitive knowledge of God, but the mode f our relation to Him and the 
mode of our knowledge of Him must be in accordance with His nature as Spirit, and 
therefore even though we have empirical relation to Him and intuitive knowledge of 
Him, they are not amenable to the kind of control which we exercise in relation to 
creaturely objects.  It is rather we who fall under the overwhelming presence of the 
divine Being and come under the control of His Spirit in our experience and 
knowledge of Him.59 
 
 From the citation it is manifest that our knowing of God takes place 
intuitively in the Spirit because human rational thoughts are limited in relating 
themselves to the being of God.  To Torrance our contingent limitation in this regard 
is not an impediment but the call to obedience and submission.  Torrance says,  
 
This is unique action in which God’s own Being is wholly present… creating from 
our side a corresponding action in which our own being is committed.  That is why 
theological thinking is essentially a spiritual activity in which we are engaged in a 
movement that corresponds to the movement of the Spirit and indeed participates in 
it.60 
                                               
57 Ibid., 176.  Gary W. Deddo, ‘The Holy Spirit in T. F. Torrance's Theology,’ in The Promise of 
Trinitarian Theology, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 96-98. 
58 Ibid., 175. 
59 Ibid.  Author’s italic.  
60 Ibid., 177.  Torrance underpins that the movement of the Spirit coming into humanity to open our 
hearts to the knowing of God is anchored to the very act of God in which the Son becomes man in 
order to take the place of humanity, and to give us a place within the communion of the divine life.  
Thus, to Torrance, we are to think of the work of the Spirit not simply as the actualising within us of 
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Torrance is explicit that our corresponding movement to that of the Spirit is 
what Kierkegaard calls ‘the leap of faith’.  But ‘it would be a grave misunderstanding 
to think of this as a blind or irrational movement, for it is the very reverse of that.’61  
If our intuitive knowledge of God as Torrance claims is inseparable from the 
movement of correlating our knowing with divine being, one may compare it, for 
example, with the realist epistemological approach of Einsteinian-Polanyian science 
that underpins the integration of form and being, or the Heidegger’s leap of thought 
to unfold the ultimate being.  On this note, Torrance, however, is adamant that such 
comparisons are inadequate as ‘In none of them are we concerned with being that 
really acts upon us but only with our own attempts to make being disclose itself.’62  
At the first glance it may appear that Torrance is being inconsistent to some extent, 
especially in relation to the Einsteinian-Polanyian science of which he appropriates 
immensely in theological science.  But if steps are t ken to ascertain what Torrance is 
trying to get at here, the key essentially lies in the absence of the epistemic dynamic 
of the Spirit in these approaches.  That is why Torrance expresses his reservation and 
says, ‘We ourselves have both to pose the questions and to answer them, and since 
                                                                                                                            
what God has already worked for us in Jesus Christ once for all, but as opening us up within our 
subjectivities for Christ in such a radical way that we find our life not in ourselves but out of ourselves, 
objectively in him.  In this regard, as Torrance aptly says, ‘we are engaged in a movement that 
corresponds to the movement of the Spirit and indeed participates in it.’  See TRst, 238; CDG, 151. 
61 Ibid.  Torrance claims that Kierkegaard has propagated a mode of rational thought within the 
subject-object relationship that is genuine and relevant in accordance with the nature of the object of 
disclosure.  Crystallising Kierkegaard’s argument under the caption ‘Truth is Subjectivity’, 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Torrance says, ‘The object of the theological knowledge is Truth 
in the form of personal Being, that is Truth as active Subject, but this Truth must be known, must be an 
object of knowledge, in a way appropriate to its nature as Subjectivity, for only then will the knowing 
subject be in the truth in relation to it.  Thus the very mode of apprehending the Truth belongs to the 
truth.’  Following the argument of Kierkegaard, Torrance underpins that this emphasis of subjectivity 
does not abrogate the validity of objectivity.  In fact, the authentic subjectivity of a human person is 
only possible when he encounters the objectivity of the divine subject, when human subjectivity 
reposes upon the objective ground in the divine reality.  Torrance reiterates Kierkegaard’s argument 
that such encountering is the experience of faith; the leap of faith.  Such leap of faith is neither a le p 
of irrationality nor subjectivism.  It is the leap of rationality, or the activity of reason, in accordance 
with the nature of the truth.  To Torrance the leap of faith is nothing but the process of ‘Real thinking, 
thinking that moves from the known to the unknown, thinking that involves transition, moves across a 
“breach” in the process of logic in order to act in accordance with objective movement in the object of 
its knowledge.’  As the experience of faith is the relational movement arsing out of meeting with the 
divine objectivity, it is also the highest passion f subjectivity in which one’s whole existence is 
involved and is transformed by it.  Thus Kierkegaard is able to claim that ‘truth is subjectivity’ for the 
subjectivity of humanity arises out of the objectivity of God.  This could only occur if the subject is in 
a knowing relation with the object.  Torrance rightly underscores that the existentialist thinkers who 
overlook the tenet of authentic subjectivity have interpreted ‘truth is subjectivity’ in the way of 
subjectivism that is greatly different from what Kierkegaard has originally intended.  See TS, 1-6, 152-
55. 
62 Ibid., 178.  Author’s italic. 
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we ourselves always stand behind our questions we are left finally alone with 
ourselves, without Another to put to us the ultimate question that will carry us beyond 
ourselves to open up the original source of our being.  All we can do… after all but a 
leap into the void?’63  But in theological knowing ‘God is at work through His Spirit 
enclosing man within the circle of the movement thaour questioning and answering, 
our knowing and speaking of Him, may reach a fruition which we could never give 
them.’  Essentially, ‘it is not man but God Himself who activates and sustains the 
relation between human knowing and His divine Being’.64  That is the distinction.  
And it is here the epistemic dynamic of the Spirit in heological science becomes all-
important to Torrance.  The importance is particularly evident in Torrance’s argument 
of the validity of recognition-statements of theology as the medium of divine self-
disclosure.  According to Torrance, recognition-statements are statements arising out 
of scientific inquiry and apposite reflection on the subject of investigation.  They are 
the fruit of allowing human reason to act ‘in accordance with the nature of the given 
object, that is, acknowledges and recognises it, so that it attains its essential 
conceptuality as it lets its thinking follow the inherent rationality of the given.’65  
Torrance says that in natural science recognition-statements derive from reflecting 
upon the rationality of the universe.  In theology they are statements relating to the 
‘intimate locution’, or the objective Word of God.  With regard to the difference 
between science and theology, Torrance claims, 
 
This is even more true of theological activity for in it the human reason finds itself 
posited with a given reality that is not a dumb or inert object of knowledge but the 
Holy Spirit speaking the Word of God and in that Word presenting the very Being of 
God as the creative source and objective ground of our knowledge of Him…. Hence 
theological statements are formed as through the speaking of the Spirit the objective 
Word of God calls forth language from us which is sustained and actualised in 
relation to God by the same Spirit as the mode of Gd’s communication with men, 
and as through the obedient response of our minds to the Spirit we seek to let our 
answering word take the form which it must take under the imprint of God’s Word if 
it is to be correlated to that Word and be the medium of its recognition among men.66 
 
                                               
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 178-79. 
65 GR, 182.  Torrance claims that if we appropriate reason with the right approach, it will serve us well 
in our theological endeavour.  In alluding to John Macmurray, Torrance says that reason is about our 
capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves.  In other words, it is the 
capacity to act in accordance with the nature of the object.  Thus, true thoughts are thoughts that refer
properly to the reality, and are in accordance with the nature of the object of their reference.  On this
note, to be rational is to behave not in terms of our own nature, but in terms of our knowledge of the 
world outside of us, of things and persons in accordance with their own natures.  See TRst, 231-32. 
66 Ibid., 182-83. 
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 Thus, recognition-statements of theology are formed differently from that of 
science when we allow them ‘to enshrine an “intimate locution” which echoes or 
reflects the “intimate locution” in the divine Being and which can only be conferred 
upon them through the operation of the Spirit’.67  In other words, to Torrance, true 
theological statements, or recognition-statements of theology, are justified as the 
valid medium of divine self-disclosure only by relating them to the objective Word of 
God through the epistemic dynamic of the Spirit, and not on any basis of man-made 
epistemology or scientific verification.  As Torrance says, ‘in shining the divine light 
or sounding the divine Word through those forms of th ught and speech, so that God 
may disclose Himself to us not apart from them but through them’ in his revelation.68 
Torrance’s argument of the essentiality of the epist mic dynamic of the Spirit 
in validating media and correlating them with the being of God in the mediation of 
Christ’s revelation corroborates his theological scheme of revelation and multiple 
mediations.  The truism to Torrance is that ‘God reveals Himself to man not, as it 
were, in His naked majesty, but in the medium of the creaturely existence to which 
man belongs in space and time, and uses the sign-world f inter-human 
communication in order to communicate Himself to man.’  Although any creaturely 
existence could become ‘the area of epistemological diastasis’, or the place and work 
of the Spirit, Torrance is explicit that not all but only those that ‘He determines, 
within the created world, within man’s life and history, and within the subject-object 
structures of his existence, certain facts and events as the signs or the mediate 
objectivities of His revelation’.69  The ‘facts and events’ God appropriates are those 
of the history of Israel and the life of the incarntion Son of God that we have 
discussed in the preceding chapters.  They comprise as well those of the church, 
particularly in relation to scripture, Word and sacraments, and also the contingent 
creation that we would analyse in the succeeding chapters.  It is through these chosen 
media that God by the epistemic dynamic of the Spirit continues to bring forth his 
self-disclosure in Christ to humanity in the course of time.   Torrance says, 
 
Thus God still comes to us clothed in the historical and biblical forms of His 
revelation which (whether B.C. or A.D.) direct us to Jesus Christ in the centre, for it 
is in Him that God has objectified Himself for our human knowing, but through the 
                                               
67 Ibid., 183. 
68 Ibid.  Author’s italic. 
69 Ibid., 184.  See TRst, 248. 
 139
power and presence of the Holy Spirit we are enabled to meet God and know Him 
directly and immediately in Jesus Christ.70 
 
 Torrance is unequivocal that the creaturely media without the imprint of the 
Spirit are mere expressions of earthly, natural andhuman activities, and are quite 
opaque in relation to God’s revelation; since they are taken from ‘man’s intra-
mundane existence, and from within the subject-object structure of his relations with 
the world of nature and other human beings’.  Unless they are ‘interpreted beyond 
their this-worldly reference’, they are unable to be the media ‘in which God reveals 
Himself.’71  That to Torrance is where the dynamic activity of the Spirit comes in, 
since without his creative acts all earthly media of divine self-disclosure will remain 
dark and opaque, and fail their task of mediation.  Torrance says conclusively, 
 
Without the Spirit, we have no opening to the transce dent Being, but through the 
Spirit our concepts are opened in such a way that He is accessible to us---if we close 
these concepts in order to give them the kind of precision apposite only to concepts 
we develop in knowledge of determinate realities, then we smother knowledge of 
God and evade His Reality.  Knowledge of God in theSpirit is profoundly 
conceptual, rational knowledge in its own right, knowledge in which we are carried 
right over to what transcends us, yet which is apposite to the nature of God as 
Spirit.72 
 
We have in this section analysed Torrance’s thought on he epistemological 
relevance of the Spirit.  We underscore that apart from the meaninglessness of 
speaking the epistemology of the Spirit, Torrance’s mphasis of the epistemic 
dynamic of the Spirit addresses as well the peril of domesticating the Spirit of God 
particularly in Roman Catholicism and Protestant Pietism.  Notwithstanding the 
dynamic and non-formal nature, the epistemic work of the Spirit is essentially 
rational to Torrance first in enabling our scientific knowing of God, and second in 
validating multiple media and correlating them with the being of God so that divine 
self-disclosure in Christ could be mediated continuously through them to humanity in 
the course of human history.  Hence, as we argue, the activity of the Spirit indeed 
constitutes immensely the divine action of the normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation of Torrance’s theological scheme. 
 
 
                                               
70 Ibid.  See TRst, 257-58. 
71 Ibid., 185.  Author’s italic. 




Torrance says, ‘Moreover by his presence the Holy Spirit is the “place” (τόπος) 
where men may meet with God and are enabled to havecommunion with him, 
receive his revelation and worship him.’73  This statement aptly encapsulates what we 
endeavour to argue in the present chapter.  Essentially the parousia of the Spirit to 
Torrance is to enable rational knowing by leading us into the communion of the Spirit 
so that we are led to the Son, as the Son reveals the Father.  By the epistemic dynamic 
of the Spirit, media of created existence are enabled to mediate divine self-disclosure 
in human history which otherwise would not be possible.  Thus, we may end by 
stating that the Spirit in Torrance’s theology of revelation and multiple mediations 
has been given the distinctive role and essential place.  The activity of the Spirit 




                                               
73 TF, 229. 
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Chapter Five 
Scripture: The Primary Medium of Revelation 
 
 
In the foregoing chapter main features of Torrance’s thought on the dynamic activity 
of the Spirit as the divine action in mediating Christ’s revelation through the human 
and earthly media have been examined.  Our discussions how that although Torrance 
has yet to devote a book completely to pnuematology, he indeed possesses rich and 
complex understanding of the role of the Spirit in d vine revelation.  We argue that 
Torrance’s pnuematology is closely related to his concept of multiple mediations; 
particularly the epistemic dynamic of the Spirit in validating and correlating media of 
revelation with the objective being of God.  We note that not all but ‘certain facts and 
events’ determined by God could then become ‘the signs’ of divine self-disclosure.1  
On this note, scripture to Torrance, as to the Reformers,2 is incontestably the primary 
earthly medium of divine revelation, particularly in relation to others that would be 
analysed in the next chapter.  We may appropriate the analogy of concentric circle to 
illustrate the point.  Christ, the sole Mediator bridging between God and humanity, is 
the core ‘clothed’ principally by the circle of scripture. The circle that surrounds 
scripture is the church, Word and sacraments.  Together with the outer circle of the 
contingent creation, the chosen media together bear witness to and mediate the self-
disclosure of God in Christ by the Spirit.3  Thus, with the primacy of scripture in 
mind, we would begin the chapter with an analysis of Torrance’s thought on the basis 
and nature of scripture, and then an assessment of his unusual move of advocating the 
effacement of scripture before moving on to a critical examination where 
implications, either derived from or exacerbated by the move, are studied.  By way of 
making the claim, we would end by questioning if the decision of Torrance is 
justifiable within his overall framework. 
 
 
The Basis and Nature of Scripture 
 
                                               
1 GR, 184.  See TRst, 248. 
2 For Torrance’s relation with Reformed tradition, see Alasdair Heron, ‘T. F. Torrance in Relation to 
Reformed Theology,’ in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 31-50. 
3 I am indebted to John McDowell for drawing my atten ion to the analogy.  
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The main purpose of this section is to consolidate and reinforce the notion with 
regard to the indispensability and normativeness of cripture as the important, if not, 
the most important medium of divine revelation in Torrance’s theology of revelation 
and multiples mediations.  In accordance with Torrance’s understanding, we would 
pivot the discussion primarily on the basis and nature of scripture in relation to divine 
revelation.  The formation of scripture would be touched on as well as it is 
fundamental in demonstrating the validity of scripture as the mediation of the 
revelatory Word of God in Torrance’s thought. 
The recent debates over the doctrinal understanding of scripture by 
theologians through the appropriation of categories such as revelation, inspiration, 
inerrancy, infallibility, authority, canon and word of God could be said at times to be 
in disarray.  John Goldingay observes the cross currents and remarks that, just to give 
some examples, James Barr and Edward Farley question the appropriateness of 
applying the notion of authority to scripture, R. P. C. Hanson declares the idea of 
inspiration ought to be abandoned, and John Barton criticises the treatment of the 
model of canon as a key to unfold the significance of scripture.4  Ronald Thiemann 
makes similar observation with regard to the crisis and contributes significantly to the 
discussions by approaching scripture from the framework of narrative to account for 
the category of revelation.5  To Torrance the landscape, notwithstanding the 
complexity, could be categorised broadly into three main streams; namely, liberal, 
fundamentalist and modern historical-critical biblica  scholarship.6  As we would 
return to Torrance’s criticism, it is sufficient atthis juncture to mention that he 
detects a tinge of dualism in the approaches and therefore demands a different 
account of the matter.  To Torrance the crux lies in our understanding of the relation 
between scripture and God.  In order to have an appropriate knowledge, Torrance 
asserts the importance for Christian theology to abandon the phenomenalist and 
observationalist theory, and return to a realist view of significance that underscores 
the referential relation between language and the objective reality of which it 
signifies.  He substantiates his argument in a dense but important statement,  
                                               
4 John Goldingay, Models for Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 1-2.  Also see James Barr, 
The Bible in the Modern World (London: SCM, 1973).  Edward Farley, Ecclesial Reflection 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982).  R. P. C. Hanson, ‘The Authority of the Bible,’ in The Anglican 
Synthesis, ed. W. R. F. Browning (Derby: Peter Smith, 1964).  John Barton, Reading the Old 
Testament (London: DLT, 1984).    
5 Ronald F. Thiemann, Revelation and Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1985).  
Chapter one and three are particularly useful in dealing with the validity of the category.  
6 RET, 15-18; STR, 2-3. 
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We have now to focus our attention on the self-revelation of God to man through his 
historical dialogue with the people of Israel and i the incarnation of his Word and 
Truth in Jesus Christ, which give rise to the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New 
Testaments.  It is thus a Bible-related revelation of God that we must have in view 
and seek to interpret, for it is in that articulation form of human word, spoken and 
written, which divine revelation has taken in space nd time, that God continues to 
make himself known to us as we meditate upon the Holy Scriptures and hear his 
Word addressing to us.7 
 
The citation encapsulates Torrance’s thought on revelation and scripture, and 
the correlation between them.  Revelation, which is the fundament of scripture to 
Torrance, is essentially ‘an articulate revealing of G d by God whom we are enabled 
to apprehend through the creative power of his Word ad ressed to us’.8  Such self-
revelation of God takes place in human history and existence, and through the media 
of human thought and speech.  It is the fruit of the union and communion of divine 
and human action.  It involves the subjectivity and objectivity of revelation, a 
reciprocal relation between God and humanity.  In this reciprocity, as our discussions 
in the preceding chapters show, Torrance develops his understanding of God’s 
dialogical interaction with his people both in the Old and New Testaments through 
the ‘two-way movement’ of ‘an adaptation of divine r velation to the human mind 
and an adaptation of articulate forms of human understanding and language to divine 
revelation.’9  This duality of objective giving and subjective appropriating in 
revelation is itself an important question of modern pistemology that Gunton also 
recognises and concurs with Torrance.  In alluding to a statement by Coleridge, 
Gunton says that the polarity of subject and object raises the epistemological question 
of subject-object relation of revelatory knowledge.10  What is at stake is that, as 
Gunton underlines the realisation of Coleridge, ‘the question of the revelatory 
authority of the Bible can be answered only in the light of a careful relating of that 
which the Bible gives, and that in the reader which responds.’11  On this note, 
Torrance is adamant that ‘that which the Bible gives’ cannot be derived merely from 
                                               
7 Ibid. 84. 
8 Ibid., 85. 
9 MC, 7. 
10 Gunton, 65.  Coleridge says, ‘And need I say that I have met everywhere [in the Bible] more or less 
copious source of truth, and power, and purifying impulses; - that I have found words for my inmost 
thoughts, songs for my joy, utterances for my hidden griefs…?  In short whatever finds me, bears 
witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit….’  See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
Confessions of an Enquiring Spirit (1840; reprinted Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 26.  Cited by 
Gunton.   
11 Ibid. 
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a phenomenological analysis of the historical data as recorded in both the Old and 
New Testaments.  The Bible, as Torrance says, ‘is the direct Word of God, not the 
Word of God as man utters it, but the Word of God as God himself utters it, n fact 
the Word of God which God himself is, for he is identical with his Word’.12  What the 
Bible gives has to come mediately from the self-revealing activity of God through the 
Word in the Spirit and our scientific inquiry that is carried out epistemologically in 
accordance with the nature of divine disclosure.  ‘That is the basic fact in the doctrine 
of Holy Scripture’, Torrance says, ‘God has willed and constituted in the apostolic 
foundation of the Church a creaturely correspondence to his own Word, assuming it 
into union with his Word and effecting it as the human expression of his Word.’13   
To Torrance the action of humanity alone without reposing on the divine 
action of God in Christ by the Spirit will not be able to appropriate and authenticate 
that which the Bible gives as the Word of God, no matter how rigorous the 
scholarship of biblical criticism is.  Having said that, it is not the intent of Torrance to 
underpin the importance of divine action at the expense of human participation in 
scriptural revelation.  Torrance clearly values therigour of biblical criticism in 
engaging scriptural texts and the historical contextual issues when he underscores that 
there ‘was no evading of the linguistic and historic -critical examination of the 
Biblical texts’.  However, if after all the painstaking human action of serious exegesis 
we fail to interpret everything finally in the light of God’s self-disclosure in Christ by 
the Spirit, to Torrance, it would simply be trying to ‘get behind the back of Jesus to 
the eternal Son of God’.14  Torrance’s point is biblical criticism has its pro er place if 
it recognises not only the fact that scriptural texts are human documentations which 
involve the constraint of writing and human fallibility, but also the truism that ‘they 
are much more than that for they have been adapted by God under the impact of his 
Spirit for his own self-testimony, and therefore thy are interpreted aright only as we 
allow the living Word of God himself to sound through them to us, and as through the 
Holy Spirit the Reality of God in Christ shines through to us.’15  As Jean-Luc Marion 
says, the theologian ‘proceeds to a hermeneutic of the biblical text that does not aim 
                                               
12 KBBET, 83.  Author’s italic.  Torrance traces Barth’s emphasis of the doctrine of the Word of God 
back to Luther and Calvin.  He says that in ‘their r discovery and reappropriation of the Word of God 
in the Bible they recognised that the Word of God is not just some communication of truth about God 
but is identical with God himself speaking in Person.’ 
13 TRst, 138. 
14 KBBET, 110-11. 
15 TRst, 257. 
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at the text but, through the text, at the event, the referent’;16 as the freezing of the 
gaze on the phenomenal would amount to idolatry, the refusal of iconic 
transcendence.  Torrance would concur with Marion when the latter accentuates that 
‘The theologian must go beyond the text to the Word, interpreting it from the point of 
the view of the Word’.17  Thus, the Bible, to Torrance, is to be handled an read not 
only from the approach of linguistic and historico-ritical examination, but also from 
what may be coined as ‘exegetic-theological interprtation’.18  It is the ‘biblical 
understanding of biblical statements and of how they are to be theologically 
interpreted’, an approach reinforced by Barth deriving from his study of Anselm.  
Torrance continues, 
 
Because of their objective reference biblical statements cannot be treated like fixed 
premises from which theological truth may be deduce, but as statements signifying 
the “solid truth” of God upon which they are grounded.  By their very nature, 
therefore, biblical statements have to be interpreted theologically in the light of the 
objective realities to which they refer.19 
 
Strictly speaking, the quest for the theological understanding of the Word of 
God lies in correlating scriptural texts with the objective truth of God in Christ.  ‘It is 
our specific task as theologians,’ Torrance says, ‘at that point between the biblical 
citations and the realities they signify, to inquire into what we ourselves have to 
thinks and say on the basis and under the direction of biblical revelation.’  And unless 
‘theological insight and formation of this kind are already present, if only in incipient 
form, in his exegetical study of the Scriptures, the biblical theologian has not been 
engaging in genuine exegesis, for he has not been concerned to understand the 
Scriptures in terms of their all-important objective reference to the Word and Truth 
that God himself is.’20  To Torrance the decisive point of our handling of scripture 
lies in going beyond its logos to the Logos of which t depends.  True reading of 
scripture occurs only when our interpretation of the exts and the apprehension of the 
reality of which they signify are correlated.  ‘When such a recognition of the personal 
nature of the Word of God strikes home,’ Torrance claims, ‘then reading and 
understanding of the Bible undergo a vast paradigmatic shift of an intensely realist 
kind.  We are swept along by the mighty driving wind of the Spirit into direct 
                                               
16 Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 148. 
17 Ibid., 149.  Author’s italic. 
18 For detailed account, see ‘A Realist Interpretation of God’s Self-Revelation’ in RET, 84-120.  
19 KBBET, 116. 
20 Ibid., 117-18.  See TRst, 138. 
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encounter with the wholly other reality of God who may be heard only through his 
own self-witness and be understood only through the e ernal Word that he himself is 
and has caused to become incarnate in the world’.21   
If scriptural texts as Torrance argues are vital as the pointer to God in Christ, 
would they efface themselves once they have served th ir referential function?  
Torrance’s answer is unequivocal as he underlines emphatically that this ‘does not 
mean that once we are in touch with the truth and being of God the biblical word may 
be left behind, far less kicked away, for we are quite nable to know God except on 
the basis of the biblical revelation.’22  The importance of scripture as the medium of 
divine revelation is unmistakably underpinned again when Torrance alludes to Barth 
regarding his exegetical rigour; ‘He certainly engaged in strenuous exegetic-
theological interpretation of the biblical text ranging over the full extent of Holy 
Scripture in an unparalleled way’.23  Notwithstanding his reiteration, we need to note 
that Torrance, unlike Barth, in fact does not demonstrate in his works the same rigour 
of working out the exegetic-theological interpretation of scripture, as one would 
expect.  Kang Phee Seng comments that ‘Torrance seems to have neglected too often 
the place of detailed exegesis.’24  Mackinnon asks, ‘Can questions of exegesis, which 
are in the end questions of epistemology, be as lightly dismissed as Torrance 
sometimes implies by the relative brevity of his treatment of them?’25  Similarly, 
notwithstanding Torrance’s consistent claim of scripture as the creaturely place of 
which one could encounter Christ continuously, Morris n remarks that ‘one finds, 
contrary to Calvin and Barth, almost no actual engagement with the text of 
Scripture.’26  The serious lack of interaction with scripture in Torrance’s works 
indeed does not sit well with his argument that divine revelation unfolds itself by the 
Spirit through human participation in rigorous exegetic-theological interpretation.  
The irregularity induces suspicion that it in someway is not unrelated to Torrance’s 
quick and inconsistent move to efface the Bible in revelation without much struggle 
with the humanity of scripture.  Is this symptomatic of a hidden tension or 
contradiction within his framework?  This is a point we would return to again. 
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As discussed, in following the footsteps of Barth, scripture to Torrance is the 
revelation and the Word of God because it ultimately hinges on Jesus Christ.  ‘In 
fact,’ Torrance says, ‘the real text of God’s self-r velation to mankind has once and 
for all been provided in the humanity of Jesus Christ, the Word of God personally 
incarnate in the flesh.’27  On this note, the issues now require Torrance’s attention 
regard the inspiration, inerrancy and authority of scripture.  To answer the question of 
scriptural inspiration, Torrance, in alluding to Barth, says lengthily that ‘the 
eventuation of the presence of the Word of God in the human word of the prophets 
and apostles, can only be regarded as a repetition, a second prolongation and 
continuation of the once-for-all and primary eventuation of revelation itself… [thus] 
Holy Scripture functions as a unique witness to divine revelation in its primary 
eventuation and as such ever points beyond itself to the transcendent Word that God 
himself is, and precisely in that service to the Word it is and ever becomes the 
divinely inspired eventuation of the presence of the Word in the human word of the 
Bible witness.’28  By saying that, Torrance does not mean that the Word of God is 
either tied to scripture or incarnated in the Bible.  However, the crux is by the work of 
the Spirit ‘God has graciously accommodated his revealed Word to the written Word 
of the Bible, and has thereby adapted its written form to his self-revelation’ as the 
inspired and authoritative text.  ‘This calls for a dynamic, not a static, concept of 
verbal inspiration’, Torrance claims, ‘Scripture given by divine inspiration is and 
becomes what it really is through the presence and advocacy of the Holy Spirit.’29   
Riding on the argument of Barth that inclines to ‘nw’ instead of ‘then’ of 
inspiration, Torrance moves on to address the doctrine of the inerrancy by claiming 
that verbal inspiration ‘does not mean the infallibility of the biblical word in its 
linguistic, historical and theological character as human word.  It means that the 
fallible and faulty human word is as such used by God and had to be received and 
heard in spite of its human fallibility.’30  Torrance elucidates that this dynamic and 
non-static notion of biblical inerrancy is undergirded by the extrapolation of the 
patristic slogan, ‘the unassumed is unhealed’.  Torrance says, ‘The miracle is that in 
the Bible the Word of God comes to us through the word of sinful, erring people to 
whom God has spoken and who bear witness to his speaking in frail, fallible, 
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inadequate forms of thought and speech, which imperfect though they may be are 
nevertheless assumed and adapted by the holy Word of God to be the human medium 
by which God continues to communicate his self-revelation to mankind… as the 
spoken and revealed Word of God’.31  To put it succinctly, notwithstanding scripture 
as a human product, the Bible to Torrance is inerrat and infallible because its 
inerrancy and infallibility lies not in itself but in God and in the dynamic 
communication of Christ by the Spirit.  Kruger aptly remarks that it is ‘both a point of 
“realism” and a point as to the “accuracy” of communication.’32  The key is that 
Christ is ‘inerrantly’ and ‘infallibly’ communicated.  The cardinal principle of Christ 
as the dynamic basis of inerrancy and infallibility is also extrapolated by Torrance to 
substantiate the claim of the authority of the Bible.  Although Torrance’s account is 
brief, from his criticism of fundamentalism it is manifest that he regards the modern 
crisis of the authority of scripture as the repercussion of the ‘marked failure to 
acknowledge the unique Reality of God in its transce dent authority’ over the 
contingent texts used by God in his self-revelation.33  Ultimately, in scripture, ‘we 
have to do with the majestic Word of the Lord God which he has stooped to speak in 
the frail human words of the Holy Scriptures thereby constituting them through his 
grace as the unique authoritative written Word of Gd to mankind.’34  The authority 
of scripture essentially lies not in the texts but in God, in Christ.  
 We have thus far discussed Torrance’s handling of scripture in relation to the 
category of revelation, Word of God, infallibility, inerrancy and authority.  We note 
the discrepancy between his postulation of the importance of exegetic-theological 
interpretation and the apparent lack of it in his works, and question if it is 
symptomatic of a hidden tension or contradiction within his framework.  Before we 
go further to discuss his advocacy of the effacement of scripture, we would continue 
to set the stage by discussing briefly Torrance’s thought on the formation of scripture; 
as it corroborates what is being said and undergirds his argument of the 
normativeness and indispensability of scripture as the medium of revelation.  We will 
focus mainly on the role of the Jews and the apostles in the forming of the Old and 
New Testaments.   
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Torrance says that the reciprocity created by God’s revelation takes a 
corporate form in human history.  In order to communicate the Word, ‘divine 
revelation penetrates into the speaker-hearer relationship within the interpersonal 
structure of humanity and becomes speech to man by becoming speech of man to 
man, spoken and heard through the intelligible medium of a people’s language.’35  
This is how Torrance interprets the revelation of Gd, particularly the self-revealing 
acts of God in the Old Testament.  As the people elect d to be the instrument of 
realising God’s self-revelation in history, Israel, through the covenantal relation, 
subjects to divine moulding in such a way that certain structures of thought and 
speech are forged within them for the service of interpreting and communicating the 
revelation of God.  ‘And so,’ Torrance delineates, ‘throughout Israel’s tradition the 
Word of God kept pressing for articulation within the corporate medium of 
covenantal reciprocity, creating formal and empirical orrelates of its own self-
utterance through which it extended its activity in space and time, progressively 
taking verbal and even written form through the shared understanding and shared 
response that developed in this people.’36  On this note, Torrance regards the 
formation of the Old Testament as the consequential event of the witness of the Jews 
to the revelation of God in human history.  In addition, he regards as well the shaping 
of Israel by God in accordance with the record of the Old Testament as the 
preparation to usher in an era of watershed in human history.  To use Torrance’s 
term, Israel is the ‘womb’ of the incarnation of the Word.  The matrix of appropriate 
forms of thought and speech that is hammered out by God in Israel throughout her 
history enables the coming of the Word in the fullness of time construable within the 
reciprocal relation of God’s giving and man’s receiving, as our discussion in chapter 
one indicates.  Thus, Torrance is able to argue convinci gly that the revelation of the 
incarnate Word in human history is mediated through the media of languages and 
concepts, as that of the Old Testament.  In fact, as indicated, Torrance claims that it is 
only in Jesus Christ that the union of the human and divine Word is made possible 
because ‘in him God assumed human speech into union with his own, effecting it as 
the human expression of the divine Word.’37   
The issue leads us to the New Testament where consideration is given to the 
question as to how the union in Jesus Christ is made communicable continually 
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within the human exchange of word and language.  The answer, according to 
Torrance, in a way similar to that of the calling of Israel for the service of God in 
divine revelation, lies in the calling of the apostle .  The apostles, called by Jesus 
Christ to form a nucleus within the speaker-hearer relation around the Son of God, 
would carry on the task of communication and mediation.  However, a point of 
distinction between Israel and the apostles Kruger picks up deserves to be mentioned.  
Kruger says, ‘Whereas God chose Israel to be the human community through which 
his self-unveiling would be earthed in appropriate human expression, the apostles, in 
Torrance’s thought, are the “chosen vessels appointed to receive the Revelation of 
Christ, to pass it through their mind, and pass it on to the Church.”’38  Kruger 
underlines that the apostles to Torrance are the ‘great cardo or hinge, the “cardinal”, 
as it were, in whom the Word of God in Christ was once and for all folded out into 
the form in which, under the living impact of the risen Christ, Christ meant it to be 
heard and spoken---that is what we have in the divine revelation of the New 
Testament’.39  We will return to Torrance’s thought on apostolicity when we come to 
the mediation of the church in the next chapter.  At this juncture, it is sufficient for us 
to underline that in Torrance’s terms the main function of the apostles is to serve as 
witness for Christ.  The apostles are ‘the controlling basis for the folding out of the 
self-witness of Christ into witness to Christ informed, empowered, and used by 
Christ’s self-witness so that it could take the field as the communicable form of his 
self-witness in history’.40  Guided by the Spirit, the witness of the apostles takes its 
formative shape within the church, and is grounded in the corporate reciprocity 
centred in Christ. Torrance underlines that the result of this witnessing, which 
remains its specific form intended by Christ for the proclamation of God to humanity 
through the Spirit, is the birth of the indispensable authoritative report---the New 
Testament.  Because of its unique fruition, Torrance asserts that the texts of the New 
Testament ‘constitute, therefore, the divinely provided and inspired linguistic 
medium which remains of authoritative and critical significance for the whole history 
of the church of Jesus Christ.’41   
The implication of the uniqueness of the New Testament as the witness of 
Christ is theologically significant to Torrance.  Apart from bestowing upon the New 
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Testament the normative status of divine ordination and endorsement as the Old 
Testament, Torrance claims that ‘Its purpose in this written form in which it has come 
down to us is to enable us to stand with the original witnesses under the creative 
impact of the Word which they received and obeyed, and to be drawn into the sphere 
of its effective operation in the world where we, like them, may learn to repent and 
believe the gospel, give thanks to God and live in communion with him.’42  Thus, in 
distinction to the Old Testament, the New Testament to Torrance serves as the 
designated medium directing us to the vicarious humanity of Christ and makes us 
contemporaneous with the apostles under the same impact of the Word and to be in 
communion with him.  It is not difficult to detect Kierkegaard’s concept of 
contemporaneity at work here.43  Metaphorically speaking, we may say that in 
Torrance’s thought the New Testament functions as the two-way traffic in bringing 
Christ to us and us to Christ as he has directed in his self-revelation.  In view of the 
basis and nature, Torrance claims that our understanding and interpretation of the 
New Testament can never be done in anyway apart from making direct reference to 
the Word.  Torrance summarises his argument and says,
 
It must be noted that with the incarnation of God’s Word in Jesus Christ and the 
community of reciprocity which it created we have a decisively different situation 
from that which obtained in Old Testament times, for here the forms of thought and 
speech developed through the historical dialogue of G d with Israel are not only 
fulfilled but transcended and relativised by the final and permanent forms which the 
Word of God has taken in the life and teaching and saving work of Christ.  Here we 
have to reckon with a profound integration between the Word of God and the word of 
man which may not be disrupted….  Hence, the basic forms of thought and speech in 
which the incarnational self-revelation of God is mediated to us in the New 
Testament cannot be made the object of independence i v stigation in 
themselves…they can only be understood from their place in the normative and 
definitive structure of the Word made flesh in his solidarity with human and physical 
being in space and time.44 
 
Notwithstanding the distinctiveness, Torrance does not elevate the New 
Testament above the Old Testament.  It stands equal to the Old Testament in 
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mediating divine revelation and jointly they form scripture.  Kruger points out that to 
Torrance the ‘Holy Scripture forms a divinely provided linguistic medium and it is 
through Scripture, not apart from but nonetheless through Scripture, that Christ in the 
Spirit gives nothing other than Himself to us.’45  As Torrance says, ‘in it God has 
allowed his self-revelation to assume forms and images from our human world which 
he uses as media or signs to disclose himself to us’.46  That, to Torrance, is what 
scripture gives and the reader should respond to.  ‘The Scriptures of the Old and New 
Testaments rightly evoke from us profound respect and veneration not because of 
what they are in themselves but because of the divine revelation mediated in and 
through them.  That is why we speak of them as “Holy Scripture”.’47  From our 
discussion, it is manifest that Torrance indeed regards scripture as an important, if 
not, the most important medium of divine revelation.  Essentially, that which is 
mediated is a ‘Bible-related revelation of God’ in Christ by the Spirit; ‘for it is in that 
articulate form of human word, spoken and written, which divine revelation has taken 
in space and time, that God continues to make himself known to us as we meditate 
upon the Holy Scriptures and hear his Word addressing to us.’48 
We have thus far discussed the significance of scripture in Torrance’s thought.  
Our discussion shows that its basis and nature as the witness of God’s historical 
engagements with humanity through Israel, Jesus Christ and the apostles are essential 
to Torrance in establishing the normative status of the Bible as the indispensable 
medium of divine revelation.  By underpinning the continuance of scripture in 
mediating Christ’s revelation through consistent rigo  of exegetic-theological 
interpretation, Torrance’s argument, as we claim, is in line with the concept of 
mediation.  On this note, any move by Torrance to debase the mediatedness of 
scripture would not only strain his argumentation unnecessarily, but subvert as well 
his framework of revelation and multiple mediations. 
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The Effacement of Scripture 
 
We have in the foregoing section discussed Torrance’s thought on the basis and 
nature of scripture.  Our discussion shows that Torrance upholds the primacy of 
scripture as the mediation of God’s revelation to humanity.  As Torrance says, 
‘Scriptures are evidently the inspired product of the community of reciprocity which, 
in the course of his saving activity, God created an maintained between his people 
and himself, within which and through which he has chosen to make his Word known 
in articulated communication to mankind.’49  Although Torrance is unequivocal of 
the indispensability of the Bible, he makes an unexpected move in Reality and 
Evangelical Theology to advocate the effacement of scripture after it has served its 
function in pointing beyond itself to Christ’s revelation.  It is therefore the purpose of 
this section to examine Torrance’s argument and ascertain the possible cause of his 
decision. 
The undergirding argument that substantiates Torrance’s move of the 
effacement of scripture lies in working on the asymmetric character of the relation 
between divine revelation and its contingent witnesses whose voices are passed on as 
those of the scriptural witness.  According to Torrance, there is a two-fold order in 
this asymmetric relation.  First, the profound hypostatic union of the divine and 
human word in Jesus Christ constitutes the first-order relation of the ontological 
inseparability between the Word of God and the word f humanity.  Second, divine 
revelation and human language form a second-order relation, since scripture is not 
ontologically identical with the incarnate Word.50  However, Torrance explicates that 
as the second-order relation is contingent upon and controlled by the first-order 
relation of hypostatic union, scripture and the incar ate Word in this regard can 
neither be divided from nor confounded with one another.  He says, ‘In this case the 
relation of asymmetric is very different, for it obtains in a relation not of ontological 
identity but of ontological difference.’51  The asymmetric relation between the 
incarnate Word and scripture is central to Torrance with regard to the nature of 
scriptural mediation.  It forms the basis of his argument that as much as there is an 
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intrinsic correlation between the two, the ‘Holy Scripture is not Jesus Christ’.52  By 
claiming the ontological distinction between scripture and the incarnate Word, 
Torrance asserts that the self-revelation of God, although is mediated in and through 
scripture, ‘must be experienced and cognised in the reality’ that ‘is apart from the 
words and statements of the Bible’.53  He says, 
 
[S]omething would appear to have gone wrong if we become too obsessed with the 
Bible, as so often happens in the stress that is laid upon its inspiration when our 
attention is directed to the Bible itself instead of t  what it is intended to bear 
witness.54 
 
 Thus, according to Torrance, the appropriate way to approach scripture is to 
‘attend jointly to the text and the divine realities to which it directs us’, and to allow 
the text to subordinate to the realities beyond.  Torrance’s accentuation of the 
referential character of scripture is consistent with his realist understanding of the 
epistemic correlation of form and being, and the necessity of adopting ‘open 
concepts’ in order to allow our understanding to come under the compulsion of the 
objective reality, as discussed in chapter three and four.  The key is scriptural texts 
fulfil the semantic function properly only when they point us to the reality of which 
they signify.  To Torrance, the scriptural texts ‘cease to be objects of attention in 
themselves but serve as transparent media through which those realities show 
themselves’.  Torrance is adamant that scriptural texts would ‘become obscure or lose 
their proper meaning when they are allowed to obtrude themselves on us as the 
immediate objects of our attention.’  ‘Transferring this to the Bible,’ Torrance 
continues, ‘we may say that we rely upon the Bible for its guidance in directing our 
understanding to the Word of God which sounds through it, or the Truth of God 
which shines through it.’55  
So far it is clear that in working out his thought on the mediatory nature of 
scripture, Torrance attempts to maintain the ontological difference between the 
human and divine Logos, or the reality that the ‘Holy Scripture is not Jesus Christ’, in 
the asymmetric relation.  Thus, we may say that the crux of Torrance’s argument with 
regard to the mediatedness of scripture lies in poiting to ‘what it is intended to bear’.  
Or, to be more precise, the continuous referential character of scripture; ‘God 
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continues to make himself known to us as we meditate upon the Holy Scriptures and 
hear his Word addressing to us’.  However, it is at this point of enforcement that 
Torrance takes an unusual step and claims that, 
 
In the fulfilment of that semantic service the Bible effaces itself before the immediacy 
and compulsion of God’s self-revelation, which we experience, certainly through the 
Bible, but in its own divine reality which is indepndent of the Bible. 
 
 And,  
 
There is indeed, then, a two-way relation between divine revelation and the Bible, 
but it is an asymmetric relation in which ontological priority and authoritative 
primacy must be given to divine revelation and not t  the Bible.  It is the 
subordination of the Bible to that revelation and the semantic service it fulfils in 
mediating that revelation to us that give the Bible its singular status in our respect 
and its decisive authority in our knowledge of God.56  
 
From the statements, we may comment that Torrance attempts to focus on that 
which the Bible points.  It could be said that by underscoring the ontological 
difference between the human words and the divine Logos, the intent of Torrance to 
accentuate the ‘immediacy and compulsion of God’s self-revelation’ is to safeguard 
the notion that only God could reveal Godself; according to Kruger, an important 
point which ‘Torrance will in no way allow to slip away’.57  As Torrance says, ‘one 
which Karl Barth has hammered home throughout all his immense work---is that 
while God is who he is in his self-revelation, that divine revelation is God himself, 
for it is not just something of himself that God reveals to us but his very own Self, his 
own ultimate Being as God.’58  However, by stressing the difference (second-order 
relation) to an extent that it eventually threatens the ontological inseparability of the 
Word and word (first-order relation), and ultimately leads to the relegation of the 
mediatedness of scripture in divine revelation---‘the Bible effaces itself before the 
immediacy and compulsion of God’s self-revelation’---would Torrance then 
contradict or subvert, first, his own understanding of the mediation of scripture, 
second, argument of multiple mediations, third, emphasis of maintaining the conjoint 
action of the divine and the human in revelation, ad fourth, claim of revelation as 
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mediation?  What are the implications entailed by the move?  Would the medium 
now simply become a channel of which the revelation of God may flow through 
tangentially losing its purpose of embodiment that is crucial to Torrance’s 
understanding?59  Does it reflect or would it exacerbate some tension that is 
embedded within Torrance’s theological framework?  These are some questions that 
have to be answered and weighed in relation to Torrance’s overall framework.  
Before we attend to these questions, we need to ascert in the possible cause of 
Torrance’s rather unusual move. 
Taking the cue from Torrance when he says that something would appear to 
have gone wrong if we become too obsessed with scripture instead of what it refers 
to, a possible cause here is the concern with the detriment of dualism that to him has 
held captive of liberal, fundamentalist and modern historical-critical biblical 
scholarship.  Torrance’s worry is conspicuous when  says that ‘Modern liberal 
theology like ancient Arianism continues to stumble at the identity between God and 
his revelation, which is evident not only in its denial of the deity of Jesus Christ but in 
its assimilation of the Spirit of Jesus Christ to the human spirit.’60  In rejecting the 
controlling centre of God, Torrance says that liberal theology is being thrown back to 
the autonomous religious reason in order to provide the ground to ascertain that 
which scripture is mediating.  ‘Thus in the last analysis it is not,’ Torrance says, ‘as in 
rigorous science or theology, reality itself that is the ultimate judge of the truth or 
falsity of our thought and speech about it, but the self-conscious and self-referring 
human spirit.’61   
Similar concern is expressed when it comes to fundamentalism.  
Notwithstanding the effort to preserve the integrity of the biblical faith, Torrance 
says, ‘Fundamentalism stumbles, not so much at the consubstantial relation between 
the free continuous act of God’s self-communication and the living content of what 
he communicates, especially when this is applied to ivine revelation in and through 
the Holy Spirit.  It rejects the fact that revelation must be continually given and 
received in a living relation with God---i.e., it substitutes a static for a dynamic view 
of revelation.’62  To Torrance the problem of fundamentalism is akin to that of 
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Newtonian mechanics operating within a rigid structure of ideas, unable to allow it to 
respond appositely to the objective reality of God in his self-disclosure.  ‘Instead of 
being open to the objective pole of their reference i  the continual self-giving of God 
and therefore continually revisable under its contrl, they are given a finality and 
rigidity in themselves as evangelical beliefs, and are clamped down upon Christian 
experience and interpretation of divine revelation through the Holy Scriptures.’63  In 
other words, fundamentalist separates dualistically the revelation of God in scripture 
from the objective reality of the continuous revealing of God in Christ by the Spirit.  
Torrance says that ‘the Bible is treated as a self-contained corpus of divine truths in 
propositional form endowed with an infallibility of statement which provides the 
justification felt to be needed for the rigid framework of belief within which 
fundamentalism barricades itself.’  ‘This effect,’ Torrance continues, ‘is only 
reinforced by the regular fundamentalist identification of biblical statements about the 
truth with the truth itself to which they refer.’64  That is the main reason, in Torrance’s 
view, that accounts for the failure of fundamentalism in acknowledging the 
sovereignty of God over the contingent medium of scripture of which God uses to 
mediate his revelation.  
Torrance’s criticism of modern historical-critical biblical scholarship in 
someway is not unlike that of fundamentalism.  To him both share the root problem 
of ‘a fatal deistic disjunction between God and the world’ that disallows the revealing 
activity of God to speak continuously through scripture and thus depriving us of 
having any real knowledge of God as he is in himself.  Because of the underlying 
dualistic presupposition, Torrance remarks that ‘biblical and theological 
interpretation of this kind is regularly trapped within the fallacies of socio-cultural 
relativism and linguistic nominalism.’  ‘That is tosay,’ he continues, ‘by cutting short 
the ontological reference of biblical and theological statements to God (at least in 
respect of any cognitive relation to him) it is forced to interpret them merely 
culturally in terms of the socio-religious self-understanding of the times, or merely 
linguistically in terms of the sentential meaning defined through grammatical usage 
and syntactical complexes---although, admittedly, attempts are made to combined 
both these approaches.’65  The main difficulty of such scholarship to Torrance is that 
the unproductive interpretation of scripture is carried out with the phenomenalist and 
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positivist assumption, separating the understanding of revelatory events from the 
objective reality of God’s continuous self-revelation.  ‘Hence,’ Torrance claims, 
‘instead of being regarded as conveying a real Word from God, a biblical writing is 
automatically held to reflect only what people happen to believe in accordance with 
the cultural standards of their own time, as if they ad no direct access to standards of 
truth and falsity transcending their time which might limit imaginative construction 
or subjective fantasies!  Then it requires to be transposed into our modern cultural 
context to be reinterpreted under the guidance of our own standards and philosophies 
if it is to be “meaningful”, “understandable”, or “elevant” today.’66  Without doubt 
some would take Torrance to task here, notwithstanding his voice in someway 
reverberates an escalating dissatisfaction with modern conventions of textual study 
preoccupied much by positivism, objectivity and neutrality, and concurs with the call 
to return to the ‘plain sense’ of the biblical texts represented by biblical scholars such 
as John Barton.67  Although it is not within the present compass to analyse the 
interaction, one may appreciate the concern if some justification is allowed.  Torrance 
says,  
 
I am not prepared (as apparently form-critics have be n and now also some redaction 
critics) to allow the socially conditioned paradigms of one community to apply as 
interpretative rules for another, very different in time, place and culture, or to allow a 
set of theoretical and methodological ideas thrown up out of our own cultural trends 
and philosophies of life to distort what I read in the ancient texts, but insist that we 
must be quite ruthless with ourselves in discarding all assumptions of an a priori or 
extraneous derivation, in attempting to penetrate into the conceptual forms and 
patterns at work in the actual, empirical stream of tradition in which the text being 
interpreted is to be found.  We must do our utmost t  allow these texts to bear 
witness to themselves as far as possible out of themselves and their own inherent 
demands, and to let them impress upon us the appropriate frame of reference for our 
understanding of them, so that we may interpret them from within their own natural 
coherence.68 
                                               
66 Ibid., 3.  Torrance underlines in the footnote that through this pseudo-assumption, all kinds of 
spurious ideas are easily consecrated in the name of ‘historico-critical scholarship’.  
67 For argument of ‘plain sense’ and overview of the key factors and developments in recent biblical 
studies, see John Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2007).  Also, Robert Morgan and John Barton, Biblical Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988). 
68 STR, 4. Torrance explains that he is not rejecting in any way the importance of careful handling of 
scripture.  He says, ‘[F]ar from it---but that my criti al mind will not allow me to accept results tha  are 
predetermined by uncritical epistemological assumption; nor does it imply that I have not learnt from 
modern New Testament scholars something of the net-work of difficulties and contradictions that must 
be recognised…  I make no apology, therefore, for trying to interpret the Bible in the light of the logos 
of God’s self-revelation which it conveys and which, in accordance with its own self-witness, created 
the historical community of reciprocity between God and ancient Israel and God and the apostolic 
Church, within which the Old and New Testaments arose and took shape as the media through which 
that logos continues to be heard in the obedience of faith.’  See 4-5. 
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 From what has been discussed, we may say the possible cause that compels 
Torrance to advocate the effacement of scripture and to shift the weight from 
mediation to immediacy is not unrelated to avoiding the pitfall of dualism, and to 
allow God the due attention in revelation.  In anticipation of subsequent critical 
examination, it could be said that by making the move Torrance has knowingly or 
unknowingly altered the nature of scripture as the medium of which divine revelation 
is mediated continuously.  That is to say, scriptural texts become something akin to 
‘disposable cups’ that could be discarded soon after th y have fulfilled their 
mediatory function; they are no longer the ‘crystal cups the master filled’.69  In 
addition, by making the move not only does Torrance run the risk of having to face 
the problem of Barth, of which ‘the mediatedness of revelation, given with the right 
hand, is in effect taken away by the left’,70 he cannot avoid as well the suspicion that 
revelation is now taking a form of mystical encounter which indubitably leads to the 
truncation of human participation and the relegation of the humanity of Christ, a point 
we will explore further in the next section. 
The current section focuses primarily on analysing Torrance’s argument of the 
effacement of scripture and the shift of revelation from mediation to immediacy.  The 
analysis suggests that the move could be a response of Torrance to what he perceives 
as the dualistic presupposition of the liberal, fundamentalist and modern historical-
critical biblical scholarship.  Notwithstanding his arguments, we judge that the move 
would entail undesirable outcome to which Torrance cannot ignore.  We will examine 
the ramification and ask if Torrance could at the end justify his decision. 
 
 
A Critical Examination 
 
We have in the preceding section examined the move and ascertained the cause of 
Torrance’s effacement of scripture.  The purpose of this section is, therefore, to 
examine critically the implications and to ask if the move is justifiable in the light of 
Torrance’s theology of revelation and multiple mediations. 
                                               
69 P. T. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority (London: Independent Press, 1952), 131.  Although 
Forsyth principally refers to the apostles, the basic principle is applicable to scripture as medium of 
divine revelation. 
70 Colin Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 5. 
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To continue the point mentioned earlier, we attempt to examine whether the 
shift from mediation to immediacy may result in Torrance a revelation of mystical 
encounter in Christ by the Spirit.  Kurt Richardson describes Torrance’s thought on 
the revelatory knowledge of God as ‘an objective knowi g by subjects, both divine 
and human, its overall condition is a mystical and participatory one….  By mystical 
interpretation then Torrance means a kind of intuitive that is occasioned by the 
unique relational knowing of God by the creature.’71  Richardson acknowledges that 
the mystical approach of Torrance is not one of mysticism, but a form of union and 
communion in Christ through intuitive knowing by the Spirit.  In alluding to Barth’s 
recovery of the ordo salutis of Reformation theology, Richardson underlines that 
Barth explicates ordo as a form of illumination, justification, new obedi nce and 
mystical union.  It is through ‘mystical union with Christ nurtured by the Holy Spirit 
there results an illumination, an understanding of the Gospel on God’s terms where 
revelation begins to achieve its fulfilment, an understanding that arises from 
participation in the gracious life of God.’72  In relation to Torrance, Richardson 
observes that he has developed his own view of mystical apprehension through the 
apophatic and kataphatic traditions of Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers.  
Richardson says, ‘If we are to consider what Torrance means by the mystical moment 
in the apprehension of the knowledge of God in revelation through Scripture, we 
must first of all be clear about what he does not mean.’  ‘First and foremost,’ 
Richardson continues, ‘it means that there is no mystical knowing of God apart from 
or beyond Christ….  Second, the Gnostic path of mystic speculation is also closed….  
Finally, the classic philosophical path… is also a mystical path bypassed by 
Torrance.’73  As Kye Won Lee states, ‘For Torrance, union with C rist is a mystical 
union, but not in a mystic sense.  Rather, he uses it in the sense that it derives from 
and is grounded upon Christ, Mysterium.’74  After clearing the way, as it were, 
Richardson arrives at the centre of Torrance’s understanding and says,  
 
                                               
71 Kurt Richardson, ‘Revelation, Scripture, and Mystical Apprehension of Divine Knowledge,’ in The 
Promise of Trinitarian Theology, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 186-
87. 
72 Ibid., 187. 
73 Ibid., 193.  For detailed account of Richardson’s delineation of the influence of Athanasius and the 
Cappadocian Fathers on Torrance in relation to the apophatic and kataphatic traditions, see 187-88, 
193-94. 
74 Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2003), 4. 
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Where Torrance discerns the mystical is in the communion of the redeemed with the 
Redeemer and therefore in participation with God in God’s own Triune life.  In this 
communion, the human knower is raised up through the s atements of Scripture to a 
knowledge of God that grasps the Trinitarian whole (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) of 
that which has been revealed by Christ, elicits a personal knowing that is 
interpersonal and inclusive of the creature, and results in true theologia, real 
knowledge of God in God’s own Trinitarian reality.75 
 
Indeed, there is a mystical dimension in Torrance’s r velation that could not 
be overlooked.  The subtlety of ‘mysticism’ seems to capacitate Torrance to move 
from mediation to immediacy without substantial theological struggle.  By making 
the shift in conjunction with the effacement of scripture, the result indubitably is the 
heightening of the mystical element of revelation as attention is now directed solely 
to ‘the immediacy and compulsion of God’s self-revelation’.  Revelation then 
becomes, as Paul Ricoeur says, a signification of ‘inspiration from a first person to a 
first person.’76  The key question is whether such a picture of mystical encounter with 
Christ in God’s revelation when the human knower is lifted up by the Spirit through 
scripture in the light of its soon erasure is one that will sit well with Torrance’s 
overall understanding of revelation and multiple mediations.  If the answer is 
negative, as we argue, the next question would be what are the implications that could 
strain his theological framework?  Or, are there problems embedded in Torrance’s 
theological structure that would be exacerbated by the move? 
Carl Henry, one of Torrance’s critics, has pinpointed he implicit incongruity 
between the human and divine Logos in Torrance’s revelation.77  He remarks that 
Torrance has attempted to rise above the antithesis of personal and proposition 
revelation by emphasising the personal manifestation of God in Christ; in particular, 
Christ, ‘at once Person and Message’, ‘both personal and propositional’.78  However, 
by shifting the focus from the human logos to the divine Logos, Henry questions 
whether the safeguarding of the sovereignty of God in Christ’s revelation is 
purchased at the price of human rationality, creativity, responsibility, self-
determination and participation of divine revelation.  To put it succinctly, would the 
elevation of the divine jeopardise the human action?  Henry is critical with regard to 
Torrance’s remark that our words are ‘impersonal acts separate and distinct from their 
                                               
75 Richardson, 193-94.  In his response to Richardson’s article, Torrance, in alluding to this citation, 
does not express any difficulty in accepting it.  Thus, we may say that Richardson’s assessment is 
accurate as it is affirmed by Torrance himself.  In the same book, ‘Thomas Torrance Responds’, 326.  
76 Paul Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 92.  
77 Carl F. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority (Texas: Word Book, 1979), 214-29. 
78 Henry, 217. 
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persons’.79  Although Henry has no difficulty with Torrance’s assessment of the 
human estrangement when the latter says that we constantly live in ‘positive untruth, 
in contradiction and opposition to the Truth’, and our ‘ideas and conceptions and 
analogies and words are twisted in untruth and are resistant to the Truth’80, he 
questions Torrance’s ground of attributing the distortion to an epistemic deficiency in 
humanity instead of the human volitional rebellion.  To resolve the incongruity, 
Henry pinpoints that Torrance has chosen not only to reiterate divine action in Christ, 
but also turned to the notion of mystery in revelation.  Henry says,  
 
Torrance replies that “while our words are distinct and separate from our persons, 
His words have an essential relation to His Person, and… partake of the hypostatic 
relation between His humanity and His deity” (TS, 148).  But this truth is 
‘communicated to us in the form of mystery,’ that is, argues Torrance, in ‘concrete 
fact or particular event to which nevertheless the Truth is infinitely Transcendent’ 
(TS, 149).  ‘Theological knowledge and theological statements participate 
sacramentally in the mystery of Christ as the Truth’ (TS, 150).81 
 
Henry argues that Torrance’s assertion with regard to the overcoming of the 
gap between the human and divine Logos in Jesus Chri t could hardly corroborate his 
claim of the inadequacy of human words and concepts.  If human nature only under 
the conditions as Torrance describes could then possess the truth of revelation in 
epistemological form, and if coherent knowledge of G d requires a structural change 
in the mind of humanity made possible only by a personal union with God, Henry 
says that the price paid for preserving the truth of revelation could not be reconciled 
with the teaching of scripture.  Henry continues that if the imago Dei, on the basis of 
divine creation, includes categories of thought and forms of logic ample to the 
knowledge and service of God, and if the fall of humanity has not destroyed the 
contingent rationality, it does not have to be the case that in God’s self-revelation we 
are faced with a reality that cannot be reduced to our creaturely dimensions.82  
Human action could still have a place in the revelation of God without denying God’s 
sovereignty.  Thus, Henry remarks that Torrance has undermined God’s revelation ‘in 
nature, history and the conscience and mind of man’, devalued the Old Testament 
revelation and compromised as well the apostles’ witnesses of Christ with regard to 
                                               
79 TS, 147.  Cited in Henry, 218. 
80 TS, 49.  Cited in Henry, 218. 
81 Henry, 219.  
82 Ibid., 222. 
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Christ’s teaching and promise.83  Henry is here sounding a note of caution that the 
normativeness of scripture as the medium of God’s revelation is at stake. 
Without question, coming from a theological tradition that stands in stark 
contrast to that of Torrance, Henry, in certain key areas, has either clearly 
misunderstood or read Torrance with some entrenched presupposition and 
expectation.84  Although to dwell in an exhaustive comparison between the two is 
outside the compass of the current section, it is sufficient for us to pinpoint that the 
main misunderstanding, among others, lies in different interpretations when terms 
such as logic, reason and rationality are alluded to or appropriated.85  
Notwithstanding the differences, Henry does bring home a point---the incongruity of 
human and divine Logos---that someone who is theologically closer to Torrance 
acknowledges as well.  Thomas Langford, the critic who very much shares 
Torrance’s aspiration of theological science,86 regards the incongruity as basic 
duality.87  Langford underlines that the distinction is made more tenuous by the 
assertions that ‘we can never claim that God must be he content of our statements 
about him’, and our statements, both theological and biblical, are to be judged true 
only by God himself in his freedom of revelation.  Langford aptly questions, ‘But 
where does this leave the deposit of written theology?  Where does this leave the 
Scriptures?  The Creeds?  The volumes by individual theologians?  All of these are 
now given only a “formal” possibility of validity.’88  These are questions Torrance 
has to reconcile.  If Torrance pushes the distinctio  between the human and divine 
Logos to its extremity, he may unintentionally invite a dialectic tension so great that 
at the end it would undermine and subvert his theological reconstruction.  On this 
                                               
83 Ibid, 218. 
84 Morrison remarks that although Henry and Torrance talk pass each other on a few important matters, 
they ‘are more in agreement on significant issues than either ever admits.’  See Morrison, Knowledge 
of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas For yth Torrance, 268-70.   
85 Their differences in logic, human reason and ration lity are due to the theological position they 
embrace. For example, while Torrance considers the Kierkegaardian leap of faith perfectly ‘logical and 
rational’, Henry would think otherwise and conclude that it is an illogical and irrational retreat to 
Christ-Word mysticism.  Similarly, Torrance would regard Henry’s view of the Bible as the written 
Word of God a form of ‘nominalism’, unjustifiably separating the Word from God. 
86 Thomas A. Langford, ‘T. F. Torrance's Theological Science, a Reaction,’ Scottish Journal of 
Theology 25 (1972): 170.  Notwithstanding several criticisms, Langford makes it clear that ‘At none of 
these points do I want to counter his primary effort.  The questions which have been put in… have to 
do with the development of these agreed upon themes in the hope that Torrance, and others, shall 
continue with the working out of the subsequent dimensions of such a theological science.’   
87 Ibid., 161-62.  Not unlike the criticisms of Henry, Langford questions if Torrance has dealt 
sufficiently the problem of scriptural mediation.  In alluding to Torrance’s delineation of the nature of 
theological and biblical statements, Langford identifies a ‘basic duality’ in the claim that while they 
are derivative of the active speaking God, they are, t the same time, undeniably human statements.   
88 Ibid., 163. 
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note, one may ask whether the relegation of the human is symptomatic of the 
swallowing up of the humanity by the divinity of Christ in Torrance’s theology, a 
problem not unlike that of Barth as Gunton pinpoints that Barth has the tendency ‘to 
underplay the significance of the humanity of Christ’?89  Is that the tension embedded 
in Torrance’s christocentric-trinitarian framework that constantly induces him to 
focus on the divine at the expense of the human in revelation?  Could Torrance 
escape the suspicion of a tinge of Docetism if the observation proved accurate?  
Surely, this is not the intent of Torrance. 
In rejecting what to him as revelational foundationalism, Thiemann criticises 
Torrance’s arguments of revelation’s uniqueness and rationality as contradictory.  
Thiemann claims that Torrance, in his defence of the primacy of theology’s object, 
namely the revelation of God in Christ, has denied human subjectivity in the 
reciprocal relation.  Thiemann says, ‘If Torrance consistently denies that human 
subjectivity has a reciprocal effect on the divine object, then either he must deny 
theology’s rationality or he must use the terms knowledge and rationality 
equivocally.’90  Thiemann claims that this apparent contradiction threatens to 
undermine Torrance’s position.  As Torrance has put m ch stock in emphasising the 
characteristic of theology as scientific and rational, the success of his argument to 
defend the sovereignty of God in revelation hinges v ry much on that characteristic.  
But, to Thiemann, Torrance’s account of theology’s unique object appears to 
undermine the arguments for formal rationality, thus his upholding of the divine at 
the expense of the human provides the falsifying argument his critics seek.  The point 
is Torrance cannot relegate the participation of human subjectivity even when his 
attention is shifted to the objectivity of God in revelation; ‘Torrance cannot deny 
subject-object reciprocity and continue to claim that rationality and truth reside solely 
in the object without also denying theology’s rationality.’91  Thiemann’s criticism, 
however, is not without challenge.  John Morrison says that Thiemann has been 
mistaken about Torrance’s argument as he does in fact m intain the necessity of 
subject-object reciprocal relation.92  Morrison underlines that Torrance has never 
allowed the subject to project into the object in the subject-object relation because the 
knowing subject could never be able to ‘add anything’ to the self-revealing object; 
                                               
89 Gunton, 119. 
90 Thiemann, 38.  Author’s italic. 
91 Ibid. 
92 For comprehensive account, see Morrison, K owledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of 
Thomas Forsyth Torrance, 275-78. 
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only receive it through faithful responses in revisable expression as it is brought into 
ever greater conformity to the object.  But, as we indicate, Thiemann considers such 
an account of theology’s unique object is achieved at the expense of the subject’s 
subjectivity, as it appears to undermine the argument for formal rationality; the notion 
is considered false because it fails to conform to the demand of general sciences.  On 
this note, Morrison develops his defence of Torrance and argues that ‘Contrary to 
Thiemann, there is no difference among the sciences to be found in Torrance’s 
thinking on the question in that sense.’93  In sounding similar note, Tom McCall 
claims that Torrance has given a convincing account that rational scientific inquiry is 
the active participation of the subject in responding appositely to the demand of the 
object.94  We may add to the discussion by underscoring a point made in our chapter 
three that the subservience of the knowing subject to the revealing object is not a 
debasement but the fulfilment of the subjectivity of the knowing subject to Torrance.  
In relation to foundationalism, Elmer Colyer, as McCall,95 argues that ‘Torrance is 
certainly not the kind of foundationalist Ronald Thiemann contends that he is’, as 
Torrance’s appropriation of intuition is a process of cientific inquiry that requires the 
active participation of the subject.96   
Thiemann is not unaware of Torrance’s appropriation of intuition to argue for 
the case that the human subjectivity in fact plays n essential but non-constructive 
role in the revelatory relationship.  He has taken note of Torrance’s argument that 
theologian must penetrate into the inner logic of Gd to trace the ‘logic of grace’ and 
think with the ‘inner compulsion’ of God’s self-revlation, a process of intuition of 
which science regards as discovery and theology as revelation.97  However, 
Thiemann is not impressed.  He says, ‘Once again the weight of an argument for 
revelation comes to rest on the frail concept of intuition.’98  By appealing to intuition, 
Thiemann underscores that Torrance, instead of resolving the inconsistency, has 
compounded the problem.  He says, ‘Torrance uses the term intuition to signify the 
indubitability and incorrigibility of this casually imposed knowledge….  Thus human 
beings must be the passive recipients of a self-evident truth.  But this appeal to 
                                               
93 Ibid., 276. 
94 For full account, see Tom McCall, ‘Ronald Thiemann, Thomas Torrance and Epistemological 
Doctrines of Revelation,’ International Journal of Systematic Theology 6 (2004): 148-68. 
95 For detailed account, see McCall, 153-55. 
96 For detailed argument, see footnote 97 of ‘The Intgration of Form in Theology’ in Elmer M. 
Colyer, How to Read T.F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology (Downers 
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 343-44.   
97 TS, 129-31.  Cited by Thiemann, 39. 
98 Thiemann, 39-40. 
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intuition surely does not resolve the inconsistency i  the logic of Torrance’s position; 
it simply makes the nature of his difficulty more app rent.’99   
Notwithstanding the challenge, Thiemann’s argument warrants our attention 
as he has indeed pinned down a point of concern that cannot be overlooked.  
Thiemann remarks that the difficulty here is reminiscent of the problem that has 
plagued Barth in his early works.  Barth’s solution, to Thiemann the version of 
Torrance is an update, is to grant God’s Spirit the mediating power to bring divine 
object and human subject together.  Thiemann claims that it is an unjustifiable answer 
because God’s Spirit is finally not the human subject but the ‘not-I’ that dwells 
within.  At the end, human subjectivity becomes nothing more than the vessel 
through which God knows himself, and the human self remains hopelessly bifurcated 
in the act of knowing God.100  Could that be as well a reasonable factor that has 
contributed to Torrance’s unusual move, as the human recipient of divine self-
disclosure is basically passive, and what is left is only the work of the Spirit in lifting 
him up before Christ in the mystical encounter of revelation?  Could that account for 
Torrance’s effacement of scripture, as attention to the humanity of scripture is 
rendered insignificant for the same reason?  Althoug  Thiemann criticises Torrance, 
he, like Henry and Langford, finally allows the problem of historicity of revelation to 
go by without substantial engagement.  It is with the issue of historical contingency 
of revelation in mind that we would now turn to Ray Anderson. 
In a book that takes its final published form from a dissertation accomplished 
under Torrance’s supervision, Anderson criticises his supervisor’s works on a few 
aspects.101  However, in view of our discussion, we would conce trate on his remark 
in relation to a lack of historical contingency in Torrance’s revelation. We believe 
that the problem is accentuated by Torrance when he effaces scripture and shifts the 
focus of revelation solely to the divine.  Anderson claims that divine revelation 
cannot be determined apart from God’s ‘historical tr nscendence’; a term he uses to 
denote the revelatory reality and presence of God as a historical experience in human 
history.102  In congruence with Torrance, Anderson underlines that the historical 
                                               
99 Ibid., 40.  Author’s italic. 
100 Ibid., 42. 
101 Ray Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God (London: Geoffrey Chapman 
1975). 
102 Anderson admits that the term ‘historical transcendence’ is an odd combination of words that may 
suggest a confusion of language game.  He, however, xplicates that the formulation is based on the 
thought of Ronald G. Smith and Dietrich Bonhoeffer in relation to transcendence and worldliness as 
historical experience.  As Anderson says, ‘by histor cal transcendence, I mean no more than that which 
 167
transcendence of God has been demonstrated most clearly through the incarnation, 
where God is present both as the Word and the Person.103  Anderson claims that a 
double movement in incarnation constitutes the ration le of God’s historical presence 
in revelation.  First, there is the movement of the et rnal Son becoming man, utterly 
conditioned by history and by humanity while remains i  reciprocal relation with the 
eternal Father.  Second, there is the movement by which ‘the Spirit causes 
community with God to impinge immediately upon humanity and thus opens up man 
to his future with God in a way that makes belief possible.’104  On this note, the 
historical presence of the Son is also the history of the Spirit, as the Spirit brings the 
person of the Son into communion with humanity.  Anderson underlines that it is 
through this double movement that the God of Trinity is revealed in human history.  
One key argument of Anderson with regard to Christ’s incarnation is that not only the 
Word is inseparable from the Person, the words and acts cannot be dichotomised 
from the Person as well.  In view of the unity, thewords and acts of Jesus could lead 
us directly to the living Word and thus they serve as a ‘pole of transcendence’ (or, 
historical contingency of divine revelation) to place us in the truth.105  
Notwithstanding Christ’s revelation occurs in specific time and place in human 
history, Anderson argues that its historical past continues to have an indispensable 
function in our revelatory encounter with God today.  The crux is the historical 
presence of Christ’s revelation takes its continuity in human history through the 
followers and disciples of Jesus, the witnesses of Jesus’ acts and words.  Anderson 
claims that the witnesses of Jesus’ acts and words carry with them an authority of 
‘absolute extrinsicality’, because they, in witnessing Christ, become part of the 
revelation.106  Anderson says,  
 
                                                                                                                            
is denoted by the use of the general concept since Bonhoeffer, but no less than the full significance of 
the “inner logic” of this concept as an explication f the reality of God.’  He continues to explain that 
‘when I suggest that a phrase such as “historical transcendence” has an “inner logic”, I mean that the 
phrase is referential in its meaning, not to the exist ntial self-understanding of the one who attempts to 
comprehend it, but to the reality which “stands behind” the phrase, the reality to which the phrase 
points.  I also intend to signify, that this reality has an intrinsic intelligibility of its own which imposes 
its rationality upon the subject comprehending it.’ From the explication of Anderson, we may 
summarise it by saying that ‘historical transcendence’ is the revelatory reality and presence of God as a
historical experience determined by the object of self-disclosure in its imposition upon the subject of 
comprehension.  See Anderson, xiv-xv. 
103 Ibid., 208. 
104 Ibid., 209. 
105 Ibid., 210.  Anderson underlines that the believers could be placed in the truth in this regard only as 
they reflect upon the testimony concerning Jesus and allow that to inform their intention to seek him 
out for a direct encounter. 
106 Ibid., 210-11.  Anderson alludes to Bonhoeffer for the use of ‘absolute extrinsicality’. 
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The authority which these words of witness to Christ conveyed was derivative of his 
own person, and conditioned by the ambiguity of all historical words and acts, but 
nonetheless, constituted a pole of transcendence, and as such, a revelation of the 
reality of Christ.  Here we see at work the operative principle for the formation of a 
larger body of witness to Jesus which became the Scriptures of the New 




It is this rationale which sets forth what can be called an inner logic to a doctrine of 
Scripture as revelation…It is here that the rationale for the transcendence of God 
through the historical person of Jesus Christ must come to terms with the rationale of 
Scripture as the revelation, and thus the historical transcendence of God.  This will 
immediately raise the ghost of so-called ‘propositinal revelation’ for some...108 
 
The above citations bring Anderson’s criticism of Torrance in relation to 
scripture as the mediation of divine revelation into focus.  Although Anderson 
appreciates Torrance’s effort to state the case for the place of scripture in ‘a double 
sense, both above the Church, and thus transcendent of the words of man, but also in 
human history, and thus subject to the limitations f human finitudes’, so that the 
Word of God will not be confounded with the word of humanity,109 he suspects 
Torrance is able to maintain the tension without sacrificing the mediatedness of 
scripture.110  He remarks that Torrance’s understanding of scripture in fact runs the 
risk of losing what propositional revelation attempts to uphold.  Anderson says, 
 
What is at stake in giving up that which a concept of propositional revelation seeks to 
preserve is the pole of transcendence which we haves id lies in history and thus can 
serve to inform the act of faith ‘in the Spirit’ ofits transcendent grounds in the person 
of Christ.  Historical transcendence itself is at stake here, because if the cognitive 
link with the content of God’s transcendence as historical act is broken, the act of 
faith must supply its own content to the divine Word.111 
 
One possible corrective, according to Anderson, for Torrance to overcome the 
lack of historical contingency of revelation is to remove the double sense of scripture 
and to affirm it as ‘the one pole of transcendence which confronts us completely as a 
                                               
107 Ibid., 211. 
108 Ibid., 212. 
109 Ibid., 213. 
110 Ibid., 214.  Anderson says, ‘One can appreciate the efforts of Professor Torrance to maintain both 
the authority and humanity of Scripture: but I am not so sure that it can be done by giving the Scriptu e 
both a transcendent and an immanent relation to man, and thus separating its transcendence from its 
historicity.’ 
111 Ibid., 213. 
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revelation within history’.112  In someway we may comment that Anderson’s proposal 
addresses what Henry and Langford recognise as problematic in Torrance’s account.  
Another difficulty, however, has to be brought to light at this juncture.  When 
scripture effaces itself as the human knower is lifted up in the Spirit to the mystical 
revelation of Christ, the problem is, as indicated in the above citation, ‘the cognitive 
link with the content of God’s transcendence as historical act is broken, the act of 
faith must supply its own content to the divine Word.’  That is to say, as scripture is 
rendered unnecessary, there is an absence of material content with regard to God’s 
revelation in human history.  Thus, faith must now search for its own content because 
revelation has become an immediate experience, as Avery Dulles says, where God 
communicates inwardly with each believer in his mystical encounter with Christ by 
the Spirit.113  When Christ’s revelation becomes a mystical experience, the question 
of verifying its content becomes imperative.  Indee it is a difficult question. ‘Can 
one claim that some forms (Paul as opposed to James; th  Council of Trent as 
opposed to the Thirty-nine Articles; Barth as opposed to Tillich) are more susceptible 
to God’s influxion than others?  If so on what grounds may this be claimed?’  A 
possible solution, according to Langford, is to turn to ‘the forms which have been 
used by God in his gracious encounter with men’.  ‘But,’ he continues, ‘this provides 
a different base---namely an historical assessment---for the validation of theological 
statements.’114  If Langford’s suggestion is acceptable, the key to the door lies in the 
subject of biblical revelation.  However, as important as it is, it is an area Torrance 
has failed to engage adequately, as our discussion thus far shows.  Langford suspects 
that Torrance’s problem is not unlike that of Barth.  In his allusion to Hermann 
Diem’s criticism of the inadequacy of Barth in biblical hermeneutics, Langford says 
that Torrance, like Barth, has not provided an adequate interaction of dogmatic work 
with scriptural exegesis.115  We need to declare that Langford’s comment of Barth, 
rightly or wrongly, does not fall within the compass of our current discussion; though 
we suspect many Barth scholars would disagree to it.  However, his criticism of 
Torrance in this regard resonates our earlier observation.  As a result, Langford says 
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that ‘the usability of this philosophy of theology seems to be meagre.’116  Langford 
continues, 
 
There seems to be one possibility: the role of the Christian community.  Any 
legitimate judgment must be made by the continuing community and therefore no 
quick or final answer is possible.  Patience and sensitivity are required for guidance 
by the Spirit….  What Torrance has achieved is a theological approach which 
remains---to the end---open to the direction of the Holy Spirit. 
If this is a correct interpretation, then one final comment upon it may be 
worthwhile.  To carry through his delineation of the work of the Spirit of God in the 
thinking of men, a stronger emphasis should be placed upon the role of the Body of 
Christ, the continuing community of faith.  For, in the last analysis, it is within this 
community that judgements of validity are to be made nd remade.  The theologians 
does not stand in isolation before God asking how he may judge the truth of his own 
interpretation, rather he submit his work to the company of believers who share with 
him the conviction that Jesus is Lord of truth of life.117 
 
From the citation we may comment that Langford’s suggestion indeed 
underlines the importance of multiple mediations. Torrance would agree with him 
that ‘the company of believers’, or the church, is a locus where the Spirit and 
believers work conjointly in the unfolding of the rvelatory truth; a point corroborates 
the normative pattern of the union and communion of divine and human action of 
revelation and mediation.  Langford’s stress of ‘the continuing community’ deserves 
to be taken seriously as it brings us back to the primary question in relation to the 
nature of the medium of revelation.  Indeed, media minted and used by God could not 
be the ‘disposable cups’, but the ‘crystal cups themaster filled’.  Langford’s 
emphasis reverberates P. T. Forsyth’s remark of the mediatedness of the apostles.118  
The point is multiple mediations is one of the main pillars of Torrance’s theology of 
revelation, and any unjustifiable move to relegate any medium of its mediatory nature 
would strain the framework and destruct its coherence.  In addition, if the move to 
efface scripture is the response of Torrance to the dualism of liberal, fundamentalist 
and modern historical-critical biblical scholarship in segregating the divine from the 
human by shifting the focus solely to the human, by doing the reverse one wonders 
whether Torrance is unknowingly falling into the very pitfall he has fought so 
valiantly throughout his academic career to surmount.  The detection of duality and 
incongruity by Langford and Henry cannot be undermined.  Is there a remnant of 
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dualism in Torrance as the result?  If the answer is yes, could there be a deeper cause?  
With these questions we may turn to John Morrison to probe the matter further. 
As a reader of Torrance, Morrison comes to an analytic  conclusion that 
there is certain remnant of dualism in Torrance’s ‘Christocentric-Trinitarian theo-
logical realism’.119  He says that Torrance’s formulation of the christological pattern 
of truth appears to produce a conceptual reduction of revelation that ends in a rather 
existential and dialectic understanding of revelation.  Morrison observes that this 
problem could be linked to the indelible influence of Kierkegaard and Barth, 
especially in relation to Kierkegaard’s contemporaneity and Barth’s 
transcendentalism.120  Morrison says, ‘This remnant dualism was said to potentially 
negate the humanity of the existing person in the knowing relation to God on the one 
hand and to endanger the real, historical incarnatio  of the Word on the other.’121  
The remark of Morrison corroborates to a great extent our earlier observation with 
regard to the relegation of human participation andthe subservience of the humanity 
to the divinity of Christ.  In order to grasp the criti ism, we need to touch on 
Morrison’s discussion of Kierkegaard and Barth, as he develops his argument of 
Torrance’s dualism through it. 
Morrison underlines that because Kierkegaard is unwilli g to follow the 
Hegelian System, he sets forth in his own ‘experiment’ to explore the relation 
between humanity and the highest truth.  In his endeavour to clarify the meaning of 
Christianity, Kierkegaard marks Christ’s incarnation as the Absolute Paradox.  
Morrison says, ‘It is the Absolute Paradox…  in existential contrast to the Hegelian-
Idealist “System” in order to set forth a philosophical reflection on the nature of truth 
in relation to God and history by means of Jesus Christ, the Historical instantiation of 
the Eternal.’122  Kierkegaard argues that in distinction to Socrati-Idealist perspective 
of the teacher as the ‘mid-wife’ who eventually vanishes in the eternal, the teacher of 
Christianity has to be understood fully as saviour, deliverer, reconciler and judge.123  
Kierkegaard asserts that the learner cannot form any co ceptual knowledge of God 
unless he receives it directly from God himself.  This, according to Kierkegaard, is 
the divine ‘incognito’.  It refers to the impossibil ty of penetrating into the divine if 
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‘without receiving the condition from the teacher’.124  Kierkegaard claims that it is 
only through faith that one could understand, affirm, and respond to the ‘teacher’.  To 
reiterate the point, Morrison says, ‘As the alternate to Idealism, the teacher who is the 
god and thus the “moment” (or “fullness of time”) must then be decisive.  “It must 
decide” the person.  The historical individual in utr th is brought into truth by the 
faith (“leap”) response to the Eternal god in time, the paradox.’125  With regard to the 
‘leap of faith’, Kierkegaard says that the immediate contemporaries of Jesus have no 
advantage over later generations because even as they get ‘to see this external form 
was something appalling: to associate with him as one f us and at every moment 
when faith was not present to see only the servant form’.126  This is the ironical 
paradox of Jesus Christ.  Only by faith can one see beyond the physical form of a 
servant and to be in contemporaneity with Jesus the God.  Morrison underlines that if 
‘a specific “moment” in history is of vital significance for the acquisition of truth and 
the change of the existing individual to truth, then “the moment” or “Absolute Fact” 
at the heart of Christology and faith is necessarily d stinct from relative facts of 
history.’127  On this note, a two-fold reason may account for the distinction; it is 
absolute in the sense that it is historical, yet it is equally contemporaneous to every 
point in time because it is the eternal.  Morrison delineates that this formulation of 
incarnation as the coming and becomingness of God into time is critical to 
Kierkegaard’s christology.  However, as the Absolute Paradox that cannot be 
explained and proved neither by human logic nor objective fact of history, the 
christology of Kierkegaard cannot be understood apart from its radical consequence 
of the leap of faith.  The necessity of historicity is undermined.  If Oscar Cullmann is 
right, this problem could be caused by the fact that Kierkegaard is found to be misled 
with regard to the relation of God and history in Christ.  Cullmann says, 
 
[Kierkegaard] with his conception of ‘contemporaneity’, mistakes the significance of 
the present for redemptive history.  According to him faith transfers us back into the 
time of the Incarnation; it makes us contemporaries of the apostles.  In this view it is 
correct that faith permits us to survey the entire redemptive line and to share in its 
fruits… but the concept of contemporaneity presupposes that basically time as 
redemptive time has already come to a standstill with Jesus Christ; hence we can 
only go back to him in order to enter the realm of salvation… when the first disciples 
uttered their original confession: ‘Christ reigns as Lord,’ this means rather that Christ 
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the Crucified and Risen One comes to us.  The redemptive history continues; Christ 
sits at the right hand of God, now, today. 128   
 
In congruence with Cullmann, Morrison underlines that Kierkegaard has 
failed to recognise fully that the post-Easter present of Christ signifies a continuance 
in time of the redemptive process.  As Cullmann aptly says, ‘while rightly centring on 
the incarnation, Kierkegaard is said to wrongly see the need to overleap the centuries 
to the Christ event as “mid-point”.’129  Because of this failure, Kierkegaard is often 
categorised with those who speak of eternity invading time to communicate a kind of 
‘oil and water’ relation.130  The problem is historical and thus redemptive-historical, 
the root lies in Kierkegaard’s understanding of God and his relation to history.  On 
this note, Cullmann is right to say that Kierkegaard’s salvation history casts 
‘mundane’ history away.  However, although Morrison agrees with Cullmann that 
Kierkegaard does lose sight of the place of all history including the history of existing 
person that is crucial to biblical understanding, the problem is not so much of an 
overleaping of centuries backward to the mid-point event of Christ.  Morrison differs 
slightly from Cullmann and claims that the Kierkegaardian loss of real history arises 
from ‘the paradoxical view of the incarnation whereby the action of the wholly other 
God is one of “coming” from the redemptive-historical mid-point by which the 
centuries may be “overleaped” to encounter the believing person who then 
participates in redemptive time, God’s time.’131  In other words, it is not so much just 
an issue of trans-historical immediacy; it is a problem of Kierkegaard’s emphatic 
declaration of the otherness of God and the utter qualitative distinction of God from 
time.  Morrison continues to underlines that as the coming of the Eternal in time, ‘the 
god can detemporalise actual historical distinctions.’132  He says, ‘History has been 
altered by the “addition” of a second “historical” (or trans-historical) continuum 
whereby paradoxical immediacy for faith is engendere  by the indirect historicity of 
the Incarnation.’133  Approaching incarnation in this way, Morrison says that 
Kierkegaard has made history-qua-history of no final accounting, and faith as that by 
which the individual encounters God in revelation outside the direct historical realm.  
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Morrison observes conclusively that Kierkegaard’s eagerness to overthrow Hegelian 
immanentism has not only caused him to alter and bifurcate history by an emphatic 
divine transcendence, it has also altered the nature of the knowledge of God and of 
historical redemption in Christ.  In congruence with Anderson’s emphasis of 
historical contingency, Morrison says, ‘The knowledg  of God as truly historical in 
the context of true historical, covenantal relatedness, “historical transcendence” 
would do much to shore up the line of thought from Kierkegaard to and through Karl 
Barth to Thomas Torrance.’134  With this remark, we would now turn to that which 
Morrison considers to be the other root problem of T rrance, Barth. 
To Morrison the difficulty of Barth is not unlike that of Kierkegaard.  For 
Barth, and Torrance, the implication of the divine priority of Christ as the sole 
objectivity of God’s self-revelation requires us tounderstand our fallen time in 
relation to the ‘real time’ of the incarnational event.  This reckoning of our fallen time 
to the time of God manifested in the fulfilled time of Christ’s revelation is to be seen 
redemptively as the love of God.135  In an almost definitional statement according to 
Morrison, Barth says, 
 
The time God has for us is constituted by His becoming present to us in Jesus Christ.  
If we say Jesus Christ, we also assert a human and therefore temporal presence.  (It) 
is an eternal but not therefore a timeless reality… not a sort of ideal, yet in itself 
timeless content of all or some time.  It does not remain transcendent over time, it 
does not merely meet it at a point, but it enters time; nay, it assumes time; nay, it 
creates time for itself.136 
 
 Morrison comments that problems could be detected from the above citation 
concerning the structuring of time and history.  He says that revelation in Barth’s 
terms still retains its own time that must be made distinct from the fallen time, so that 
it will not become something merely historical.  Morrison claims that Barth’s 
development of the ‘God’s Time/our time’ relationship only exacerbates the 
dilemma.137  Morrison’s observation is verified by Richard Roberts.  Notwithstanding 
Barth’s ‘extraordinary efforts to affirm the parallel between the Word’s becoming 
flesh and its becoming time’, Roberts criticises that the relation of real time and our 
time ‘remains ambiguous’ and the problem of disrelation continues to plague Barth’s 
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Church Dogmatics.138  According to Morrison, the solution that Barth has provided to 
resolve the gulf between God and humanity is to create a form of unity-in-distinction 
which will maintain the otherness of the divine in his comingness in history.  It is 
here Morrison argues that Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘contemporaneousness’ has 
become significant for Barth’s theological formulation, and so its difficulty as well.  
The influence is clearly seen when Barth says, 
 
In revelation God stands in for us entirely.  And so also the time He creates for 
Himself in revelation, the genuine present, past and future is presented to us entirely.  
It should, it can, it will become our time, since H directs His Words to us; we are to 
become contemporary with this time of His.  His genuine time takes the place of the 
problematic, improper time we know and have.  It replaces it in that, amid the years 
and ages of this time of ours, the time of Jesus Christ takes the place of our time 
coming to us as a glad message presented to us as a promise, and to be seized and 
lived in by us.139 
 
 Regarding Barth’s distinction of Geschichte and Historie, Morrison, in 
alluding to Richard Niebuhr, points out the apparent ambiguity of Barth’s argument.  
Niebuhr says, ‘In Barth’s mind… these two orders of history requires two methods of 
cognition.  For profane history, ordinary experiential cognition suffices, but for God’s 
immediate action, there is no human response that is adequate.  Pure revelation 
demands a wholly passive attitude of man, for what ppens then and there… 
happens wholly and entirely externally to him, outside and apart from him.  How then 
can revelation be known?’140  In congruence with Niebuhr, Morrison underlines that 
Barth’s attempt to adequately reflect the factual instantiation of God’s time for us in 
Jesus is beclouded in transcendental otherness and a ‘history’ of its own that cannot 
be ours but only God’s;  ‘The Christ, as the Word of G d’s self-giving for us, remains 
“transcendentalised”.’141  On this note, Roberts comments that despite Barth’s 
endeavour to preserve Christian theology from the indifferent and hostile secular 
world through a profound ontological exclusiveness, hi  theological aggrandisement 
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inevitably runs the risk of segregating and alienating his theology from natural 
reality, as symptomatically mirrored in the difficulty of his doctrine of time.  Thus, 
Roberts, in a concluding statement, underlines that B rth’s works illustrate 
phenomenally ‘the logic of the disrelation of Christian theological categories and the 
reality of which they speak from our own culture.’142  This, to Morrison, is the core 
problem of Barth’s God-world relatedness.  It has its root in Kierkegaard.  And it is 
on this ground, as we shall now see, that Morrison argues for the remnant dualism of 
Torrance. 
Morrison says that Torrance has attempted to work out an adequate 
‘disclosure model’ to reflect faithfully the revelation of God.  However, in his 
theological construction along the Kierkegaardian-Barthian line of thought, Morrison 
remarks that Torrance has fallen prey to the same problems of Kierkegaard and Barth.  
The outcome is that there exists a polarity of unreconciled sides of revelation.  While 
Torrance delineates the importance of the ‘historical disclosive situation’ in Christ by 
the Spirit, his understanding of the Word as encountered in revelation continues to 
maintain strong bases in Kierkegaardian-Barthian transcendentalism.143  Morrison 
says, 
 
At Torrance’s critical theo-logical point where human knowing of God is meant to be 
actualised or instantiated in real historical relation, God seems to recede from the 
historical into non-objectivity for space-time human existence.  Torrance’s 
formulations and descriptions of that ‘moment’ of encounter become descriptions of 
a Christ-mysticism very similar to descriptions of the existential Word-event as 
found in such prominent post-Bultmannian theologians s Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst 
Fuchs.144 
 
 In alluding to Thiselton’s criticism of the modern theological-existential 
emphasis of the ‘Word-event’, Morrison remarks that Torrance’s approach has come 
too near to the Word-magic.  The setback of it is the inevitable devaluation of the 
‘place of assertion’ and the ‘complexity and variety of functions performed by 
statements’ in the revelatory process;145 a point evidently corroborates our earlier 
argument.  The main reason for Torrance to use Kierkegaard in spite of the problems 
seems to be the fact that in him Torrance has found the much needed objectivity and 
                                               
142 Roberts, 58. 




dynamic mode of thinking.146  However, the appropriation of Kierkegaard does come 
with a price; as Morrison says, what Kierkegaard has left unfinished and disjoined, 
have not been overcome by Barth or Torrance.  As much as Torrance wants to 
surmount the disjunction between the divine and human history, his Kierkegaardian’s 
leap of faith into the encounter of contemporaneity has left him with the inevitable 
negation of the historicity of the Word and humanity.  At the end, Morrison says that 
the problem persists in Torrance’s theology ‘because of “transcendentalism” 
assumptions which thwart a final completion of real interrelatedness as is necessary 
in Torrance’s asymmetrical, unitary theo-logical whole as a disclosure model of 
God’s lordly creative-recreative relation to the world as centred and founded in the 
real historicity and Mediation of the Word made flesh.’147   
What have we achieved in the discussion of Morrison?  Fundamentally it has 
thrown the criticisms, particularly that of Anderson, into sharp relief and unveiled a 
possible remnant of dualism embedded in Torrance’s th ological structure by tracing 
its root back to Barth and Kierkegaard.   By suggesting the failure of overcoming the 
problems, Morrison’s observation has provided us with another possible cause of 
Torrance’s unusual move.  Thus, it may be said that a two-fold factor has given rise 
to it; internally within his framework an inclination of transcendentalism, and 
externally the response to the dualistic presupposition of the liberal, fundamentalist 
and modern historical-critical biblical scholarship.  As mentioned, notwithstanding 
Torrance’s arguments of the locatedness of God’s revelation in space and time, it 
remains essentially outside the human history.  Because of the inherent historical 
inadequacy of his theology of revelation, Torrance manages to shift from mediation 
to immediacy without much struggle.  In conjunction with the advocacy of the 
effacement of scripture, the shift has led to a form of mystical immediacy where the 
human subject’s historical existence and humanity is finally demeaned or lost as he is 
lifted up by the Spirit in the moment of contemporaneity.  On this note, the 
inevitability is the vulnerability of subordinating the humanity to the divinity of 
Christ in divine revelation; the shadow of Docetism is still lurking.  Thus, the 
conclusion of Morrison corroborates our claim that, by derailing from the normative 
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pattern of revelation and mediation, Torrance has unknowingly fallen prey to the very 
problem he endeavours to surmount in his theological quest. 
As Morrison traces Torrance’s problem back to Kierkegaard and Barth, we 
may return to the remark of Gunton underscored in the preceding chapter about the 
inadequacy of Barth’s pneumatology.  Gunton says, ‘We have already met the 
problem of Barth’s tendency to underplay the signifcance of the humanity of Christ.  
It is accompanied by an equivocal failure to give due place and function to the Holy 
Spirit.’148  Gunton claims that the Spirit is the ‘subjective side in the event of 
revelation’ to Barth.149  And, like many great theologians of the Western tradi ion, 
Barth is unable to avoid the weakness of limiting the activity of the Spirit to the 
believer’s relation with Christ in divine revelation.  In alluding to the Forth Gospel, 
Gunton says that the way to overcome this weakness i  pneumatology is to allow the 
Spirit the distinctive revelatory role beyond the subjectivity of human knower.  
Gunton says, ‘The Spirit is revealed as the mediator of relation to God through Christ 
and consequently as the mediator of revelation.’150  Thus, the Spirit is the agent of 
revelation actively working through human and earthly media and leading all to the 
truth, to Jesus; ‘the Spirit is to point to, and in that sense, reveal the Son; that of the 
Son to reveal the Father.’151  Our discussion shows that Torrance is in fact in 
congruence with Gunton on this note.  In his endeavour to surmount the eclipse of the 
Spirit by the Son in divine revelation and mediation, Torrance underscores that the 
doctrine of the Spirit cannot be less important than the doctrine of the Son.  Torrance 
regards, as Gunton, the construction of a full doctrine of the Spirit an urgent task of 
modern theology that even Barth has yet to work out thoroughly in his Church 
Dogmatics.152  In view of the remarks, we would now attempt the question left 
unanswered at the end of the foregoing chapter.  Weask if Gunton is right about 
Barth’s weakness of limiting the activity of the Spirit to the believer’s subjective 
appropriation of revelation, would Torrance then fall into the same pitfall despite of 
his argument.  Is Torrance finally free from the pneumatological weakness of Barth, 
given that he shares Barth’s problems as Morrison has indicated?  The answer, we 
believe, is manifest in the light that revelation in Torrance’s scheme is now voided of 
historical contingency and mediation, the Spirit has no other media but the 
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subjectivity of the beholder; a symptomatic problem, according to Ricoeur, at least in 
the West, of lacking ‘an appropriate theology that does not psychologise the Holy 
Spirit.’153  Thus, we may conclude that by making the move to advocate the 
effacement of scripture and underpin the immediacy of Christ’s revelation, Torrance 
has altered the landscape considerably and pneumatology is now a weakness 
notwithstanding his arguments. 
We have thus far examined the implications and problems that are either 
derived from or exacerbated by Torrance’s move to effac  scripture and focus 
primarily on the immediacy of Christ’s revelation.  Through our engagements with 
Richardson, Henry, Langford, Thiemann, Anderson, Morris n and Gunton, we show 
that the ramifications are complex and far reaching.  Despite the complexity, we may 
encapsulate them into six main points.  First, the revelation of God in Christ is denied 
of historical contingency.  It has become a form of transcendental-mystical encounter 
between the redeemed and the Redeemer outside the human history.  Second, as 
scripture effaces itself and is rendered unnecessary in revelation, the lack of material 
content leaves no option except to allow the act of faith to search for its own 
revelatory message in the mystical encounter.  Questions of authenticity and 
verification then become imperative and problematic.  Third, the move to efface 
scripture in revelation has debased the nature of mediation and thus contradicted the 
argument of multiple mediations.  As the nature of c ntinuance has been discarded, 
media of divine revelation become something disposable.  Fourth, the move has 
exacerbated the dialectic tension between the human and the divine in Torrance’s 
theological structure and led to a remnant of dualism.  Fifth, the safeguarding of God 
in revelation is purchased at the price of human participation.  The derailing from the 
normative pattern of revelation and mediation has undermined the historical existence 
of the human person as a creative, responsible and self- etermined creature; a serious 
setback for his postulation of theological science.  The repercussion indubitably is the 
susceptibility of subordinating the humanity to the divinity of Christ, a problem of 
Docetism.  Sixth, notwithstanding his arguments, pneumatology becomes a weakness 
in Torrance’s theology.  As revelation takes up theform of mystical immediacy 
negating historical contingency and multiple mediations, the activity of the Spirit is 
limited to the subjectivity of the beholder before God in Christ.  Taking all points into 
                                               
153 Ricoeur, 93.  Ricoeur argues that the problem is not unrelated to our over-psychologising of 
revelation.  Thus, to ‘discover the objective dimensio  of revelation is to contribute indirectly to this 
non-psychologising theology of the Holy Spirit that would be an authentic pneumatology.’ 
 180
account, the question we raise at the outset becomes an asy one to answer.  Indeed, 
as we claim, it is difficult for Torrance to justify the move as it goes against the grain 





We have in this chapter examined the importance of scripture as the primary medium 
of revelation in Torrance’s thought.  In our discussion of the basis and nature, we 
note Torrance’s use of scripture in relation to the category of revelation, Word of 
God, infallibility, inerrancy and authority.  As the testimony of God’s involvement in 
human history via the chosen people of the covenants, scripture to Torrance assumes 
a normative status in mediating divine revelation that could neither be ignored nor 
discarded.   The continuance of scripture in embodying and mediating God’s self-
revelation in Christ is again accentuated through his postulation of exegetic-
theological interpretation, although an undeniable lack of it is manifest in his works.  
Is the discrepancy suggestive of a hidden tension that leads to the derailment from the 
normative pattern of revelation and mediation?  Perhaps the move taken by Torrance 
to efface scripture after establishing the primacy nd normativeness is not completely 
an unexpected one if the external and internal contributing factors of capacitation as 
our discussion shows are taken into consideration.  As much as ‘something would 
appear to have gone wrong if we become too obsessed with the Bible’, the relegation 
of scriptural mediation and the underpinning of theimmediacy of Christ’s revelation 
do come with a dear price tag that perhaps may surpri e even Torrance.  We believe 
Torrance would concur with Rowan Williams when the latter says that ‘the model of 
revelation as a straightforward “lifting of a veil” by divine agency has to be treated 
with caution.’154  What is significant arising out of our discussion s the unearthing of 
that which stays beneath the symptomatic move; particularly the embedded tension 
within Torrance’s framework that at times seems to lurk him to derail from the 
normative pattern of revelation and mediation.  The question now is could other 
weighty media within Torrance’s structure of multiple mediations avoid similar 
setback?  It would be the task of the next chapter to ascertain the answer before a 
possible corrective is proposed at the end. 
                                               
154 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 135. 
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Chapter Six 
Church, Word and Sacraments, Creation: A Variety of Media 
 
 
The preceding chapter focuses on Torrance’s understanding of scripture as the 
primary medium of divine revelation.  Our analysis hows that notwithstanding the 
intent to argue consistently for the normativeness of scripture, Torrance, due to 
internal tension and external dualistic threats, takes an unusual step to relegate the 
mediatedness of scripture and advocate the immediacy of Christ’s revelation in order 
to maintain the primacy of God in divine self-disclosure.  As our arguments show, 
such move is unnecessary as Torrance has constructed a theology of revelation and 
multiple mediations centred on Christ; the normative pattern of divine self-disclosure 
which is derivative of the hypostatic union of Christ underpins the essentiality of the 
union and communion of divine and human action could serve well as deterrence to 
the dualistic threats and overcome the dialectic tension without compromising either 
the sovereignty of God or the validity of human participation in revelation.  In fact, 
the whole enterprise of Torrance’s theological reconstruction which upholds the unity 
of form and being in Christ lies precisely in attempting to surmount the dualism that, 
according to him, has derailed Western theology from the centrality of God and his 
self-revelation for a substantial period of time.  What is required of Torrance when 
facing the pitfall, as we claim, is to keep in line with what he has developed.  
Notwithstanding the embedded tension as discussed, w  would argue that in his 
explication of other ordained media of revelation Torrance is basically successful in 
overcoming the inducement, especially when the normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation is properly maintained.  On this note, it is he purpose of the final chapter 
to examine Torrance’s arguments of the church, Word and sacraments, and 





The purpose of this section is to examine Torrance’s understanding of the church as 
the significant medium of divine revelation.  We attempt to show that Torrance, like 
Barth, primarily centres his thought on Christ as he develops his ecclesiology.  The 
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mediatory nature and essence of the church will be further explored as our focus turns 
to the apostles.  Our aim is to argue that Torrance, by observing the normative pattern 
of the union and communion of divine and human action of revelation and mediation, 
is able to affirm the validity of ecclesial mediation despite the embedded tension. 
John McLeod Campbell says, ‘Do not imagine the Christ, the Son, came to 
change the Father: he came to reveal the Father---h did not come to make God kind, 
but to show us God’s kindness---“Herein God commendeth his (that is God’s) love 
towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us.”’1  The atonement of 
Christ to Campbell is the effect of God’s love for mankind, and it is mediated by 
Christ as the representative of a new humanity;2 as Dorothee Sölle says, 
‘Representatively he reconciled us to God and reveal d God’s prevenient grace 
towards us.’3  On the same note, to Torrance, it is out of God’s providence as God’s 
love and grace take concrete form of articulation and expression in Christ, that 
revelation and reconciliation are but inseparably the obverse of Christ’s atonement in 
bearing the fruit of the new humanity in Christ (see chapter one).  ‘If atoning 
reconciliation between man and God is not externally but internally related to Jesus 
Christ,’ Torrance says, ‘then the Church of Jesus Christ cannot be thought of as only 
externally related to him.’4  The question is how could one understand this ‘internal’ 
relation between Christ and the church, or the new humanity, especially with regard 
to revelation and mediation?  Torrance clearly recognises the significance when he 
attempts the question ‘What is the Church?’5 
There are many ways one could delimit the meaning of the church even if it is 
approached from the perspective of scripture.  From the images and names used by 
scripture to speak of the church, Torrance claims that the most significant expression 
is the ‘Body of Christ’ because it is more inclusive than any of the others.6  ‘But the 
                                               
1 John McLeod Campbell, Sermons and Lectures, vol. 2 (Greenock: R. B. Lusk, 1832), 76.  Cited in 
George M. Tuttle, So Rich a Soil: John McLeod Campbell on Christian Atonement (Edinburgh: 
Handsel Press, 1986), 79. 
2 John McLeod Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement and Its Relation to Remission of Sins and 
Eternal Life (London: James Clarke and Co., 1959), 20.  See Tuttle, 85-88. 
3 Dorothee Sölle, Christ the Representative (London: SCM, 1967), 19-23, 51-56.   
4 MC, 66. 
5 CAC1, 104.  An address Torrance gave to the Theological Col eges Union at New College, 
Edinburgh, in November 1956.  It was then published in The Ecumenical Review, October 1958. 
6 Torrance elucidates that we have to approach the metaphor in proper light.  It cannot be understood 
in terms of organism in biological sense even thoug the New Testament does use some biological 
language in speaking about it.  ‘But,’ Torrance says, ‘at those very points it deliberately uses language 
that is unnatural and un-biological, as when St. Paul speaks of the Body as growing from the head as 
well as into head, and when he balances it with the image of the building which contrary to normal 
procedure is built down from the coping stone.  It is only when we allow the other analogies and 
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word “Body” is most important,’ Torrance says, ‘for in the expression “the Body of 
Christ” it directs us at once to Christ Himself in such way that we have to lay the 
emphasis upon “of Christ” and not upon “Body”’.7  It is not difficult to comprehend 
Torrance’s preference especially in the light that the metaphor is essentially 
christological.  But more importantly, the analogy provides Torrance with the proper 
language to articulate God’s prevenient grace of incorporating the church into a 
relation of union and communion with Christ that finally sets the basis of fittingness 
not only of its existence, but also of the church as the valid medium of divine 
revelation in human history.  As Kye comments, ‘Upon this union with Christ, 
Torrance clarifies the intimate relation between Christ and the Church, and the 
Church and Christ.’8  Not unlike the asymmetric relation between the Word f God 
and the word of scripture as discussed in the preceding chapter, ‘Body of Christ’ to 
Torrance does not mean ‘a relation either of identity or of difference between Christ 
and His Church but an analogical relation in which there is no relation of proportion 
but only of similarity (and dissimilarity) of proportion.’  In other words, it is neither a 
relation of identity nor of difference, but one invol ing something of difference and 
of identity.  The analogical relation could only beproperly thought out ‘in terms of 
the hypostatic union of the two natures in one Person, and indeed in terms of the 
inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter of the Chalcedonian formula.’9   
By appropriating the church as the body of Christ and pivoting on the relation 
of union in Christ, the analogy enables Torrance ‘not [to] focus our attention upon the 
Church as a sociological or anthropological magnitude, nor upon the Church as an 
institution or a process, but upon the Church as the immediate property of Christ 
which He has made His very own and gathered into the most intimate relation with 
Himself.’10  The personal and dynamic relation of union and communion between 
Christ and his church serves as the firm foundation capacitating Torrance to work on 
safeguarding both the sovereignty of God and the participatory significance of the 
church in ecclesial mediation without falling into the dualistic pitfall of allowing the 
                                                                                                                            
images to play their part in opening up and enriching this concept of the Body that it can serve its 
purpose in declaring the nature of the Church.’  SeeCAC1, 104-05.   
7 Ibid., 106. 
8 Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2003), 221-22. 
9 CAC1, 231. 
10 Ibid.  Torrance underlines that we must learn ‘to make the Christological reference paramount in all 
our thinking and understanding of the Church, and at no point allow anything in the Church to obscure 
Christ Himself, to stand in His way, to set Him aside, or to subordinate Him to another interest or end, 
even momentarily.’  See CAC1, 107. 
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elevation of one at the expense of the other; especially to avoid the swallowing up of 
the divine by the human that causes the church to become merely, as cited, ‘a 
sociological or anthropological magnitude’.  Since ‘Christ clothed with His Gospel is 
the essence of the Church.  There is no Church except that which participates and 
lives in Him and loves and obeys Him’,11 the task of fulfilling the calling of the 
church as the object of God’s grace existing in human history to reveal, mediate and 
witness the love of God concretely in Christ before humanity cannot succeed without 
upholding the normative pattern of revelation and mediation.  Thus, on the conjoint 
action of the divine and the human in mediating God’s self-disclosure in Christ, we 
would first touch on Torrance’s thought of the Spirit as the divine action, and then the 
participation of the church as the human action of the normative pattern of revelation 
and mediation. 
The significance of the Spirit in enabling the church to be in union with Christ 
cannot be understated in Torrance’s ecclesiology.  To Torrance it is by the coming of 
the Spirit upon the church that, as it receives the power, understanding and faith, it 
becomes the body and true witness so that Christ could continue ‘to be heard and to 
be believed’ among humanity in the course of time.  ‘Thus,’ Torrance says, ‘through 
the coming of the Spirit God brings his self-revelation to its fulfilment, for the Spirit 
is the creative Subject of God’s revelation to us and the creative Subject in our 
reception and understanding of that revelation…  in and with his coming, Christ 
himself returns to be present among us, living and speaking and operating in the 
Church which through the Spirit is constituted his Body on earth and in history.’12  To 
Torrance the ascension of Christ is not meant to be an absence but the real presence 
of Christ by the Spirit in human history.  Torrance says, ‘By ascension Christ has 
withdrawn Himself from the visible succession of history… and [He] sends us His 
Spirit by which He fulfils His own Revelation of Himself.’13   
To address Torrance’s thought on the work of the Spirit in ecclesial 
mediation, three salient points may be encapsulated.  First, it is by the epistemic 
dynamic of the Spirit that the church is in union with Christ and becomes validated as 
the effective medium of divine revelation.  Torrance, however, is unequivocal that the 
                                               
11 Ibid., 107-08. 
12 TRst, 253.  In relation to our preceding chapter about the transparency and self-effacing nature of the 
Sprit, Torrance underlines that the office of the Spirit in the church is not to call attention to himself 
apart from Christ, but ‘to focus all attention on Christ, to glorify him, to bear witness to his deity, o 
testify to his mind and will, and in him and through him to lead us to the Father.’ 
13 RP, 28. 
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forming of the church is achieved not on the basis of the Spirit but the foundation of 
Christ’s redeeming work, so that by the Spirit the c urch ‘is opened up from within 
for the reception and actualisation of revelation’.  ‘As such,’ Torrance continues, ‘this 
Body becomes matched to Christ as His vis-à-vis in history ’.14  Second, it is by the 
Spirit that the church grows within itself to the fullness of Christ and reaches out 
extensively to the ends of the world to fulfil its mediatory mission in Christ.  On this 
note, we may say in anticipation of later discussion that Torrance, notwithstanding his 
manifest devotion to the ministry and missionary work f the church, has produced 
less than little work in that field.  Third, it is by the Spirit that the church fulfils its 
ministry of the Word and sacraments; so that ‘it grows, increases, gathers strength, 
and is multiplied’, and ‘all who believe and are baptised into the name of Christ are 
added by God to the Body’.15  It is important to note in Torrance’s thought that the 
inseparableness of Christ and his church is the fruit of the indwelling of the Spirit.  
To Torrance the activity of the Spirit that generats the relation of reciprocity 
between Christ and his church derives from and is grounded in the mutual indwelling 
of the Father, the Son and the Spirit within the Trinity.16  While the church 
participates in Christ by the communion of the Spirit and becomes his body on earth 
to mediate continuously God’s presence to humanity, it essentially draws its life 
incessantly from the communion of the triune God; as Gunton aptly puts, ‘The 
Church is called to be the kind of reality at a finite level that God is in eternity.’17  
Torrance resonates, 
 
Thus the Church has no independent existence, as if it were anything at all or had any 
life or power of its own, apart from what is unceasingly communicated to it through 
its union and communion with Christ who dwells in it through the Spirit and fills it 
with the eternal life and love of God himself.  It is quickened and born of the Spirit; it 
is filled and directed by the Spirit, but in order that the church may be rooted in Jesus 
Christ, grounded in his incarnate Being and mission, and in order that it may be 
determined in its inner and outer life through participation in his life and ministry.18 
 
                                               
14 Ibid., 23. 
15 Ibid.,24. 
16 MC, 67.  For detailed account of the church as the communion of the Spirit, see Thomas F. 
Torrance, ‘The Mission of the Church,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 19 (1966): 133-36. 
17 Colin Gunton, ‘The Church on Earth: The Roots of Cmmunity,’ in On Being the Church, ed. Colin 
E. Gunton and Daniel W. Hardy (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), 78. 
18 TRst, 205. 
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In corresponding appositely with the revelatory and mediatory work of the 
Spirit, the church as the human counterpart of the divine, according to Torrance, 
participates in Christ’s revelation through a double reference.  Torrance delineates,  
 
[O]ne which we may describe as vertical, and one which we may describe as 
horizontal.  It is only through vertical participation in Christ that the Church is 
horizontally a communion of love, a fellowship of reconciliation, a community of the 
redeemed.  Both these belong together in the fullness of Christ.  It is only as we share 
in Christ Himself, that we share in the life of the Church, but it is only as we share 
with all saints in their relation to Christ that we participate deeply in the love and 
knowledge of God.  Participation is a conjoint participation, a participation-in-
communion, but the communion is above all a communion-in-participation in 
Christ.19 
 
Torrance argues that the word koinonia, as it is used in the New Testament, 
refers firstly to our vertical participation in Christ and secondly our horizontal 
communion with one another in Christ.  As Christ is he basis of koinonia, Torrance 
claims that ‘the Church as the Body of Christ is not a figurative way of speaking of 
some external moral union between believing people and Jesus Christ, but an 
expression of the ontological reality of the Church oncorporate with Christ 
himself’.20  Although Torrance is explicit about the church as the historical presence 
of Christ by the Spirit, or ‘the earthly historical form of his existence’ as Barth calls 
it,21 he does not disregard the church in actuality is as well the gathering of human 
believers called by God out of his prevenient grace.  Thus, to Torrance, our 
understanding of the church as the human action of the normative pattern of 
revelation and mediation will not complete without acknowledging this horizontal 
dimension of participation not only as the communion of believers here and now, but 
also those in history.  Torrance explains, ‘All through its history the fellowship of the 
Church on earth is only maintained as the Church participates in the fellowship of 
heaven as well as of earth, i.e. in the great communion of saints, the whole company 
of heaven and earth of all who are named with the Name of Christ.’22  Similarly, the 
horizontal dimension of the church is not only about the mediation of divine 
revelation here and now, it refers as well to its continuous mediation of God’s 
presence in Christ past, present and future in human history until in the fullness of 
time of Christ’s second coming.  Torrance underpins three key elements of the human 
                                               
19 Ibid., 109. 
20 MC, 67. 
21 Cited by Torrance in MC, 66. 
22 CAC1, 116. 
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action of ecclesial mediation.  First, the mediation of God’s love.  The ‘Church is a 
communion of love’ as it ‘represents that area within humanity where the love of God 
is poured out by the Holy Spirit and where men and women are given to share 
together in their life on earth, and within the social cohesion of humanity, in the 
overflow of the divine life.’23  Second, the mediation of God’s reconciliation.  Upon 
the communion of love the church is also a fellowship of reconciliation; ‘not only a 
fellowship of those who have been reconciled to God in Christ and those who have 
therefore been reconciled with one another, but a fellowship sent out into the world in 
order to bring healing and reconciliation into the gr at multitudes who are alienated 
from God and divided from one another in estrangement and conflict.’24  Third, the 
mediation of God’s new creation.  Having partaken in what Christ has established and 
tasted the power of the age to come, ‘the Church on earth and in history is the 
provisional manifestation God has given to mankind of the new creation which will 
be revealed when Christ comes again.’25 
One could note the relatedness of the vertical-horizontal dimension of the 
church’s participation in Christ with the reciprocal- ovenantal relation of God and 
Israel in Torrance’s discourse.  We may recall from the first chapter that the 
covenantal relation in Torrance’s terms is one which entails corporate as well as 
personal participation, as personal relations with God take place within the corporate 
interaction with God.  Torrance says that ‘the vertical and the horizontal interrelations 
of the covenant partnership penetrated each other, constituting a coherent community 
of reciprocity between God and Israel, and manifesting a community response to the 
self-revealing and self-giving of God to Israel.’26  The similarity between the church 
and Israel as chosen media of God in this regard evi ences the consistency of 
Torrance’s argument that is undergirded by the normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation.  As God calls Israel and establishes the vertical-horizontal relation, 
likewise he gathers his apostles and believers to be his body in order that they may 
participate in him vertically and horizontally to fulfil their mission that Christ has 
laid.  Notwithstanding the parallel, it is ultimately the church and not Israel according 
                                               
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid., 117.  Torrance says that if the reconciliation between humanity and God is not externally but 
internally related to Christ, then the church cannot be thought of as only externally related to him.  
Torrance underscores, ‘In the Church of Christ all who are redeemed through the atoning union 
embodied in him are made to share in his incarnatiol union with him through his birth, death and 
resurrection and are incorporated into Christ by the power of his Holy Spirit as living members of his
Body’.  See MC, 66. 
25 Ibid., 120. 
26 MC, 13. 
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to Torrance that has been called to mediate finally the full revelation of God in 
human history.  On this note, we may now turn to the apostles because their place in 
Torrance’s scheme as the human action of the church through which the self-
revelation God in Christ is mediated cannot be undermined. 
Torrance says that ‘the apostolicity of the Church refers back to the original 
foundation of the Church once for all laid by Christ upon the apostles, but it also 
refers to the interpretation of the existence and mission of the Church in its 
unswerving fidelity to that apostolic foundation.’27  The relation between the church 
and the apostles is one of inseparability in Torrance’s thought.  It may be said that to 
Torrance the ministry and mission of the apostles is the ministry and mission of the 
church, as both are one and singularly founded by Christ upon his salvific foundation 
and in union with Christ.  Thus, in relation to the preceding argument of the vertical 
and horizontal participation of the church in Christ, Torrance claims that the apostolic 
witness is also ‘to have a twofold reference, a vertical reference to Christ, and a 
horizontal reference to others to whom witness is being communicated’.28  However, 
the distinctiveness of the apostles is that they ar the ‘hinges’ or ‘cardinals’ where the 
vertical and horizontal meet.29  Torrance says, ‘Apostles formed the inges of the 
divine mission, where, so to speak, the vertical mission in the sending of the Son by 
the Father, is folded out horizontally into history at Pentecost’.30  There are two ways 
to understand the significance.  First, the apostles are the hinges between ‘the Old 
Israel with its Twelve Patriarchs and Tribes, and the New Israel which is 
reconstituted in them as the Body round the Messiah-K ng.’  In this sense, ‘the 
Apostles are the authoritative link between the Old Testament Revelation and the 
New Testament Revelation.  It is on the ground of the Apostolic witness that the Old 
Testament is subsumed under the New Testament Revelation, so that the Church is 
founded on Apostles and Prophets.’31  Second, the apostles are the hinges ‘between 
                                               
27 TF, 285. 
28 TRst, 43. 
29 Torrance explicates that when the New Testament speak  of the church as founded once and for all 
upon the apostles, and that apart from them no foundation is to be laid, it means that the apostles ar 
the only ‘cardinals’ of faith and the only ‘hinges’ in which ‘the vertical is folded out into the horizontal 
in such a way that throughout history men and women on the ground of this witness communicated to 
them horizontally and mediately on the plane of history may be directed vertically, as it were, and 
immediately to the Lord to meet and know him for themselves.’  Thus, in the nature of the case, 
Torrance claims that the apostles can have no succesors because it is not given to anyone else to 
receive the Word directly from Christ and to translte it into witness of which the whole church’s 
foundation is built upon.  See TRst, 43-44. 
30 RP, 27.  Author’s italic.  
31 Ibid., 27-28.  Author’s italic. 
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the incarnational Revelation objectively given in Christ, and the unfolding of that 
once and for all in the mind of the Church as the Body of Christ.’32  Although as 
hinges, Torrance is unequivocal that the function of the apostles is not to pass on 
directly what they have received ‘in precisely the same way’ that they have received 
from Christ.  Torrance explicates, 
 
The supreme importance of the Apostles lies in the fact that they were the chosen and 
trained instruments, endowed with the Spirit, to pass on the self-witness of Jesus (in 
word and act) translated into witness to him by men in history, for men in history.  In 
the apostolic witness there took place once and for all, under the power of the 





The mission of the Apostles was not just to reproduce the ipsissima verba of Jesus, 
but under the compulsion of his teaching and his actions, as they illuminated one 
another, to communicate a faithful report of him, by means of which others in 
historical tradition could be brought under his power, and find their minds compelled 
to think of him and speak of him in the basic way.34 
 
 From the citations we may comment that the witness to Christ’s revelation 
and the mediation of Christ’s revelation in Torrance’s thought are but the obverse 
sides of the same apostolic mission revolving around God’s grace and love as 
embodied and articulated in Christ.  In this one apostolic movement of witnessing and 
mediating Christ’s revelation in human history, Torrance brings to light a 
characteristic twofold relation that corresponds to the twofold nature of Christ as the 
Word and Person.  First, there is a corresponding relation between the words of the 
apostles and the Word of Christ.  ‘The apostolic statements are thus by their nature 
recognition-statements which at one and the same ti point away from themselves 
to Christ… in such way that others hearing or reading their report are themselves 
directed to look away to Christ, and indeed meet him and know him through the 
apostolic witness.’35  It is significant to note at this juncture that Torrance, in 
emphasising the referential character, does not relegate the medium to effacement in 
divine revelation.  Instead, he reinforces the validity as well as the continuity of the 
apostolic testimony by claiming that ‘it is the form in which they handed on that 
                                               
32 Ibid., 28. 
33 TRst, 206. 
34 Ibid., 41-42. 
35 Ibid., 41. 
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Word in tradition that determines the form in which the historical Church continues 
to grasp and apprehend the Truth.’36  The second corresponding relation regards the 
ecclesial communion and the personal being of Christ.  Just as Christ creates and 
shapes the understanding of the Word in the church through the apostolic words, 
Torrance says that ‘through the Apostles the Person of Christ creates the community 
which receives him and which he compacts around himself as his own Body, the 
Church.’37  The vital undergirding principle that cannot be overlooked here is that to 
Torrance there should be no dualistic division betwe n our knowing and God’s being 
in the knowledge of Christ’s revelation.  As the Einsteinian-Polanyian realist 
epistemology rightly underscores the integrative and relational mode inquiry, 
Torrance asserts that our knowing of and union with Christ must go ‘hand in hand 
together’ so that our knowledge of God is one based on a personal and living 
communion with Christ vertically, and with one another in the church horizontally.  
Thus, the ‘apostolic knowledge of the Word was Christian knowledge, and the 
apostolic understanding of Christ was Christian understanding, for that was the 
knowledge and understanding that Christ meant the wole Church to have of himself 
and of God through him.’38  The inseparability of the apostles and the church in 
mediating divine self-disclosure is accentuated as the ‘revelation of God objectively 
given and subjectively realised in the Person and Work of Christ now through the 
Spirit subjectively takes shape in the mind of the apostolic Church in final form.’39  
Torrance says conclusively in affirming ecclesial mediation, 
 
That is the Apostolic mission.  It is not any new revelation or any new interpretation 
added to it or put upon the objective Revelation in the historical Christ, but the actual 
unfolding of the Mind of the risen Lord within His Church, the pleroma of the 
incarnational Revelation through His Spirit.  The Apostles thus formed the definite 
medium in our flesh and blood where the unfolding of the Mind of Christ was met by 
inspired witness and translated into the language of the flesh, the medium, where, as 
it were, the Revelation of Christ through the Spirit became earthed in the Church as 
the Body of Christ, became rooted in humanity.40 
 
                                               
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 42. 
38 Ibid.  Author’s italic.   Because the apostles are th  primary and foundational Christians, Torrance 
claims that it is upon their knowledge and understanding of the divine revelation of Christ that the 
whole church rests.  In this regard, ‘the apostolic mind is determinative for all theological activity 
within the Church.’ 
39 Ibid., 137. 
40 RP, 27. 
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We have thus far identified a twofold import of Torrance’s ecclesial 
mediation.  First, it is by building his argument upon the scriptural metaphor of the 
church as the body of Christ, and upon the essentiality of the conjoint activity of the 
Spirit (as divine action) and the apostles (as human action) that Torrance is able to 
articulate the church as the crucial medium in which the revelatory presence of Christ 
is unfolded horizontally in the course of human history.   Second, the peril of 
dualism---the inducement of focusing solely either on the divine or the human in 
revelation---is basically surmounted when the normative pattern of the union and 
communion of divine and human action of revelation and mediation is maintained.  
Thus, Torrance, on the ground of ecclesial mediation, is able to declare theologically 
that the church through God’s prevenient grace is empowered to reach out 
extensively into the world ‘in order to bring healing and reconciliation into the great 
multitudes who are alienated from God and divided from one another in estrangement 
and conflict.’41  Evidently, Torrance’s argument of the church as the vital medium of 
divine revelation harmonises well with his theology of revelation and multiple 
mediations.   
An observation, however, could be made at this juncture.  Notwithstanding his 
profound articulation of the horizontal dimension of the church as both the communal 
body of believers and the locus of Christ’s revelation and reconciliation on earth in 
human history, Torrance is rather mute on how the church ought to live and do in the 
world of pluralism and secularism of which it situates. The silence is evidenced by a 
conspicuous lack of discussion in Torrance’s corpus on relating the church as the 
mediation of divine grace and love to the earthly and fallen reality of which it speaks 
from.  The insufficiency encourages suspicion that Torrance’s ecclesiology is 
basically either overtly noetic or too occupied with Christ’s vicariousness, despite his 
claims of the church to reveal and mediate God’s love and grace in the world and to 
bring forth reconciliation between God and humanity in Christ.  Is the disrelation 
symptomatic of dialectic tension?  
The fact is the issue of church-in-the-world, or eccl sial praxis, is one no 
theologian serious about ecclesial mediation could afford to ignore.  In alluding to 
Don Browning, Anderson brings to mind questions such as ‘What should we do?  
And how should we live?’ indeed provide critical point ‘to which all theological 
reflection must return if it is to contribute toward a knowledge of God which guides 
                                               
41 CAC1, 117. 
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human life as well as thought.’42  Without addressing the issue adequately, 
ecclesiology as a subject of theological reflection ru s the risk of losing its prophetic 
voice of speaking authoritatively and relevantly to the life of the church in specific 
context.  It creates, as Christoph Schwöbel says, a ‘gap between the factual existence 
of the Church in society and the theological formulae in which its nature is 
expressed’, and reflection of ecclesiology as an academic operation that is deprived 
of the social context of the church is ‘unable to relate to the practical questions which 
face the Church in its struggle for survival in a society more and more shaped by a 
plurality of religious and quasi-religious world views.’43  If the church is to fulfil 
steadfastly the function of mediation as Torrance has relentlessly argued, the manner 
of realising its essence and mission in the world is a crucial question that any astute 
theologian has to address.  Torrance would probably concur without difficulty with 
Alvaro Quiroz Magaña when the latter says that a ‘new praxis’ is needed in order to 
respond faithfully to ‘a word that constantly summons us to emerge, to take the road, 
to go on a pilgrimage to a new land, to take up the cross and follow Jesus.’44   
The vital question is what type of ecclesiology is able to mediate realistically 
and faithfully the revelation of God in Christ in a world of deprivation?  If Gunton is 
right in saying that ‘The concrete means by which the Church becomes an echo of the 
life of the Godhead are all such as to direct the Curch away from self-glorification to 
the source of its life in the creative and recreative presence of God to the world’,45 the 
challenge that awaits Luther at the crossroads of embracing theologia crucis instead 
of theologia gloriae is after all not in the remote past to us.   Gerhard Forde, on 
commenting the thesis twenty-one of Heidelberg Disputation, says pointedly that 
theologians of glory fail to understand that ‘there is no abstract theological solution’ 
but only ‘the cross itself and the subsequent proclamation of the word of the cross as 
a divine deed’ to God’s sovereignty.46  Could the theology of the cross be the 
pilgrim’s journey, one that Torrance may incline to take?  What kind of ecclesiology 
                                               
42 Ray S. Anderson, ‘Reading T. F. Torrance as a Practical Theologian,’ in The Promise of Trinitarian 
Theology : Theologians in Dialogue with T.F. Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2001), 176.  See Don S. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1991), 10-11. 
43 Christoph Schwöbel, ‘The Creature of the Word: Recov ring the Ecclesiology of the Reformers,’ in 
On Being the Church, ed. Colin E. Gunton and Daniel W. Hardy (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), 117. 
44 Alvaro Quiroz Magaña, ‘Ecclesiology in the Theology of Liberation,’ in Systematic Theology: 
Perspectives from Liberation Theology, ed. Jon Sobrino and Ignacio Ellacuría (New York: Obris, 
1996), 179. 
45 Gunton, 79. 
46 Gerhard O. Forde, On Being a Theologian of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 74-75. 
 193
would emerge from it?  It seems that there is only e answer, at least according to 
Douglas Hall; ‘the theologia crucis gives rise to an ecclesia crucis.’  Alternatively 
put, it is ‘to engender a movement---a people---that exists in the world under the sign 
of the cross of Jesus Christ: a movement and people call d into being by his Spirit 
and being conformed to his person and furthering his work.’47  Does it or does it not 
resonate and cohere inherently with that which Torrance has argued 
uncompromisingly about the church being God’s peopl sent out into the world in the 
power of the Spirit to fulfil the mission of Christ as discussed?  Thus, Torrance’s 
ecclesiology on this note should not, at least, be adjudicated as ahistorical, although 
the issue of ecclesial praxis has not been addressed a  sufficiently as one would 
expect.  Having said that, given the embedded tension in Torrance’s structure as 
discussed, it is not to disregard the susceptibility of giving in to the pressure of 
gravitating towards immediacy especially when the normative pattern of revelation 
and mediation is not adequately maintained.  We, however, would argue otherwise 
that Torrance’s ecclesial mediation does provide a good basis for its further revision 
and development as, essentially, Torrance himself i convinced that ‘Knowledge of 
God takes place not only within the rational structure, but also within the personal 
and social structures of human life’.48 
 
 
Word and Sacraments 
 
The preceding discussion shows that Torrance’s ecclesial mediation is indeed in line 
with his theology of revelation and multiple mediations.  Notwithstanding the lack of 
ecclesial praxis, Torrance, particularly when the normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation is properly maintained, is capable of upholding the importance of the 
church in mediating divine revelation.  As we turn to the ministry of the Word and 
sacraments, the question is whether Torrance is able to remain consistent in his 
arguments as that of the church.  Thus, we would focus on kerygma, Baptism and the 
Holy Communion. 
 
                                               
47 Douglas John Hall, The Cross in Our Context: Jesus and the Suffering World (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2003), 137. 
48 GR, 188. 
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The Proclamation of the Word 
 
In a principal statement that arguably encapsulates th  essence of the ministry 
of the Word in his thought, Torrance says, 
 
The saving revelation of God in Jesus Christ and the faithful reception and 
understanding of it by the apostles were incorporated together in the foundation of 
the Church, so that in the economic purpose of God the truth as it is in Jesus was 
made accessible to people in history only through the apostolic preaching and 
teaching of the Gospel and only in living continuity with their godly tradition in the 
Church.49 
 
 From the citation it is apparent that the ministry of the Word as both the 
human action of preaching and teaching of the Gospel i  intimately associated with 
the apostolic foundation and tradition of the churc.  Although the work of the Spirit 
is not mentioned here, its import is implicit in the whole movement of translating the 
self-witness of Christ to witness to Christ in terms of preaching and teaching the 
Word by the apostles and the church.  Our preceding iscussion evidently argues a 
point that the activity of the Spirit is decisive and instrumental to Torrance in the 
fulfilment of the church as the body of Christ through administering the Word and 
sacraments.  In fact, it would be a mistake to compartmentalise the work of the Spirit, 
the apostolic mission, and the ministry of the Word and sacraments in Torrance’s 
understanding of the unfolding of Christ’s revelation horizontally in human history as 
though they are not in one way or another closely rated.  Torrance himself is 
unequivocal that the communication and instruction of the Word of God in the body 
of Christ cannot be achieved without the communion of the Spirit.50  The key, as we 
have argued, is that the Spirit has a significant role in enabling the reciprocal relation 
between Christ and the church so that the Word could take the specific form intended 
by Christ for the goal of proclamation to all humanity.  ‘That is what took place in the 
apostolic foundation of the church and in the apostolic formulation of the kerygma,’ 
Torrance says, ‘both as parts of one movement in whch Christ’s self-address to man 
evoked and inspired a response in word and deed which he assimilated into union 
with his own response to God and effected as the authoritative expression of his own 
                                               
49 TF, 30. 
50 SF, xxiii-xli.  Especially from xxxix to xli, Torrance underlines the importance that ‘Christian 
instruction can only achieve its end through the demonstration of the Spirit’.  Kruger makes similar 
observation.  He says that in the overall structure of Torrance’s thought scripture, church and 
preaching go together in the communion of the Spirit.  See Kruger, 251. 
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kerygma in the world.’  Torrance continues, ‘The apostolic proclamation of Christ 
was so geared into his self-proclamation that it was used by him as the shared and 
corporate medium of understanding and communication….  Thus through the 
apostolic witness and proclamation it was Christ himself who was at work testifying 
to the mighty acts whereby he had redeemed the world and offering himself as their 
Saviour and Lord.’51   
It is noteworthy that by pivoting on the church centr d in and controlled by 
Christ through the activity of the Spirit, Torrance endeavours to defend the fittingness 
of the ministry of the Word as the ordained medium in which divine revelation is 
mediated through the union and communion of human and divine action.  Torrance’s 
undergirding argument of the fittingness, as that of he church as discussed in the 
foregoing section, lies in being in union with Christ by the Spirit; ‘it is through a 
union of the Church’s kerygma with Christ’s own Kerygma by the Spirit that the 
Church’s kerygma is made to echo Christ’s own self-proclamation’, as Kye rightly 
remarks.52  Even though it is in union with Christ by the Spirit that the preaching and 
teaching of the church locate the qualification of fittingness and source of efficacy, 
Torrance is adamant to maintain that the upholding of God’s sovereignty in this 
regard does not relegate the participation and self-determination of the preachers and 
teachers as indispensable media of divine revelation; indisputably it is through their 
acts of proclamation and teaching that the mediation of Christ’s revelation in human 
history is achieved from generation to generation.  I  alluding to the last chapter of 
the Gospel of Mark, Torrance claims, ‘Here we have  statement about the relation 
between the Church’s proclamation of Christ and the activity of Christ himself in that 
proclamation where, through their common objective and dynamic content, the 
proclamation of the Gospel in the name of Christ and Christ’s own proclamation are 
one and the same.’  ‘That is the New Testament concept of the kerygma,’ Torrance 
continues, ‘in which proclamation is objectively and dynamically controlled by the 
reality proclaimed.  Primarily, it is Christ’s own kerygma, his self-proclamation, 
which through the Spirit he allows to be echoed andheard through the preaching of 
the Church, so that their kerygma about Jesus Christ is made one with him own 
kerygma.’53  To Torrance the crux of the ministry of the Word lies in the conjoint 
participation of Christ and his church by the Spirit so that when the revelation of God 
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in Christ is mediated in preaching and teaching, it is able to confront humanity with 
the power of God in the Spirit and to summon people to respond to Christ in faithful 
believing and following.  Torrance says, 
 
According to St. Paul (1 Cor. 2:1) God’s testimony, martyrion, takes place through 
proclamation (κήρυγµα).  God’s testimony, as we have seen, is defined concretely as 
Christ crucified, Power of God.  Kerygma may be defined as the straightforward 
proclamation of this martyrion in such a way that the original martyrion actually 
takes place in the experience of the hearer.  That is to say, the original event becomes 
event all over again through the power of the Spirit so that in kerygma a man 
encounter the living Christ, Christ crucified but risen.54 
 
 Torrance does not deny the fact that the proclamation of the Word on one 
level is mere human speech or articulation about God.  However, kerygma, he claims, 
becomes the medium of divine revelation when, by the power of the Spirit, God bears 
witness to and authenticates it through Christ.  It is noteworthy that in his endeavour 
to affirm the mediatingness of the medium, Torrance in fact says that ‘kerygma is 
revelation’ by the power of the Spirit.55  ‘In itself kerygma is simply speech’, 
Torrance elucidates, ‘but it becomes the power of Gd---that is the great mystery: 
God manifest in the flesh.  This is the treasure that we may possess in earthen 
vessels.’56  Because kerygma becomes Christ’s revelation through the dynamic 
activity of the Spirit, it therefore becomes ‘sacramental preaching with an 
eschatological result’ so that whenever the proclamation of the Word is carried out 
the original event of Christ’s revelation becomes event all over again in the hearer.  In 
a rare moment, Torrance turns to the Roman Catholic Church to substantiate his 
point.  Torrance says, 
 
That is why we cannot reject outright the thought of repetition in the Roman Mass.  
In the teaching of the New Testament, however, this is not temporal repetition, but 
eschatological event.  Thus there is also an element of truth in the Roman doctrine of 
the opus operatum, for the Word-deed of God, that becomes event and becomes flesh 
in the sacrament, is the creative Word, the active Word, the original Word-deed of 
God (cf. John 1:1 ff).  It is that Word that is the dynamis in kerygma.57   
 
From the argument it is evident that kerygma to Torrance cannot become a 
dispensable medium of divine revelation.  On the contrary, its ‘repetition’, or 
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56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., Author’s italic.  See Torrance’s footnote. 
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continuity, is crucial in mediating the reality of Christ’s revelation in human history.  
Torrance says, ‘Kerygma is not the proclamation of ideas or a bare message, but such 
a proclamation of Christ, the Word-Act of the living God, that by the Holy Spirit it 
becomes itself the actualisation of the Word-Act among men in salvation and 
judgment.’  Thus, the ‘Word of God is never idle.  It always accomplishes its action 
upon man in the Kerygma.’58 On this note, the eschatological dimension of kerygma 
is underscored. It has a dual significance corresponding to the eschaton.  First, it is 
used by God as the medium of which God himself is able to intervene in human 
situation.  It occurs in the church, as Torrance argues, ‘where the age to come has 
already overtaken this age and overlaps it.’  Second, notwithstanding the hearer is 
brought face to face with the schaton through the proclamation of the Word, 
Torrance says that Christ has withdrawn visibly from human history but without 
being absent, so that ‘the Word of the Gospel and the final Deed of God are partially 
held apart in eschatological reserve until the Parousia or the Epiphaneia.’59  Because 
the age to come has yet fully arrived, Torrance underlines that Christ by sending the 
Spirit has instituted ‘the ministry of the Word and Sacrament within history, whereby 
he continually nourishes, sustains, orders and governs his people on earth.’60  From 
the arguments it is manifest that the ministry of the Word to Torrance is the vital 
medium through which the revelation of God in Christ by the Spirit is mediated 
continually in human history until the second advent of Christ.   
We have discussed Torrance’s thought on the ministry of the Word.  Our 
discussion shows that Torrance, by maintaining the normative pattern of revelation 
and mediation, is able to affirm kerygma as the valid medium of divine self-
disclosure without compromising the sovereignty of G d or the importance of human 
participation.  Thus, we may claim that Torrance’s account of the ministry of the 
Word as the indispensable medium of revelation harmonises with his theology of 
revelation and multiple mediations.  The question nw is could the same be said of 
the ministry of the sacraments?  Would Torrance build his case upon similar ground 
                                               
58 Ibid., 73.  Torrance explicates the unity of the Word and Act of Christ in kerygma by saying that in 
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judgment.  It is that eschatological urgency that lies at the heart of kerygma.’ 
59 Ibid.  Thus, current age to Torrance is the age of kerygma in which the Word of God is proclaimed 
to all until the coming of the schaton.   
60 STR, 121. 
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so that the media of the sacraments will not be finally effaced in revelation?  To 




Torrance is unequivocal that baptism is to be interpreted in a way similar to that of 
kerygma,  
 
Kerygma refers to the proclamation of the Gospel, and yet not so much to the 
proclamation itself as to what is proclaimed, namely, Jesus Christ; not so much to the 
act of proclaiming as to the saving work of Christ.  When the Gospel is proclaimed it 
is Christ Himself the crucified and risen Lord who is present and active for our 
salvation.  Similarly in regard to Baptism, the New Testament is not interested so 
much in the outward rite as in what stands the rite; not so much in the subjective 
experience of the baptised as in the death and resurrection of Christ; and therefore it 
is not interested in the human minister but in the One into whose name we are 
baptised.61 
 
 It would easily be an oversight, if reading only from the citation, for one to 
conclude that the media are unimportant as to that w ich is mediated through them.  
The intent of Torrance, however, is clear when he affirms their validity by saying that 
‘This is not to say that the outward rites are dispensable; on the contrary, they are 
quite indispensable’.62  The import in relation to baptism is particularly evident as 
Torrance primarily follows Calvin in emphasising it as participatio Christi; as 
Hunsinger comments, it means ‘the baptised person was granted a share in Christ’s 
own baptism in the Jordan, which he had undergone fr the sake of sinners.’63  ‘For 
Jesus,’ Torrance says, ‘baptism meant that he was con e rated as the Messiah, and 
that he, the Righteous One, became one with us, taking upon himself our 
unrighteousness, that his righteousness might becom ours.  For us, baptism means 
that we become one with him, sharing in his righteousness, and that we are sanctified 
in him as members of the messianic people of God, cmpacted together in one Body 
in Christ.’64  In other words, as the medium of divine revelation, baptism leads us to 
                                               
61 CAC2, 127.  Torrance underlines that the referential chracter of kerygma and baptism is like the 
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62 Ibid. 
63 George Hunsinger, ‘The Dimension of Depth: Thomas F. Torrance on the Sacraments,’ in The 
Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T.F. Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 139-40. 
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and mediates to us what God in Christ has done for us and on our behalf in the 
economy of salvation.  Torrance’s argument in this regard resonates a point 
mentioned in our preceding chapter about the ‘two-way traffic’ trait of scripture in 
bringing Christ to us and us to Christ as he has directed in his self-revelation.  
However, notwithstanding the similarity, Torrance’s discourse of baptism does not 
end as his scripture.  The mediatedness of baptism is affirmed when Torrance 
underscores the careful appropriation of the term by the New Testament writers.  
Torrance says, 
 
It is significant that from the very beginning the Christian Church avoided the term 
baptismos, which is regularly used in Greek to denote a rite of religious ablution, and 
employed instead the term baptisma, which it may well have coined, with the 
intention of expressing Christian baptism in this objective sense….  This is the 
mystery of Christ and his Church which is being fulfilled in us who through the 
Spirit enter into the inheritance of Christ and arebeing made one Body with him…  
All this helps to make it clear that while baptism is both the act of Christ and the act 
of the Church in his Name, it is to be understood finally not in terms of what the 
Church does but in terms of what God in Christ has done, does do and will do for us 
in his Spirit.65 
 
What concerns us here is Torrance’s intent to safegu rd the sovereignty of 
God through ‘the act of Christ’ without subverting the validity of baptism as the ‘act 
of the Church’, especially when both are treated inseparably as one through the work 
of the Spirit.  As Torrance claims, ‘There is one baptism and one Body through the 
one Spirit.  Christ and his Church participate in the one baptism in different ways---
Christ actively and vicariously as Redeemer, the Church passively and receptively as 
the redeemed Community.’66  Torrance elucidates, 
 
Thus whenever the Church in obedience to the command of Christ baptises specific 
individual with water in the Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, it 
believes that Christ himself is present baptising with his Spirit, acknowledging and 
blessing the action of the Church as his own, fulfilling in the baptised what he has 
already done for them and making them share in the fruit of his finished work.  While 
in this sense baptism is both the act of Christ and the act of the Church, they may 
well be distinguished but may not be separated, for their content, reality and power 
are the same… in the one vicarious baptisma of Christ.67   
 
                                               
65 Ibid., 83-84.  My italic.  For detailed account of baptism in the New Testament, see CAC2, 106-25. 
66 Ibid., 87.  Author’s italic.  Torrance explicates a well that it is in this light we are to understand the 
commission of Christ to the church to baptise in the name of the Trinity.  As Torrance says, ‘to baptise 
in the Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit’ is to carry in it ‘both a reference back to 
Jesus, own baptism in the Jordan and a reference forward to its complement in the baptism of the 
Church at Pentecost.’  See TRci, 86. 
67 Ibid.  My italic. 
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That is why in the New Testament the ordinance of baptism and the vicarious 
baptism of Christ are spoken of so indivisibly that it is impossible to separate our 
understanding of the ordinance from what has been done for us in the birth, life and 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  It is precisely that union or inseparable 
relation which is the very meaning of the sacrament in which we are baptised with 
Christ’s baptism, and why the sacrament is spoken of, n t as baptismos, but as 
baptisma.68   
 
Torrance’s avowal of the inseparability of the act of Christ and the act of 
humanity in baptism comes to the foreground when he criticises Barth of separating 
water baptism from Spirit baptism.  To Torrance we ar  faced with two choices in our 
approach towards baptism.  First, it is to ague for a sacramental dualism between 
water-baptism and Spirit-baptism, and to locate the meaning of baptism not in the 
direct act of God but in the ethical act of the person who makes the baptismal 
decision as a way of response to what God has done for him and on his behalf.  
Second, it is to argue for a stronger unity of water-baptism and Spirit-baptism by 
emphasising the saving act of Christ through the Spirit in baptisma.69  Given 
Torrance’s theological propensity, the first choice of sacramental dualism is 
understandably outside his consideration.  Although expressing a sense of regret that 
his theological mentor has indeed taken the first choice, Torrance, as Molnar 
observes, ‘does not believe Barth actually fell into Gnostic dualism’.70  Torrance 
says, ‘[T]his seems to me to be deeply inconsistent with his dynamic doctrine of the 
Trinity and the opera ad extra in creation and redemption as well as with his doctrine 
of the Incarnation according to which God himself has come to us within the space-
time structure of our worldly existence and communicated himself personally to us 
there in his own living being and reality as God.’71  Torrance’s argument is aptly 
recapitulated by John Yocum, when he remarks that Barth has posited ‘a stark choice’ 
of understanding it as either the divine action or the human action, and ‘having 
established the necessity of a choice, chooses the latter option.’72  On commenting 
                                               
68 Ibid., 88.  My italic. 
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70 Paul D. Molnar, ‘The Eucharist and the Mind of Christ: Some Trinitarian Implications of T. F. 
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of Barth and Calvin’s thoughts on baptism and the Eucharist, see George Hunsinger, ‘The Dimension 
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72 John Yocum, Ecclesial Mediation in Karl Barth (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004), xii-xiii, 138.  For 
detailed treatment of Barth’s understanding and development of baptism, see ‘The Baptism Fragment’, 
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Torrance’s disagreement, Molnar explains, ‘Torrance suggests, as did Alasdair 
Heron, that because Barth saw Christ as the only sacrament, he separated our ethical 
behaviour from God’s direct actions so that the sacrament was seen as our response 
to what God has done in Christ rather than as the inclusion of our response in his 
ongoing objective priestly mediation of us to God.’73   
If to argue for a stronger unity of water-baptism and Spirit-baptism is the only 
way, Torrance avers with the intent to avoid the sacramental dualism that what is 
needed is to work out a proper understanding of the direct act of God in baptism in 
terms of the economic activity of the triune God.  This is the ontological and 
epistemological foundation of Torrance’s argument: ‘Everything depends in the last 
analysis upon whether we believe in a God who really acts or not, and by a “God who 
really acts” is meant… the mighty living God who interacts with what he has made in 
such a way that he creates genuine reciprocity between us and himself within the 
space-time structures of existence in which he had pl ced us.’74  On this note, the 
reciprocity between God and humanity according to Torrance is undergirded by the 
‘two-fold mode in Christ and in the Spirit’; ‘in Christ, for it is in hypostatic union that 
the self-giving of God really breaks through to man, when God becomes himself what 
man is and assumes man into a binding relation with his own being; and in the Spirit, 
for then the self-giving of God actualises itself in us as the Holy Spirit creates in us 
the capacity to receive it and lifts us up to participate in the union and communion of 
the incarnate Son with the heavenly Father.’75  To put it succinctly, we may say that it 
is not to separate dualistically the divine action from the human action in baptism, but 
to pivot on their relation of union and communion of which God has established in 
Christ and continued to do so through the work of the Spirit in the church.  Torrance 
argues, 
 
It is the objective unity of the two-fold operation f God the Father in Christ and in 
the Spirit which enables us to discern in the relation between the act of man and the 
act of God in baptism a genuine reciprocity between the self-giving of God and the 
responsive reception of man, yet one within which the divine self-giving remains 
transcendent and free, precisely as grace.76 
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as the sign and seal of regeneration.  Torrance undrli es that the significance of baptism will be 
diluted if two primary facts of regeneration are missed.  First, he says that the concept of regeneration 
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 The reciprocal relation between God and humanity i baptisma as Torrance 
claims does not compromise the sovereignty of God.  The primacy of God in divine 
self-disclosure is not taken captive within the reciprocity as if the act of humanity in 
responding to God in baptism could supersede the act of Christ.  Baptism, as 
Torrance pointedly says, essentially ‘starts from and rests upon the free ground of 
God’s being and grace in Jesus Christ… his act of grace remains sovereignly free and 
is not trapped within a reciprocity between man andGod that begins with man and 
ends with man.’77  Although the decision of baptism is undoubtedly a personal one of 
the believer and the administration of it is a corporate one of the church, both to 
Torrance are possible only out of God’s prevenient grace.  Thus, baptism as a 
sacrament is not solely about what we can do but what God through Christ by the 
Spirit in his freedom, love and grace has done soteriologically for us and on our 
behalf.  That, at its simplest, is the import of baptism to Torrance.  Hunsinger says, 
‘Like Calvin, that is, he sees the sacraments as vehicles of testimony that impart the 
very Christ whom they proclaim (by the gracious operation of the Holy Spirit), as 
opposed to Barth, who insists on seeing them “ethically” as no more than a grateful 
human response to a prior divine grace not mediated or set forth by the sacraments 
themselves.’78  In affirming the mediatedness of baptism, Torrance says conclusively,  
 
This approach to the doctrine of baptism in terms of the economic acts of Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit, cut behind the false problems of sacramental dualism and monism 
that have constantly troubled the Church….  If baptism is to be understood properly 
in this way within the saving operation of the economic Trinity, then the focus of 
attention is necessarily directed upon Jesus Christ imself, for it is only in him that 
God is incarnate and it is through him alone that the saving operation of God takes 
                                                                                                                            
‘applies first of all to Christ Himself, to His birth of the Spirit and to His resurrection from the dea .  
Christ is One in whom the regeneration of our humanity has already taken place.’  Second, to 
Torrance, the concept of regeneration is applied by the New Testament to Christ’s second return in 
power to judge the world and to give rise to a new creation.  Although baptismal rite in itself does not
regenerate, Torrance underlines that its mediatory role cannot be debased as it is ‘in Baptism that our 
regeneration in Christ is declared, and shown forth, and promised; it is sacramentally enacted as an 
image and likeness of the birth and resurrection of Christ.’  Thus, like the miracles of Jesus, Torrance 
says that sacraments, both baptism and the Eucharist, e prophetic signs that have to do with the 
renewal of life and saving of creation.  ‘As the Sacraments of God’s interaction with our physical 
existence in Jesus Christ,’ Torrance claims, ‘they are the counterparts in our ongoing life to the deeds 
of grace and power in the historical life of Jesus….  As such, the Sacraments both call for and provide 
a response in which the interaction of the spiritual and the physical is exhibited here and now in 
anticipation of the new creation.’   See CAC2, 131-32; GR, 161. 
77 Ibid., 103. 
78 Hunsinger, 142-43. 
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concrete form in our creaturely existence, and therefore it is only through our union 
with him that we share in all that God has done for us.79 
 
 As we end with the note of God’s grace in baptism, we may ask if the intent to 
‘cut behind the false problems of sacramental dualism’ is also behind Torrance’s 
argument of the Holy Communion.  We would now examine Torrance’s thought on 
the Eucharist to ascertain the answer. 
Torrance regards St. Paul’s dictum ‘Christ, our pasch l lamb, has been 
sacrificed’ (1Cor. 5:7) as the centre of a proper understanding of the Eucharist.  
Torrance says that in the act of instituting the Lord’s Supper just before his 
crucifixion, Jesus, in linking his passion with the consecration of the bread and wine, 
has constituted himself as the mystery of the Last Supper and transformed it into the 
Eucharist of the church.  Thus, ‘the mystery of the Eucharist is not any mystery of the 
Eucharist itself but the paschal mystery of Christ which he set forth in the Eucharist 
for the participation of all who believe in him’.80  To Torrance the mystery is 
unfolded in the eucharistic celebration, a time when the reality of Christ’s revelatory 
presence is mediated by the work of the Spirit.81  ‘We believe that when the Church 
celebrates the Eucharist in the name of Jesus Christ’, Torrance says, ‘it is Christ 
himself who is really present pouring out his Spirit upon us, drawing us into the 
power of his vicarious life, in death and resurrection, and uniting us with his self-
oblation and self-presentation before the face of the Father where he ever lives to 
make intercession for us.’82  Thus, Torrance is unequivocal that the Eucharist fulfils 
its purpose only when it refers beyond itself to the paschal mystery which is the 
revelatory reality of the Mediator, the actuality of Christ’s high-priestly duty in self-
oblation and self-presentation.  Torrance says, 
                                               
79 TRci, 104.  Author’s italic. 
80 Ibid., 107.  For detailed account of the Lord’s Supper as the Eucharist, see CAC2, 148-51. 
81 MC, 92.  Thus, Torrance says that ‘the celebration of the Lord’s Supper means that we through the 
Spirit are so intimately united to Christ, by communion in his body and blood, that we participate in 
his self-consecration and self-offering to the Father made on our behalf and in our place’. 
82 TRci, 107.  To Torrance, the presence of Christ by the work of the Spirit mediated through the 
sacraments of the Eucharist and baptisma is similar to that of kerygma.  Torrance says that ‘the holy 
Sacraments which He has appointed to accompany the preaching of the Gospel as a means to beget 
faith, to help our weakness, and actually to convey Himself to us so that we have living communion 
with Him, and with Him are raised up in the fellowship and adoration to the face of our heavenly 
Father.’  The close relation between the proclamation of the Word and the administration of the two 
sacraments in terms of mediating Christ by the Spirit in Torrance’s thought could be traced back to the 
influence of Calvin, especially when the latter claims that the sacraments have the same office as the 
Word in offering to us Christ, and through him the tr asures of heavenly grace. See Thomas F. 
Torrance, When Christ Comes and Comes Again (1957), 82.  Hereafter abbreviated as WCCA.  Also 
see Institution, IV.14.17 and Kruger 261-64. 
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Eucharist is regarded in a dimension of depth in which we are directed to look for its 
meaning not in itself as such, but in the paschal mystery of Christ himself, for then 
the teaching of Jesus about his coming down from heaven as the bread of life and the 
need to eat his flesh and drink his blood if we are to live by him as he lives by the 
Father, and the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews about the nature and mission 
of Christ Jesus as the Apostle and High Priest of our c nfession, through whom we 
may come boldly to the throne of grace, have direct and profound bearing upon the 
Eucharist.  In this perspective the Eucharist by its very nature points us beyond itself 
to its constitutive reality in Jesus Christ himself, to the saving mystery which he is in 
the unity of his person and work and word as the on Mediator between God and 
man.83 
 
As the medium it functions as a sign, not unlike th pointing-beyond-itself-to 
of kerygma and baptisma as discussed, leading to and mediating Christ’s revelation.  
As Torrance says, ‘The Lord’s Supper as celebrated in the Church is a sign with a 
meaning; it is signitive, pointing beyond itself to what Christ had done and does for 
us’.84  A twofold argument of Torrance’s sacramental signification may be noted.  
First, with regard to the signifying, or the referential character, Torrance, as his 
discourse of the ‘Body of Christ’, underlines that ‘the relation of the sign to what it 
signifies as involving neither a relation of identity nor a relation of difference, but of 
analogy involving something of identity and something of difference.’  Second, ‘this 
relation of sign to the matter signified depends entir ly upon the nature of the matter, 
so that the analogical relation is determined by the nature of Christ Himself, who is 
the substance or the matter signified.’85  One should not overlook that by itself neither 
the sign nor the analogical relation tells us anythi g substantive about the Eucharist.  
To Torrance they are basically bare and void of materi l content unless in union with 
Christ.  By saying that it does not mean that Torrance is here elevating the matter 
signified and relegating the sign, or the medium.  The crux is only in union with 
Christ the medium as sign has a valid role to play in divine revelation.  As the ‘true 
sign’ it then has in itself something of that which t signifies.  Torrance elucidates, ‘In 
the ordinance of Christ, through His command and promise, the outward sign and the 
inward reality belong together as form and content of he sacramental communion; 
although the form is not the content… nevertheless it i  the form in which the content 
is communicated to us’.  To affirm and defend the mdiatory validity, Torrance 
                                               
83 Ibid., 108.  See MC, 90. 
84 CAC2, 141. 
85 Ibid. 
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makes an exceptional remark that when the outward sign or form ‘is neglected or 
repudiated the inner content inevitably goes with it.’86 
Torrance’s argument of the inseparability of the eucharistic celebration and 
the church as one valid medium of divine revelation again evidences the point.  
‘[T]he Eucharist is both the act of Christ and the act of the Church in his name’ 
although ‘in the nature of the case the act of the C urch is one which serves the act of 
Christ and directs us away from itself to Christ.’87  ‘Attention must be focused, 
therefore, beyond all religious and ethical acts,’ yet Torrance insists, ‘indispensable 
as they may be’.88  In addition, by stressing that ‘the Eucharist is both the act of 
Christ and the act of the Church in his name’, Torrance is here emphasising as well 
the central two-fold significance of the mediation f the Eucharist.  First, by 
upholding the normative pattern of the union and communion of divine and human 
action that safeguards both the primacy of God and human participation in the 
eucharistic celebration, Torrance attempts to address the sacramental dualism that to 
him has troubled the worship and prayer of the Western church.  Torrance’s intent is 
evident in ‘The Mind of Christ in Worship: The Problem of Apollinarianism in the 
Liturgy’,89 a magisterial paper according to Gunton provides much food for thought.  
The thesis, as Gunton aptly pinpoints, is that ‘thehuman Christ has effectively been 
written out of the liturgy of the Western Church’, and the theme here ‘is taken up of 
the human priesthood of the ascended Christ present in the worship of the Church.’90  
To address the Apollinarian tendency and to bring to the foreground the essentiality 
of the humanity of Christ, Torrance accentuates the priestly duty of Christ and argues 
                                               
86 Ibid. 
87 TRci, 107. 
88 Ibid., 108.  One key factor undergirds Torrance’s adamant of the indispensability of the sacraments 
is that the media are the supernatural act of Christ clothed in the natural act of church.  In other words, 
the Eucharist and baptism are the earthly means or vessels that contain the miracle of God in Christ, 
and thus they are significant as media of divine revelation.  According to Torrance, two types of 
miracles can be found in scripture.  ‘The first kind of miracle,’ he says, ‘we see in the miraculous act  
of healing recorded in the Gospels, such as this, in which beyond the power of man and beyond the 
power of any human science’.  The sacraments, however, belong to the second type of miracle which, 
according to Torrance, ‘are also signs and wonders, but in them God always makes use of natural 
forms such as water and bread and wine.  They are no l ss supernatural, for it is God’s creative Word 
that is at work in them, but at work upon us under natural veil of water, bread and wine, in such a way
that while water remains water, and bread and wine remain bread and wine, even when consecrated to 
this holy use, in and through them Jesus Christ crucified and risen comes to us and communicates 
Himself to us with all His saving power and grace, and blesses us with the gift of His Holy Spirit.’  
WCCA, 82-83; STR, 150. 
89 Ibid., 139-214. 
90 Colin Gunton, ‘Being and Person: T. F. Torrance's Doctrine of God,’ in The Promise of Trinitarian 
Theology : Theologians in Dialogue with T.F. Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2001), 132. 
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unequivocally that although ‘the Eucharist is the act of the Church in his name and is 
also a human rite, it must be understood as act of prayer, thanksgiving and worship, 
i.e., as essentially eucharistic in nature, but as act in which through the Spirit we are 
given to share in the vicarious life, faith, prayer, worship, thanksgiving and self-
offering of Jesus Christ to the Father, for in the final resort it is Jesus Christ himself 
who is our true worship.’91  In other words, as Molnar succinctly states, the 
eucharistic worship and prayer to Torrance are directed ‘through Christ the one 
Mediator to the Father so that we pray not only i  and through Christ but with 
Christ.’92  Torrance elucidates, 
 
Since the Son of God was made Priest in that he was made man, without ceasing to 
be God, he fulfils his priesthood as one who receives as well as one who ffers 
prayer.  Since Christ is not twofold but indivisibly one, the worship of our souls and 
the confession of our faith are offered to him as well as through him and by him to 
God the Father… since he is God become man, who in becoming man was made 
Priest, it is humanity which is the sphere of his priesthood, and it is the fulfilment of 
his priestly ministry as man offering himself on our behalf which becomes the focus 
of our worship of the Father.93 
 
 To use the language of John McLeod Campbell, Torrance says that it is the 
presentation of ‘the mind of Christ’ to the Father because what God accepts as our 
true worship is Christ himself who remains as the Pri st and the Sacrifice, the Offerer 
and the Offering.94  The claim of Torrance does not devalue the unique human act of 
worship of both the church and believers; it in fact brings to light the truism that only 
when in union with Christ by the Spirit our participation of worship in, through and 
with the High Priest finds its true and ultimate fulfilment.  Thus, ‘the Eucharist is not 
to be regarded as independent act on our part in response to what God has already 
done for us in Christ’, a point of caution against Barth’s sacramental dualism by 
Torrance.  It, however, should be regarded as ‘within t e circle of the life of Christ’, 
as Campbell says, to which human action is assimilated by the Spirit to the 
acknowledgment of all the Father has already fulfilled in the humanity of Christ in 
our place and on our behalf.  On this note, Torrance argues that ‘the Eucharist, while 
                                               
91 TRci, 109.  Author’s italic.  Torrance underlines that in the context of worship the sacraments bring 
forth the importance that liturgical language and activity derive their true forms only through 
assimilation to the vicarious life and work of Jesus Christ.  Genuine worship occurs when liturgical 
language and activity exhibit in themselves the ‘conformity to the normative pattern of worship in the 
humanity of Christ in so far as they make room for Him and direct us to Him as the actualised essence 
and core of man’s true worship of God.’  GR, 159. 
92 Molnar, 178.  Author’s italic. 
93 TRci, 175-76.  Author’s italic. 
94 Ibid., 139. 
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being the worship of the men on earth, is essentially a participation in the worship of 
the heavenly sanctuary which Jesus Christ their ascended High Priest renders to the 
Father in the oblation of his endless life, for it is worship in the same Spirit by whom 
we are made one with the Son as he is one with the Father, in whom we have assess 
to the Father, and through whom we are taken up into the eternal communion of the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.’95  Because the Eucharist is interpreted in the 
context of ‘prayer, thanksgiving and worship’, Torrance underlines that it is closer to 
kerygma than baptisma in terms of repetition and continuity.  Torrance says, 
 
The two Sacraments of the Gospel enshrine together the two essential ‘moments’ of 
our participation in the new creation, while we arestill implicated in the space and 
time of this passing world.  Baptism is the Sacrament of our once and for all 
participation in Christ, and may be spoken of as the Sacrament of Justification, which 
is not to be repeated.  The Eucharist is the Sacrament of our continuous participation 
in Christ and may be spoken of as the Sacrament of Sanctification, which is regularly 
to be repeated, until Christ comes again.96   
 
Torrance’s argument that is christologically and therefore trinitarianly 
oriented is regarded significant by Gunton because it pointedly addresses the neglect 
of the Holy Spirit and the underplaying of the human life and ministry of Jesus 
especially after his ascension.97  Molnar affirms likewise and says that ‘By focusing 
on “God as Man rather than upon God in Man”, Torrance embraces a high 
Christology which concentrates on the humanity of the incarnate Son of God and a 
view of Eucharistic worship and life “in which the primacy is given to the priestly 
mediation of Jesus Christ”’.98 
This leads us to the second significance of the eucharistic mediation that 
Torrance regards as the presence of the ‘whole Christ’.  On this note, Torrance 
reminds us that the inner relations of the incarnate Son who takes up human mortality 
and stands between the Father and humanity as the Mediator cannot be overlooked; 
as the presence is the presence of ‘the incarnate, crucified, risen and ascended Son, is 
in himself in respect both of his activity from the Father towards mankind and of his 
                                               
95 TRci, 109-10.  See MC, 89-90 
96 STR, 150.  Notwithstanding the variation, Torrance claims that kerygma, baptisma and the Eucharist 
in their totality expresses the core of the ontological and eschatological relation that is embodied 
within the crucified, risen and ascended Lord.  ForT rance’s discourse of the sacramental and 
eschatological relation to Christ, see STR, 148-58; MC, 91. 
97 Gunton, 132. 
98 Molnar, 185.  Author’s italic.  
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activity from mankind towards the Father’.99  ‘It is in this union and communion with 
Christ the incarnate Son who represents God to us and us to God that the real import 
of the Lord’s Supper becomes disclosed, for in eating his body and in drinking his 
blood we are given participation in his vicarious self-offering to the Father.’100  That 
is to say, to Torrance, the inner relations of Christ in relation to both the Father and 
humanity as demonstrated in his two-fold movement of mediation (see chapter one) 
undergird the meaning of eucharistic sacrifice.  However, notwithstanding ‘neither is 
what it is without the other’, Torrance underlines with regard to the eucharistic act of 
remembrance that it is the Godward aspect which is prominent.  As noted earlier, the 
priority of God here ‘is determined by the integral and essential place we give to the 
mind and will of Jesus in his divine-human agency in fulfilling his work of priestly 
self-oblation to the Father and in our union with him in body, mind and will in which 
we offer Christ eucharistically to the Father through prayers and thanksgiving in his 
name as our only true worship.’101  Thus, as the church celebrates the Eucharist, 
Torrance could say that the ‘whole Christ’ is ‘savingly and creatively present in his 
mediatorial agency… blessing what we do on earth at is command and accepting it 
as his own act done in heaven.’102 
The real presence of Christ in the celebration of the Eucharist is an 
unquestionable reality to Torrance.  He calls it the eucharistic parousia because it is 
in distinction to Christ’s first advent in the past and his second coming in the 
future.103  A question one may ask in responding to Torrance’s eucharistic parousia 
is how the real presence of Christ is actually made present through the celebration of 
the Eucharist.  Torrance’s answer, if it is acceptable, is that it is only ‘explicable from 
the side of God, in terms of his creative activity which by its very nature transcends 
any kind of explanation which we can offer.’ ‘But,’ he avers, ‘it is nevertheless the 
real presence (parousia) of the whole Christ, not just the presence of his body and 
blood, nor just the presence of his Spirit or Mind, but the presence of the actual Jesus 
                                               
99 TRci, 109. 
100 Ibid., 111. 
101 Ibid., 118.  Author’s italic. 
102 Ibid., 109. Author’s italic. 
103 CAC2, 170-71.  By underpinning the distinctiveness of the eucharistic parousia, Torrance is not 
saying that it is unrelated to the first or the second advent of Christ.  He clearly identifies the close 
relation between them when he says that the Eucharist is bound to historical time and space, and it 
‘reaches out into the past, to the death of Christ…[and] reaches out beyond the present into the future, 
and becomes the means whereby the Church in the pres nt is brought under the power of the advent of 
Christ.’  Thus, the coming of Christ in the Eucharist to Torrance may be said to be the parousia in 
between the first and the last.  See STR, 148-50. 
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Christ, crucified, risen, ascended, glorified, in hs whole, living and active reality and 
in his identity as Gift and Giver.’104  It is a presence that is ‘objectively grounded in 
the presence of God to himself, and such is the profoundest and most intensive kind
of presence there could ever be’.  Thus, ‘it is impossible for us to construe the real 
presence of Christ in the Eucharist in terms of anythi g we can analyse naturally in 
this world.’105  Torrance although is adamant that the eucharistic parousia is beyond 
the elements of the Eucharist, he endeavours not to shift our focus away but from and 
through them to their real ground in the whole pasch l mystery of Christ that finally 
gives them their basis and meaning.  The significant shift of attention is to avoid the 
‘fore-shortening [of] the meaning of the Eucharist by detaching it as a liturgical event 
from the objective reality with which it is integrated, and thus of phenomenalising it 
as something enshrining a hidden meaning or mystery in itself.’106  Torrance’s effort 
is consequential in the light of his intent to overcome what he perceives as the pitfall 
of dualism and phenomenalism in the Roman Catholic and Protestant understanding 
of the Eucharist.  Torrance says pointedly, 
 
As we have seen difficulties began to arise in the understanding of the sacrament as 
soon as they were interpreted within the radical dualism… whenever the Eucharist 
has been set within a dualist context, whether thatbe Augustinian-Neoplatonic, 
Augustinian-Aristotle or Augustinian-Newtonian, its meaning tends to be found 
either in the rite itself and its performance or in the inward and moral experience of 
the participant, for then the Eucharist is regarded as a holy mystery in itself 
enshrining and guaranteeing the divine mystery of the Church in the host, or as the 
appointed ordinance which occasions and stimulates deeper spiritual consciousness 
and awareness in believers.107 
 
To Torrance the indubitable outcome of interpreting he Eucharist in any form 
of dualism or phenomenalism is the separation of God fr m the world and the 
disjunction of the Gift and the Giver.  When the Gift is no longer seen as being 
identical with the Giver, the real presence of Christ, as Torrance argues, is rendered 
impossible because the inherent oneness of the Gift and the Giver in the Eucharist is 
fractured.  Although the Gift when separated from the Giver may still be able to be 
                                               
104 TRci, 119. 
105 Ibid., 121.  Author’s italic. 
106 Ibid., 122.  The sift of focus to the centrality of Christ in the Eucharist is crucial if it is to remain 
faithful as the appropriate medium God has ordained to mediate the eucharistic parousia.  Together 
with baptisma, Torrance underscores that both are sacraments precisely because they are the 
‘sacraments of the Word made flesh.’  Thus, they ‘do not have existence or reality independently of 
the Word.  To make them self-sufficient and independent of the Word would be to take away their 
sacramental character, for it would deny to them their element of mystery’.  See CAC2, 164. 
107 Ibid., 130-31.  For detailed criticism, see 123-32. 
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taken as the grace or the body and blood of Christ, it has basically degenerated into a 
created intermediary between God and humanity; a sort of ‘substitute-Christ’ 
standing in between the church and God.  In a substantive statement, Torrance says,  
 
This is not to say that God does not communicate himself to us through created 
mediations… but that when the created mediations becam  through refraction merely 
intermediate between God and us, then in the last resort Jesus Christ is held back 
from us and remains at a distance.  Thus when the relation between the Giver and the 
Gift is broken or refracted in this way we are thrown back either on the Eucharist 
itself as enshrining the Gift or upon ourselves as receivers over against the Giver.  
The former is the Catholic tendency, in concern for the real presence of the body and 
blood of Christ, an objectifying concentration on the Gift which comes to be thought 
of as inhering in the Eucharist as such, constituting it the centre which absorbs our 
attention and devotion.  The latter is the Protestant tendency, in concern for personal 
encounter with Christ, an awareness of ourselves as receivers of divine grace which 
comes to be thought of in terms of God’s creating in us a loving response to what he 
has done for us, but in which God in Christ has not come all the way to us in a fully 
real self-communication to us at our creaturely level.108   
 
 Torrance is confident that the way to overcome the sacramental dualism and 
phenomenalism is to return to the objective reality of Christ’s presence that upholds 
the unity and oneness of the Giver and the Gift in the Eucharist.  Torrance is 
unequivocal that such complete presence of God’s self-giving in Christ that is 
mediated by the Eucharist has to be taken as the fruit of the activity of the Spirit in 
creating for us a relation of union and communion.  Essentially, it is by the Spirit who 
‘comes to us from the Father through the Son and who gives us access through the 
Son to the Father’ that the real presence of Christ as both the Giver and the Gift in the 
Eucharist becomes finally ‘the most exalted kind, one grounded in the real presence 
of God to himself.’109   
We have thus far argued that Torrance, in building his understanding of the 
Lord’s Supper, has remained steadfast to the normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation.  When he detects the problematic interpretations of the Eucharist by the 
Roman Catholic and evangelical churches, instead of relegating the mediatedness of 
the medium, Torrance stays in line with what has been built theologically for 
kerygma and baptisma, and argues consistently against the truncation of the paschal 
mystery by asserting the importance of the real and complete presence of Christ in the 
                                               
108 Ibid., 132.  Author’s italic.  At the heart of Torrance’s argument lies the pivotal point that the 
eucharistic proclamation in fact refers to the divine action of God’s salvation in Christ which cannot be 
completely swallowed up by the human action of celebration without distorting its meaning and 
significance.  See CAC2, 180-81. 
109 Ibid. 
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Eucharist.  Thus, together with his discourse against the Apollinarian tendency of 
eucharistic worship, we may say conclusively that Torrance’s arguments of the 
Eucharist as the vital medium of divine revelation corroborates his overall theology 
of revelation and multiple mediations.  Before we move on to the creation, we may 
register a note that the Word and sacraments to Torrance indeed are indispensable 
media ‘ordained by God and were to be regarded as the provision he had made for the 





The purpose of this section is to discuss Torrance’s thought on the creation as an 
essential medium of divine self-disclosure.  We would examine the nature of the 
mediation and the subject of natural theology of which it entails.  We attempt to argue 
that Torrance’s discourse of the creation-mediatedness sits consistently well with his 
theological framework of revelation and multiple mediations. 
The importance of the contingent creation as the valid medium of divine self-
disclosure cannot be undermined in Torrance’s theological scheme.  Its validity is 
evident in Torrance’s claim that ‘theological scien, like natural science, cannot be 
pursued scientifically without being committed to a fundamental attitude to the 
universe’.111  The truism of divine self-disclosure to Torrance is that it does not take 
place apart from the medium of the created order of space and time of which 
humanity belongs.  Torrance says, 
 
Since we ourselves are members of the universe, it is only within that contingent and 
semantic reference of the universe to the Creator that we may develop knowledge of 
God that is, within the space and time which God has brought into being with 
universe as bearers of its rational order and through which he makes himself known 
to us and summons us to intelligent relation toward himself.  Any attempt to 
explicate knowledge of God outside of or apart from those structures of space and 
time is inevitably and essentially irrational.112 
 
Thus, in theological science, Torrance claims, 
 
                                               
110 MC, 89. 
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Neither the doctrine of creation nor the doctrine of the incarnation will allow 
theology to detach itself from, far less despise, natural or human science in which 
man is set by God to the task of exploring, and bringing to word, the order and 
harmony of the universe and all that takes place within it, for the universe is the 
sphere in which the believer glorifies and praises God the Creator, as well as the 
medium in and through which God makes himself known to man.113 
 
 It would be helpful for the cause of clarity to pin down at this juncture the 
fundamental ideas that undergird Torrance’s understanding of the mediatedness of the 
creation.  First, the created world is one of a harmonious system characterised by 
multiple structures of existence.  In alluding to the classical Christian doctrine of 
creation, Torrance says, ‘One God, the Father Almighty, is the Creator of heaven and 
earth… while the incarnate Son or Logos, through whom all things were made and in 
whom they hold together, is the central and creativ source of all order and rationality 
within the created universe’.114  Second, as the work of God’s creation, the created 
reality is essentially contingent and rational.  Infollowing the Judaeo-Christian idea 
of creatio ex nihilo,115 Torrance argues that the creation by itself is ‘not self-sufficient 
or ultimately self-explaining but is given a rationality and reliability in its orderliness 
which depend on and reflect God’s own eternal ration l ty and reliability.’116  In the 
light of its contingent createdness, the creation ought to be given due attention if, as 
Torrance says, ‘we are to have rational knowledge of G d through the medium of 
space and time where he communicates himself to us, b t even if we are to 
investigate the contingent processes of nature and discover their laws as far as they 
may be disclosed to us.’117  Torrance’s advocacy, as Roland Spjuth remarks, 
primarily builds on the conviction that contingency and rationality are united in the 
harmonious created order.118  Third, God’s relation to the created order is neither one 
of necessity nor arbitrariness, but freedom deriving out of love.119  Because the 
creation is contingent upon God and his freedom, ‘it is given a contingent freedom of 
its own, grounded in the transcendent freedom of God and maintained through his 
free interaction with the universe.’  However, in distinction to God’s freedom, the 
contingent freedom of the creation is limited.  Torrance elucidates, ‘Freedom in the 
                                               
113 STR, 179.  See DCO, 64. 
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115 See TF, 95-98. 
116 DCO, vii-viii.   
117 Ibid., 3-4.  See GG, 54-57; TF, 102-04. 
118 Roland Spjuth, Creation, Contingency and Divine Presence in the Thologies of Thomas F. 
Torrance and Eberhard Jüngel (Lund: Lund University Press, 1995), 107. 
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contingent universe is limited, but not less freedom because it is limited, for that 
which limits its freedom, the transcendent freedom f God, is the ground of its 
freedom as contingent.  That is to say, limited freedom of this kind is the freedom 
proper to limited and contingent being, for it is inseparably bound up with its 
contingent rationality.’120  Although it is limited, it embraces inexhaustible 
possibilities as it reposes continually upon God’s unlimited freedom. An unlimited 
contingent freedom would basically be an inherent contradiction to Torrance.  With 
these undergirding ideas in mind, Torrance is able to claim scientifically and 
theologically that, 
 
That is the universe to which we ourselves belong, with the structure of which we 
share in the distinctive structure of our own human being, so that we find our 
rationality intimately connected with its rationality and as open to what is beyond us 
as the universe itself to the ultimate source and ground of all that is in the unlimited 




What confronts us is an inner correlation between the structure of human knowledge 
and the structure of the world known by man, for while the universe unfolds its 
structure in coordination with the scientific inquiries of man, man himself develops 
along with the disclosure of the structured universe around him.122   
 
To address the question how the creation as the mediu  actually mediates the 
self-disclosing reality and rationality of God, Torrance finds the realist epistemology 
of Einsteinian-Polanyian science helpful in providing the needed apparatus, in 
particular the concept that the multi-levelled struc ure of scientific knowledge indeed 
corresponds to the stratified structure of objectiv reality.  On this note, while 
Einstein postulates the stratified structure of individual science into at least three 
levels and Polanyi advocates the hierarchical structu e of all sciences, the difference 
between them does not disturb Torrance.  In fact, Torrance regards their works 
complemental and often uses them correspondingly in bu lding his arguments.  The 
appropriation is manifest when Torrance underlines that ‘each science reveals a 
stratified structure of at least three layers or levels, in additional to that of pre-
                                               
120 DCO, 4-5.  Torrance underlines that ‘it was this doctrine of the freedom of the creation contingent 
upon the freedom of God which liberated Christian thought from the tyranny of the fate, necessity, and 
determinism which for the pagan mind was clamped down upon creaturely existence by the inexorably 
cyclic processes of a self-sufficient universe.’  See GG, 57-60.   
121 Ibid., 20. 
122 TCFK, 85. 
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scientific experience and thought, the physical, the t eoretical and the meta-
theoretical (which has been Einstein’s principal interest), but with the fact that the 
various sciences themselves, ranging from physicals and chemistry to the humanities 
and theology can be regarded as constituting a hierarchical structure of levels of 
inquiry which are open upwards into wider and more comprehensive systems of 
knowledge but are not reducible downwards (which has been of special interest to 
Polanyi).’123  By appropriating their arguments, Torrance intends to achieve the 
objective of laying the scientific foundation that investigative events, either within a 
particular science or a collective of sciences, become coherent and intelligible only 
by referring them to a higher hierarchical level.  That is to say, from the side of 
epistemic knowing, scientific understanding of investigative events is often attained 
by the introduction of an additional factor from above the original level; ‘a dimension 
of depth involving cross-level reference’.124  It is in this mode of multi-dimensional 
perspective that, according to Torrance, particularly in theological science, a 
profounder knowing of the object is achieved through the human action of scientific 
inquiry and the divine action of self-disclosure; as Sue Patterson remarks, ‘For 
Torrance, contingent worldly rationality necessarily reveals and is revealed by 
transcendent divine rationality.’125   
One important argument Torrance makes with regard to the principle of 
hierarchical structure of knowledge is that it is not a theoretical abstraction imposing 
upon the creation like the old school of Cartesian or Kantian epistemology.  On the 
contrary, he claims that the concept ‘is increasingly being forced on scientific thought 
under the constraint of the intrinsic rationality of nature’.126  Alternatively put, the 
universe in Torrance’s view is indeed a multi-levelled complex of rational order.  It is 
‘a stratified structure, for we have to do not only with levels of knowledge but with 
different levels of existence or reality.’127  Torrance encapsulates the mediation of the 
creation in the following assertion, 
 
[W]ithin the universe itself we must surely operate with the principle of directive 
control between the many levels of order which, as we have seen, characterise the 
stratified structure of the universe.  Each level remains ‘indeterminate’ or ‘uncertain’ 
or ‘incomplete’ in such a way that it is open at its boundary conditions to external 
                                               
123 STR, 188. 
124 Ibid., 188-89. 
125 Sue Patterson, Realist Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1999), 14. 
126 DCO, 102. 
127 STR, 190.  
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direction from another level….  Hence, we may hold as a general principle that 
within the coherent structure of the universe the ‘lower’ levels of reality disclose the 
full measure of their proper order when the ‘higher’ l vels interact creatively with 
them, and conversely that through the interaction of the ‘higher’ levels with the 
‘lower’ the latter are given direction and purpose within the meaningful organisation 
of the multi-levelled complex of the universe.128 
 
Torrance is in congruence with Polanyi with regard to the principle of 
hierarchical structure of the universe.  To him Polanyi’s principle has laid the crucial 
foundation for the discovery of the universe as an intrinsic intelligibility of a 
deepening dimension that is both independent of our a priori presupposition and 
beyond our finite comprehension; it evokes a sense of transcendental awe in us as we 
are confronted and overwhelmed by its indefinite capacity of compelling self-
disclosure.129  On this note, scientific inquiry as human action f the normative 
pattern of revelation and mediation must move away from the traditional flat 
understanding of the natural world to one that is concerned with the complex 
relations between things and events at different levels within the objective reality.  
While Torrance baptises Einsteinian-Polanyian principles in theological science, he is 
not unaware of the dissimilarity between science and theology.  Torrance says, ‘Here, 
of course, we have to reckon with a considerable difference between the kind of 
knowledge that obtains in physical science, for the created universe does not disclose 
or declare itself to us as God does’.130  Although in science we do speak of nature 
disclosing itself to our inquiry and experiment, Torrance is unequivocal that it in fact 
is silent in relation to God’s self-revelation to humanity through his Son by the Spirit.  
Essentially, God communicates himself with us through Jesus Christ in such a 
dynamic way that no created order can compare.  ‘[God] is not dumb but supremely 
eloquent in his divine Being, characterised by what Anselm used to speak of as inima 
locutio apud Summam Substantiam.’131  Thus, the being that confronts theology is the 
Subject-being and not just the Object-being in natural science.132  Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding the difference, Torrance is adamant that the common ground the two 
disciplines share cannot be undermined.  He says conclusively,  
 
                                               
128 DCO, 127-28. 
129 STR, 191.  Torrance says, ‘As the universe becomes progressively disclosed to our scientific 
inquiries it is found to be characterised by an intrinsic intelligibility of an ever deepening dimension 
which far outrages our power of comprehension, invoking from us awe and wonder.’   
130 RST, 138. 
131 CDG, 87. 
132 See RST, 138-39. 
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However we consider it, it seems clear that theological science and natural science 
operate within the same world, and within the same medium, the medium of space 
and time, which are the bearers of contingent order or intelligibility in which all 
created realities share.  Within that medium, natural science is concerned to explore 
the stratified structure of contingent existence, and theological science inquires of 
God their Creator who reveals himself through them.133  
 
The discussion of the similarity and difference between science and theology 
leads us to the heart of the subject of natural theology that not only marks Torrance’s 
reformative understanding, but also distinguishes his approach from that of his 
theological mentor.  In the preface of an important work, Space, Time and 
Resurrection, Torrance recalls his last conversation with Barth about Barth’s 
persistent rejection of an independent natural theology and the possibility of a 
workable basis for the subject in the light of modern science.134  Torrance believes 
that if a deep natural connection exists between science and theology, ‘that common 
basis surely be the proper ground for a natural theology.’135  However, Torrance is 
unambiguous that should there be a viable reconstruction, it can only be on the basis 
of a restored ontology in which we function with a realist epistemology of integrating 
form and being within the contingent, intelligible and multi-levelled-structure 
universe.  In distinction to some critics who, according to Torrance, have erroneously 
averred that Barth’s objection is based on ‘some form f Marcionite dualism’ or ‘a 
scepticism coupled with a false fideism’, he states that it in fact rests upon an 
immense stress of God’s dynamic interaction in creation and upon the refusal to 
accept ‘natural reason’ could alone limit God’s self-r velation to humanity.136  On 
theological ground, if our knowledge of God as Trinity, as Barth says, is made 
possible only through Jesus Christ, natural theology indubitably has no place in 
theology as it leads not to the Being of the Trinity but some Being of God in general.  
Torrance underscores,  
 
Natural theology by its very operation abstracts the existence of God from his act, so 
that if it does not begin with deism, it imposes deism upon theology.  If really to 
know God through his saving activity in our world is to know him as Trinity, then 
the doctrine of the Trinity belongs to the very groundwork of knowledge of God 
from the very start, which calls in question any doctrine of God as the One God 
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gained apart from his trinitarian activity---but tha  is the kind of knowledge of God 
that is yielded in natural theology of the traditional kind.137 
 
Barth underlines the importance for every scientific discipline to develop 
specific method of inquiry appropriate to the nature of its investigative object.138  
Theology as an a posteriori science therefore necessarily involves the questioning of 
all presuppositions and structures of thoughts independent of or antecedent to its own 
operation.  ‘This is why,’ Torrance says, ‘Barth makes so much of the 
epistemological implications of justification by grace alone, for it forces upon us 
relentless questioning of all we thought we knew beforehand… in such a way that in 
the last resort theology is thrown back wholly upon the nature and activity of God for 
the justification or verification of our concepts and statements about him.’139   
Torrance notes that Barth in fact does not reject natural theology on the 
ground of its argumentation or rational structure, but its independent character.  When 
Barth rejects natural theology as a praeambula fidei, he is rejecting it as an 
independent epistemological system antecedent to actual knowledge of God that is 
revealed in Jesus Christ.140  The main problem of independent or traditional natural 
theology according to Torrance’s reading of Barth lies in the tendency to split the 
knowledge of God into two parts; namely, natural knowledge of the One God and 
revealed knowledge of the Trinity, which is both scientifically and theologically 
unacceptable.  However, instead of rejecting it tout court, Torrance underlines that 
Barth has transposed it into the material content of theology and in a changed form it 
constitutes the epistemological structure of our knowledge of God.  On this note, 
natural theology, properly understood, cannot stand o  its own as an independent 
system apart from the actual knowledge of God reveal d in Jesus Christ, although it 
is open to philosophical analysis.  Torrance claims that Einstein’s treatment of the 
relation between geometry and physics could illustrate well Barth’s approach.  
Instead of idealising geometry (like Euclidean geomtry) by detaching it from 
experience as an independent conceptual system, Einstein, according to Torrance, 
underscores that it must be brought into unification with physics where it becomes a 
kind of natural science, or an epistemological structure, in the heart of physics.141  
                                               
137 Ibid., 89. 
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140 STR, ix-x. 
141 Ibid.  See GG, 91-92.  Is there a danger of compromising theology in Torrance’s use of geometry 
analogy?  McGrath draws our attention to the question that Frederick Norris raises in the light that the
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Thus, ‘natural’ in a similar way, natural theology then ‘constitutes the 
epistemological “geometry”, as it were, within the fabric of “revealed theology” as it 
is apprehended and articulated within the objectivities and intelligibilities of the 
space-time medium through which God has made himself known to us.’142  Indeed, 
Barth’s reworking of natural theology by providing it with a ‘dependent’ character in 
positive theology according to Torrance has set aside the a priori difficulty.  
However, the question now is could the ‘dependent’ natural theology fully assume its 
role in the light of Einsteinian-Polanyian science?  Torrance says, ‘But if Barth’s 
position is to be accepted, as I believe it is, then I also believe that there must be a 
deeper connection between the basic concepts of thelogical science and natural 
science than he seemed to allow.’143  In other words, given the natural connection 
between the two disciplines, Torrance believes a proper natural theology ‘should be 
natural both to theological science and natural science.’  Torrance elucidates, 
 
A natural theology in this full sense will have its proper place in the dialogue 
between theological science and natural science within their common sharing of the 
rational structures of space and time conferred on the universe by God in his creating 
of it, and within their common sharing in the basic conceptions of the unitary 
rationality of the universe, its contingent intelligibility and contingent freedom---
which derive, as we have seen, from a Christian understanding of the relation of God 
to the universe.144 
 
In order to develop his argument, Torrance turns to Athanasius and Anselm.  
Torrance underlines that Athanasius in Contra Gentes has showed us that ‘as we let 
our minds tune in to the rational order that pervades the universe, they are already on 
the way that leads to the really existence of God.’  Thus, ‘No attempt was made there 
to find a way of reaching God by logical reasoning, but rather to point out a way of 
communicating with the regulative and providential activity of God in the rational 
order of the universe’.145  Because theology and science share common basis th t 
does not derive from any cosmological reason but the uncreated Word of God, 
                                                                                                                            
relation between natural and revealed theology may be determined by an analogy outside its discipline.  
McGrath argues that the analogy to Torrance is simply ‘a convenient way of illustrating something 
which he already knew to be true on other grounds.  In other words, the analogy is to be understood as 
illustrative, not determinative or constitutive.’  Alister E. McGrath, Thomas F. Torrance: An 
Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 187.  Also see Frederick W. Norris, 
‘Mathematics, Physics and Religion: A Need for Candor and Rigor,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 37 
(1984): 466-67. 
142 RST, 39. 
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Torrance claims that Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione together disclose ‘what 
Athanasius is doing there is to show that knowledge of God and knowledge of the 
world share the same ultimate foundations in the Logos, or Rationality, of God the 
Creator.’146  Since no distinction is made between natural and supernatural 
knowledge, Athanasius’ argument provides the needed way for Torrance to articulate 
that God’s revelation is mediated as well through the contingent creation as both 
human action of scientific inquiry and divine action f compulsive self-disclosure 
take place within the field of God-man-world or God-world-man interconnections.  
Torrance says, ‘It is within the compass of that integrated theological understanding 
of creation and incarnation that we have embedded th  argumentation that some 
would regard as “natural theology.”’  Thus, knowledg  of God as spoken by natural 
theology derived from the mediation of the contingent creation ‘cannot be abstracted 
and made to stand on its own, for it holds good and is consistent only in a deep and 
unbreakable polarity with our actual knowledge of Gd revealed in and through Jesus 
Christ.’147  On this note, Anselm’s ontological argument is intrumental to Torrance.  
Torrance says that the unity of intelligibility and being in Anselm’s thought 
characterises all created realities so that when we inv stigate, we are under the 
compulsion to understand and interpret them in accordance with their contingent 
rationality.  However, since created intelligibility, or the contingent creation, is under 
the compulsion of the unlimited intelligibility of God and thus points beyond itself to 
God’s ultimate reality, the use of inferential argument to ascertain God’s existence in 
this regard, according to Torrance, is perceived to be inadequate by Anselm because 
with its contingent nature it could only break off before terminating on God.148  But, 
‘as contingent creaturely being and intelligibility  require a sufficient ground and 
reason beyond themselves in order to be what they actually are,’ Torrance claims that 
by existing they in fact ‘constitute a rational question requiring rational answer.’149  
‘[I]t does have something to “say” to us, simply by eing what it is, contingent and 
intelligible in its contingency, for that makes itslack of self-explanation inescapably 
problematic, and it is precisely through that problematic character that it points 
beyond itself with a mute cry for sufficient reason.’150  Torrance says, 
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On the other hand, if our thought along these lines really has to do with an active 
Agent who is the creative Source of the intelligibility of the universe, then we know 
him not because we succeed in penetrating through the in elligible structures of the 
universe to net him… but rather because he actually interacts with us and the 
universe, constitutes himself the active Object of our knowledge, and discloses 
himself in a positive way to us as the created universe by virtue of its sheer 
contingency is quite unable to do….  Yet it is not with discovery that we have to do 
here, as in our inquires into mute and determinate realities when we seek to let them 
‘disclose’ themselves to our questioning, but with revelation in which our seeking 
and inquiring are anticipated, prompted and supported by creative activity on God’s 
part.151 
 
Here is the key of Torrance’s transformed natural theology.  The fact that the 
contingent creation is intrinsically rational means that it is capable of mediating 
rational explanation from beyond itself, its completeness will only be fulfilled if it is 
met with the act of God’s actual self-revelation.  This is also the strength of 
Torrance’s ontological argument; as Colyer says, ‘This is the core of Torrance’s 
reformulation… that it does identify the kind of subtle, yet intelligible, way the 
universe coming to articulation by the new science se ms to point (in the form of a 
question) in the direction of the Christian God as the sufficient reason for this 
universe.’152  Natural theology in this regard is connected and i tegrated with 
revealed theology.  That is to say, ‘natural theology properly arises under the 
dynamic impact of God’s own Being and Word, but in he context of the relation of 
God the Creator to the universe he has made and to the whole integrated complex of 
created intelligibilities that that entails.’153  The multi-levelled structure of the 
contingent creation as Torrance argues is irrefutably the crucial medium of divine 
self-disclosure that cannot be undermined.  In rejecting the deistic disjuncture 
between God and the creation, Torrance is unequivocal that natural theology cannot 
be pursued in its independent or traditional form.  If natural theology is to have a 
workable basis, it has to be brought into revealed theology and be pursued in 
unbreakable unity with it.  ‘No longer extrinsic but intrinsic to actual knowledge of 
God, it will function as the necessary intra-structure of theological science,’ Torrance 
underscores.154  On this note, Torrance, in alluding to Henri Bouillard, stresses that 
natural theology in a transformed way constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient 
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condition for theological knowledge.  It essentially is an ‘open, pliant structure, 
involving basic concepts that are decided only on other grounds or at another level of 
thought.’155  Torrance says conclusively that ‘now the whole character of natural 
theology becomes transformed, for pursued within the actual inquiry of theological 
science, where we must think rigorously in accordance with the self-disclosure of 
God in his own intelligible relations, it will become natural to the material content 
theology and will fall under the determination of its ntelligibility.’ 156  Essentially, 
Torrance’s natural theology, as Molnar observes, attempts ‘an account of our 
relations with God in grace, faith and revelation that do not destroy human nature or 
the created world of nature but place them on their proper footing in relation to the 
incarnation and resurrection in particular.’157  Natural theology finally is dependent 
upon God’s ultimate revelation in Christ. 
 We have thus far analysed the importance of the contingent creation as the 
ordained medium of divine self-disclosure in Torrance’s theology of revelation and 
multiple mediations.  We show that the mediatedness of the creation, as Torrance 
argues, is constituted by its endowed nature of contingency, rationality and 
intelligibility.  Being the medium of contingent nature it thus unfolds the divine 
action of compulsive self-disclosure and points the human action of scientific inquiry 
to the ultimate reality in God.  The mediation of the creation is again affirmed in 
Torrance’s argument of a needed transformed natural heology.  As the analysis 
draws near to the end, we cannot let the question if Torrance is successful in his case 
of natural theology to go by unmentioned.  In general, Torrance is commended by 
scholars such as McGrath, Morrison and Colyer for the success of shifting natural 
theology to a new paradigm not only without compromising the christological 
foundation of Barth of which it is built, but also engendering a closer inter-
disciplinary dialogue and interaction between science and theology.158  Molnar 
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recognises the solution of Torrance has undoubtedly scaped two problems that 
trouble much contemporary theology; namely, there is no ‘logical bridge’ between 
our knowledge of the world and knowledge of God, and thus an a priori knowledge 
of God is not possible.159  However, Molnar suspects that Torrance in his 
appropriation of Bouillard may have parted company with Barth more than he 
realises, and thus introduced an inconsistency to his argument.160  A point implicated 
in Molnar’s discussion about the indispensable rolethe contingent creation plays in 
mediating divine self-disclosure concerns us most closely here.  On the ground that 
the mediatedness of the contingent creation finds its fulfilment finally in Christ, we 
are in congruence with Molnar to state that Torrance’s project would have been more 
plausible if he refers it as a theology of nature instead of natural theology.161  
Unquestionably, as we argue, Torrance’s discourse of the creation as the crucial 
medium of divine self-disclosure harmonises well with his overall framework of 
revelation and multiple mediations.  On this note, a statement of Torrance in the 
preface of Reality and Evangelical Theology aptly ends the discussion, 
 
Now since God had endorsed his creation with a ration lity and beauty of its own in 
created correspondence to his transcendent rationali y and beauty, the more the 
created universe unfolds its marvellous symmetries and harmonies to our scientific 
inquiry, the more it… reflects the glory of the Creator and resounds to his praise.  
But this is the very universe to which we human beings belong and which God has 
ordained as the creaturely medium through which he makes himself known to 
mankind, in his historical dialogue with Israel and above all in the incarnation of his 
Word in Jesus Christ; therefore the increasing scientific understanding of the 
universe, as under God it becomes disclosed to our inquires, must be taken into 





This chapter pivots on Torrance’s arguments of the c urch, Word and sacraments, 
and contingent creation as the irreplaceable media of God’s self-disclosure in Christ 
by the Spirit.  Our discussion shows that the normative pattern of the union and 
communion of divine and human action of revelation and mediation is paramount to 
Torrance undergirding his discourse and enabling him to surmount the dualistic 
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tension of separating God from the world.  The cardinal principle serves as the 
anchorage aiding Torrance to stay in line with the int nt to uphold both the divine and 
the human in revelation, and preventing him from goin  off at a tangent towards the 
immediacy of revelation.  Torrance’s arguments of the church as the body of Christ, 
the proclamation of the Word as the indivisible ministry of Christ and the believers in 
the Spirit, the inseparability of water baptism and Spirit baptism, the conjoint ‘act of 
Christ and the act of man’ in the Eucharist, and the correlation between human 
scientific knowing and divine self-disclosure in creation-mediatedness, as noted, 
evidence the significance of the principle.  To Torrance it is not a priori but a 
posteriori because it has for its foundation the Mediator who fulfils the revelation and 
mediation between God and humanity with the act of G d and the act of humanity 
both united as one in union and communion within himself, as our chapter one 
claims.  Because the normative pattern of revelation and mediation has been fulfilled 
and set by Christ himself, our understanding of thehuman and earthly media 
participate in Christ through the work of the Spirit in mediating God’s revelation in 
human history cannot derail from it without falling into the peril of dualism.  This 
essentially is the core of Torrance’s argument thatcannot be overlooked by any 






In the first part that encompasses three chapters of the thesis, our primary aim is to 
establish the first claim that divine self-disclosure in Torrance’s theological scheme is 
the mediation of the incarnate Son Jesus Christ.  We have, in chapter one, focused on 
Torrance’s understanding of Christ as the Mediator between God and humanity, and 
in him the foundation of the normative pattern of revelation and mediation is set.  
Torrance’s argument of the nature of Christ’s revelation and mediation is analysed.  
We argue that Torrance primarily pivots on the hypostatic union of Christ as fully 
God and fully man in one person to demonstrate that in him one finds the culmination 
of the two-way movement of God’s revelation and mediation.  Because of the 
fulfilment in Jesus Christ, Torrance underscores the importance of the union and 
communion of divine and human action as the normative pattern of revelation and 
mediation.   
We shift our focus to dualism in chapter two and examine, in Torrance’s 
view, its threat and detriment to Christ’s revelation and mediation.  Our discussion 
shows that Arian dualism and Newtonian dualism demean Christ’s revelation and 
mediation by separating God from the world.  The main problem of dualism, as 
Torrance argues relentlessly, lies in distorting our knowing of divine self-disclosure 
by moving the centre of interpretation erroneously from God in Christ to humanity.  
In order to repair the damage, Torrance postulates realism as the pertinent corrective.   
Riding on the advancement of Einsteinian-Polanyian science and building on 
the theological foundation of Barth, Torrance advocates theological science, the 
subject of our chapter three, as the answer of theological reconstruction.  We discuss 
Torrance’s understanding of scientific inquiry as the proper theological action 
because it acts in accordance with the compulsive nature of God’s self-revelation in 
Christ.  If scientific inquiry of theological science constitutes the human action, then 
the work of the Spirit in Torrance’s framework forms the divine action of the 
normative pattern of revelation and mediation.  Thus, our analysis of Torrance’s 
pneumatology in chapter four begins the second part of the thesis and sets the stage 
for subsequent discussions of revelation and multiple mediations.   
The discussion in chapter four shows that notwithstanding the dynamic and 
non-formal features, Torrance’s understanding of the epistemic work of the Spirit is 
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essentially rational and intelligible.  To Torrance the Spirit as the divine action 
corresponds to the human action of scientific inquiry in bringing about God’s self-
revelation in Christ through multiple mediations.  Since the Spirit works through 
human and earthly media, we argue, in subsequent chapters, that any attempt by 
Torrance to relegate them in any way will not only undermine his theology of 
revelation and multiple mediations, but also weaken his pneumatology.   
Chapter five and six involve the second claim of the esis.  The examination 
of Torrance’s understanding of scripture in chapter five shows that notwithstanding 
his intent to uphold the primacy of scripture in mediating divine revelation, he makes 
the unusual move to relegate the mediatedness by advoc ting its effacement when 
responding to what he perceives as the dualistic threa  of liberal, fundamentalist and 
modern historical-critical biblical scholarship.  The extensive discussion affirms our 
claim that such move is unnecessary and unjustifiable, as it derails not only from the 
normative pattern of revelation and mediation, it also creates problems and 
exacerbates tension that is embedded in his theologica  structure, and runs the risk of 
gravitating revelation from mediation to immediacy.  We claim that what is required 
of Torrance when he senses the peril of dualism is to tay in line with that which is 
built and argue consistently from the theological foundation of the union and 
communion of divine and human action of revelation and mediation.   
Our analysis of Torrance’s discourse of the church, Word and sacraments, and 
creation in chapter six evidences just that.  By remaining steadfast to the cardinal 
principle, Torrance demonstrates his theological stmina in sustaining a dynamic 
understanding of the ordained media as essential forms of mediation without 
compromising either the divine or the human.  In this regard, one could not help but 
to feel that if only Torrance has taken heed of his own construction, the argument of 
scripture as the primary medium of divine revelation would be less problematic.  If it 
is true that at times one needs alternate voices to be reminded of certain ‘blind spot’, 
the question then is who, in the case of Torrance, could do the job?  Without question 
there are able voices in the Christian tradition for the purpose.  We however 
recommend Tillich and Gunton, believing that Tillich’s thought on the revelatory role 
of religious symbol1 and Gunton’s view of propositional revelation would provide 
                                               
1 Morrison underlines that Torrance has two choices to overcome his theological negation of historical 
and human participation in Christ’s revelation.  He says, ‘Either Torrance must theologically go in the
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differences between Torrance and Tillich, Morrison eventually opts for Calvin to develop his 
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Torrance with food for thought.  Tillich and Gunton are chosen for another two 
reasons.  First, they are contemporaries of Torrance d therefore belong to the same 
historical era.  Second, their contrasting theological positions are able to give 
Torrance distinctive stimulants to reassess the whole issue of scripture as the primary 
medium of divine revelation. 
 
 
Human Logos as Symbol 
 
To Tillich the importance of human logos in theology should not be confined only to 
the function of mediating the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ, as it is also 
indispensable in communicating almost all doctrinal and human expressions.  Tillich 
says, ‘Man’s rational structure cannot be understood without the word in which he 
grasps the rational structure of reality.  Revelation cannot be understood without the 
word as a medium of revelation.’2  Tillich argues that we could only understand the 
meaning of the ‘Word of God’ and ‘Logos’ when we gain n insight into the general 
nature of the words.  And, our understanding of the knowledge of God has to do with 
the semantic analysis of the symbolic ‘word’ used in revelation.  Similarly, our 
interpretation of the biblical message cannot be done without involving semantic and 
hermeneutic principle.  Tillich’s understanding of the close relation between the 
human logos and divine revelation reverberates notably Torrance’s argument of the 
asymmetric relation between scripture and revelation as discussed in chapter five.   
From the side of Torrance, he would welcome Tillich w en the latter says, 
‘Revelation through words must not be confused with “revealed words.”’3  To Tillich 
human logos whether it is used in the context of sacred or secular language, is 
nothing more than the product of humanity that is based on the experiential 
correlation between mind and reality in the process of history.  Tillich claims that 
fundamentally no apparent distinction could be made between religious or ordinary 
language.  Tillich says, ‘Revelation uses ordinary l nguage, just as it uses nature and 
history, man’s psychic and spiritual life, as mediums of revelation.  Ordinary 
                                                                                                                            
corrective as he believes that Calvin’s theological approach may contribute to ‘Torrance’s Barthian 
understanding of “the Being of God in his Act and the Act of God in his Being” and the simultaneous 
authority and humanity of the scripture, which Torrance seems to indirectly acknowledge, another 
needed and complimentary dimension.’  See Morrison, 320-21. 
2 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 1 (London: Nisbet, 1953), 136. 
3 Ibid. 
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language, which expresses and denotes the ordinary experience of mind and reality in 
their categorical structure, is made a vehicle for expressing and denoting the 
extraordinary experience of mind and reality in ecstasy and sign-event.’4  In this 
regard, human language remains primarily as the communicative tool of divine 
revelation to Tillich and thus one should not be confounded with the other.  As 
revelation is distinct from ordinary language, Tillich, like Torrance, does uphold the 
sovereignty of God’s revelation in relation to the media of divine revelation.  In 
someway similar to Torrance’s argument of the necessity to allow the compulsive 
self-disclosure of God to shape human language in such a fashion that it could be 
used as the ‘appropriate tool’ to depict accurately he revelation of Christ, Tillich 
underlines that revelation, or the experience of revelation, like any human experience, 
could contribute to the formation and transformation of our understanding and use of 
words.  However, Torrance may not accept lock, stock and barrel of Tillich’s claim 
that by itself revelation ‘cannot create a language of its own which must be learned as 
in the case of foreign language.’5  As our discussion of his understanding of the 
proficiency of human language in chapter three evidences, Torrance believes that a 
‘new’ language, or a specialised language as scientific language, could and ought to 
be created under the compulsion of divine self-disclosure and human participation so 
that theological language is able to speak accurately of divine revelation.  
Notwithstanding his rhetoric, as we argue, the human logos used in articulating God’s 
revelation in Christ although is theologically specialised, is not altogether different 
from ordinary language, a point Torrance himself eventually concedes.  On this note, 
we may say that Tillich’s argument could not be entir ly unacceptable to Torrance.  
In the light of what has been said, one could agree that both Torrance and Tillich are 
rather likeminded with regard to the importance of c rrelating the human logos to 
divine revelation.  The difference between them nevertheless surfaces when we take a 
closer look at the nature how the human logos is infact related to divine revelation.  
And, it is here we believe that Tillich’s perspective could be an alternative to 
Torrance.  Tillich says, 
 
The preaching of the church presupposes an understanding of the expressive and 
denotative functions of the word in addition to its communication function.  Under 
these circumstances it is not surprising that an attempt has been made to reduce the 
whole of theology to an enlarged doctrine of the “Word of God” (Barth).  But if this 
                                               
4 Ibid., 137. 
5 Ibid., 136-37.  
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is done, “word” must either be identified with revelation and the term “word” must 
be used with such a wide meaning that every divine self-manifestation can be 
subsumed under it, or revelation must be restricted to the spoken word and the “Word 
of God” taken literary instead of symbolically.6 
 
 If Tillich is right in his comment, the latter option is clearly the one Torrance 
inclines to take, given his theological propensity.  Having said that, one should recall 
the attempt to take scriptural words as literal revelation of God’s Word, such as the 
propositional model of revelation, is one that Torrance rejects unquestionably.  
Torrance’s twofold order of the asymmetric relation between the human and divine 
Logos may be regarded as a sophisticated answer to tackle what he perceives to be a 
simplistic and literal association between the two.  As we would return to the subject 
of propositional revelation, it is suffice at this juncture to say that given that which 
has been laid down by Tillich, Torrance would find the latter option more acceptable 
than the former.   
But there is a price for taking the latter option, according to Tillich.  It 
‘contradicts not only the meaning of God’s power but also the religious symbolism 
inside and outside the biblical literature, which uses seeing, feeling, and tasting as 
often as hearing in describing the experience of the divine presence.’7  Torrance, on 
the one hand, may disagree with Tillich on a twofold ground.  First, Torrance 
underpins that the ultimate of ‘hearing’ has its root in the Hebraic tradition of which 
the shaping of theological form is determined largely by its hearing of the Word of 
God in distinction to the Hellenic tradition of focusing on the primacy of vision and 
the perception of the true, the beauty and the good.8  Second, Torrance claims that the 
objective reality of God’s self-revelation in Christ  the incarnate Word who speaks 
to us in person and he is not mute.  As Torrance says, ‘we are concerned mainly to 
insist that theological concepts have an aspect that cannot be appropriated so long as 
we insist on construing them only in modes of vision.’9  While his argument without 
question warrants our attention, Torrance, on the ot r hand, has to concede as well 
that ‘This is not to say that there is no place for knowledge construed on the pattern 
of visionary experience; on the contrary, it has an essential and unavoidable place’.10   
                                               
6 Ibid., 136. 
7 Ibid. 
8 TS, 22. 
9 Ibid., 29.  Torrance claims that the element of ‘hearing’ is the uniqueness of Christian theology.  He
says, ‘The outstanding characteristic of theology is that it operates with a direct act of cognition in 
hearing God and engages in the act of conception thr ug  audition.’  TS, 23, 30-31, 39-40.  
10 Ibid., 22. 
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We may underscore three main reasons for Torrance’s possible 
acknowledgement and thus the prospect of his eventual congruence with Tillich.  
First, Torrance would have rejected Tillich complete y if the latter claims that all 
knowledge is construed only through the model of vision.11  Clearly this is not the 
argument of Tillich as he unequivocally states that, as the above citation shows, the 
aesthetic experience of vision, touch and taste would not supplant but complement 
our experience of the revelatory presence that derives through hearing.  Second, the 
argument of Tillich may enrich Torrance’s discourse of the inseparableness of the 
Gift and the Giver in the Eucharist.  It could possibly serve as a workable basis for 
Torrance to deepen the nuance of the ‘whole Christ’ present in the eucharistic 
celebration.  For example, giving more weight to the ‘seeing, feeling and tasting’ of 
the elements would enrich our apprehension and experi nc  of the presence of the 
‘whole Christ’ in the Eucharist.  Third, the argument of Tillich does not jeopardise 
the primacy of God’s revelation.  In fact, Tillich, like Torrance, is adamant that 
human logos and divine revelation cannot be confounded.  Tillich unequivocally says 
that ordinary language by itself even when it is dealing with matters of ultimate 
concern is not a medium of revelation.  He says, ‘When speaking of the ultimate, of 
being and meaning, ordinary language brings it down to the level of the preliminary, 
the conditioned, the finite, thus muffling its revelatory power.’12  If ordinary language 
by itself is handicapped, the question naturally is how could it become a medium of 
divine revelation?  Tillich answers, ‘Language as a medium of revelation… has the 
“sound” and “voice” of the divine mystery in and through the sound and voice of 
human expression and denotation.  Language with this power is the “Word of God.”’  
He continues, 
 
If it is possible to use an optical metaphor for the characterisation of language, one 
could say that the Word of God as the word of revelation is transparent language.  
Something shines (more precisely, sounds) through ordinary language which is the 
self-manifestation of the depth of being and meaning.13 
                                               
11 Ibid.  Torrance says that ‘it would be false to construe all knowledge on the model of vision.’ 
12 Tillich, 137. 
13 Ibid.  My italic.  In delimiting the denotation and expression of ordinary language, Tillich says that
the denotative power of language is about its ability to grasp and communicate general meaning, and 
the expressive power of language is about its ability to disclose and communicate personal states.  He 
gives examples to explain his points.  He says, ‘Analgebraic equation has an almost exclusively 
denotative character, an outcry has an almost expressive character.  But even in the case of an outcry a 
definite content of feeling is indicated, and even the case of a mathematical equation a satisfaction 
about the evidence of the result and the adequacy of the method can be expressed.’  Thus, to Tillich, 
most language moves between the two poles.  The mor technical and scientific language would 
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 At times one can be surprised by how close Tillich and Torrance are on 
certain matters.  The fact is the optical metaphor of Tillich is almost identical to 
Torrance’s claim that scriptural words ‘serve as transparent media’,14 and we could 
‘rely upon the Bible for its guidance in directing our understanding to the Word of 
God which sounds through it, or the Truth of God which shines through it.’15  
Another aspect of Tillich’s assertion of which Torrance would again agree regards the 
fact that scripture is not solely about information.  Tillich says, ‘If it were this, if 
revelation were information, no “transparency” of language would be needed.  
Ordinary language, transmitting no “sound” of ultimacy, could give information 
about “divine matters.”  Such information… would lack the characteristics of 
revelation.’16  Torrance could support Tillich on the ground of safeguarding the 
authenticity of God’s self-revelation by pinpointing that scripture is not any ordinary 
work.  Gunton’s comment on this note is helpful in enriching our discussion.  Gunton 
says, ‘One of the proposals sometimes heard… is that we consider the Bible as a kind 
of classic: a work that retains its hold as an indispensable work of literature, 
providing clues to our being in the world that are unavailable elsewhere.  On such an 
account, however, we reach a similar difficulty, for there are many classics, and they 
give us all kinds of information….  But they are not the Bible.’17  Gunton argues that 
scripture, being the mediation of divine revelation, is marked by its unique good news 
of the salvific truth of Christ.  The Bible is not something that provides us with 
helpful information; it is about the salvation of God made possible in Jesus Christ, the 
divine Logos becomes human words so that humanity ma  hear and see the 
revelatory glory of God.  As Tillich says, the centr  of our concern essentially is the 
‘power of grasping, shaking, and transforming’, which s the attribute of the ‘Word of 
God’ in revelation.18   
After establishing the symbolic characteristic of human logos in relation to the 
revelation of God, Tillich continues to underline the importance of positing the 
relation of human and divine Logos within the events of revelation.  This leads to the 
recollection of Morrison’s criticism that pinpoints he lacuna of Torrance’s God-
                                                                                                                            
incline towards the denotative pole, and the more po tical and communal one would move to the 
expressive pole. 
14 RET, 96. 
15 Ibid., 97.  My italic. 
16 Tillich, 138.  
17 Gunton, 72-73. 
18 Tillich, 138. 
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world-human relation, the problem of historical relat dness of divine revelation.  
Tillich says, 
 
If the word as a medium of revelation is not information, it cannot be spoken apart 
from revelatory events in nature, history, and man….  A collection of assumed divine 
revelations concerning “faith and morals” without a revelatory event which they 
interpret is a lawbook with divine authorisation, but it is not the Word of God, and it 
has no revelatory power….  The “Word of God” contais neither revealed 
commandments nor revealed doctrines; it accompanies and interprets revelatory 
situations.19 
 
 Tillich argues that human logos as the medium of divine revelation will lose 
its revelatory meaning if it is severed from ‘revelatory events in nature, history, and 
man’.  He gives two examples to substantiate the point.  Tillich says, ‘When the 
prophets spoke, they spoke about the “great deeds of God,” the revelatory events in 
the history of Israel.  When the apostles spoke, they spoke about the one great deed of 
God, the revelatory event which is called Jesus, the C rist.’20  Revelatory events are 
crucial to Tillich because they assume a critical two-fold function.  First, they provide 
the historical anchorage for the divine and human logos.  Second, they serve as 
historical contexts of interpretation and make possible the hermeneutical 
understanding of the message in accordance with the in ent of the giver; as, ‘divine 
revelations… without a revelatory event which they interpret is a lawbook with 
divine authorisation, but it is not the Word of God, and it has no revelatory power’.  
The strength of Tillich’s argument in this regard lies in opening up a wider scope 
beyond the subjectivity of the human knower for theSpirit to mediate God’s self-
revelation in Christ.  In other words, the revelatory events are platforms the Spirit as 
the source of revelatory power could work to transform ordinary language into 
revelatory language, a point comparable to Torrance’s rhetoric of the epistemic 
dynamic of the Spirit (see chapter four).   
Tillich’s emphasis of the revelatory events brings to mind the concern of 
Anderson that without the historical contexts the historical transcendence of scripture 
is at stake; ‘if the cognitive link with the conten of God’s transcendence as historical 
act is broken, the act of faith must supply its own content to the divine Word.’21  
These are important issues Torrance has to wrestle with, as we clearly identify in 
chapter five.  No doubt there is valid cause for Torance to claim that the ontological 
                                               
19 Ibid., 138-39. 
20 Ibid., 138. 
21 Anderson, 213. 
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reality of revelation is independent of the human logos.  However, as argued, we 
cannot forget the point as well that it is through the platform of scripture the Spirit 
mediates the revelation of God by working closely with the human counterparts first 
in the events of forming it, then in the process of passing it down from one generation 
to the next in human history, and finally in the moent of interpreting it.  Torrance 
himself agrees that scriptural words ‘are much more than that for they have been 
adapted by God under the impact of his Spirit for his own self-testimony’.22  Would 
Torrance eventually take cognisance of Tillich’s argument?  The common ground 
both share seems to suggest that Torrance’s theological framework is able to 
accommodate Tillich’s thought as an auxiliary.  Thus, the possibility cannot be ruled 
out simply because of their general theological differences. 
 
 
Proposition and Inspiration 
 
To do justice to Torrance, it has to be said from the outset that while he rejects 
propositional revelation, he indeed says that ‘the divine revelation does certainly 
involve the communication of truths and ideas and propositions’ and ‘without all that 
the Scriptures in the saving purpose of God have come to embody, we would not be 
able to know God or to have intelligible communion with him within our continuing 
human historical existence’.23  Thus, it would be helpful to set the stage by bringing 
to light the reasons of Torrance’s objection before we engage Gunton in conversation.  
Kruger’s concise observation would aptly serve the purpose as he rightly pinpoints 
the questions Torrance raises as, 
 
[I]s it ‘in and through’ these truths and idea and propositions that ‘God speaks to us 
personally and confronts us with the majesty and dignity of his own Truth’?  Does 
our knowing and faith terminate on the statements of he Bible and its information, or 
upon the living Jesus Christ?  Is the Holy Scripture the ordained and inspired and 
authoritative medium of the personal communication of the living Christ Himself or 
is Holy Scripture the content of the mediation itself?’24   
 
                                               
22 TRst, 257. 
23 See TRst, 91 and STR, 12-13.  Cited in C. B. Kruger, ‘Thesis: Participation in the Self-Knowledge of 
God: The Nature and Means of Our Knowledge of God in the Theology of T. F. Torrance’ (The 
University of Aberdeen, 1990), 234.  
24 Kruger, 234. 
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From the questions we may infer three main reasons of Torrance’s objection.  
With Gunton’s help in providing critical alternative, Torrance may reassess the 
viability of the subject in question.  First, the objection involves the misrepresentation 
of the relation between reality and language.  The so-called one to one 
correspondence between the human logos and divine rev lation in scripture is 
perceived to be inaccurate and unacceptable.  To put it in Torrance’s terms, scriptural 
word can never be the incarnate Word; the ‘Holy Scriptu e is not Jesus Christ’.25  
However, the problem of such approach is that it takes the theory unnecessarily in its 
most simplistic way.  In alluding to McGrath, Gunto says that even the mediaevals 
who are the proponents of proposition believe that ‘doctrines were reliable, yet 
incomplete descriptions of reality.’26  The argument is built upon the claim that no 
theory of metaphorical truth would base on a naïve understanding of the one to one 
correlation of word and reality.  The undergirding principle of the appropriation of 
propositonal statements lies in the referential characteristic of language; a salient 
point in fact sits well with Torrance’s emphasis of the referential feature of the media 
of divine revelation.  Gunton asks, ‘Does our langua e or does it not refer, or affect to 
refer, to realities which lie beyond it, however elusively?  Does it or does it not affect 
to describe, albeit partially, obliquely and inadequately, those things which truly 
are?’27  Gunton says, ‘If it was once true that Jesus diedfor our sins on the cross, then 
it is always true.  I take that sentence to be propositional, cognitive, in that it makes 
claims for the truth of that which lies beyond its formulation in words, and to form 
one dimension of what it is to claim that Christianity is a revealed religion.’28  
Torrance would have no difficulty in accepting Gunton’s argument on the account of 
the importance of the referential feature of proposition. 
Second, if the question is about whether ‘the object of our faith accurate 
propositions or is it the living Christ’,29 the issue in fact is about the suspicion that 
propositional form is too cognitive and it has reduced the salvation of Christ into 
abstract concept or statement.  The concern of Torrance is legitimate in this regard, as 
Gunton himself recognises as well that ‘there have be n in the history of theology the 
development of propositions that appear to stand in rather tenuous relation to the 
                                               
25 RET, 95. 
26 Gunton, 8.  See Alister McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundation of Doctrinal 
Criticism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 16-17. 
27 Ibid., 9. 
28 Ibid., 8. 
29 Kruger, 234.  
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nature of Christian faith’.30  But, Gunton, in alluding to Calvin, explicates that the 
issue is more complex than just about propositional ag inst non-propositional.  He 
comments that Calvin, though a propositionalist theologian, has a conception of 
knowledge far from being intellectualist in the narrow sense.  ‘The shape of his 
theology,’ Gunton says, ‘from the beginning seeking to integrate the knowledge of 
God and ourselves, is witness to theology as wisdom: not abstract, but saving and 
existentially relevant knowledge.’31  Having said that, it however does not fully 
resolve the suspicion that some propositions may be merely abstract and conceptual.  
The way to go, as Gunton suggests, is to distinguish those that are not from those that 
are.  For example, the patristic slogan that says that ‘ he unassumed is unhealed’ is 
clearly not just a conceptual abstraction, although it is expressed cognitively in 
propositional form.32  The point is by making a distinction between various forms of 
proposition, we are able to avoid generalisation and give proper recognition to the 
role it plays.  The indisputable fact is the incarnate Word is indeed mediated by the 
words and testimonies of the apostles and those who are involved in the events of 
Christ within a unique historical and communal context.  Torrance himself clearly 
recognises the point as our analyses in the preceding chapters evidence.   
Third, when the focus of our faith is placed primarily on the ‘living Christ’ 
instead of the ‘accurate propositions’, we may deduc  the undertone is about the 
assumption that propositions are primarily static and fixed.  In other words, as the 
scriptural records of revelation are in someway tied o the past, the presupposition is 
‘there is no further divine action, only the working out of what God has done 
already.’33  It however does not have to be understood in that way, as Gunton argues 
that notwithstanding the seemingly static, fixed and textual character of biblical 
revelation, it in fact provides the foundation for the belief that there are further divine 
acts to come.34  Gunton cites Isaiah 43:19 that says that ‘Behold, I am doing a new 
thing’ to substantiate his argument.  He claims that e propositional form of biblical 
revelation does not relegate the truism that ‘the ascended Christ is a living and active 
advocate with the Father, or that the Spirit works to perfect the creation.’  In addition, 
in spite of its association with the past, Gunton says that propositional form of 
revelation encourages inquiry and revision in the belief that ‘we shall learn greater 
                                               
30 Gunton, 9. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 80. 
34 Ibid. 
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things, and that the servant of the kingdom is likea scribe bringing out his treasure 
things both new and old (Matt. 13:52).’35  The crux of Gunton’s argument lies in 
riding on Calvin’s claim that the Spirit enables us through the mediation of scripture 
to see the world in a different perspective.  Alternatively put, while the mediation of 
revelation is unchanging, our apprehension of its content through the guidance of the 
Spirit may change.  Gunton says pointedly, 
 
That is where the discipline of theology must necessarily differ from other 
disciplines, which are not tied in the same way to the past history.  If God is the one 
who creates and redeems through Christ and Spirit, and is made known as such by 
the incarnate, crucified, risen and ascended Jesus, then that is the one he always is.  
Any new action, therefore, can be expected within te framework of this eternal 
revelation (or revelation of the eternal gospel)... the possibility of progress in 
theology which is grounded in the revelation, and i particular the promise that the 
Spirit will lead the church ‘into all truth’.  Therfore dogma and theology are 
revisable, scripture is in certain respects open to question, but revelation, mediated 
through scripture, is not.’36   
 
From the arguments we may derive the notion that Gunton’s understanding of 
the nature of revelation and mediation is not unlike that of Torrance.  The emphasis 
of God’s self-disclosure in Christ, the dynamic work of the Spirit in unfolding and 
leading all to the truth, and the fact that dogma and theology are human formulations 
which under the leading of God require to be revised constantly are salient points 
close to the heart of Torrance’s theology of revelation and multiple mediations.  
Torrance would appreciate Gunton when the latter endeavours to uphold the 
sovereignty of God’s revelation by emphasising that, like theological statements, 
‘scripture is in certain respects open to question, but revelation, mediated through 
scripture, is not.’  Gunton’s view of proposition is food for thought to Torrance 
especially when, in one moment, he concedes that ‘By their very nature theological 
statements [and scriptural texts] involved propositi nal relations with God and 
propositional relations between human subjects’.37 
We may now turn to the related issue of the inspiredness of scripture and 
continue to allow Gunton to dialogue with Torrance.  In order to commence our 
discussion we should return to the statement of Torrance that says, ‘if we become too 
obsessed with the Bible, as so often happens in the stress that is laid upon its 
inspiration when our attention is directed to the Bible itself instead of to what it is 
                                               
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 80-81.  Author’s italic. 
37 GR, 190. 
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intended to bear witness.’38  From the articulation we may construe that Torrance 
adopts a position akin to that of Barth by putting the weight of revelation not so much 
on the past process by which it occurs under the pen of the inspired writers of 
scripture.  The emphasis, however, is placed more on the present process by which 
scripture, through inspiration, becomes revelation o its readers.  To put it succinctly, 
the focus is on the ‘now’ instead of the ‘then’ event of revelation.  When the ‘now’ 
outweighs the ‘then’, Gunton says that the upholding of the dogma of the humanity of 
scripture is achieved at the cost of paying too little attention to the intrinsic 
inspiredness of the text.39  We believe Gunton’s reflection may lend Torrance a hand 
to reconsider his position. 
Gunton says that a common view of how scripture becomes the mediation of 
revelation through the process of inspiration could be captured briefly in a picture 
depicting the image of a shadowy figure of the Spirit hovering over the writer 
prompting him in his writing, either by dictation or by giving guidance.40  Whether 
this is how the Spirit works is a point of discussion.  However, according to Gunton, 
the main concern here is that it is too individualist a picture to give an adequate 
account of the two features of the characteristic work of the Spirit.  Gunton says, ‘In 
the first place, the Spirit is the one whose gift is communion, community, both with 
God and with the other.  The Spirit is thus, among ther things, the Spirit of the 
church.’41  As much as it is commonly understood as a work of the individual writers, 
the argument is that scripture is also a product of he early Christian community. 
Gunton argues that the Paraclete is the one who guides the community into all truth, 
and the Bible’s inspiration may be perceived to derive from the fact that ‘it is the 
book of a community, or rather of the people of God who are variously Israel and the 
church.’42  Principally Torrance is congruent with Gunton particularly when the latter 
builds his discourse of the inspiredness of scriptue on the conjoint action of the Spirit 
and the chosen communities.  It harmonises well with Torrance’s normative pattern 
of revelation and mediation that puts much stock in the union and communion of 
divine and human action.  Our analysis thus far show  that the formation of scripture 
                                               
38 RET, 96. 
39 Gunton, 67.  
40 Ibid., 74.  Gunton does not deny the possibility.  He says that artists and scientists sometimes do feel 
that they have been given insight from beyond to solve the problem they face.  For example, Anselm is 
granted his wish to find one argument with which to put beyond all doubt the existence of God. 
41 Ibid., 75. 
42 Ibid., Gunton remarks that the scriptural writers a e sometimes called redactors.  Their job is to piece 
together parts of the tradition into literary wholes in the light of the needs of the community of which 
they are also a part.    
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to Torrance is never a one-sided process carried out singularly either by the divine or 
the human (see chapter five).  Nevertheless, attention should be directed to Gunton’s 
argument of giving more weight to the inspiredness of criptural texts.  This is crucial 
because it involves in Torrance’s thought a critical decision of shifting the focus from 
the ‘now’ to the ‘then’ event of revelation.   
The second feature, according to Gunton, lies in the fact that the Spirit is the 
one who leads us through Christ back to the Father.  Gunton says,  
 
If we are to rely on the testimony of the New Testament, and particularly that of the 
Fourth Gospel, it is noteworthy that their emphasis is not on Jesus Christ as revealing 
himself….  It is rather on Jesus as the one who makes known, mediates indeed, God 
the Father.  Within the complex interrelations of the persons of the Trinity, the 
function of the Spirit is to guide to Jesus as the on who reveals the Father.  The 
Spirit is thus the one who points away from himself to Jesus, whose will is to do the 
work of the one who sends him.43   
 
 Gunton claims that the inspiration of scripture is to be found somewhere here: 
by the Spirit, in the Son, and to the Father.  The significance of the apostles and the 
believing community as the witness for Christ in the first days of the church cannot 
be undermined.  Gunton observes part of what it means to say scripture is inspired is 
the affirmation that the Spirit enables the Christian individual and community to bear 
the witness of Christ.  However, Gunton does concede a weakness in the metaphor as 
at times the witnesses may speak of what they see in the r own strength; for example, 
the account of the Palm Sunday (John 12:16-19) indicates that the witnesses are the 
ones who in fact misconstrued what is to happen.  Nevertheless, despite the 
weakness, Gunton claims that the metaphor is indeed helpful in suggesting the 
importance of the work of the Spirit in turning the uman logos of the scriptural 
writers into the words of God.44  Torrance would concur with Gunton in relation to 
the significance of the apostolic witness in unfolding the revelation of God in Christ.  
Our foregoing chapter clearly indicates that the chur  to Torrance is the 
indispensable medium of divine revelation because the Spirit works within the faith 
community in pointing all to Christ, and through Christ to the Father.  If Torrance is 
to accept that it is here, as Gunton avers, where the inspiration of scripture is to be 
found, he would have to bestow upon the Spirit a greater role in turning the human 
words of scripture into the words of God; not an impossible task to Torrance as he 
                                               
43 Ibid., 75-76. 
44 Ibid., 76-77. 
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possesses a dynamic understanding of the epistemic work of the Spirit (see chapter 
four).  Gunton aptly says, 
 
It is first to express a little more adequately thefact of the work of the Spirit in 
ordering the community and its writings around and to the incarnate Lord, and thus 
of a process of formation both of the community andof its documents, in which the 
words are, as human, already and as a result of that process in an important sense the 
words of God.  P. T. Forsyth put it thus: ‘This interpretation of theirs, this exposition 
of Christ, was a providential, integral, and, we may s y, polar part of the action of the 
total fact itself, and not a searchlight thrown on it from without.’ ‘The Apostles were 
not panes of bad glass, but crystal cups the master filled.’  There is thus, to use an 
expression I owe to Alan Torrance, an intrinsic relation between revelation and the 
words used to enable it to come to expression.45   
 
Another way to approach the inspiredness of scripture has to do with the 
advantage of being the contemporary of Jesus Christ.  Gunton is aware of the 
discourse of Kierkegaard in bringing to light the relevant point that contemporaries of 
Jesus in fact have no advantage over us in the reception of God’s revelation.  While 
he acknowledges the argument, Gunton underlines that the advantage here lies in the 
givenness of the peculiar function of apostolicity.  Gunton delineates, 
 
There is a particular function to be performed by those who are apostles because of 
their unique relation with that ‘which’, in the opening words of the First Letter of 
John, ‘we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon and touched with our 
hands, concerning the word of life….’  Their unique and unrepeatable function is to 
‘proclaim also to you’, but in such a way that revelation and more than revelation is 
mediated: ‘that you may have fellowship with us; and our fellowship is with the 
Father and with his Son Jesus Christ’.  The functio of the contemporary, of the 
apostles, is to act as mediator of salvation to the one who is not.  According to John, 
that was the aim of his writing his Gospel: ‘these [things] are written that you may 
believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, an  that believing you may have life 
in his name’ (Jn. 20.31)46 
 
 Gunton’s argument is not altogether unfamiliar to Torrance.  Our preceding 
chapter shows that the uniqueness of Jesus’ contemporary in bearing witness to him 
and unfolding his revelation in the course of time is theologically significant to 
Torrance.  Gunton’s stress of the unrepeatable function of the apostles in proclaiming 
and mediating Christ’s revelation resonates Torrance’s understanding of their role as 
‘hinges’.  In addition, Gunton expresses that analogous argument could be developed 
for the inspiration of the Old Testament texts, as the Old Testament writers’ 
revelatory function derives as well from their place in a community of faith.  
                                               
45 Ibid., 77. 
46 Ibid., 78. 
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Notwithstanding the similarity, Gunton is aware that the question of revelation is far 
more complex in the Old Testament.  Among others, Gunton pinpoints two main 
reasons that account for the complexity.  First, although it is necessary to understand 
Jesus’ identity and his saving reality within the context of the Old Testament, Jesus’ 
ministry represents one among other possibilities offered by the Old Testament for 
the shape of being the people of God.  That is the reason, according to Gunton, why 
while the New Testament writers as a whole recognises Jesus as the fulfilment of the 
Old Testament, they are free to draw upon some strands of tradition at the expense of 
others; in particular, those which express the vicarious suffering rather than military 
glory of the messiah.47  Second, in the revelation of the Old Testament God in Jesus 
‘is personally present in a way only anticipated in Israel.’  That is why Gunton says 
that we need not be embarrassed about the less accept ble sides of the record for ‘it is 
only to be expected that the trumpet will at times give a more uncertain sound.’48  
The complexity of the Old Testament revelation and its relation to the self-disclosure 
of God in Christ are crucial issues Torrance acknowledges and addresses as well.  
Since we have analysed them in the earlier chapters, i  is sufficient at this juncture to 
highlight that Torrance’s analogy of Israel as the womb of the incarnate Word would 
be able to contribute significantly to the interaction.  In the light of what has been 
discussed, we may conclude by saying that Gunton’s understanding of the 
inspiredness of scripture would be the impetus for T rrance to reassess the question 
of the ‘now’ and ‘then’ event of revelation, and to bestow more weight upon the 
mediatedness of scripture.   
As the end is at hand, we may close our discussion by stating that Tillich and 
Gunton are suitable dialogue partners to Torrance particularly on the issue of 
scriptural mediation.  Their distinctive views are the stimuli needed in engendering 
theological reconsideration and revision, as all agree unanimously that dogma and 
theology are revisable, but not revelation.  If the current analysis is able to bear some 
fruit, it would be, as indicated, in pointing to the direction of moving from immediacy 
to mediation by giving scripture the legitimate weight of mediation.  It is a return to 
the primacy of scripture in Torrance’s theology of revelation and multiple mediations.  
Essentially as Torrance says, the compulsive self-disclosure of God eventually takes 
‘verbal and even written form through the shared unerstanding and shared response’, 
                                               
47 Ibid., 79. 
48 Ibid. 
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and in and through scripture ‘men continued to hear God addressing them directly 
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